Patrols of Dervish hors.e.m.e.n had been frequently seen during the march, falling back before the cavalry, and their outposts were driven in beyond Egeiga.
Some time before the main body of the army had reached Egeiga, the cavalry, striking off in a south-westerly direction, reached the slopes of Jebel Surgham, nearly a mile beyond. From this point, at noon, the entire Dervish army was seen drawn up in battle array in the desert outside the city. They were in five divisions, and their numbers were estimated at 35,000 men.[168]
It soon became evident that this huge force had not come out for the mere purpose of being looked at. It began steadily to advance, with a line in front extending over three miles. At one time the enemy halted, and then again moved forward.
The cavalry then proceeded to fall back on Egeiga, where the main body of the army, receiving news that the Dervishes were advancing to the attack, had hurriedly moved out and formed up in position.
After following the retiring troops for some time, the vedettes at 2 p.m. reported that the enemy had halted, and later on it was observed that they were preparing bivouacs and lighting fires. So rapid was the Dervish advance that they all but came into action with the rear squadrons of the reconnoitring force.
Beyond a few shots exchanged between the Lancers and the enemy"s scouts nothing further happened, and the Sirdar"s troops, after remaining in position all the afternoon, retired at nightfall to their camp.
Meanwhile the gunboats, under Commander Keppel, had proceeded at daylight on the 1st towing the 37th Howitzer Battery Royal Artillery in barges. Steaming up the east bank, with the aid of a party of friendlies, they cleared that side of the river. Several villages were found occupied, but these the friendlies took one after another.
On the steamers approaching Halfiyeh three forts opened on them. The gunboats returned the fire and soon silenced the works, which were then occupied by the friendlies. As the steamers, proceeding in line ahead, rounded Tuti Island, at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, they were fired on by the forts, both at Khartoum and at Omdurman. The fire, though fairly heavy, was ill directed, and did no harm. A suitable spot having been found on the east bank, the howitzer battery was landed and at once brought into action.[169] After a few rounds at a range of 3,000 yards, the dome over the Mahdi"s tomb was partially destroyed. The superior weight and accuracy of the steamers" guns ended the naval part of the fight almost as soon as it was begun, and the flotilla, leaving the _Tamaai_ and _n.a.z.ir_ to guard the battery, returned down stream to rejoin the army at Egeiga.
The night of the 1st September was an anxious one for everybody in the Sirdar"s camp. Less than five miles separated the opposing armies.
Information had been received that the Khalifa contemplated a night attack upon the position, and preparations to repel it were made. The men all lay down fully dressed on the sand with their arms and accoutrements beside them. Though the moon was at its full only twenty-four hours before, the night being cloudy, there was not much light. The gunboats from time to time flashed their electric rays on Jebel Surgham and the surrounding country with a view to discovering any signs of a Dervish advance. At the same time, natives from the village of Egeiga were sent out in the direction of the enemy"s camp to obtain information, so as to give the idea that the Sirdar intended to make a night attack, and in the expectation that this, coming to the Khalifa"s knowledge, would decide him to remain in his position. As a result the _ruse_ succeeded perfectly, and, with the exception of two false alarms which occurred, the night pa.s.sed away tranquilly enough.
In not making a night attack the Khalifa lost a grand opportunity. Had he taken advantage of the comparative obscurity to hurl his enormous force upon the Sirdar"s position there is no saying what might have been the result. The rifle fire of the British and Egyptian troops, which was the thing the Dervish leader had most to fear, would have been far less effective than by daylight, and might not have been successful in stopping at all points the Dervish rushes. Had the enemy once succeeded in breaking the line of troops and engaging hand to hand with, say, the Egyptian divisions, the difficulty of coming to their aid in the darkness and confusion would have been considerable, and though the ultimate result might have been favourable, it could only have been attained by an enormous loss of life.
CHAPTER LXVII.
THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN.
The force under the Sirdar"s command on the 2nd September, was thus composed:--
_British Troops_: 21st Lancers; 32nd Field Battery Royal Artillery; 37th Howitzer Battery Royal Artillery; two forty-pounders Royal Artillery.
_Infantry Division, 1st Brigade_ (_Wauchope"s_): 1st Battalion Warwickshire Regiment; 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment; 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders; 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders; six Maxims; detachment Royal Engineers.
_2nd Brigade_ (_Lyttelton"s_): 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards; 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers; 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers; 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade; four Maxims; detachment Royal Engineers.
_Egyptian Troops_: Nine squadrons cavalry; one battery Horse Artillery; four field batteries; ten Maxims; eight companies Camel Corps.
_1st Brigade_ (_Macdonald"s_): 2nd Egyptian Battalion; 9th, 10th, and 11th Soudanese Battalions.
_2nd Brigade_ (_Maxwell"s_): 8th Egyptian Battalion; 12th, 13th, and 14th Soudanese Battalions.
_3rd Brigade_ (_Lewis"s_): 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Egyptian Battalions.
_4th Brigade_ (_Collinson"s_): 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Egyptian Battalions.
The gunboat flotilla, under Commander Keppel, consisted of the twin screw steamers _Sultan_, _Sheikh_, and _Melik_, each carrying two twelve-pounder quick-firing guns, one four-inch howitzer, and four Maxims; the large stern-wheelers _Fatteh_ and _n.a.z.ir_, each armed with one twelve-pounder quick-firer, two six-pounder quick-firers, and three Maxims; and the small stern-wheelers _Tamaai_, _Hafir_ (formerly _El Teb_), _Abu Klea_, and _Metammeh_, armed with one nine-centimetre Krupp and two Maxims.
Each vessel was commanded by a British officer, with a non-commissioned officer of the Royal Marine Artillery as gunnery instructor.
The total force, naval and military, may be put down as a little over 22,000 men.[170]
The position occupied by the Sirdar"s force was a favourable one for defensive purposes. It stood on slightly elevated ground with a clear open s.p.a.ce of desert dotted with scrub directly in front, and extending for five miles to the base of a group of hills to the westward. In a northerly and southerly direction was a series of hills of moderate elevation, culminating on the north at a distance of about two miles in the Kerreri Hill, and on the south at a distance of 1,200 yards in that of Jebel Surgham. Behind the position was the broad expanse of the Nile.
The camp formed a sort of angular crescent or horse-shoe, with the ends, practically the flanks of the position, resting on the river, and protected by the gunboats. In the centre were a few mud huts, and within the position, but a little to the north, stood the small village of Egeiga.
The troops were disposed as follows:--On the left was the 2nd British Brigade, composed of the Rifles, the Lancashires, the Northumberlands, and the Guards, with the Maxim battery worked by the Irish Fusiliers.
Then came the 1st British Brigade, consisting of the Warwicks, the Camerons, Seaforths, and Lincolns, with a battery of Maxims manned by a detachment of the Royal Artillery. The Soudanese and Egyptian Brigades, under Maxwell, Macdonald, and Lewis, continued the fighting line round to the right, Collinson"s Egyptian brigade being kept in reserve in the rear of Lewis"s and Macdonald"s. Maxims were placed between Lewis"s and Macdonald"s brigades. The 37th Howitzer Battery of the Royal Artillery had been detached and placed on the opposite bank of the Nile, as stated in the last chapter. The 32nd Field Battery of the Royal Artillery, under Major Williams, was posted, with two Egyptian batteries and Maxims, on the extreme left of the position close to the river. The two remaining Egyptian batteries were put on the north or right side of the position. The 21st Lancers were picketed at the south end of the camp, and the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps occupied a position away to the north in the direction of the Kerreri Hill. Along the front of the British line a breastwork of bushes was placed, whilst the Egyptian line was defended by a shallow trench.[171]
Of the gunboats, two remained to support the howitzer battery opposite Omdurman, three others guarded the camp, and the rest were stationed at various points between Egeiga and Omdurman.
At 3.30 a.m. on the 2nd September the bugles sounded the reveille, and the troops all stood to their arms, the hour before dawn being the most usual for a night attack. After waiting an hour, there being no signs of the expected a.s.sault, the Sirdar resolved to take the initiative and march out against the Dervish forces. At 5.30 the booming of the guns of the howitzer battery on the east bank and of the gunboats in front announced that the bombardment of Omdurman, which had begun the previous day, had recommenced. Before the cannonade had lasted many minutes the patrols reported the enemy to be advancing to attack. At 6.30 the Egyptian cavalry on the right were driven in and posted themselves with the Horse Artillery, Camel Corps, and four Maxims on the Kerreri ridge, on the right flank of the position. The British infantry were led forward a few paces, and formed up in double rank in the rear of their zeriba defences, the Egyptian battalions doing the same behind their trenches.
At 6.40 the shouts of the advancing Dervishes became audible, and a few minutes later their flags appeared over the rising ground, which formed a semicircle round the front and left faces of the position. They came on in an immense ma.s.s, composed apparently of five divisions, with ranks well kept, and marching with military regularity. As they advanced they chanted, "La Ilah illa" llah wa Mohammed rasool Allah" ("There is but one G.o.d, and Mohammed is His prophet"). Emirs and sheikhs led the way, and Baggara hors.e.m.e.n trotted abreast of the men on foot.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
At 6.45 Major Williams"s battery of Royal Artillery, on the left of the position, opened fire at a range of 2,800 yards. The guns made good practice, the sh.e.l.ls bursting in the midst of the Dervish ranks. The enemy replied with a few rounds from some guns on the Khalifa"s left, but their sh.e.l.ls all fell short. The intention appeared to be to cross the Sirdar"s front, but, suddenly swerving to their right, the main body of the Dervish forces bore down towards the southern face, where the British division was posted. Simultaneously with this movement another ma.s.s of Dervishes swarmed out from behind Jebel Surgham, to a.s.sail the left flank of the position. Though their riflemen, mounting the hill, opened a long range fire on the zeriba, this attack, being checked by the fire of the gunboats, was not pressed home.
Thus far the fire of the artillery, which had been supplemented by that from the Maxim-Nordenfeldts, though it thinned the enemy"s ranks, failed to stop their advance, and in a short time the troops on the left and front were hotly engaged.
The Guards, who were the first of the British infantry to engage, opened with section volleys from their Lee-Metfords at a range of 2,000 yards.
Then, as the range diminished, the fire ran along to the Warwicks, the Highlanders, the Lincolns, and later on to Maxwell"s brigade. From one end to the other there was a continuous blaze of flame, the men firing both in volleys and independently. The Lee-Metfords grew so hot that the men in the firing line had to change them for others held by their comrades in the rear. The weapons gave out no smoke, so the view was uninterrupted. The Dervishes were seen falling in heaps, whilst the ground in front was white with dead men"s clothing. Constantly reinforced from the rear, the a.s.sailants made repeated efforts to reach the lines of infantry, and as whole ranks went down others rushed in to fill their places. When the front rank got within 800 yards of the British force, the fire became even more deadly, and the further advance was practically arrested. Even at this range, here and there, small bodies of Dervishes continued to make isolated attempts to reach the lines, but only to perish in the effort. What took place became less a fight than an execution. One old sheikh, bearing a banner, headed one of the rushes. In a few seconds he was left with but five comrades, who in their turn all dropped, and he alone charged to within 200 yards, at which point he folded his arms across his face and fell dead.
Up to this period there had been but few casualties, and the fight had been for the Sirdar"s force about the least dangerous that a soldier ever took part in. While the original advance was being made, a few only of the Dervish riflemen paused to fire, and, more for the purpose of working up their martial ardour than anything else, discharged their weapons in the air. Even when they took the trouble to aim, the bullets from their Remingtons all fell short. As soon as the opposing forces got closer together, things changed, and the enemy"s fire began to tell. At the moment when the Dervish spearmen were being shot down in their mad rushes, a party of 200 of their riflemen managed to get within about 300 yards of the front, from which point, under cover of a bank, they opened fire. The riflemen on Jebel Surgham, though sh.e.l.led by the gunboats, persisted in their fusillade, and casualties became frequent. Captain Caldecott, of the Warwicks, was shot through the head, and died an hour later. One or two other officers, as well as two newspaper correspondents, were wounded, and twenty-five of the Camerons and over a dozen of the Seaforths had to be carried to the rear. Eventually the riflemen in front were dislodged by Major Williams"s battery, which, firing sh.e.l.l among them, caused them to get up and run, only, however, to be shot down by the Warwicks, Camerons, and Lincolns, not a single rifleman being left alive.
The attack had hitherto been almost entirely directed on the British troops, but as the fight proceeded the enemy were gradually driven more and more to the right, thus leaving the 2nd Brigade (Lyttelton"s) out of action, and giving the 1st Brigade (Wauchope"s) and Maxwell"s Egyptians all the work to do. Seeing this, Lyttelton moved up the Lancashires and the Rifles in support of the 1st Brigade.
After a while the enemy"s onrushes began to diminish. It was not so much that the charging spearmen were driven back, as that they were all killed. The fire of the troops then slackened. Just before it ceased altogether a last Dervish effort was made. This time it took the form of a cavalry attack. A party of Baggara hors.e.m.e.n, about 200 in number, formed up at a distance of about 1,200 yards and gallantly charged Maxwell"s whole brigade. A more hopeless enterprise could scarcely be imagined. Nevertheless, though swept down by rifle and Maxim fire, the remnant courageously dashed on till within 200 yards of the fighting line, when all that was left of them was a struggling ma.s.s of men and horses lying on the ground.
It was now about 8 a.m., the main attack was finished, and the great body of the enemy was gradually retiring in a westerly direction toward some hills three miles distant.
Whilst the Khalifa was delivering his first attack on the front and left of the Sirdar"s position, a large and compact body of Dervishes, under the Khalifa"s son, Sheikh-el-Din, and the Emir Wad Helu, marched round to attack the right of the position. Here, posted on the Kerreri ridge of hills, were the Egyptian mounted troops, under Colonel Broadwood, with whom, at 7 a.m., about 10,000 of the enemy, advancing rapidly, soon became engaged. On the approach of the Dervish force, the guns of the Egyptian horse battery at once opened fire at a range of 1,500 yards, and the cavalry and Camel Corps dismounting, joined in with their Martini-Henry carbines. The Dervishes, however, continued to advance, firing as they came on. The force was in far too great a number for Broadwood to hope to operate against it alone with any prospect of success, and seeing that the intention was to surround him and cut him off from the zeriba, he directed the Camel Corps and guns, covered by the cavalry, to fall back upon the right flank of the position.
There was some delay in getting the camels to move, and afterwards in taking them and the guns over the rough and broken ground. The Dervishes pursued closely, firing all the while. The Egyptians from time to time halted, and fired volleys in return. So hardly was Broadwood"s force pressed at one moment, that two of his guns had to be abandoned. For some minutes the fighting was most severe, hand-to-hand encounters took place, and over sixty of his men fell.
The Egyptian force had by this time fallen back to a point not far distant from the river, and fortunately at the critical moment one of the gunboats told off to protect the flanks steamed down to afford a.s.sistance. It at once opened with sh.e.l.l fire at close range, and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, upwards of 450 bodies being afterwards counted within a comparatively small area. The intervention of the steamers effectually checked the onslaught, and enabled the Camel Corps to get to the zeriba, although the Dervishes for some time continued the pursuit of the cavalry. After this encounter the Dervishes made no attempt to push home their attack on the right, but drew off in good order and retired under cover of the hills. This, with the repulse of the Dervish attack already recorded on the left flank, terminated the first stage of the fight.
All attacks on the position having now failed, the 21st Lancers, about 320 in number, under Colonel Martin, were sent out to clear the ground on the left front, and to head off any retreating Dervishes from the direction of Omdurman. They moved off about 9 a.m., and after crossing the eastern slopes of Jebel Surgham perceived what looked like a force of from 250 to 300 of the enemy concealed in a khor or ravine, from which a few scattered shots were fired. The Lancers then wheeled into line and charged. When they got to a distance of only 200 yards from the position, a body of Dervishes, variously estimated at from 1,500 to 3,000 in number, suddenly rose from the khor and opened fire. The trap laid was now evident enough, but the Lancers continued the charge, and, headed by their colonel, dashed on into the khor, fought their way through the Dervish ranks, and out at the opposite side.
This was not accomplished without the loss of several of their comrades.
There was a three-foot drop into the ravine, and this caused many disasters. Colonel Martin"s horse fell at this point, but, with the spearmen cutting and slashing all around him, he managed to get his charger on its legs again, and, with only a stick in his hand, rode through the fight uninjured.
The Dervishes made a desperate resistance. They reverted to their usual tactics of first hamstringing the horses and then spearing their riders.
Of the troopers who were unhorsed, hardly a man escaped alive.
Lieutenant Grenfell was killed by a sword-cut received early in the fight, when charging by the side of his men. As soon as he was missed, Captain Kenna and Lieutenant de Montmorency rode back to search for him.
Finding Grenfell"s body, de Montmorency dismounted and proceeded to put it on his horse, which unluckily bolted, leaving him alone to face the Dervishes with his revolver. Happily Captain Kenna, with the aid of Corporal Swarbrick, succeeded in catching the animal, and De Montmorency was enabled to join his troop.