The Ca.n.a.l had been filled with dead bodies, and the banks were still strewn with them, probably with the idea of making the water undrinkable. It was here that one of the English artillerymen, having offered to fetch water for a wounded Egyptian, was shot dead by the latter whilst doing so.
The stock of provisions captured was a most welcome addition to the stores in hand, and in particular the grain left on the ground in large quant.i.ties was invaluable, for the horses had been for several days on an extremely short allowance of forage.
It will be remarked that the operations of the day hardly attained to the dignity of an engagement, the Egyptians offering practically no resistance, but falling back on Tel-el-Kebir, where a large camp had been established north of the railway, and where extensive intrenchments were begun along the crest of a range of hills running north and south.[56]
The losses on the side of the British were small--only five killed and twenty-five wounded; but the cases of sunstroke were numerous, the 4th Dragoons having sixteen and the York and Lancaster Regiment twenty-five men disabled from this cause.
On August 26th a small force of the Dragoons occupied the lock on the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l at Ka.s.sa.s.sin without opposition. This was a most important step, because the possession of the lock gave Sir Garnet Wolseley control of the water in the upper reach of the Ca.n.a.l--no small advantage to an army worked like his on strictly temperance principles.
That it could have been accomplished so easily is an indication of the ignorance or carelessness of the enemy. Later in the day the Duke of Cornwall"s Light Infantry, the 84th York and Lancaster Regiment, as well as two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, were marched to the lock, where they established themselves, the cavalry withdrawing to Mahsameh.
A house on the left bank of the Ca.n.a.l was occupied by General Graham and his staff, who remained in charge of the advanced guard. As it was known that the enemy was not far off, the cavalry scouted by day and night, and strong outposts were established.
CHAPTER XXI.
Ka.s.sa.s.sIN.
The British force had now outrun its Commissariat, and for two days the men had lived from hand to mouth. To secure the water supply it had become necessary to push forward a force into the Desert nearly twenty miles from the base of operations at Ismailia. The question arose how the troops were to be supplied with food, and the want of a proper organization for the transport of provisions began to be severely felt.
The men, weakened by prolonged exertion under a terrible sun, were forced to live for two or three days on biscuits and muddy water, flavoured only with the dead bodies of Egyptian men and horses. The English horses also were short of forage and showed signs of fatigue and exhaustion. The question of supply became an anxious one. Mules were not forthcoming, the railway had been cut, and no rolling stock was available, and the British force was for days almost without food.
On the third day, owing to the vigorous efforts of the navy, some stores were forwarded to the front by the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l, but the prospects were, to say the least, gloomy. The men were compelled to live on pigeons, water-melons, &c., looted out of the neighbouring village. On the 27th, however, a foraging party was conducted into the country by the transport officer, and some fourteen head of cattle were driven in, besides some sheep and turkeys. The General ordered them all to be paid for, and this rule was observed on subsequent occasions.
On the 28th the Egyptians made an effort to regain their lost ground by a serious attack upon the advanced force under General Graham, at Ka.s.sa.s.sin.
The position occupied by the British was not the most favourable for defence. The troops were astride the Ca.n.a.l, and although a bridge existed, the separation of the right and left wings was partial in any case, and complete if the force had either to advance or retire.
However, on the right of the position the Desert rose to a ridge some 100 to 160 feet high, which with a force like Graham"s, too weak to occupy it, might easily conceal the movements of an outflanking force.
About 9.30 a.m. the Egyptian cavalry appeared in force on the left front on the north side of the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l. Graham"s troops, consisting of 57 cavalry, 70 mounted infantry, 1,728 infantry, and 40 artillery, with two 13-pounder guns, were at once posted under cover, fronting to the north and west, the cavalry being thrown out on the flanks to observe the enemy"s movements. About 11 a.m. it was reported that a large force of cavalry, infantry and artillery was being moved round towards the British right behind the ridge already referred to. At noon, the Egyptians opened fire from two heavy guns on the left front of Graham"s position. The range being at least 4,000 yards, the shot all fell short. After a time the fire slackened, and about 3 p.m. the enemy were reported to be retiring.
Graham"s men, who had been suffering very much from their long exposure to the sun without food, were then ordered back to their camps.
The matter, however, was not destined to end here, for at 4.30 the enemy advanced his infantry in great force, displaying a line of skirmishers at least a mile in length, with which he sought to overlap the left of Graham"s front. This movement was supported by a heavy and well-directed artillery fire, which searched the camp and wounded a sick officer in the building occupied as a hospital.
The dispositions to meet the attack were as follows:--On the left the Marine Artillery were directed to take up a position on the south bank of the Ca.n.a.l, whence they could check the enemy"s advance by a flank fire. In the centre was the Duke of Cornwall"s Regiment, extended in fighting line, about 800 yards to the right rear of the Marine Artillery, and the York and Lancaster extended the fighting line of the Duke of Cornwall"s with two and a half companies, keeping the remainder in support and reserve.
The position of the infantry was an irregular echelon, the right thrown back. A troop of the 7th Dragoon Guards was kept on this flank, and the two 13-pounders, now reinforced by two others, took up a position on the ridge, and promptly replied to the Egyptian cannonade. Unfortunately, these guns had only the ammunition contained in their limbers and had soon to cease firing for want of a further supply, though they did good service while it lasted. The reason of the ammunition failing was the heaviness of the road from the base to the front. Efforts were made to get up a proper supply, but the waggons stuck in the sand and so arrived late.
The Mounted Infantry and a dismounted detachment of the 4th Dragoon Guards occupied a portion of the gap between the Marine Artillery and the Duke of Cornwall"s Regiment, and although the attacking force made persistent efforts to break through at this point, it failed owing to the steady fire of the Marine Artillery and the little band of Dragoons and Mounted Infantry.
The enemy made repeated attempts to overcome this resistance, putting a number of men across the Ca.n.a.l; and three times their guns were kept from advancing by the horses and men being shot when trying to press past.
Feeling secure on his left, Graham turned his attention to the right flank of his position. On the first notice of the attack (4.30 p.m.) he had sent a message to General Drury-Lowe by heliograph, and by a mounted officer to Mahsameh, three or four miles distant, requesting him to move up the Cavalry Brigade to cover the right flank, and also to send forward the Marine Light Infantry as a reinforcement.
At 5 p.m. Graham sent a further order for the cavalry to advance under cover of the ridge on the right, fall upon the left flank of the enemy"s skirmishers and roll up his line. The particulars of the cavalry attack made in pursuance of this order are given later on.
Reinforcements for the enemy being observed arriving by train, still further to protect his exposed right, Graham sent a reserve company of the York and Lancaster in that direction. Near the same point a Krupp gun, taken from the enemy at Mahsameh and mounted on a railway truck, was brought into action, and worked by a detachment of Marine Artillery.
This gun was admirably served and did great execution among the attacking force.
Although fired upon by as many as four guns at a time, not a man of the gun detachment was. .h.i.t, and the gun continued to fire on to the last, expending ninety-three rounds. The immunity enjoyed by the gun"s crew was doubtless due to the constant shifting of the gun backwards and forwards on the line of rails. The gun itself was protected by a breastwork of sandbags.
At 6.45 p.m. a general advance was ordered, with the object of closing on the enemy"s infantry about the time that Graham reckoned Drury-Lowe"s cavalry charge would be taking place.
The advance was made very steadily, the British infantry firing volleys by companies, the reserves following in rear of the railway embankment.
The Marine Light Infantry had now come on to the ground on the right and joined in the advance, which was continued for from two to three miles, the enemy falling back and only once attempting to make a stand. This was on the British left, but here the Egyptians broke at the first volley of the Marines.
At 8.45 p.m. Graham heard of the cavalry charge from an officer of the 1st Life Guards, who had lost his way. Graham"s force had now been marching forward for an hour and a half in the moonlight, and his men had had narrow escapes in mistaking detached bodies of the enemy for British troops. Fearing some mistake might be made, and seeing no further chance of co-operation with the cavalry, Graham ordered the troops back to camp.
To describe the movements of the cavalry under General Drury-Lowe.
According to that officer"s report, the aide-de-camp despatched by Graham reported at 5.30 that the enemy was advancing in force, and the brigade was at once turned out. It consisted of the Household Cavalry, the Dragoon Guards, and four guns of the Royal Horse Artillery. As the troops advanced, the sound of heavy firing was heard, and, _en route_, a galloper from General Graham arrived, and stated that the General desired to say that "he was only just able to hold his own, and that he wished the cavalry to attack the left of the enemy"s skirmishers."
The sun had now set, and a bright moon was shining. The light, however, was not good, and the force had to be guided by the flash of the guns and musketry.
General Drury-Lowe made a wide circuit, so as to turn the enemy"s left, and the brigade arrived close to this portion of their line without being noticed.
As the cavalry advanced, it was received by a fire of sh.e.l.ls and musketry, which, being aimed too high, was practically harmless. When within 500 or 600 yards of the enemy, the guns of the Horse Artillery, then in the rear of the Household Cavalry and Dragoons, were unmasked by the retirement of the first line, and brought into action. After a few rounds had been fired, Sir Baker Russell led a charge of the Household Cavalry against the enemy"s infantry, which had commenced to advance.
Moving steadily towards the flash of the rifles, the charge was gallantly led and executed. The British cavalry carried all before them.
The enemy"s infantry was completely scattered, and, according to the official report, the cavalry swept through a battery of nine guns. In daylight these must have been captured, but, unfortunately, their exact position could not be found afterwards, and it is supposed that they were subsequently removed during the night.
This moonlight charge was the most dramatic, as it was one of the most dashing, episodes of the campaign. Whether the charge, brilliant as it was, occurring so late in the engagement, had any real effect upon the fortunes of the day may well be doubted. The general opinion of military men appears to be that its importance has been much exaggerated. The non-capture of the Egyptian guns is especially to be regretted, and has indeed led to the expression of a serious doubt as to their existence.
The message referred to by General Drury-Lowe, to the effect that General Graham wished to say that "he was only just able to hold his own," was, it appears, not sent by the General, but was merely the appreciation of the person who brought the message. There is no doubt, however, that it correctly represented the situation at the time.
The British loss was a total of killed or dangerously wounded, 11; wounded, 67. The enemy"s loss is unknown, but was believed to have been heavy, the ground being thickly strewn with their killed, more especially in the spot where the cavalry charge took place. The burying parties next morning found that many of the bodies had been shockingly mutilated during the night. The circ.u.mcised had all been left untouched.
The persons committing these outrages followed a fixed plan, which they applied to the uncirc.u.mcised corpses of both armies. They lopped off the feet, hands, and other members, and deeply gashed the abdomen and the upper part of the forehead. General Graham"s estimate of the Egyptian forces engaged was 1,000 cavalry, 8,000 infantry, and 12 guns.
It may be remarked that, small as was the British force employed, the results of the engagement were of the greatest importance. It showed, in the first place, that Arabi felt himself strong enough to attack and act on the offensive, with a view to regain the prestige which his troops had lost in the previous encounters. In the second place, it showed that the campaign was likely to be something more than a parade across the desert, and that the enemy was willing to come within range and hold his own for hours together. It showed also that he would not stand an attack at close quarters, and that, unless in greatly superior numbers, he might be expected to give way if resolutely a.s.sailed.
The British left being well supported by the Ca.n.a.l and its banks, the most obvious move on the part of the attack was to double up their right and force them into the Ca.n.a.l, cutting off communication with their rear. The Egyptians had no commander capable of realizing the importance of this object, and, in consequence, the main attack was made in front, the strongest part of the British position, and the flanking movement was only half-hearted and unsuccessful.
With this fight ended the first part of the campaign. There was then necessarily a pause in the military operations. A further advance was beset with many difficulties. The railway was damaged in many places, and blocked in others. There were no locomotives to haul the trucks containing stores from the base to the front, and the army transport had in great measure broken down. The draught animals were few and in poor condition; pack-mules in sufficient numbers were lacking, and camels were almost entirely wanting. The strong regulation carts, suitable for use on European roads, were so heavy as to stick hopelessly in the sand.
A waggon designed for two horses required not less than six to move it under existing conditions. The navy, it is true, was doing its best to make up for the defects of the army transport. The boat service on the Ca.n.a.l had been definitely organized under Commander Moore, of the _Orion_, and rendered most valuable service in getting provisions and stores to the front.
Notwithstanding all that the boats could do, it became doubtful whether even the few troops at the front could be maintained, and every effort had to be made to keep them supplied with the food requisite to enable them to exist. The men bore their privations and discomforts cheerfully until the arrival of locomotives from Suez made it possible to supply the army properly. The water, too, was the reverse of good, the only supply practically being from the Ca.n.a.l, and this at times was simply loathsome.
In addition to this discomfort, there was always the possibility of the railway or Ca.n.a.l being intercepted by marauding parties of the enemy.
Either of these contingencies would have seriously imperilled the troops at the front.
In the meantime, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Division, composed of Highlanders, under the command of Sir Edward Hamley arrived at Ismailia from Alexandria.
Three more transports with Indian troops also turned up, making the total number of transports in Lake Timsah no less than 93, besides men-of-war. The 3rd Brigade was not landed at once, but remained on board the troopships, pending the solution of the transport problem.
The state of affairs at this period appears from a telegram from Sir Garnet Wolseley to the Secretary of State for War, and which was as follows:--
"_Ismailia, September 1, 1882._
"In reply to your inquiry of 29th ultimo, circ.u.mstances have forced me ahead of transport, but it is rapidly becoming efficient. The necessity of securing a sufficient supply of fresh water in the Ca.n.a.l rendered it imperative to push on as quickly as possible. My successes on the 24th and 25th, and retreat of the enemy, have enabled me to seize (the) two important positions on the Ca.n.a.l of El Magfar and Ka.s.sa.s.sin Lock, the latter about twenty miles from this place. I am, therefore, in a more forward and favourable position generally than I had antic.i.p.ated, and am only now waiting till my transport arrangements are more complete to enable me to make a further movement.