Meantime the Mahdi had full information of the movements of the British expeditionary force. The delay in the advance from Metammeh inspired both him and his followers with fresh courage. It also gave support to Mohammed el Kerim"s arguments, and when, on the 24th, intelligence was received that two steamers had started from Metammeh, a Council was held at which it was determined to act on his advice and make the attack before the vessels should arrive.
This decision was, to some extent, influenced by the circ.u.mstance that the Mahdi had opportunely had another vision, in which, this time, the Prophet had a.s.sured him "that Allah had put the lives of the garrison into the Mahdi"s hands, and that the attack should be made early on the morning of Monday, the 26th."
On the 25th Gordon was slightly ill, and, it being Sunday, he did not appear in public. Through mental strain and trouble his hair had grown completely white. Although he appeared to realize that the end could not be much longer postponed, he was repeatedly heard to say that, if he had only a couple of English soldiers to parade on the ramparts, he should not fear the enemy"s attack.
In the morning he observed a great movement in the hostile lines, and called many of his officers, and the leading men of the town, to the Palace. After telling them that he thought the attack was impending, he appealed to them to make a last effort, as he believed that the British troops would arrive in twenty-four hours. He called upon every male inhabitant--even the old men--to a.s.sist in manning the fortifications.
It was a gloomy Sunday in Khartoum, and as the day went by without any signs of the relieving force, despair settled down over all. When night came many of the famished soldiers left their posts on the ramparts and wandered into the town in search of food. Others were too weak, from want of nourishment, to go to their stations. Although this was not an unusual occurrence of late, the number of defaulters that night was so great as to cause the most serious alarm in the town, and many of the princ.i.p.al inhabitants armed themselves and their servants and went to the fortifications in place of the soldiers.
Gordon, who had established a complete system of telegraphic communication with all the posts along the lines, sat up alone writing in the Palace till after midnight, and then, worn out with anxiety and fatigue, fell asleep.
In the early part of the night, which, after the moon had set, was dark and cloudy, the Mahdi crossed over from Omdurman with a huge ma.s.s of his followers and joined the armies of Wad en Nejumi and Abu Girgeh, drawn up on the south and east faces of the fortifications. After addressing the combined forces and giving his final orders, the Mahdi then returned to Omdurman, leaving Wad en Nejumi to conduct the attack.
At about 2 a.m. on the 26th, the entire force, under Wad en Nejumi, numbering from 40,000 to 50,000 men, began its advance. It moved in two divisions. The foremost was told off to attack the lines to the westward at the point between the Messalamieh Gate and the White Nile, where the defences had been partially destroyed by the river. The other division was to attack towards Buri, at the opposite, or eastern, extremity of the lines, or in the event of the attack on the White Nile side proving successful, to follow in the track of the foremost division and thus enter Khartoum. The instructions were to march as silently as possible, and not to fire until fired upon by the defenders.
Carrying "angaribs," or couches of palm boughs, and bundles of brushwood, to throw into the trenches, under cover of the darkness the Dervishes marched noiselessly close up to the lines till the ditch was reached. This they found partly filled with mud and the parapet broken away. A few of the Dervishes fired in reply to the fire from the lines; the remainder, charging with spears, dashed into the trench and up the opposite side, shouted their war cries, and, meeting but little resistance, effected an entrance into the works.
The defenders only perceived the advance a few minutes before the actual attack, when the alarm sounded. The greater part of the troops were so tired and worn out that it was not till the sentries fired that the rest of the garrison started up, to find the enemy swarming across the ditch and up the broken parapet. When once the Dervishes were upon them, Gordon"s soldiers made but little fight. Too feeble to withstand the rush, some were killed, and still more broke and fled. In a few minutes all resistance at this part of the position was over, and whilst a stream of Dervishes from behind, pouring in through the place where the entry had been effected, pushed on and entered Khartoum, those in front rushed along inside the parapets and attacked the defenders in the rear.
These last, stationed at distances of from three to four paces apart, and hopelessly outnumbered, could do but little. They fired a few shots and were then either killed or dispersed--leaving the enemy in undisputed possession of the fortifications. Over 150 soldiers" bodies were afterwards counted on the parapets alone.
The Commandant, Farag Pasha, was at Buri, at the further end of the fortifications, when the a.s.sault was made, and at once rode down the lines, encouraging his men. When he reached the Messalamieh Gate, the Dervish horde had already crossed the ditch and were rolling up the line of the defenders on the parapets. Farag, seeing that resistance was useless, opened the Messalamieh Gate and surrendered himself prisoner. A great many of his followers also rushed out through the gate and threw down their arms. Charges of treachery have been brought against Farag for his conduct on this occasion, but, seeing that the enemy were well within the position when the gate was opened, this act could not have affected the issue one way or another. Farag"s having been put to death in the enemy"s camp three days later also tends to rebut the accusation of having betrayed his trust.
Mohamed Bey Ibrahim, who commanded at the same gate, formed his men, consisting of two companies, into a square, and, taking up a position on the plain between the lines and the town, fought courageously till he and nearly all his men were killed.
Bakhit Betraki was in charge at Buri, and held his ground till, seeing that the enemy had carried the works at the other end, and were inside the lines, he abandoned the fortifications. Then, rallying his men, he fought as long as any of them were left alive.
Notwithstanding the resistance offered in this and other instances, the Dervish loss was but trifling, only from 80 to 100 being killed in the whole operations, which, from the time the first gun was fired till Khartoum was taken, are said to have lasted three hours.[123]
The soldiers who had been placed on board the barges and armed boats on the White Nile, as already stated, made but very slight resistance. They did a little firing at the moment of the first a.s.sault, after which they forsook the boats and fled.
The garrisons at Tuti Island and at "the North Fort" were, from the nature of their positions, unable to take any active part in the fight; they fired occasionally from their guns, but when Khartoum fell they all surrendered without further opposition.
The party of Dervishes who, when the first attack succeeded, pushed on to Khartoum, at once took possession of the town and began ma.s.sacring, pillaging and looting everywhere.
Their first thought was to rush for the Palace, where they expected to find the treasure, as well as Gordon, the man who had so long and so successfully resisted them.
Gordon, who had with him a company of black troops as a guard, on being aroused by the noise of the attack, went on the roof of the Palace, which stood on the northern side of the town facing the Blue Nile, and, finding that the enemy had entered the works for upwards of an hour, kept up a hot fire in the direction of the attack. As dawn approached he could see the Dervish banners in the town. Soon the gun which he had mounted on the roof became useless, as it could not be depressed sufficiently to fire down upon the Dervishes, who were by this time crowding in thousands round the Palace. Gordon, seeing that resistance was useless, then quitted the roof, put on his Pasha"s white uniform, and, with his sword by his side and his revolver in hand, placed himself at the door of his divan just at the top of the grand staircase. Here he stood and calmly awaited his fate.
A small band of Wad en Nejumi"s followers forced their way into the building and dashed up the steps. Gordon asked them who was their leader. The only reply that he got was a curse, and one of the band plunged his spear into Gordon"s body. Gordon made no attempt to defend himself, but turned away with a disdainful gesture, when he was again stabbed from behind and fell forward on the ground. Others of the party then rushed up and cut and hacked at the prostrate body until life was extinct. This was shortly before sunrise--whilst hundreds of Dervishes swarmed up to the Palace roof and slaughtered the soldiers there.
Gordon"s body was dragged down the steps to the garden, where the head was cut off, wrapped in a handkerchief, and taken to the Mahdi. The Mahdi is said to have been very angry at Gordon"s death. His idea had been to convert him to Mahdism, and afterwards to hand him over to the Government in exchange for Arabi Pasha. Gordon"s head, after being shown to Slatin Pasha, then a captive in the camp, was hung on a tree at Omdurman, where mult.i.tudes of the Mahdi"s followers cursed and insulted it. His body was left in the garden the whole day, and thousands of the Dervishes came up and plunged their spears into it. Later on it was thrown, with many others, into one of the wells adjoining.[124]
The steamer which Gordon had placed near the Palace was of no a.s.sistance at the critical moment. The captain saw the mob rushing to surround the building, and waited for Gordon to arrive. Later on, probably at the moment when Gordon met his end, a crowd of Dervishes made for the vessel, which, to escape being captured, steamed out into mid stream and moved backwards and forwards until the captain received a message from the Mahdi, offering him pardon if he would give up the steamer, which was thereupon surrendered.
After the Palace had been taken the Catholic mission building and church were the next objects on which the mob directed themselves. The guards in the grounds outside were at once killed, and the a.s.sailants then broke into the building, killing and looting everywhere.
The ma.s.sacre in the town lasted six hours, and 4,000 persons at least were killed. The black troops were spared, except such as resisted. The Bashi-Bazouks, fellaheen regulars, and the s.h.a.ggiah irregulars were mostly killed in cold blood after they had surrendered and been disarmed. Large numbers of the townspeople and slaves were either killed or wounded.
At 10 a.m. the Mahdi sent orders to stop the ma.s.sacre, which then ceased, and the Dervishes devoted themselves exclusively to looting. The Mahdi had promised his followers as much gold and silver as they could carry when Khartoum fell, and immense disappointment was expressed when they failed to find the expected treasure, for which Gordon"s bank notes formed but a poor subst.i.tute.[125]
The bloodshed and cruelty which attended the ma.s.sacre are said to be such as defy description. Nicola Leontides, the Greek Consul, had his hands first cut off and was then murdered. Martin Hansel, the Austrian Consul, and the oldest member of the European colony, was alive up to 2 p.m., when a party of Arabs, headed by his own janissary, entered his house and beheaded him, together with a man named Mulatte Skander, who lived with him. The two bodies were then taken outside, covered with petroleum and set fire to. The Austrian tailor, Klein, on making the sign of the cross, had his throat cut from ear to ear before the eyes of his wife and children. The savages then buried their lances in the body of his son, aged seventeen, who fell lifeless. The mother, a Venetian by birth, seized her son of five years old with one hand, and, holding her baby to her breast with the other, struggled heroically to prevent their taking her children from her. Eventually they seized her daughter, a girl of eighteen, who was carried off to add to the other booty taken.
Numbers of women, and even children, perished in the general slaughter.
Of the survivors, all the young and good looking women and girls were taken off to the "Beit el Mal," the Mahdi"s treasury, where the loot was ordered to be collected. There they lay exposed like cattle in a pen, awaiting their turn to be selected to fill the harems of the conquerors.
The first choice lay with the Mahdi himself, then followed the various Emirs, each in order of his rank. The women who were not chosen were distributed among the soldiers. The old women were given a few rags with which to cover themselves, and then sent to the Dervish camp to eke out a miserable existence by begging.
The number of Europeans made prisoners is stated to have been about ninety altogether, besides several thousands of natives. Most of these were removed to Omdurman, where they were left to get on as best they could, and exposed to many privations.
Only two days later, on the 28th, whilst the Mahdi"s army was still engaged in celebrating the victory, Wilson"s two steamers were observed slowly making their way up stream in the direction of the north end of Tuti Island, firing as they advanced both from guns and rifles. It was at once decided to oppose the landing of the red-coated soldiers who could be seen on board. All rushed to the river"s bank, the women shouting "Mot lil Inglesi" ("Death to the English").
After reaching a point mid-way between Tuti Island and the left bank of the White Nile, and apparently looking for indications as to the fate of Khartoum and Gordon, the steamers were seen to turn round and proceed down the river under a hail of bullets from the sh.o.r.e.
The news of the fall of Khartoum, after a siege of 317 days, or only nine days less than that of Sebastopol, reached the War Office in London at a quarter of an hour before midnight on the 4th February. It was communicated by a despatch from Lord Wolseley, sent from Korti, at 9.10 p.m. on the same day.
The War Office officials, many of whom were summoned on the receipt of the despatch, hesitated to believe the news it contained, until it should be confirmed by later intelligence, and the representatives of the Press a.s.sociation were informed that nothing would be published till the following day. On the 5th the despatch appeared in the second edition of several of the morning papers, and England realized to the fullest extent the bitterness of a great national disappointment. All the gallantry and devotion of her officers and men had been unavailing; the costly Nile Expedition had proved a dismal failure; and Gordon had been allowed to perish.
The general feeling on the subject was intensified by the reflection that but two days elapsed between the fall of Khartoum and the arrival of the British troops before the town. The Government of Mr. Gladstone was severely reproached with having been once more "too late."
As to the part taken by Sir Charles Wilson, there was a strong tendency to censure the delay which had occurred in the departure of the steamers for Khartoum. Sir Charles, in a letter to Lord Wolseley, gave full explanations on this subject. He based his reasons for not starting sooner on the following considerations:--
1st. The military situation. The force had been much weakened by its losses in the fighting on the 17th and 18th January, and would be further reduced by the convoy and escort which it was necessary to send back to Gakdul. The horses and camels were so "done up" from fatigue and want of food, as to be unable to reconnoitre any distance.
Reinforcements for the enemy were reported as advancing both from Omdurman and Berber, and it was necessary for him, before leaving, to ascertain that the small British force at Gubat was not liable to attack.
2ndly. The necessity of changing the men in the steamers (in accordance with Gordon"s advice) and replacing them by Soudanese.
3rdly. The steamers" engines required to be overhauled, and the vessels themselves had to be prepared for resisting the batteries which it was known they would have to fight on their way to Khartoum.
4thly. Gordon was known to be still holding out, and there was nothing to show that the expected crisis, so long delayed, would take place in the next few days.
As a fact, the steamers from Khartoum reached Gubat on the 21st January, whilst the British were engaged with the enemy at Metammeh; and Wilson received the letters which General Gordon had sent down between three and four p.m. on that day. The earliest possible date for starting would, therefore, be on the morning of the 22nd, and Sir Charles pointed out that, if the steamers had left at that time and travelled at the same rate as they subsequently did, they would then only have reached Khartoum at mid-day on the 26th, when it had already fallen.
Sir Charles might, without exaggeration, have enlarged on the condition of his forces, which were so utterly used up--both men and animals--that a short interval of comparative repose was indispensable before anything further was attempted. That in spite of their condition they should have been able to undertake the abortive attack on Metammeh on the 21st, speaks volumes for their pluck and endurance.
Even if Wilson had disregarded all other considerations and pushed on at once with his handful of soldiers, there is every reason to suppose that the result would have been the same. From what has subsequently been ascertained, it is clear that for weeks previously the Mahdi had Khartoum at his mercy, and could have taken it at any moment, though he preferred that it should fall by the slower process of starvation.
He had full information of Wilson"s movements, and had the latter started two days earlier, the only result would have been that the capture of the town would have been accelerated by precisely that period of time.
It would be too much to imagine that if the subaltern"s guard which Wilson had at his disposal had reached Khartoum whilst it still held out, it could (notwithstanding Gordon"s expectations to the contrary) have changed the fortunes of the day, or have induced the Mahdi to carry out his idea of raising the siege and retiring to Obeid. For this, the presence, or at least the advance, of the whole force at Gubat was necessary.
As it happened, the column at Gubat was not in a condition to advance, and the Mahdi, knowing that at the worst he had only the two steamers to reckon with, determined to risk an a.s.sault.
The responsibility for the disaster may be traced partly to the insufficient supply of camels to the Desert Column, owing to which Stewart, instead of pushing on at first straight across the Bayuda desert, was compelled to return from Gakdul Wells to Korti, and then make a fresh start, thus losing twelve days" valuable time. But after all, the main responsibility will always rest with the Government which so long delayed despatching the Relief Expedition, and then, as if to make its failure the more certain, sent it by the wrong route.
CHAPTER XLV.
THE RETREAT FROM GUBAT.