As the force advanced the Lancers began to report that parties of the enemy were seen hovering about.
The heat of the day, with a burning sun overhead, from which the bushes afforded no protection, now began to tell on the men, and at 10 a.m., when a little over five miles had been traversed, it was calculated by the two generals that, allowing time for the construction of the zeribas (Nos. 1 and 2) and the return journey, it would be well towards midnight before the Indian Brigade and transport train would get back to Souakim.
Accordingly at 10.30 it was determined to halt the force and make the zeriba in an open s.p.a.ce six miles from the camp at Souakim.
The spot selected formed a large oblong with very irregular outlines, presenting an area in the clearest portions about half a square mile in extent.
McNeill then telegraphed to head-quarters at Souakim the change which the difficulties with the transport had necessitated, and received back in reply the message, "Go on if you can; if not, zeriba." The reply also stated that, as the halt had been made at only six miles distance, no intermediate zeriba would be required at the five-mile point previously ordered.
The site for the zeriba being fixed upon, no time was lost in making the necessary dispositions. The troops marched upon the ground in the same order in which they had advanced, and the British square, being the first to emerge upon the open, turning up a little to the left halted in its original formation, taking up a position on the north-east side of the open s.p.a.ce. Past it came the Indian Brigade with the transport train under its charge, General Hudson disposing his troops so as to cover the ground on the three remaining sides.
On the side opposite the British square were posted the 15th Sikhs, to the right the Bombay Native Infantry, and to the left the Bengal Native Infantry. The bush in front of the Bombay Infantry being very dense, and comparatively open in front of the Bengal Infantry, two companies of the latter were moved across and placed on the right of the former to strengthen and prolong this face.
In order to protect the front of the various lines of infantry, small pickets of from four to five men each were thrown forward about 120 yards. A quarter of a mile further out in front of these pickets were the Lancers, arranged as "Cossack posts" of four men each. Another "Cossack post," also of four men, was used as a connecting link, the remainder const.i.tuting the picket and visiting patrols.
At once the task of measuring and pegging out the site for the proposed works was taken in hand. The plan adopted was to form three separate squares placed diagonally like squares on a chess-board, or, as it is termed, "in echelon," the large or central square, intended to contain the stores, non-combatants, and transport animals, being between the other two. Attached to this, and communicating with it at its north-west and south-east angles respectively, were the smaller squares set apart for the north and south zeribas, of equal dimensions, with accommodation in each for a battalion and two Gardner guns. By this arrangement every side of the central square or zeriba was capable of being swept by a flanking fire from the zeribas at the angles.
Working parties were organized for cutting down the bush and dragging it into position. The chief work of construction fell upon the Royal Engineers and the Madras Sappers, but to expedite matters working parties were drawn both from the British and Indian troops. The remainder of the British troops, retaining their original formation in square, piled their arms, and were ordered to lie down and rest. The Indian troops not engaged in cutting brushwood remained standing to their arms in lines two deep.
At 12.30 the Marines had their rations served out, the men dining by half-companies at a time.
At 1 p.m. Major Graves with a squadron of the 20th Hussars arrived from the camp at Souakim, and stated that he had been sent by General Graham to communicate with McNeill. The Major reported that on the way out he had seen in his front stray parties of the enemy, who retired before the cavalry without coming into collision. On receiving a despatch for Graham"s chief of the staff, stating that matters were proceeding satisfactorily, the Major started with the Hussars on his return journey at 1.30.
As the most vital part of the defences, attention had been first of all directed to the formation of the north and south zeribas. Both of these were pushed on with the utmost expedition, but, as has been seen, the bush being thickest at the north side, in front of the Bombay Infantry, the zeriba at this angle was in a more advanced state than that on the south side. The former was completed shortly after 2 p.m., and the two Gardner guns designed for it were got into position. The battalion of Marines. .h.i.therto forming part of the British square was now transferred to this zeriba, together with the reserve ammunition and the telegraph waggon. With this transfer of Marines the Berkshire Battalion was contracted into a smaller square.
Meanwhile the south zeriba was also being rapidly proceeded with, and it being represented that the Berkshires had eaten nothing since 4 a.m., rations and water were ordered to be served out to them, the men taking their food by half battalions. As soon as the first of the half battalions had finished it was marched into the south zeriba, very soon after the Marines had occupied that on the north. The time was now getting on towards half-past two, and shortly after the half battalion had gone into the zeriba the soldiers piled their arms inside, part of the men going out in front of the Sikhs to cut bush in order to complete the defences.[135]
The camels had been unloaded in the central zeriba, and were filing out to form up for the return march, the bulk of them being collected on an unoccupied s.p.a.ce to the south-east. The lines were being held by eight companies of the Bengal Infantry, by the 15th Sikhs, and by the Bombay Infantry.
This was the situation when shortly after 2.30 one of the Lancers rode up and informed McNeill that the enemy was gathering in front and advancing rapidly. Orders were at once given for the working and covering parties to come in and for the troops to stand to their arms.
Whilst these instructions were being carried into effect, the Cavalry were seen galloping up on every side with the Soudanese close at their heels.
The attack was delivered mainly on the southern and western sides, the Soudanese surging onwards in one vast impetuous ma.s.s, enveloped in clouds of dust and filling the air with shouts and yells as they made frantic efforts to storm the position. The Berkshires and Marines, as well as the Sikhs and Bombay Infantry, stood their ground, receiving and repulsing the attack with a heavy fire. The 17th Bengal Native Infantry, however, thrown into partial disorder by some of the Cavalry riding through their ranks, fired one wild and scattered volley and fled for such cover as the zeriba might afford, many of them being shot down by the defenders. Every effort was made to rally the fugitives, and about 120 were got within the southern zeriba, where they fired another ineffectual volley and again broke and fled.
The a.s.sailants now crowded in by the uncompleted salient at a point where there was no brushwood, but merely a sandbag parapet, where the Gardner guns, not being yet in position, could not be got into action, and killed six of the sailors and four officers.
Other parties of the enemy following the retreat of the Madras Infantry dashed into the central zeriba, and caused a stampede among the animals there and a panic among the native drivers. A general rush of the latter took place both to the open side, and also through the north zeriba, where some of the Marines were for the moment carried away by it. At this moment the rear rank of the Berkshire half battalion engaged in defending the western face of the south zeriba faced about and occupied the gap through which the Soudanese were now pouring. Meeting the enemy half-way, the Berkshires despatched every Arab who had entered, 112 bodies being counted within the limits of this zeriba alone. They also captured a flag which the enemy had planted on the sandbag parapet. In a few minutes this zeriba was cleared, and no further serious attack was made upon it.
The bulk of the enemy"s force, repelled by the steady volleys from the troops on the south and west sides of the position, swept round by the great ma.s.s of the transport animals, gathered together outside and to the eastward for the return journey to Souakim. It was to cover this part of the ground that six companies of the Bengal Infantry had been drawn up in line. Their unfortunate collapse, however, gave the enemy an opportunity of which they were not slow to take advantage. With a wild howl, peculiarly alarming to the camel, they rushed upon the panic-stricken and helpless ma.s.s. Plying lance and sword, cutting, stabbing, hacking, and hamstringing the beasts, and slaughtering their drivers, the tribesmen of the Soudan drove before them an unwieldy and terrified body, heedless of everything but flight. Thus driven, the transport train broke up and scattered itself in all directions.
Impelled by the pursuers, part of it bore down upon the zeribas held by the Berkshires and Marines respectively, and part on the central zeriba.
Mixed up as they were with the charging enemy, many of the animals were unavoidably shot down by the troops as a matter of self-preservation.
The same thing happened in the attack made upon the half battalion of the Berkshires which remained drawn up outside in square formation, but, pursued by the Arabs, the great bulk of the baggage train went off in their mad flight in the direction of Souakim.
After the southern zeriba the two main points of attack were the northern zeriba, held by the Marines and the half battalion of the Berkshires. Both these positions were in the direct line of the camel stampede, and their occupants were placed at a serious disadvantage. In spite of the completed mimosa fences, trampling their way over all obstacles, a ma.s.s of the terror-stricken animals tore right through the northern zeriba, for the time seriously disorganizing the defence. As stated by Colonel Way, an eye-witness--
"Everything seemed to come at once, camels, transport of all kinds, including water-carts, ammunition mules, 17th Native Infantry, Madras Sappers, sick-bearers, Transport Corps, cavalry and Arabs fighting in the midst. All these pa.s.sed close by me, and went out on the other side of the zeriba, carrying away with them a number of the Marines and some officers, who eventually got together and returned. The dust raised by this crowd was so great that I could not see anything beyond our zeriba for a minute or two, and it was impossible to say what might happen.
The men behaved splendidly, and stood quite still. It was about the highest test of discipline I shall ever see, as in my opinion nothing could beat it."
The stampede of the transport train is thus described by another writer:--
"Suddenly from the bush all along the face of the zeriba fronting Tamaai burst out a clamour of savage cries, and the next instant the whole a.s.semblage of transport animals plunged forward. There was a mult.i.tude of roaring camels, apparently heaped one upon another, with strings of kicking and screaming mules, entangled in one moving ma.s.s. Crowds of camp-followers were carried along by the huge animal wave, crying, shouting, and fighting. All these surged up on the zeriba, any resistance being utterly hopeless. This ma.s.s of brutes and terrified natives swept all before it, and a scene of indescribable confusion ensued."
Notwithstanding the rush of the transport which had pa.s.sed through the Marines" zeriba, comparatively few of the enemy seem to have penetrated it, only twelve bodies being counted there. Outside the dead were much more numerous, the position having been attacked on various sides. The men behaved with the greatest coolness, and, after being rallied by their officers when the living avalanche had swept past, were well in hand.
The naval detachment in this zeriba, more fortunate than their companions in the southern one, had their Gardner guns in action from the first, discharging at least 400 rounds and doing great execution.
The half battalion of the Berkshires remaining, formed up in the open at a distance of 250 yards east of the zeriba, had also a severe time of it. Falling in and standing to their arms at the first alarm, they formed a rallying square, and successfully defended themselves against the repeated attacks made on them. It was found that 200 of the a.s.sailants had fallen before the fire of their rifles, whilst amongst themselves there was only one slight casualty.
Other small bodies of men who were outside the zeriba at the moment of the attack, or had stampeded at its occurrence, were similarly collected by their officers, and succeeded in making their way back to the zeriba.
The whole affair lasted only about twenty minutes, after which the enemy, unable to stand any longer against the leaden hail of the Martini-Henry and Snider rifles, recoiled at every point, and at twelve minutes past three, as the a.s.sailants disappeared in the bush, the bugle sounded "Cease firing." Up to the last moment individual Arabs came forward, throwing up their hands above their heads, and facing the rifles as if bent on suicide, and courting the death which they received. Small groups of them also formed up as if to encourage each other for a renewed a.s.sault, but without effecting anything they melted away before the deadly fire of the soldiers.
When the smoke cleared away, and there was time to look around, a dreadful spectacle presented itself. The dead bodies of friends and foes lay thickly scattered within and about the zeribas. Everywhere were wounded and slaughtered men and animals, whilst groans and cries filled the air. Strewn upon the ground were arms and accoutrements of every kind, with all the usual accompaniments of a savage and sanguinary conflict.
The enemy"s force was reported by General Graham in his despatch as not less than 2,000, although, as he states, it was impossible to form an accurate estimate.
The Soudanese as usual fought with the utmost courage. One man came rushing on to the zeriba holding by the hand a boy armed with a knife.
Throwing the boy over the defensive works, he jumped in after him, and immediately both were killed. At another point there stood between the opposing forces another boy, apparently not more than twelve years old, actually throwing stones at the British troops in one of the zeribas.
Among various mischievous devices resorted to may be noted that of a Soudanese armed with a rifle, who during the attack managed to creep up close to the mimosa fence of the southern zeriba, and from this cover contrived in succession to shoot first one and then another of the Berkshires, and though fired at in return, was missed. His third shot was directed at a major of the regiment on duty inside the zeriba, who narrowly escaped, the bullet carrying away his trousers pocket and part of his coat, and not till then was the a.s.sailant shot. Another trick of the a.s.sailants was to bring hides, and throwing them on the top of the th.o.r.n.y bushes forming the fence, they would spring over into the zeriba and rush at the defenders and engage in a hand-to-hand fight.
During the a.s.sault on the southern zeriba an interesting adventure occurred to the Colonel of the Berkshires. He was sitting on his horse close to his regiment when the attack took place, and was confronted by a gigantic Soudanese who appeared from behind a camel, brandishing a huge spear, and bent on slaughter. Their eyes met, and seeing the Colonel"s revolver levelled at his head, the expression on the countenance of the savage suddenly changed from triumph to horror as the Colonel fired, and the Arab, with the upper part of his head blown away, fell to the ground a ghastly wreck.
McNeill"s force suffered severely, having, exclusive of camp-followers, 6 officers and 94 men killed, and 6 officers and 136 men wounded, and 1 officer and 10 men missing. Amongst the killed were Captain Francis J.
Romilly, and Lieutenant C. M. C. Newman, of the Royal Engineers; Lieutenant Montague H. M. Seymour, of the Naval Brigade; Major Von Beverhoudt, of the Indian Contingent; Quartermaster C. Eastmead, of the Ordnance Store Department, and Lieutenant George S. Swinton, of the Berkshire Regiment. The bodies of 8 British and 25 Indian soldiers were found in the bush away from the zeriba.
The loss in transport animals was enormous, over 900 camels alone being killed. Scores of them, which had been left outside the zeriba, were shot as the enemy swarmed on to the attack.
The enemy"s loss was severe. Graham states that 1,000 bodies were found on the field. Besides the 112 bodies counted in the zeriba, there were the 200 found in front of the Berkshire Regiment. Near the redoubt held by the Naval Brigade, the dead lay in heaps. All around the ground was literally strewn with bodies; among them were several women and boys.
Throughout the entire conflict McNeill showed the greatest coolness and judgment, leading his men on with a courage oblivious of danger. During his preliminary efforts to rally the Bengal Native Infantry, the General, mounted on his grey Arab horse, found himself outside the defences, with the enemy streaming on full in front. Here, strange to say, he seemed to be entirely unnoticed, and, with revolver in hand ready to despatch any who might venture too near, he quietly turned his horse, and without difficulty made him cross the fence and step into the zeriba.
Later on, towards half-past three, there were circ.u.mstances which appeared to indicate that the enemy, notwithstanding the heavy loss they had sustained, were disposed to renew the attack, a large gathering of them presenting itself to the south-east of the zeriba. Their att.i.tude was so threatening that McNeill resolved to make a sortie and endeavour to disperse them. Taking with him two companies of Marines, he led them straight for the enemy. As they advanced the little force was soon in front of the foe. Fire was at once opened, and the ground cleared; and though the men were anxious to make a charge with the bayonet, the demonstration having served its purpose, the troops were withdrawn without further fighting.
Notwithstanding McNeill"s successful defence of the zeriba, and the heavy loss inflicted on the enemy in the action on the 22nd, Sir John has been the object of much adverse criticism. This criticism has been directed upon several points. It has been asked, Why were the fatigue men employed in cutting materials for the zeriba allowed to go into the bush unarmed? Sir John"s answer is, that this was done designedly; the working parties were covered by the Cossack pickets of the Lancers; men inc.u.mbered with slung arms could not work to any good purpose in hot weather; in the event of attack, it was not desirable that the working parties should attempt to make a stand, as they would be of more service by running in and taking their places in the alignment marked by their piled arms, and they would thus avoid the danger of masking the fire of the troops in position.
The main charge, however, brought against the General is that he allowed himself to be surprised. This, however, if true at all, is so only in a limited sense of the term. That his force was attacked before the whole of it had time to form up in a fighting att.i.tude is undoubted; but whether this was through any fault of his is quite another matter. The careful planning of the zeribas, the disposition of the troops, and the outlying pickets and vedettes have already been referred to. It is difficult to see what other precautions the General, with the means at his command, could have adopted. Not more than one-third of the British troops ever left their arms, and the Indians, minus their fatigue parties, remained throughout in position constantly ready for an attack.
Whilst one half of the Berkshires moved into their completed zeriba, the remaining half was carefully re-formed in square outside. In the issue, as showing that a zeriba was little required for their protection, this last half battalion proved the strongest part of the position, and though subject to repeated attacks, lost not a man.
That Sir John was not informed in time of the impending attack was due to the insufficient number (one squadron only) of cavalry with which he was provided, and which were absolutely necessary for covering a frontage of over three miles. Here it may perhaps be remarked that, had this suggested itself to the General"s mind, it seems strange that he did not take steps to detain and utilize the squadron of Hussars, under Major Graves, which visited the zeriba shortly before the attack was made.
The General had many difficulties to contend with. He was inc.u.mbered with a wholly disproportionate ma.s.s of transport; was directed on an impracticable line; was unsupplied with information of vital importance; and, finally, was sent to conduct an operation of which he strongly disapproved. To crown all, there was the flight of the Bengal Infantry at the very commencement of the fight, an event which the General could hardly have been expected to foresee. The result, however, was a signal victory, and practically the only successful operation of the campaign.
Graham was at Souakim whilst the attack was made on the zeriba. On first hearing the firing at 2.45 p.m., he ordered the Guards and Horse Artillery to go to McNeill"s a.s.sistance. The force advanced two miles on the road when a message sent by the field-telegraph from the zeriba arrived, stating that the attack had been repelled, after which the proposed reinforcements returned to Souakim.
The following day Graham advanced to McNeill"s zeriba. Here he sent off the following despatch, dated Souakim, March 23rd, 6.30 p.m.:--
"_Advanced Zeriba, 12 noon._