JOHN LAURENS.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Boston, February 7th, 1781.
Sir,
Since my letter to your Excellency on the 4th instant, the measures taken by Governor Hanc.o.c.k relative to the Castle guard proving insufficient, I addressed a Memorial to the General Court. Their permission to engage volunteers from that corps, and a sum of specie granted for the purpose, the volunteer draft from the continental troops, and the unremitting exertions of General Lincoln, have put us at length barely in condition to go to sea. I shall embark today, and expect Captain Barry will sail with the first fair wind. I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency"s letter of the 12th ultimo, and the letter and packets enclosed. Particular attention shall be paid to your instructions relative to the latter.
I have the honor to be, with the profoundest respect, &c.
JOHN LAURENS.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
L"Orient, March 11th, 1781.
Sir,
I have the honor of informing Congress, that I arrived at this place on the afternoon of the 9th instant; and should have proceeded, without an instant"s repose, to Pa.s.sy, had not the commandant of the town a.s.sured me, that the Marquis de Castries would arrive here that evening on his way to Brest, where he was going to accelerate by his presence the execution of his naval disposition. The prospect of an immediate conference with the Minister on the objects of my mission, which relate to his department, the danger of missing him by our travelling different routes, and the repeated a.s.surances of his expected arrival, have detained me till this morning; but as the delay has been much greater than I apprehended, and the Minister"s approach is not announced, I have determined to pursue my journey.
The accounts, which the commandant has communicated to me of the naval preparations at Brest, are, that twentyfive sail of the line are ready for sea, with ninety transports, on board of which are six thousand troops; that the ships of war are destined part for the West Indies, and part with the troops for North America.
The rupture between England and the United Provinces has. .h.i.therto proved very prejudicial to the latter, as they were exceedingly vulnerable by having so great a number of merchant ships at sea. On our voyage we captured a British privateer in company with a Venetian ship, of which she had made a prize, contrary to the laws of nations.
This appeared to me a happy opportunity for manifesting the determination of Congress to maintain the rights of neutral powers, as far as depends on them. After a short consultation, Captain Barry and his officers very readily acceded to the liberation of the Venetian, and the complete restoration of the cargo and property, which were very valuable. The captain was accordingly left to pursue his voyage, and the privateer was brought into port. Mr Palfrey, our consul, is not yet arrived at this port; it is generally feared that this ship foundered in a storm, which separated her and the Franklin in the commencement of their voyage, as she has not been heard of since.
I have the honor to be with the profoundest respect, &c.
JOHN LAURENS.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Pa.s.sy, March 20th, 1781.
Sir,
I had the honor to write to your Excellency from L"Orient the 11th instant. On my journey hither, I met the Marquis de Castries, and obtained a hasty conference with him, in which I insisted princ.i.p.ally on the necessity of a constant naval superiority on the American coast. He observed on his pert, that the dispositions of the fleet were already made; that it was not in his power to alter them; that it was necessary at the present juncture to make naval exertions in more places than one; that the French West India possessions, a nearer interest, must naturally be first secured; at the same time he repeatedly a.s.sured me, that the United States had a very considerable share in the present armament, the movements of which he was going to accelerate; that he hoped a maritime superiority would exist on the part of the allies, but that it must depend upon the events of war. He excused himself from descending into particulars, and urged me to proceed with all possible despatch to Versailles. Upon my arrival here, I found that the letter of Congress to his Most Christian Majesty, of the 22d of November, 1780,[16] had been delivered by our Minister Plenipotentiary; that he had proceeded to negotiate the succors solicited by Congress, and had received the following communication from the Count de Vergennes.
"It is impossible for his Majesty to favor a loan in this kingdom, because it would prejudice those which he has occasion to make himself for the support of the war; but his Majesty, in order to give a signal proof of his friendship for the United States, grants them under the t.i.tle of a donation, a sum of six millions livres tournois. As the American army is in want of arms, clothing, &c. Dr Franklin will be so good as to deliver a note of them. The articles will be procured of the best quality, and on the most reasonable terms. General Washington will be authorised to draw for the remaining sum, but the drafts are at long sight, in order to facilitate the payment at the royal treasury. The Courts of Petersburg and Vienna have offered their mediation. The King has answered, that it will be personally agreeable to him, but that he could not accept it as yet, because he has allies whose concurrence is necessary. Dr Franklin is requested to acquaint Congress of this overture and the answer, and to engage them to send their instructions to their Plenipotentiaries. It is supposed that Congress will eagerly accept the mediation."
In my first interview with the Count de Vergennes, I represented to him, in the strongest terms, the insufficiency of the above mentioned succor, and the danger to which France was exposed of losing all her past efforts in favor of America, unless the requests of Congress were complied with. I afterwards addressed to him the enclosed letter, in which I transcribed the result of my conference with General Washington on the objects of my mission, contained in a letter from the General to me of the 15th of January. In consequence of the Count de Vergennes" desire, that I would select from the estimate of the Board of War the articles of most urgent necessity, I extracted a list in which I confined myself to the artillery, arms, military stores, clothing, tents, cloth, drugs, and surgical instruments, and accompanied it with a letter.
My personal solicitations have not been wanting to hasten an answer to these letters, and render them favorable. The constant language of the Count de Vergennes is, that our demands are excessive, that we throw the burthen of the war upon our ally, that the support of it in different parts of the world has cost France exertions and expenses, which fully employ her means, that the public credit, however well established, has its limits, to exceed which would be fatal to it. He adds, at the same time, the strongest a.s.surances of the good will of our ally. This Minister and M. de Maurepas inform me, that nothing can be determined until the return of the Marquis de Castries, which will be the day after tomorrow; that the matter must be deliberated, and that they will consider what can be done. My expectations are very moderate.
We have received no intelligence of the sailing of the Brest fleet. It consists of twentyfive sail, five of which are destined for the East Indies with troops, but it is said they will be detained for want of transports. The remaining twenty are to proceed to the West Indies, where ulterior dispositions will be made, of which the Chevalier de la Luzerne is instructed. The British fleet, of twentyeight sail of the line, with the convoy for Gibraltar, sailed the 13th instant, and Commodore Johnston"s squadron put to sea the same day. The Spanish fleet is likewise at sea.
I am firmly of opinion, that the British in the present moment of success will not accede to those preliminaries, which France and the United States can never depart from, and, consequently, that the news of the mediation of Petersburg and Vienna should have no other effect, than to redouble our ardor and exertions for the campaign.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN LAURENS.
FOOTNOTES:
[16] See this letter in the Secret Journals of Congress, Vol. II. p.
343.
_Memorial to the Count de Vergennes._
As in presenting a Memorial to your Excellency on the objects of my mission, I should necessarily repeat in part a conference, which I had by order of Congress with General Washington, previous to my departure, I prefer presenting your Excellency with such extracts from it as relate to my purpose. They are as follows.
"1. That considering the diffused population of these States, the composition and temper of a part of its inhabitants, the want of a sufficient stock of national wealth as a foundation for credit, and the almost extinction of commerce, the attempts we have been compelled to make for carrying on the war, have exceeded the national abilities of this country, and by degrees brought it to a crisis, which render immediate a.s.sistance and efficacious succor from abroad indispensable to its safety.
"2. That notwithstanding from the confusion always attendant on a revolution, from our having had governments to frame, and every species of civil and military inst.i.tution to create, from that inexperience in affairs necessarily incident to a nation in its commencement, some errors may have been committed in the administration of our finances, to which a part of our embarra.s.sments are to be attributed; yet they are princ.i.p.ally to be attributed to our essential want of means; to the want of a sufficient stock of wealth as mentioned in the first article, which, continuing to operate, will make it impossible, by any merely interior exertions, to extricate ourselves from these embarra.s.sments, restore public credit, and furnish the funds requisite for the support of the war.
"3. That experience has demonstrated the impracticability of maintaining a paper credit, without funds for its redemption; the depreciation of our currency was in the main a necessary effect of the want of those funds, and its restoration is impossible for the same reasons, to which the general diffidence, that had taken place among the people, is an additional, and in the present state of things, an insuperable obstacle.
"4. That the mode, which for want of money has been subst.i.tuted for supplying the army, by a.s.sessing a proportion of the productions of the earth, has. .h.i.therto been found ineffectual, has frequently exposed the army to the most calamitous distress, and from its novelty and incompatibility with ancient habits, is regarded by the people as burthensome and oppressive, has excited serious discontents, and, in some places, alarming symptoms of opposition. This mode has besides many particular inconveniences, which contribute to make it inadequate to our wants, and ineligible but as an auxiliary.
"5. That from the best estimates of the annual revenues, which these States are capable of affording, there is a balance to be supplied by credit. The resource of domestic loans is inconsiderable, because there are, properly speaking, few monied men, and the few there are can employ their money more profitably otherwise; added to which, the instability of the currency and the deficiency of funds have impaired the public credit.
"6. That the patience of the army, from an almost uninterrupted series of complicated distress, is now nearly exhausted, their wants carried to an extremity, which has recently had very disagreeable consequences, and demonstrate, the absolute necessity of speedy relief, a relief not within the compa.s.s of our means. You are too well acquainted with all their sufferings, for want of clothing, for want of provisions, for want of pay.
"7. That the people being dissatisfied with the mode of supporting the war, there is danger to apprehend, that evils actually felt in prosecuting it may weaken the cause which began it, evils founded not on immediate sufferings, but on a speculative apprehension of future sufferings from the loss of their liberties; there is danger that a commercial and free people, little accustomed to heavy burthens, pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind, may not make a proper allowance for the necessity of the conjuncture, and may imagine they have only exchanged one tyranny for another.
"8. That from all the foregoing considerations result, 1st, the absolute necessity of an immediate, ample, and efficacious succor of money, large enough to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of finance to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations.
2dly, the vast importance of a decided effort of the allied arms on this continent the ensuing campaign, to effectuate once for all the great object of the alliance, the liberty and independence of these United States. Without the former, we may make a feeble and expiring effort the next campaign, in all probability the period to our opposition; with it we should be in a condition to continue the war as long as the obstinacy of the enemy might require. The first is essential; both combined, would bring the contest to a glorious issue, crown the obligations which America already feels to the magnanimity and generosity of her ally, and render the union perpetual by all the ties of grat.i.tude and affection, as well as mutual interest, which alone render it solid and indissoluble.
"9. That next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority is the most interesting; this would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult, defensive war, and by removing all prospects of extending their acquisitions, would take away the motives for prosecuting it.
Indeed, it is not to be conceived, how they could subsist a large force in this country if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid of money, would enable us to convert the contest into a vigorous offensive war. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both nations, nor how much it would facilitate our supplies. With respect to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points, and it appears to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from the immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to America. The number of ports friendly to them and hostile to the British, the materials for repairing their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet, are circ.u.mstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the contest of the sea. No nation will have it more in its power to repay what it borrows than this. Our debts are hitherto small. The vast and valuable tracts of unlocated lands, the variety and fertility of climates and soils, the advantages of every kind, which we possess for commerce, insure to this country a rapid advancement in population and prosperity, and a certainty (its independence being established) of redeeming in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts, it may have occasion to contract. Notwithstanding the difficulties under which we labor, and the inquietudes among the people, there is still a fund of inclination and resource in the country equal to great and continued exertions, provided we have it in our power to stop the progress of disgust, by changing the present system, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the nation, and more capable of activity and energy in measures of which a powerful succor of money must be the basis.
"The people are discontented, but it is with the feeble, oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself; they are not unwilling to contribute to its support, but they are unwilling to do it in a way that renders private property precarious, a necessary consequence of the fluctuation of the national currency, and of the inability of government to perform its engagements oftentimes coercively made. A large majority are still firmly attached to the independence of these States, abhor a re-union with Great Britain, and are affectionate to the alliance with France. But this disposition can ill supply the means customary and essential in war, nor can we rely on its duration amidst the perplexities, oppressions, and misfortunes, that attend the want of them."
From those extracts it will appear to your Excellency, that the fate of America depends upon the immediate and decisive succor of her august ally, in the two points of a specific loan and a naval superiority. The most accurate calculation of the expense requisite for a vigorous campaign, and the interior means which Congress have of defraying that expense, prove that there is a deficiency of the full sum solicited by Congress. The grant of six millions, which his Majesty is pleased to make under the t.i.tle of a donation to the United States, will be acknowledged with the liveliest emotions of grat.i.tude by affectionate allies, at the same time it would be frustrating the gracious intentions of his Majesty towards his allies, and betraying the common cause of France and America, to encourage a belief, that the above mentioned aid will enable the United States to surmount the present perilous juncture of our affairs. The reasoning in the foregoing extracts will evince how inadequate the sum is to the present exigency.
I must likewise remark to your Excellency, that the credit in bills of exchange is subject to difficulties and disadvantages, which render such a resource very unfit for the conduct of the war. Bills are obnoxious to the vicissitudes and speculations of commerce, and it is easy to foresee, that his Majesty"s allies would be great sufferers by their drafts, and at the same time be incapable of giving that vigor and energy to their operations, which would be derived from specie.
The same enlightened policy and generous regard for the rights of mankind, which prompted France to espouse the cause of America, still dictate the conduct which she is to pursue; they demand every effort on her part to prevent America from being reduced to the British domination, her commerce, and those sources of wealth being restored to the tyrant of the European seas, the ancient rival of France; but on the contrary, the abas.e.m.e.nt of this rival, and the establishment of a faithful ally, united by all the ties of grat.i.tude, affection, and the most permanent mutual interests. To those invaluable purposes give me leave to repeat to your Excellency, that the decisive measures in the foregoing extracts are necessary.
I submit to your Excellency, whether the objection to his Majesty"s favoring a loan in the name of Congress, may not be obviated by an additional loan in the name of his Majesty, on account of the United States, for which Congress will be accountable. The excellent state of the finances of this kingdom, the exalted state of public credit, must unquestionably give the greatest facility for this purpose, and it may be clearly proved, that giving decisive succor in this article at the present juncture will be infinitely more advantageous, than suffering the war to languish, by affording partial and inadequate a.s.sistance.