_March 21st._ The consideration of the letter of the 13th instant, from Robert Morris being resumed, a motion was made, and it was
_Resolved_, that the Superintendent of Finance be, and he is hereby empowered to appoint and remove at his pleasure, his a.s.sistants in his peculiar office or chamber of business in immediate connexion with him; it being first determined by the United States in Congress a.s.sembled, that such a.s.sistants so to be appointed are necessary, and what the salary of each shall be.
_Ordered_, that the remainder of Mr Morris"s letter be referred to a committee of three. The members appointed were Messrs Houston, Burke, and Wolcott.
TO THOMAS BURKE, WILLIAM HOUSTON, AND OLIVER WOLCOTT, COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS.
Date Uncertain.
Gentlemen,
When I had the honor of a visit from you on the subject of my interview with Congress, it was agreed that I should make out and deliver you a list of the several officers concerned in the expenditure of public money, over whom I judged it necessary for the Superintendent of Finance to have the uncontrolled power of dismission. But on reflection I found it was not in my power to render such a list, because I do not know the several degrees of officers now in employment, and even if I did, such a list would not answer the end, because others may hereafter be created, who should also be subjected to the power of the Financier, and it would be very troublesome for Congress on every such appointment to pa.s.s a resolution for the purpose. There will also be appointments made occasionally by the Commander in Chief, the Heads of Department, and by other officers, in which the expenditure of public moneys will be involved, and of course such appointments must also be subject to the same authority. For these reasons, it seems proper that the power of the Minister of Finance, with respect to the control and dismission from office of all persons concerned in the expenditure of public property, should be defined in one Act of Congress, vesting him with that authority.
To me it appears absolutely necessary, that this power should be vested in the Financier to enable him to remedy and prevent public abuses; and the _extent_ should be measured by the _necessity_ and the _use_. As to myself, I am far from desiring power for the sake of power. Indeed I think it is generally more dangerous to the possessor than to the objects of it. Consequently I cannot have a wish to extend it beyond the necessity and utility mentioned.
The whole business of finance may be described in two short but comprehensive sentences, if I have proper notions on the subject. _It is to raise the public revenues, by such modes as may be most easy and most equal to the people; and to expend them in the most frugal, fair, and honest manner._ In our case the first part must ever be the business of Congress, and the Legislatures of the respective States; because the powers of taxation cannot be delegated. The second I take to be the most essential part of the duty of the Superintendent of Finance. He must ever have it in view to reduce the expenditures as nearly as possible to what in justice and in reason they ought to be; and to do this, he must be vested with power to dismiss from employment those officers he shall find unnecessary, unequal to their stations, inattentive to their duty, or dishonest in the exercise of it.
In a monarchy this power need not be officially vested in a Minister, because he can have constant intercourse with the Sovereign, and by that means he is in the daily exercise of it. Where the sovereignty is vested in a public body of men, such an intercourse is impracticable; and I am persuaded that a Minister who would venture to execute the duties of his office with vigor, without possessing uncontrolled the power of dismission, would in a few months put it out of his power to proceed in his business, and Congress would have full employment to hear and determine between him and suspended officers. On the contrary, if a dismissed officer can have no appeal but to the laws of the land, Congress will not be troubled, business may be conducted with decision, and the very knowledge that such a power exists, will have a tendency to prevent the frequent exercise of it, after the first reforms are effected.
I have been told, that some gentlemen considered the expressions in my letter to Congress on this subject so general as that they might be construed to comprehend the Commander in Chief, Heads of Department, &c. But this cannot be. The Commander in Chief is not concerned himself, but employs others in the expenditure of public money, to whom he grants warrants or drafts on the military chest; and the persons so employed ought to be accountable, and subject to dismission. I suppose officers of the army may frequently be so employed, and in that case it cannot be supposed, that the power of the Financier extends to the military commission, for it certainly must be confined to the money matters. There is one exception with respect to what I have said of the Commander in Chief, and that is the expenditures for secret service, and in this respect I think he should be responsible to the Sovereign only.
The Quarter Master General, having a military as well as a civil duty, he cannot be under the control of the Financier, for the first, although he certainly ought to be the last, which has great connexion with heavy expense, and perhaps it would be best, that he should execute all the business of expenditures by one or more deputies, which would exonerate him from that power, which they must be subjected to. The Commissary General, and every person employed under him, are the immediate objects of this power. The Paymaster General, may be considered as a channel of conveyance, through which money pa.s.ses from the treasury to the army, and as he is subjected to the law military, the Minister of Finance needs no other authority over him and his officers, than the power of putting under arrest and suspending for mal-conduct in office.
All persons employed as Commissaries of military stores, of clothing, or any other denomination, wherein the expenditure of public money or property is connected, ought to be subjected to this authority. The expenses in the medical department are said to have exceeded those of the like kind in any other country. It is, therefore, evident that the Purveyors, Commissaries, &c. in this department should be subject to the same immediate control as others; and although the Financier cannot judge of the medical skill of the Director General and his officers, yet if any waste or misapplication of public property in their department should come to his knowledge, he should have authority to bring offenders to a Court Martial.
There is no possibility of introducing public economy without the frequent adjustment of accounts; and the more various these may be, the greater is the necessity of constant attention to liquidate them speedily and well. The Financier ought, therefore, to have the power of removing any of the officers, whose business it is to examine and settle the public accounts, that so he may be enabled to obtain a proper and early settlement, and prevent the dangerous effects of inattention or corruption on one hand, or of delay, insolence, and tyranny to individuals concerned in such accounts, on the other. And on account of this power the Financier should have no accounts with the public himself, but wherever expenditures are necessary in his department, he should employ proper persons therein, subject to the same powers and modes of accounting with every other person employed in expending public property; or if of necessity he shall at any time have accounts with the public, Congress can appoint a committee, or special board, to examine and settle his accounts.
From what I have already said, I think it is evident, that the power I have stipulated for is absolutely necessary; and although it is not possible to enumerate every object of that power, yet the general lines within which they may be comprehended can be drawn from the observations I have made, although I have said our foreign departments, as these may be brought into consideration hereafter when it shall appear necessary.
Whoever contemplates the extent of the United States, and the vast amount of their present expenses, while at the same time all our operations languish, must certainly be convinced that some immediate remedy ought to be applied. The office of Superintendent of Finance I suppose is meant as one means of restoring economy and vigor; and nothing will keep up in the minds of the public servants such a constant sense of their duty, as a knowledge of the power to remove them in the hands of a person of vigilant and decisive character.
Whether I shall have sufficient courage and perseverance to act up to that character, and whether my small abilities, supported by application and attention, will enable me to render essential service in the execution of this office, is become an object of great consideration, that fills my mind with much apprehension, and induces me to wish I had declined this arduous undertaking in the first instance.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.
PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS.
_April 21st._ On a report of the committee, to whom was referred Mr Morris"s letter of the 13th of March,
_Resolved_, That the Superintendent of Finance be, and he is hereby authorised, to remove from office or employment, for incapacity, negligence, dishonesty or other misbehavior, such persons, not immediately appointed by the United States in Congress a.s.sembled, as are or may be officially intrusted with, and immediately employed in the expenditure of the public supplies, stores, and other property; in stating, examining and pa.s.sing the public accounts, or in the receipt of the continental revenues of the United States, and such of the said persons as are or may be in his judgment unnecessary, reporting to such authority, board, minister, or office, to whom it may belong to supply the vacancy, the respective names of the persons so removed.
That he be authorised to suspend from office or employment, for similar causes, persons officially employed and intrusted as aforesaid, immediately appointed by the United States in Congress a.s.sembled, reporting forthwith their names and the reason of suspension.
Provided, that in all cases where any of the persons aforesaid, are or may be amenable to the law martial, the Superintendent be, and he is hereby authorised and directed, if he shall deem it most expedient for the public service, to put them in arrest by order in writing, and to apply to the officer whose duty it may be, to order a court martial; and such officer is hereby directed to order proceedings on the arrest accordingly.
That in every case of suspension, all pay and emoluments cease from the date thereof, unless the persons suspended be, upon trial, acquitted and restored; and the Superintendent shall have power to supply the place when it may be necessary, by a temporary appointment, to continue until the person suspended be restored or dismissed.
That the aforesaid powers shall not be construed to interfere with the rank, commission, or military duty of any officer in the line of the army, or those who may be duly intrusted with money for secret services by Congress, or the Commander in Chief of the army, or commanding officer of a separate department.
That the powers aforesaid be exercised during the pleasure of Congress, but not to extend beyond the duration of the war.
_April 27th._ On a further report of the committee on Mr Morris"s letter of the 13th ultimo,
_Resolved_, that in order that the Superintendent of Finance may be at liberty to devote his time and attention to the more immediate duties of his office, he be, and hereby is authorised, to appoint by letter of attorney, or otherwise, such person or persons, as he may think proper, to prosecute or defend for him, in his official capacity, or in behalf of the United States, in all places where the same may be necessary.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Philadelphia, May 14th, 1781.
Sir,
The honor conferred by Congress in appointing me Superintendent of Finance, their several resolutions of the 20th of March, and the 21st and 27th of April, which your Excellency has been pleased to transmit, and a serious conviction of that duty, which every citizen owes to his country, especially in times of public calamity, will no longer permit me to hesitate about the acceptance of that office, although I must again repeat, that I have the fullest sense of my own inability. I shall, however, strive to find such a.s.sistance as will enable me, in some measure, to answer the reasonable expectations of Congress, to whom I can promise for myself nothing more than honest industry.
You will readily perceive, that much time must be consumed in procuring proper officers; fixing on men for a.s.sistants, whose abilities and integrity may be depended on; in laying plans for obtaining money with the greatest ease to the people, and expending it with the greatest advantage to the public; forming arrangements necessary to carry these plans into execution; and obtaining information as to the present state of things, in order that abuses may be, if possible, speedily and effectually remedied.
Besides this, it will be necessary that I should confer with the Commander in Chief, on the various expenditures of the war, and the means of retrenching such as are unnecessary. Let me add, that the accounts of my private business must be adjusted, so as that all my affairs may be put into the hands of other persons, and subjected to their management. My necessary commercial connexions, notwithstanding the decided sense of Congress, expressed in their resolution of the 20th of March, might, if the business were transacted by myself, give rise to illiberal reflections, equally painful to me and injurious to the public. This reason alone would deserve great attention; but, further, I expect that my whole time, study, and attention will be necessarily devoted to the various business of my department.
Having thus stated some of the causes, which will prevent me from immediately entering on the arduous task a.s.signed me, I pray leave to call the attention of Congress to the advanced season, and then I am persuaded their own good sense will render it unnecessary for me to observe, that very little can be expected from my exertions during the present campaign; they will, therefore, easily perceive the propriety of the request I am to make, that the business may go on according to the present arrangements, or such other as Congress may devise, until I can take it up, which I promise to do as speedily as possible. By this means, I may be enabled so to dispose of the several members of my department, as to form them into a regular system; whereas, by throwing the whole immediately upon me, I shall be inevitably involved in a labyrinth of confusion, from which no human efforts can ever afterwards extricate me.
Another consideration of great magnitude, to which I must also pray the attention of Congress, is the present public debts. I am sure no gentleman can hope that these should be immediately paid out of an empty treasury. If I am to receive and consider the applications on that subject, if I am to be made responsible, that alone will, I fear, be full employment for the life of one man, and some other must be chosen to attend to the present and provide for the future. But this not all; if from that, or any other cause, I am forced to commit a breach of faith, or even to incur the appearance of it, from that moment my utility ceases. In accepting the office bestowed on me, I sacrifice much of my interest, my ease, my domestic enjoyments, and internal tranquillity. If I know my own heart, I make these sacrifices with a disinterested view to the service of my country. I am ready to go still further; and the United States may command everything I have, except my integrity, and the loss of that would effectually disable me from serving them more. What I have to pray, then, is, that the adjustment of all past transactions, and of all that relates to the present system, may be completed by the means already adopted, that whatever remains unpaid may become a funded debt, and that it may in that form be committed to me, to provide for the yearly interest and for the _eventual_ discharge of the princ.i.p.al. This task I will cheerfully undertake; and if, in the progress of things, I am enabled to go further, with equal cheerfulness it shall be done; but I must again repeat my serious conviction, that the least breach of faith must ruin us forever.
It is not from vanity that I mention the expectations, which the public seem to have formed from my appointment. On the contrary, I am persuaded, they are raised on a weak foundation, and I must lament them, because I foresee they must be disappointed. I must, therefore, entreat that no flattering prospect of immediate relief may be raised.
Congress will know that the public credit cannot be restored without method, economy, and punctual performance of contracts. Time is necessary to each; and therefore the removal of those evils we labor under can be expected from time only. To hold out a different idea would deceive the people, and consequently injure the public service.
I am sure it is unnecessary to add, before I close this letter, that I confidently expect my measures will meet with the fullest support from Congress, so long as they are honestly directed to the general welfare. In this conviction, and with every sentiment of respectful attention, I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT MORRIS.[31]
FOOTNOTES:
[31] _May 14th._ Wrote a letter to the President, promising to accept the office. At this time, however, various reasons occurred to prevent an immediate acceptance of the Commission; but particularly it was necessary to retain my seat in the a.s.sembly of Pennsylvania, in order to lay a foundation for such measures as might tend to their support of me in pursuing the public good, not doubting but their example would have proper influence on the Legislatures of the other States, especially in their determination upon general points, such as their repealing those tender and penal laws, which in their operation had destroyed all public and private confidence and credit; in pa.s.sing effective tax bills, that might yield substantial aid to the United States for calling in the paper money, that had lost its credit; and is adopting plans of reviving and establishing the credit of such as had been injured in some degree, but which, being necessary in circulation, and originally issued on funds sufficient for its redemption, ought not to be given up to ruin, if possible to prevent it. _Diary._
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Philadelphia, May 17th, 1781.
Sir,