"No soldiers ever stood so firmly to their posts under a heavy fire as did the Egyptians under the fire of twenty-eight ships during ten hours.
"At 9 a.m. on Thursday an English man-of-war was seen to put a small screw in place of the larger one which she had been using, and it was then known that her screw had been carried away by a shot from the forts. On examining other ships it was observed that eight had been severely battered on their sides, and that one had lost her funnel."
CHAPTER IX.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOMBARDMENT.
The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria was an occurrence of such importance, and so rare are bombardments in recent naval annals, that a few general observations will probably not be without interest.
The most obvious mode of attack on fortifications would be for the ships to form in line ahead and steam past the batteries, each ship delivering her fire in succession as her guns would bear. Having thus pa.s.sed the line of defence, the ships would turn and repeat the process with the other broadside. By manoeuvring in this manner, the forts (which have the advantage of a fixed gun-carriage), would labour under the disadvantage of having a moving target to fire at. On this principle for two and a-half hours the bombardment of the forts from Ras-el-Tin to Pharos was conducted by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_. From the fact that at 9.40 a.m. this mode of attack was changed for one which consisted in the systematic concentration of fire on individual forts, from ships more or less stationary, it may be concluded that the former plan was found faulty.
It is submitted that the best principle in practice is the consecutive silencing of individual batteries, and not a general, and so to speak collective, bombardment. In support of this principle it may be mentioned that from the time of the adoption of the second plan the fire of the ships improved very much in accuracy. This also had the further advantage of being accompanied by a simultaneous diminution in the accuracy of the fire of the enemy: as is shown by the circ.u.mstance that the majority of the hits received by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_ were sustained before 9.40--the time when these vessels came to an anchor and adopted the concentration principle.
That the fire of the ships would improve as soon as the vessels became stationary is intelligible enough, and is accounted for by the exact range being then attainable, but that the enemy should have made worse practice against a fixed than against a moving target appears a little difficult to understand. The naval officers engaged have, with some sense of humour, suggested that the vessels in manoeuvring from time to time steamed across the line of the Egyptian fire and so got struck.
The explanation, however, is probably to be found in the increased state of demoralization of the artillerymen as soon as the ships anch.o.r.ed and made more accurate practice.
In the insh.o.r.e squadron the flag-ship _Invincible_ was anch.o.r.ed for the most part 1,300 yards from Mex, and was kept broadside to the wind on one side, and to the batteries on the other, by a kedge carried out to windward. The _Monarch_ and _Penelope_ remained under way, pa.s.sing and repa.s.sing the forts. The _Penelope_ adopted the plan of steaming out three-quarters of a mile towards the reef, and then drifting towards the sh.o.r.e broadside on until within about 700 yards, whilst the _Monarch_ kept more way on, moving in a line parallel with the sh.o.r.e. The fire from these two ships was throughout less effective than that from the _Invincible_, which was at anchor.
The range at which the fleet generally engaged seems to have been needlessly great. The outside squadron could have got to within 1,000 yards of the Lighthouse Fort and 800 yards abreast of the Ras-el-Tin lines, to within 500 yards of Fort Adda and 200 yards of Fort Pharos, whilst the insh.o.r.e division could easily have got within 400 yards of all the batteries in the neighbourhood of Mex. It can hardly be doubted that the boldness of this move would have been rewarded by the more speedy and extensive dismounting of the guns, which was confessedly the chief object of the attack, and would have allowed the machine guns in the vessels" tops to be used with greater effect.
It must be remembered that the target in each case was the muzzle of a gun, a mere pin"s head at the distance at which the ships were engaged, and that a successful hit meant either good luck or phenomenally good shooting. This hammering away at long range was tolerably successful, but the length of the action was a disappointment to those who expected short work to be made of the Egyptians, while, as has been seen, it drained the stock of ammunition to a dangerously low ebb.
The enormous disproportion between the damage sustained by the ships and batteries respectively may be accounted for, partly by the inferior construction of the works, and partly also by the inferior practice of the gunners by whom they were manned. There were other faults in the defence. For example: the batteries were so placed as to be unable, except at Fort Pharos, to support one another; there was no bomb-proof cover; there was too small a stock of ammunition in readiness; and the men who should have been employed as reliefs for manning the rifled guns wasted their efforts with the smooth bores, which were practically useless.
With regard to the fire of the fleet generally, a variety of opinions has been expressed. One authority states that, with the exception of the _Inflexible_ and _Temeraire_, the English gunners did not greatly distinguish themselves. Many of the sh.e.l.ls of the _Monarch_, _Inflexible_, and _Superb_ fell short.[23] The fire also was said to have been too slow, thus giving the enemy"s artillerists time to recover themselves. The fire of the _Inflexible_ was stated to have been particularly disappointing in this respect. That of the _Alexandra_ was much more rapid than that of the others, as her much greater expenditure of ammunition shows.
A naval officer of experience has expressed the opinion that, considering the nature of the works attacked, an old line-of-battle ship, with her numerous though much smaller guns, would have been more effective than the modern ships which took part in the bombardment. If one considers the great size and weight of the majority of the projectiles used, as well as the capacity of the sh.e.l.l and the consequent amount of their bursting charges, one can hardly fail to be astonished at the small effect produced on the sand parapets, especially when it is remembered that the latter were in many cases, according to modern theory, too weak to afford any real protection. It is a fact, and one on which too much stress cannot be laid, that in only one instance was any one of the parapets pierced by a sh.e.l.l from the fleet, and that Fort Mex was the only battery which could not have been sufficiently repaired during the night to resume the action on the following day. One remarkable feature of the fire from the fleet was the enormous number of sh.e.l.ls which failed to explode, and this has never been satisfactorily accounted for.
The expenditure of ammunition by the squadron appears from the following table:--
(A) Common.
(B) Palliser.
(C) Shrapnel.
(D) Segment.
(E) Empty Sh.e.l.l.
(F) Shot.
(G) Case.
(H) TOTAL.[24]
(I) Martini-Henry.
(J) Nordenfeldt.
(K) Gatling.
(L) Rockets.
-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+--- SHIP.(A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)(H)(I)(J)(K)(L) -----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+--- Alexandra37923144074000340Superb257832534124111161880Sultan24724344101033818002000Penelope24145326238050001672Monarch2275129636718003440268021 Temeraire13970136228160Invincible2212522250200020001000Inflexible1392111372082000Beacon21161181013203 Condor162831201100020013 Bittern667112389Cygnet7271143Decoy696940Helicon66+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+--- TOTAL22462332611541751263319810,16016,233710037 -----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
The hits received by the fleet were as follows:--
_Alexandra._ Twenty-four shot and sh.e.l.l penetrated the ship above the armour-plating. Several shot and sh.e.l.l struck the armour; of these, some made indentations on the plates from five inches to one inch in depth.
The foremost funnel was struck in three places. The total number of hits was about sixty.
_Sultan._ Number of hits, twenty-seven, of which two struck the armour, denting two plates, and starting one. One shot went through the after funnel. The holes made in the side were as follows:--One sixteen inches by twelve inches; another fifteen inches in diameter; and a third fourteen inches in diameter. A hole sixteen inches by ten was made through the mainmast.
_Superb._ Fourteen hits, of which seven were on the hull, and seven on the upper works and spars. A 10-inch sh.e.l.l struck the port side, and, bursting, tore a hole in the side ten feet by four feet, within three feet of the water-line. The armour-plating on the port side was struck by two sh.e.l.ls, of which one indented the armour three inches, and the other burst, starting a plate, and breaking fourteen rivet-heads. Some of the rigging was shot away, and a hole twelve inches in diameter was made in the foremast. Two other holes in the side were as follows:--One ten inches in diameter, four feet above the water-line; the other twelve inches in diameter (made by a 10-inch shot), five feet above the water-line.
_Penelope._ Eight hits, of which three were on the armour, making little or no indentation. Of the others, one pa.s.sed through the after embrasure on the starboard side; another hit the starboard quarter gallery; the third struck a 9-pounder gun, carried off the sight and damaged the carriage; the fourth hit the mainyard, port side; and the fifth struck the muzzle of one of the 8-inch guns, then broke up and destroyed the transom plate of the carriage. The gun and carriage were put out of action.
_Invincible._ Eleven hits, six of which pa.s.sed through the side. A large dent was made in the armour by a shot which also started a plate.
_Inflexible._ About six hits altogether. One shot struck the unarmoured part of the hull, and, penetrating, damaged the bollards and did other injury. Other shots damaged the upper-works, but the armour-plating was not struck.
The _Monarch_, _Temeraire_, _Hecla_, and gunboats received no hits at all.
With regard to the effects of the bombardment on the various forts, it is proposed to give a short account, taking them in the same order in which they were first presented to the reader.[25]
1. _Fort Marabout._--A small store was burnt. There were several hits on the scarp, but none of the guns were in any way injured.
2. _Fort Adjemi._--Uninjured.
3. _Marza-el-Kanat._--No injury was done to the fort, but a store of gun-cotton was exploded.
4. The citadel of Mex had several breaches made in the works, but no guns were dismounted.
5. _Old Fort of Mex._--Parapets were uninjured, but the buildings in the rear were almost swept away. A small store in front of magazine was levelled to the ground. The large store was riddled with shot, but the magazine was untouched. The barracks were much damaged. The fort was found to contain many fragments of sh.e.l.l, and the loss of life among the defenders was probably considerable. The damage to the guns was as follows:--A 10-inch Armstrong gun was struck in the second coil by a sh.e.l.l which cut a groove of an oval shape in the metal; the coil was shaken out of place and cracked, but the gun was left serviceable. A 9-inch Armstrong gun was struck by a sh.e.l.l, and received an oval graze 125 inch in depth. In the right portion of the battery, a 10-inch S.B.
and two 8-inch Armstrong guns were struck by shrapnel bullets, and the fifth gun from the left, an 8-inch Armstrong, was struck on the coil by a sh.e.l.l. The blow dismounted gun, carriage and slide. The metal of the gun was ripped off for eighteen inches, and the trunnion ring was also started by the force of the blow. The remaining guns (36-pounders) were uninjured.
_Left Flank Battery._--Left gun(10-inch S.B.). This gun was. .h.i.t on the right of the carriage by a splinter, the gun was uninjured. No.3 gun (10-inch S.B.).--This was. .h.i.t by a sh.e.l.l on the muzzle, gun uninjured.
6. The Mex Lines, armed with S.B. guns, were not fought, and the works escaped injury.
7. _Fort Kamaria_ was not much injured. A 10-inch S.B. gun was dismounted by a sh.e.l.l.
In view of the tremendous fire to which Fort Mex was subjected, and the comparatively short range at which all the ships except the _Temeraire_ engaged it, it is almost impossible to believe that not a single gun here was disabled or dismounted during the action proper. The 8-inch gun which was dismounted was bowled over by the _Penelope_ long after the fort had ceased firing, and from a distance stated to be about 300 yards. The successful shot was the thirtieth of this series, and was aimed by the gunnery lieutenant.
"This fort was the only one which could not have resumed action on the following day, in consequence of the injury done by the landing-party by exploding gun-cotton and spiking the guns."[26]
8. _Omuk Kubebe._--The effects of the bombardment were considerable, though they were due less to the number of hits than to the size and weight of the 16-inch sh.e.l.ls which caused most of the injuries. The effect of three of these sh.e.l.ls from the _Inflexible_ was worthy of note. One sh.e.l.l having burst on the top of the scarp made an almost practicable breach. Two others, within a few feet of each other, hit the parapet, 24 feet thick, and almost pierced it. They appear to have struck the exterior slope, and having cut a trough in the parapet about 11 feet in width, burst after penetrating 17 feet, and formed craters 16 feet in diameter, and 5 feet and 4 feet 6 inches in depth, respectively.
With regard to the ordnance, the only damage was the destruction of a 36-pounder S.B. gun.
9. _Saleh Aga._--One 10-inch and one 65 S.B. gun were dismounted, and one of the 65-inch S.B. guns was destroyed, though not dismounted.