From this the Egyptian artillery had opened fire down the line of the Ca.n.a.l, although it was still too dark for them to see the approaching troops clearly, whilst the infantry lost no time in opening a heavy fusillade. The Highlanders deployed for attack, and then gallantly stormed the battery with a rush at the point of the bayonet. The Egyptians retreated upon some villages close by, where they were pursued by a squadron of the Bengal Cavalry across the cultivated ground.[66]
The Indian Contingent scarcely lost a man--a happy circ.u.mstance, due to the excellent arrangements made by General Macpherson, and to the fact that, starting one hour later than the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the resistance of the enemy was so shaken by the earlier attacks north of the Ca.n.a.l, that they soon gave way before the impetuous onslaught of the Seaforth Highlanders.
On the extreme right the Cavalry Division,[67] under General Drury-Lowe, was designedly late in arriving, being fully two miles distant when the first shot was fired at the Highlanders. Hearing the sound, the division quickened its pace, reaching the intrenchments in time to permit its two horse batteries to take in reverse and enfilade the lines north of General Graham"s a.s.sault, while the cavalry took up the pursuit of the runaways, most of whom threw away their arms, and, begging for mercy, were left unmolested. To have made them prisoners would have taken up too much time, the cavalry being required for the more important work of pushing on to Cairo. The whole Division, Cavalry and Horse Artillery, united shortly after near the bridge over the Ca.n.a.l, prior to advancing towards the capital.
The British losses in the engagement were:--
Total--Nine officers and 48 non-commissioned officers and men killed, 27 officers and 353 non-commissioned officers and men wounded, 22 non-commissioned officers and men missing. Grand total of casualties, all ranks, 459.
The officers killed were as follows:--
2nd Battalion Connaught Rangers (attached to 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment)--Captain C. N. Jones. Royal Marine Light Infantry--Major H. H.
Strong, Captain C. J. Wardell. 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders-- Lieutenant Graham Stirling, Lieutenant J. G. McNeill. 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders--Lieutenant H. G. Brooks. 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry--Major Colville, Lieutenant D. S. Kays, Lieutenant L.
Somervelle.
Such is the general outline of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
The Egyptians had been sleeping in their trenches when the attack was made, and although in one sense surprised, were nevertheless quite ready.[68]
Probably they never expected a night attack.[69] At the same time there is no doubt that they knew the British army was in their immediate vicinity and might come on at any moment, and took precautions accordingly.
The best proof of this is the blaze of fire with which both the 2nd Brigade and the Highland Brigade were received. Prisoners taken afterwards stated that the striking of the tents at sunset was observed, and that pickets were on the watch ever since. Anyhow, the English forces, before they closed with the enemy, were subjected to a perfect hail of bullets.
Sir Edward Hamley, relating the attack of the 2nd Division, writes as follows:--
"Yet a minute or two elapsed after the Egyptian bugle was blown, and then the whole extent of intrenchment in our front, hitherto unseen and unknown, poured forth a stream of rifle-fire.
"The Egyptian infantry," writes one witness, "cl.u.s.tered thickly in the parapets of the redoubts, and fired down the slopes into the trenches. Hundreds of them, lying down, plied the heads of the advancing brigades with fire."
A curious circ.u.mstance occurred with regard to the polygonal redoubt already described as standing 1,100 yards in advance of the lines. This was missed by the attacking forces, who must have pa.s.sed within 200 yards of the work. It is partly accounted for, however, by the prevailing darkness, and partly by the fact that the gunners in the redoubt, either asleep or unprepared, let the Highland Brigade march past them to the lines without firing a shot. It was only when day broke that the Egyptian artillerymen called attention to the existence of the redoubt by aiming their guns and firing at the spot where Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff were a.s.sembled. This was too much, and the British artillery had to be sent for. After being under case and shrapnel fire for a short time, what was left of the garrison threw down arms and formed a stream of fugitives who, with ghastly wounds, poured out from the redoubt, and scattered over the country.[70]
The missing of this redoubt was one of the lucky incidents of the fight.
Had the advancing column been aware of its existence they must have paused to take it before storming the lines. In attacking the redoubt the position of the advancing force would have been at once revealed to the enemy, and the fire which was reserved for some minutes later would have at once opened.
The Egyptian guns were 8-centimetre and 6-centimetre Krupp steel B.L.R.
of the old pattern (1868), mounted on field-carriages. The small-arms were all Remington breechloaders. The supply of ammunition was practically inexhaustible. At intervals of every three or four yards were found open boxes, each containing 1,050 cartridges.
The trenches, after the battle, were found to be filled with dead, mostly bayoneted, and the ground in rear as far as the railway station was dotted with the bodies of those shot down in retreat. The British cavalry, sweeping around the northern end of the intrenchments, cut down the fugitives by scores, until it became evident that the rout was complete. Most of the bodies were observed to be lying on their backs, as if the men had stopped to have a parting shot at their pursuers.
The Egyptian loss in killed was not far from 2,000. There was no return of their wounded, the army organization having disappeared; but 534 were treated at Tel-el-Kebir, during the four days succeeding the battle, twenty-seven capital operations being performed. Of the wounded, 202 were soon able to go to their homes, whilst the remainder were sent to Cairo in charge of Egyptian surgeons. The British medical authorities did all in their power to alleviate the sufferings of these poor creatures, and furnished tins of meat, bottles of brandy, and skins of water to those being conveyed away in the railway trucks. The greater number, who were slightly wounded, managed to get to the neighbouring villages, and therefore are not counted in the figures above given.[71]
It is stated--and the statement appears credible--that very few superior officers were killed or wounded; and Arabi and his second in command were undoubtedly the first to escape. Arabi himself mounted his horse and rode rapidly towards Belbeis. There appears to be no doubt that proper leaders, in every sense of the word, were wanting in the Egyptian army. It has been both humorously and truthfully remarked that each officer knew that _he_ would run, but hoped his _neighbour_ would stay.
The Egyptian soldiers, on the other hand, displayed real courage, as the struggles in the trenches and their heavy loss in killed abundantly prove. The black regiments, composed of negroes from the Soudan, were especially noticeable for their pluck, fighting bravely hand to hand with their a.s.sailants. It has been well observed that more intelligence and less downright cowardice on the part of their officers might have converted these men into a formidable army.
In the previous encounters between the English and the Egyptians, the artillery and cavalry had borne the brunt of the fighting, and had carried off the honours, but the battle of Tel-el-Kebir was almost entirely an infantry action. The tactics employed, a direct a.s.sault without flank movements of any kind, were of the simplest description.
The object, to get to close quarters with the enemy, and to crush him, was accomplished.
After the attack, Arabi"s army ceased to exist. In scattered groups it might be found all over Egypt, but as an organization it may be said to have been annihilated.
In view of the complete success of Sir Garnet Wolseley"s tactics, comment is superfluous. It has been said by competent critics that the mode of attack adopted was rash to the degree of imprudence; that no commander would dare to employ such tactics against a European foe, and that a night march of nine miles could only be followed by an immediate and successful a.s.sault under circ.u.mstances so exceptional as to be providential. He has been blamed for having left his camp with his forces so early in the evening on the 12th, and having halted half-way from Tel-el-Kebir, and then only after midnight having set out again, a manoeuvre which might have endangered the whole result of the movement, and which, perhaps, may account for the surprise of the enemy"s position not being so successful as it might have been.
Again, it has been said that besides a front attack, there should also have been a flank one, in conformity with ordinary military tactics.
In reply to these and other criticisms, it may be sufficient to observe that the English Commander-in-Chief formed a just appreciation of his enemy, had a strong conviction as to the proper manner of engaging him, and had unbounded confidence in the officers and men under his own command. What Sir Garnet Wolseley would have done had the enemy been of a different character is another question, the consideration of which does not come within the scope of the present work. The means adopted were exactly adjusted to the end to be attained, and the justification (if any were needed) for the risks run lies in the success which attended them.
CHAPTER XXIII.
CAPTURE OF CAIRO AND COLLAPSE OF THE REBELLION.
When the Egyptian regiments, mingled together in one wild and disorderly ma.s.s, once commenced their retreat, no chance of rallying was for a moment given them. The cannon in the redoubts were turned against their former occupants, and the guns of the Royal Horse Artillery rained shrapnel sh.e.l.l on the fugitives. The cavalry, sweeping round from the north and charging in amongst them, completed the rout. The Egyptians threw down their arms and scattered themselves across the country. Arabi himself, with a few of his chief officers, caught the train at Belbeis and got to Cairo the same day, where it is said he began preparations for the destruction of the city.[72]
No time was lost in reaping the fruits of the morning"s work. Advances were at once ordered in two directions, the one along the railway to the important railway centre of Zag-a-zig, whence a double line of railway proceeds to Cairo _via_ Benha, and a single line _via_ Belbeis; the other road was along the Ismailieh, or Sweet Water Ca.n.a.l, to Cairo.
The enemy were pursued to Zag-a-zig by the Indian Contingent, the leading detachment of which reached that place a little after 4 p.m., and by the Cavalry Division to Belbeis, which was occupied in the evening.
The seizure of Zag-a-zig was effected in the dashing manner peculiar to all the incidents of the day, and shows what may be done by a few bold men. The squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry left with the Indian Contingent led the way, and when within about five miles of the town broke into a gallop. The horses being somewhat fatigued by the hard work of the preceding twenty hours, were not in a condition to keep together, and, as a consequence, the best got to the front and the others dropped to the rear. The advanced part of the squadron was composed of Major R.
M. Jennings, Lieutenant Burn-Murdoch, R.E., and not above half-a-dozen troopers. These pushed right into the railway station, where were five trains filled with soldiers, and seven locomotives. At the sight of this handful of men, the engine-drivers either surrendered or ran away, except one, who began opening the throttle valve of his engine and was shot by Lieutenant Burn-Murdoch, while the Egyptian soldiers, hundreds in number, and too demoralized to think of resistance, threw away their arms, left the cars, and ran off as rapidly as possible.
By nine p.m. the entire force under General Macpherson had reached Zag-a-zig, not a man having fallen out by the way.
The Cavalry Division was ordered to push on with all possible speed to Cairo, Wolseley being most anxious to save the city from the fate which befell Alexandria. The division, making an early start from Belbeis on the 14th, and striking across the intervening desert, reached Cairo at 4.45 p.m.
The sun was setting as the cavalry arrived at the suburb of Abba.s.sieh.
The men had been in the saddle since daybreak, at which time they had left Belbeis. The men and horses were thoroughly exhausted after their long march under a blazing sun. But suffering from hunger, parched with thirst, and covered with dust as they were, they yet remained equal to the fulfilment of their task.[73]
The garrison of Cairo was divided into two parts; one from 6,000 to 7,000 strong at Abba.s.sieh; the other, of from 3,000 to 4,000 men, at the Citadel of Mehemet Ali, situated on a lofty eminence in the city, and strongly fortified. The former, on being summoned by Colonel Stewart, attached to General Drury-Lowe"s force, to surrender unconditionally, at once complied. Captain Watson, R.E., was immediately sent on with two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards, and a detachment of the Mounted Infantry, to demand a surrender of the Citadel. No guides were available, but two Egyptian officers, taken prisoners at Abba.s.sieh, were made to show the way, orderlies being told off to shoot them at once in case of treachery. The route taken was round by the Tombs of the Khalifs, outside the walls of Cairo. The city was entered, without opposition, by the gate at the foot of the hill on which the Citadel stands; by this means only a few hundred yards of the native quarter had to be traversed.
It was now dark, such of the inhabitants as were met were perfectly tranquil, and only looked with curiosity at Captain Watson"s party.
Arrived at the entrance to the Citadel, the Egyptian officer in command was sent for, and he at once agreed to give up possession of the place.
The small British force marched in and took up position in fours between the outer and inner gates. The Egyptian infantry, nearly 4,000 in number, with their arms, paraded by regiments in front of the great Mosque of Mehemet Ali, inside the inner gate. They were then ordered to lay down their arms and march down to the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks. This they proceeded to do quite quietly, and as they marched out they pa.s.sed within a few yards of the English force, whose numbers were concealed by the darkness.
As soon as the Egyptian troops had all left the Citadel, the various gates were handed over to Captain Watson"s force. The gates were then closed and guards posted. It was now ten o"clock. The troopers were literally dead-beat. But there yet remained the task of taking possession of the fort on the Mokattam Hill, which was occupied by Egyptian troops, and which commanded the Citadel. Watson, anxious to save his men as much as possible, sent one of the Egyptian officers who had acted as a guide, and told him to order the garrison to march down towards Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, and there pile their arms. The officer returned in a couple of hours with the keys of the fort, and informed Watson that his orders had been carried out.
In the dungeons of the Citadel many unfortunate wretches were found in confinement. Some of them were convicts, but several were political prisoners. They cried out in piteous terms to be set free. Some actually managed to break loose, and fled with their chains clanking round their ankles. They were, however, retaken, and a.s.sured that as soon as it was light their cases should be inquired into, and such as were not convicts should be set free. A sentry was posted over the gate, with orders to shoot any one attempting to escape. One man did make the attempt, and was shot.
It only remains to refer to the combination of courage, energy, and tact displayed by Captain Watson in thus, with a handful of men, taking possession of the strongest fortified work in Cairo, held by a force more than a hundred times that of his own. It should be added that the Egyptian officer who gave up the keys of the Mokattam Fort subsequently put in a claim for the war medal!
The Citadel being secured, the next step was to send a message to Arabi Pasha, through the Prefect of Police of the city, calling upon him to surrender, which he did unconditionally, accompanied by Toulba Pasha.
The vigour shown by General Drury-Lowe in his march on Cairo, and the inestimable results of that movement, together make it one of the most brilliant achievements of the whole campaign.
By the successful attack on Tel-el-Kebir, Sir Garnet Wolseley, at one blow, crushed the armed rebellion against the authority of the Khedive.
By General Drury-Lowe"s successful march, the most beautiful of Oriental cities was saved from destruction, and its European inhabitants from ma.s.sacre.