It was under the influence of some such misgiving that Lord Lyons, the British Amba.s.sador in Paris, was instructed on the 6th January, 1882, in communicating to the French Government England"s a.s.sent to the Note, to make the reservation that she must not be considered as thereby committing herself to _any particular mode of action_, if action should be found necessary. In reply, M. Gambetta, by a despatch dated the following day, stated that he observed with pleasure "that the only reservation of the Government of the Queen was as to the _mode of action_ to be employed, and that this was a reservation in which he partic.i.p.ated."
When one sees how, later on, when action became necessary, the att.i.tude of the two countries became reversed, the extreme reluctance of the English Government to move at this time seems curious enough, especially when it is contrasted with the continued readiness of France to come forward in the interval. The explanation is that M. Gambetta, with his clear statesman-like intellect, foreseeing that some sort of intervention would become necessary, was determined that it should be limited to that of England and France to the exclusion of Turkey, and so long as he remained in power boldly shaped his policy with that object.
The English Government, on the other hand, had throughout no real settled policy with regard to Egypt. Their first idea was to have no intervention at all; they hoped that things would mend of themselves.
When they found that this was not likely to be the case, the idea of a Turkish intervention found favour. France, however, was resolutely opposed to this, and to allow the latter Power to take isolated action, as indeed she appeared disposed to do if thwarted, was open to serious objections. To avoid such a catastrophe the English Government found themselves under the necessity of following, for the time being, the masterly lead of M. Gambetta. However this may have been, England, by taking part in the Joint Note, a.s.sumed a definite position relative to Egypt, and, throwing off all hesitation as to "interference with the internal affairs of the country," pledged herself jointly with France to support the Khedive against all enemies from within or without.
The first to take offence at the Joint Note was naturally enough the Sultan, who caused Lord Granville to be informed that the Porte considered that sending the Khedive any such communication except through itself was highly improper. The Sultan added that, "To protect the immunities granted to Egypt, and to preserve the order and prosperity of that province, was the sincere wish and interest of the Porte, whose efforts had till then always been directed to that end, and that there were no circ.u.mstances in Egypt which could serve as a motive for any foreign a.s.surances of the kind made." Finally, the Turkish Amba.s.sador requested that the two Powers would give an explanation of what they meant. At the same time the Sultan sent a Circular to the other Powers, protesting against the action of England and France.
Lord Granville now began to doubt whether he had not gone a little too far, and drafted an answer to the Porte of an apologetic character. The tone of the proposed reply was somewhat of the kind that a schoolboy taken to task for an act of impertinence towards his master might be expected to give. Substantially, it was that the two Powers did not mean anything at all.
The despatch, as originally drafted, began by disclaiming any doubt whatever as to the sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt. It proceeded to declare that there was no change in the policy of Her Majesty"s Government, which was as anxious as ever for the continuance of the sovereignty of the Porte, and for the maintenance of the liberties and administrative independence secured to Egypt by the Sultan"s Firmans.
Having paid the Porte these little compliments, the despatch disclaimed all ambitious views with regard to the country (of which, by the way, the Sultan had been careful never to accuse the two Powers), but said that they could never be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt into anarchy, and that it was only with a view to warding off such a catastrophe that Her Majesty"s Government thought it advisable, in conjunction with the French Government, to forward a declaration showing the accord of the two in carrying out the policy described. The despatch finally pointed out that the form of the Note was not a new one, and that similar declarations had been on special occasions made to the Khedive without calling forth any remonstrance from the Porte.
Gambetta, however, viewed the matter in a different spirit. Having once gone forward he was not disposed to draw back. He had, moreover, the interests of the large body of French bondholders to protect. He at first objected that no explanation of the Joint Note at all was necessary, and that any attempt to explain it would only tend to encourage the military party. Seeing, however, that Lord Granville was determined to send some reply, Gambetta insisted on certain modifications in the despatch. Amongst them he suggested that the a.s.sertion of the Porte, that there were no circ.u.mstances that could justify the steps taken by England and France, should be answered, and proposed that it should be pointed out, first, that the authority of the Khedive had been modified and diminished; second, that the Chamber of Notables had arrogated to itself the right of interfering with matters expressly exempted from its jurisdiction by the Khedive"s Decree; and third, that the Chamber had aimed at setting aside arrangements to which Egypt was bound by international engagements with England and France.
Lord Granville once more yielded to what he had begun to recognize as the superior mind of the French statesman, and Gambetta"s amendments were agreed to.
It was not until the 2nd February, however, that the reply to the Porte"s remonstrance was actually sent off.
In the meantime the Gambetta Ministry had fallen, and from this moment dates a marked change in the att.i.tude of the French Republic with regard to Egypt. M. de Freycinet, the successor to Gambetta, though agreeing to the amended reply to the Porte, cautiously inquired what meaning was to be attached to the reservation as to "taking action" made by Her Majesty"s Government in a.s.senting to the original Note.
Lord Granville, no longer under the influence of Gambetta, and apparently anxious to recede as far as possible from the somewhat bold position which he had been induced to adopt, answered, contrary to the plain words in which the reservation had been expressed, that Her Majesty"s Government reserved to themselves the right to determine, not merely the _particular mode of action_ to be adopted in Egypt, but whether any action at all was necessary.
De Freycinet, who, it must be admitted, was equally glad to back out, then plainly declared that he was disinclined to any armed intervention in Egypt, whether by France and England together, or by either separately. This announcement must have been a surprise to the British Government, which, after being led by France into sending the Joint Note, now began to discover that in the event of its becoming necessary to take any steps to carry it into effect, England could no longer count on her as an ally.
Under these circ.u.mstances, and feeling that the time when action would have to be taken might not be far off, Lord Granville addressed a Circular to the other Powers, requesting them to enter upon an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the Egyptian Question.
The effect of the Joint Note upon the Porte has been stated. It only remains to consider its effect upon the Khedive and the Notables. The Khedive received the a.s.surances of protection given by England and France gratefully enough. It was not so, however, with his Ministers, who, on the Note being communicated on the 8th January, wanted, like the Sultan, to know what it meant. Sir Edward Malet, in reply, a.s.sured them that the Note was merely intended to convey to the Khedive the a.s.surance of the friendship of the Powers, and that in point of fact it did not really mean much.
It is obvious that to produce any good effect on the Chamber and the National Party it was necessary that the Note should have been backed by the display of force, and this unfortunately was just what was wanting.
In short, England and France launched their threat without being prepared to follow it up by immediate action. It created great indignation on the part of the military leaders and in the Chamber; Arabi declared point-blank that any intervention on the part of England and France was inadmissible. Later on, when it was seen that the two Powers were not really to act, but, on the contrary, were busy doing all they could to attenuate the step they had taken, the feeling of indignation gave way to one of contempt, very natural under the circ.u.mstances.
Amongst those who misled the chiefs of the National Party none were so conspicuous as two Englishmen, namely, the late Sir William Gregory, an ex-Colonial Governor, and Mr. Wilfred S. Blunt. Both these gentlemen had, whilst spending some months in Egypt, conceived a violent sympathy for the National movement. They had witnessed during their stay in the country numerous instances of misrule and oppression, and they regarded Arabi and his friends as the leaders of a genuine popular effort to secure political liberty and good government.
In addition to the a.s.surances which they received from Sir William Gregory and Mr. Blunt, the leaders of the National Party were led to believe, and as has been seen not without reason, that England and France were not really agreed to do anything, much less to take any decisive step in the way of intervention; that the two Powers were jealous of each other, and that the Joint Note might be safely disregarded. The Arabists further clung to the hope that even were France and England allied, the other Powers would prevent their interference, and the protests which four of them, namely, Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy, made at the time against any foreign interference in Egypt without their consent, certainly tended to confirm this view.
This was the condition of affairs on the 2nd February, when, as already stated, the deputation from the Chamber requested the Khedive to summon a new Ministry. Tewfik had by this time become thoroughly alarmed. The tonic effect produced by the Joint Note had quite gone off, and he was beginning to doubt how far he could rely on support from England and France. He realized that by placing himself under the tutelage of the Western Powers he was injuring himself with the Porte, and he had daily proofs afforded him of his growing unpopularity with his subjects. Under these circ.u.mstances he saw nothing for it but to yield. At the suggestion of the Chamber, the intriguer Mahmoud Sami was directed to form a new Ministry, which he lost no time in doing, in conjunction with his confederate Arabi, who now filled the important post of Minister of War.
CHAPTER VI.
CRITICAL POSITION.
Although the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was forced upon the Khedive, the position of the latter was at the time so hopeless that one must not be surprised at his endeavouring to make the best of it and put a good face upon the matter. Accordingly, on the 4th of February, 1882, Tewfik, in true Oriental style, wrote to his new Premier that, in accepting the task of forming a Cabinet, he had given a fresh proof of his devotion and patriotism, and the letter ended by approving of the programme which the new Premier had drawn up.
The programme in question referred to the arrangements for the Public Debt, including the Control. It spoke of the necessity for judicial and other reforms, and then pa.s.sed on to the burning question of the Chamber of Notables, and stated that the first act of the Ministry would be to obtain sanction for the proposed law for the Chamber. This law, it was stated, would respect all rights and obligations, whether private or international, and would wisely determine the responsibility of Ministers towards the Chamber as well as the discussion of laws.
Mahmoud Sami"s programme elicited from the English and French Controllers a memorandum, in which they very sensibly observed that it mattered very little whether or not the intention of attacking the Control was a.s.serted, as by the very force of circ.u.mstances it became ineffectual when the Controllers found themselves no longer in the presence of the Khedive and of Ministers freely appointed by him, but of a Chamber and an army. It added that the Chamber, under the influence of certain military chiefs, did not hesitate to claim rights incompatible with the social condition of the country; it had gone so far as to compel the Khedive to change the Ministry which had his confidence, and, under pressure of certain officers, to impose on him the late Minister of War as Prime Minister, and concluded with the significant words: "The Khedive"s power no longer exists."
After this it is not surprising that the Controllers resigned office.
Sir Auckland Colvin was requested by the British Government to remain at his post and maintain "an att.i.tude of pa.s.sive observation." His French colleague was replaced by M. Bredif. There is no doubt that the Controllers" view of the situation was only too just. With Arabi as Minister of War, and his co-conspirator, Mahmoud Sami, President of the Council the country was simply under a military dictatorship.
Meanwhile, the reserves of the Artillery were called in and distributed amongst the coast fortifications, recruiting in the provinces was being actively carried on, ninety Krupp guns were ordered from Europe, and Arabi was created a Pasha by the Sultan.
The National Party had now become complete masters of the situation.
Notwithstanding this, a collision might for some little time have been averted but for an incident which occurred shortly after.
The differences between the Circa.s.sians and the native-born Egyptians in the army have been already touched upon. One peculiarity of the Arab race is a revengeful disposition. Arabi and his friends had, as already stated, met with rough usage at the hands of the Circa.s.sian party. Hence it followed that the first idea of the former on getting into power was to avenge themselves on their old enemies. This was carried out by the wholesale arrest of fifty Circa.s.sian officers, and of Osman Pasha Rifki, former Minister of War, on a charge of conspiracy to a.s.sa.s.sinate Arabi.
It was also alleged that the plot comprised the deposition of the Khedive and the restoration of Ismail Pasha.
The prisoners were tried in secret by a court martial appointed by the military leaders, and, of course, found guilty. They were, it is said, subjected to torture to induce them to confess, and persons of respectability testified that they heard at night shrieks of pain coming from the place where the prisoners were confined. The sentence pa.s.sed on forty of them, including Osman, was that of exile for life to the remotest limits of the Soudan. This was equivalent to a sentence of death as regards most of the prisoners.
It was necessary that the sentences should be confirmed by Decree of the Khedive, and he consulted Sir Edward Malet as to the course to be taken.
The story of the plot was, there is reason to believe, purely imaginary.
With some little hesitation, and after conferring with the diplomatic agents of the Powers, the Khedive boldly determined to exercise his prerogative without reference to his Ministers, and signed a Decree commuting the sentences to simple banishment from Egypt, without loss of rank and honours.
This was a defiance of Mahmoud Sami, to which he was not disposed to submit. On the 10th May, the Khedive summoned the Consuls-General, and informed them that the President of the Council had insisted that this Decree should be changed by condemning the prisoners to be struck off the strength of the army, and had threatened that his refusal would be followed by a general ma.s.sacre of foreigners. The significance of this threat coming from Mahmoud Sami, the Minister who was in power when just a month later--namely, on the 11th June--a ma.s.sacre of foreigners _did_ take place in Alexandria, will probably be remarked.
The Chamber of Notables had ceased to sit on the 26th March, when the session closed; but Mahmoud Sami now announced that since the Khedive and his Ministers could not agree, and as it was impossible for the Ministry to resign, they had determined themselves to convoke the Chamber, and to lay the case before it, and that he did not intend to hold any further communication with the Khedive until the difference between them had been decided by the Chamber. He added that in the meantime the Ministry would answer for the public safety.
The alarm in Cairo now began to be general. It was open warfare between the Khedive, and his Ministry supported by the army. The National Party made no secret of their intention to depose the Khedive as soon as the Chamber a.s.sembled.
The Notables, when the day for a.s.sembly arrived, began to show a disinclination to support the National Party. They had commenced to realize that they had already gone further than they had intended, and also that they were being merely used as tools by Arabi and his colleagues.
At first they refused to meet at all, on the ground that they had not been convoked by the Khedive, but only by the Ministry. They were, however, induced to a.s.semble, and on the 13th May they met at the house of Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber. Here Mahmoud Sami read an indictment against the Khedive, charging him princ.i.p.ally with not governing through his Ministers, and with compromising the liberties of Egypt. On the 14th the Ministers were so little sure of the support of the Notables, that Mahmoud Sami and Arabi went to the Palace, and, in the names of themselves and their colleagues, offered to resign if the Khedive would guarantee public order. His Highness answered, that such a condition was a most unusual one, and that it would be the business of the Ministry to see that public order was not troubled; he added that the only persons likely to cause trouble were Arabi and his a.s.sociates.
On the 15th, the English and French Consuls-General gave notice to Arabi that if there was a disturbance of public order, he would find Europe and Turkey, as well as England and France, against him, but that if, on the other hand, he remained loyal to the Khedive, his acts and person would be favourably regarded.
Arabi, in reply, stated that he would guarantee order only as long as he remained Minister, except that in the event of a fleet arriving he could not answer for the public safety. The same day the two Consuls-General announced to the Khedive that an Anglo-French fleet was hourly expected at Alexandria. This was followed by the Ministers going in a body to the Palace and making a complete submission to the Khedive.
A reconciliation of the Khedive with his Ministers was accepted by the former only on the earnest representations of the Notables and the Consuls-General, in order that tranquillity might not be disturbed, the idea was to keep the Ministry in office as a temporary measure, in order that there might be some one to treat with when the fleets should arrive.
Notwithstanding the improved aspect of affairs, the alarm in Cairo continued, and crowds of people daily left the city. To allay the panic, Mahmoud Sami and Arabi declared that they would guarantee the preservation of order on the arrival of the fleets.
On the 19th and 20th of May the much-talked-of "fleets" arrived at Alexandria. They consisted only of the British ironclad _Invincible_ with two gunboats, and the French ironclad _La Gallisoniere_, also accompanied by two gun-vessels. The remainder of the allied squadron was left at Suda Bay, in the island of Crete.
The despatch of the English and French ships to Alexandria by two Powers, each professing to be "disinclined to armed intervention in Egypt," was so important a step that it may be interesting to go back a little to consider the means by which it was brought about. Lord Granville, immediately after the Abdin demonstration of the 9th September, had intimated to the French Government as his idea of a remedy for the military insubordination prevailing the sending of a Turkish General to Egypt. M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire, Minister for Foreign Affairs, objected that this might lead to further steps, and possibly to the permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops.
The French Minister expressed himself in favour of a "joint military control," consisting of an English and a French General, to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army. Nothing was done to carry out either suggestion.
In March, 1882, when the struggle between the Khedive and the Chamber was at its height, Lord Granville suggested that England and France should send two "technical advisers" to a.s.sist the representatives of the two Powers in settling the details of the financial matters then pending. The proposal was so ludicrously absurd under existing circ.u.mstances, that it says much for the politeness of the French Minister that he took the trouble to give a serious reply. He objected that the measure would give offence to the other Powers, as an attempt on the part of England and France to effect a separate settlement of Egyptian affairs, and also that it would tend to lower the Consuls-General in their own eyes and in those of the Egyptians.
Again baffled, Lord Granville, in April, 1882, could think of nothing better than that the Sultan should be asked "to send a General with full powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army, with the understanding that he was not to exercise those powers in any way without the concurrence of an English and a French General, who would be a.s.sociated with him."
This proposal also fell through, the French Government objecting that the sending of a Turkish General at all would tend sooner or later to the sending of Turkish troops, which was not desirable.
The despatch of a Turkish Commissioner of some kind continued to be talked about, when, on the 7th May, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote to the Foreign Office that the Khedive"s Ministers would certainly resist by force the arrival of any Commissioner from Turkey. After this, Lord Granville was for a time forced to abandon his favourite hobby of Turkish intervention. Sir Edward Malet"s despatch contained the following significant pa.s.sage:--