The important matter contained in the despatches lately received, renders me unwilling to reply to them without being well satisfied of the sentiments of Congress. But, as the subjects on which I wish to be informed, are of too delicate a nature to be rendered formal acts, I shall submit to them the drafts of my reply to the joint letter of our Ministers, now at Paris. Previous to this, it will be necessary that Congress come to some express determination upon points which arise out of the treaty, and which, if they see in the same light that I do, they will consider as the most embarra.s.sing, as well as the most important that can claim their attention.
Congress have hitherto, in all their acts, both of a public and private nature, manifested the utmost confidence in the Court of France. In answer to every communication, they have reiterated their resolutions on that subject, and so lately as the 4th of October last, resolved unanimously, "That they will not enter into the discussion of any overtures of pacification but in _confidence_ and in _concert_ with his Most Christian Majesty;" and directed that a copy of the above resolution should not only be furnished to the Minister of France, but be sent to all the Ministers of the United States in Europe, and published to the world. Yet, Sir, it has unfortunately so happened, that the Ministers of these States have imagined they had sufficient grounds to suspect the sincerity of the Court of France, and have not only thought it prudent to agree upon and sign preliminaries with Great Britain, without communicating them, till after the signature, to the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty, but have permitted a separate article to be inserted in their treaty, which they still conceal from the Court of France.
This reduces Congress to the disagreeable necessity, either of making themselves parties to this concealment, and thereby to contradict all their former professions of confidence in their ally, made not only to that ally, but to their own citizens, and to every Court at which they had a Minister, or of revealing it at the expense of the confidence they would wish to maintain between their Ministers and the Court of France, and that, too, when those Ministers have obtained such terms from the Court of London, as does great honor to them, and at least equals our highest expectations.
I feel the more pain on this subject, because, from the manner in which this treaty is drawn, as well as from the article itself, I am inclined to believe that England had no other view in its insertion, but to be enabled to produce it as a mark of the confidence we reposed in them, and to detach us from our ally, if the nation could be brought to continue the war.
The preamble, drawn by our Ministers, contained professions of attachment to the alliance, and declared that the treaty should not be obligatory till His Britannic Majesty shall have agreed to accept the terms of a peace between France and Britain, proposed or accepted by his Most Christian Majesty, and shall be ready to conclude _with him_ such treaty. The preamble, agreed to, and, as there is reason to conclude, framed in England, is so expressed as to render it very doubtful whether our treaty does not take place the moment France and England have agreed on the terms of their treaty, though France should refuse to sign till her allies were satisfied. This construction is strongly supported in the House of Commons by the administration.
The separate article is in itself an object of no moment; the territory it cedes is of little importance, and if, as our Ministers a.s.sert, it made a part of West Florida previous to the war, it will, on the peace, be annexed to the nation that shall retain that Colony; but it is extremely well calculated to sow the seeds of distrust and jealousy between the United Stales and their allies. It demonstrates a marked preference for the English over the present possessors, and seems to invite Britain to reconquer it. Though this may promote our particular interest, it never can consist with our honor to prefer an open enemy to a nation engaged in the same cause with us, and closely connected to our ally. This article would, in my opinion, if avowed by the United States, fully justify Spain in making a separate peace without the least regard to our interest.
But this, Sir, is an inconsiderable evil, compared with those which may result from its having been concealed from the Court of Versailles. Mr Laurens informs Congress (and that too from letters of a late date from London,) "that the people of England still retain the idea of _our late Colonies_ and of _reconciliation_; _that Government gives every possible encouragement to this humor_; that it has been their incessant endeavor to detach us from our ally, and that it is given out in London, that, _by signing the late preliminaries, they have out-manoeuvred the Court of France_; that every engine had been set at work; that every degree of craft, under the mask of returning affection, will be practised for creating jealousies between the States and their good and great ally." Mr Adams"s letters of November, speak the same language. If, Sir, we suppose these gentlemen to have been well informed, how much reason have we to apprehend that this secret article will prove in the hands of Britain a most dangerous engine. They may reveal to the Court of France the jealousies our Ministers entertain, the confidence they repose in them, with such falsehoods and additions as will best serve their purposes, and, by producing this secret article, gain credit for all they advance. This line they certainly pursued with respect to France, revealing all that they learnt from the Count de Vergennes, relative to his opinion of the first commission; nor is there room to doubt, that Marbois" letter was received through the same channel. And there is no reason to believe, if (as our Ministers suppose) the Court of France had put themselves more in their power, that they would neglect such promising means of increasing the suspicions our Plenipotentiaries already entertained.
Add to this, that this article may be used in Parliament, and with the British nation at large, as a most powerful argument for continuing the war, adducing, from the resentment it discovers to Spain, and the distrusts it manifests of France, that the quadruple knot is untied.
But suppose, what may possibly be the case, that the British administration are sincere, how is the honor and good faith of the United States to be justified to their allies, and to the world, if by any of those causes which daily operate, this secret, which is now known to sixty or seventy people, should be discovered? To tell the world that we suspected France, will not suffice, unless we can show probable grounds for such suspicion. Our Ministers inform us, that when they communicated the articles of the treaty to Count de Vergennes, "he appeared _surprised_, but not _displeased_ at their being so favorable to us." Mr Laurens declares expressly, "That he sees no cause for entertaining more particular jealousy, than ought to be kept up against every negotiating Court in the world, and not half so much as should at this moment be upon the watch against every motion arising from our new half friends."
I confess, Sir, though my sentiments are of little moment that I am fully of this opinion, and that I tremble lest we should at this hour be on the edge of a precipice, the more dangerous, as we have fixed our eyes on the flattering prospect which lies beyond it. I am persuaded that, the old maxim, "Honesty is the best policy," applies with as much force to States as to individuals. In that persuasion, I venture humbly to recommend, that such measures be adopted as to manifest, that repeated professions of fidelity to their engagements, and confidence in their ally, may not appear to have been made by Congress to mask deceit. The caution, which negotiations require, and the light in which objects have appeared to our Ministers, may justify them, and perhaps ent.i.tle them to credit for attempting to serve us at every personal hazard.
But, Sir, it certainly cannot consist with the honor of these States, upon such slight grounds, to contradict their own resolutions, and forfeit the confidence of an ally, to whom it has been so much indebted, and whose aid it is at this moment supplicating for the means of carrying on another campaign.
Under these impressions, I humbly submit these resolutions, namely;
"That the Secretary of Foreign Affairs be directed to communicate the Separate Article in the Provisional Preliminary Treaty with Great Britain, to the Minister of his Most Christian Majesty, in such manner as will best tend to remove any unfavorable impression it may make on the Court of France, of the sincerity of these States or their Ministers.
"That the Ministers for negotiating be informed of this communication, and of the reasons which influenced Congress to make it. That they be instructed to agree, that in whatever hands West Florida may remain at the conclusion of the war, the United States will be satisfied that the line of Northern boundary be as described in the said separate, articles.
"That it is the sense of the United States in Congress, that the articles agreed upon between the Ministers of these States, and those of his Britannic Majesty, are not to take place until a peace shall have been actually signed between their Most Christian and British Majesties."
Congress will easily believe, that I offer these sentiments with the utmost diffidence; that I see many and powerful arguments that militate against them; that I feel extreme pain in advising a measure, which may hurt the feelings of Ministers, to whom we are indebted for their continued zeal and a.s.siduity, all of whom I respect, and with one of whom I have had the closest and most intimate friendship from our earliest youth. But, Sir, it is a duty that my office requires; and I am happy in reflecting that this duty is discharged, when I have proposed what I think right, and that the better judgment of Congress is to determine.[26]
I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
FOOTNOTES:
[26] See further remarks by Mr Livingston on this subject in _John Jay"s Correspondence_, Vol. VIII. p. 215; also _Correspondence of the Commissioners for Peace_, Vol. X. p. 129.
CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATES.
Philadelphia, March 18th, 1783.
Sir,
Congress a few days since directed me to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the provisional treaty for a peace between the United States and Great Britain. I should have done it at an earlier day without any particular direction, had not an order pa.s.sed in Congress for furnishing the Delegates of each State with a copy, that it might be transmitted through them. In conformity to the second direction I have the honor to enclose a copy, though I have no doubt that I have been already antic.i.p.ated by that forwarded by the Delegates of your State.
Yet, Sir, this letter may not be entirely useless when it a.s.sures you that the conclusion of the treaty is still very uncertain. My public letters are of such a nature as not to free me from apprehensions that Britain still seeks rather to divide her enemies than to be reconciled to them. Though this suspicion may not perhaps be well founded, yet such conduct is so conformable to the general tenor of British Councils, that it is at least the part of prudence to be upon our guard against it. But whatsoever their intentions may be, the peace must still depend upon so many contingencies that no preparation for another campaign should be omitted on our part. None is neglected by our antagonists. They have voted one hundred and ten thousand seamen for the ensuing year. France continues her preparations, and will not close the war till she can obtain honorable terms for her allies.
Little progress was made in their negotiations when my letters were written. Count de Vergennes has thought it prudent to advise Congress of this circ.u.mstance, that they might be prepared for every event. I communicate it to your Excellency with similar views. I doubt not you will avail yourself of this information to urge the State in which you preside, to take such measures that they may not be found unprovided in case our hopes of peace should be frustrated.
It would give me pleasure to learn the measures that have been adopted, in consequence of the requisitions made in my letters to your Excellency or your predecessors in office at different periods relative to my Department, and more particularly to receive the account so frequently called for of the damage done by the enemy in your State.[27] I have reason to think had it been furnished in time, it might have been of singular use to our Ministers, and perhaps have tended to obtain some relief for the sufferers. It may not yet come too late to be useful. Let me pray your Excellency to take measures for furnishing three authentic copies by the earliest opportunity.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
FOOTNOTES:
[27] Proper alterations were made to this paragraph in the letter to the Governor of Connecticut, as he had already sent the accounts herein mentioned.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Office of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, } March 21st, 1783. }
Sir,
I enclose for the inspection of Congress a letter received by the Washington from Mr Barclay. I take this opportunity to remind Congress, that I had the honor of laying before them, on the 23d day of December, a letter from the same gentleman, which contained objections to the convention for the appointment of Consuls, proposed to be entered into between France and the United States, reasons for sending him a new commission, const.i.tuting him Consul General in France, with Count de Vergennes" objection to the one he now holds; also a request of blank commissions for privateers and letters of marque. This letter was committed to a special committee. I have not yet been informed, whether they have reported; nor have I been honored with the commands of Congress relative to these objects.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
TO GEORGE WASHINGTON.
Philadelphia, March 24th, 1783.
Dear Sir,
You will by this express receive the agreeable intelligence of _a general peace_, upon which I most sincerely congratulate you and the army. Harmony, a regard for justice and fidelity to our engagements, are all that now remains to render us a happy people. The vessel that brought these despatches was sent out by the Count d"Estaing to recall the French cruisers. As the Minister tells me he will forward the orders and pa.s.sports to your Excellency, I will not detain the messenger till I have mine copied. This should in my opinion be immediately sent either by Congress or your Excellency to Sir Guy Carleton.
A private letter to me mentions, that the Bahama Islands are also ceded to the British. Holland seems to have come worst off, and France by getting little for herself has laid in a store of reputation, which will be worth more than much territory. I must request your Excellency to send on the enclosed letters by express to the Governor.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
_P. S._ I have thought proper to send Mr Lewis Morris to New York, to inform General Carleton of the happy re-union of the powers at war, and also of a resolution of Congress of this day, directing their Agent of Marine to take proper measures to stop all further hostilities by sea.
TO SIR GUY CARLETON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY"S FORCES IN NORTH AMERICA.