CHAPTER XXIX.
THE DESTRUCTION OF HICKS" ARMY.
Then came a long period of silence, and great anxiety began to be felt.
From its outset Hicks" army had been beset with spies, who informed the Mahdi of every movement. Hicks, on the other hand, had to trust to treacherous guides, and possibly false reports. It was, moreover, no secret that there was dissension in the Egyptian force, for Al-ed Din Pasha was jealous at not having been intrusted with the chief command, and some of the Egyptian officers were suspected of treachery.[90] Here, then, were all the elements of failure.
[Ill.u.s.tration: ROUTE OF HICKS" ARMY.]
Military critics had from the first condemned the decision forced upon Hicks to give up the proposed series of posts connecting the army with its base. Sir Samuel Baker, a high authority on the Soudan, as well as General Stone, an American officer of experience, formerly chief of the staff, stated that the force despatched was wholly inadequate, and that they antic.i.p.ated nothing but disaster. As week after week pa.s.sed on without intelligence, the public anxiety increased. Daily telegrams were sent by the Government to Khartoum, demanding news, and a steamer was despatched from there to patrol the White Nile, but in vain. Attempts to send messengers to communicate with the army failed. One messenger, who had been captured by the rebels, was put alive into an ant-hill, and this naturally tended to discourage others who might have been induced to make the attempt.
At last three soldiers returned to Khartoum from Duem, and reported that Hicks had been attacked by from 25,000 to 30,000 Mahdists at a place three leagues from Obeid, had repulsed the attack, inflicting a loss of 8,000 men on the enemy, had laid siege to Obeid, and captured it on the 4th of November, the Egyptian losses being nil.
Doubts were entertained as to the accuracy of this information. The absence of any loss on the Egyptian side in operations of such magnitude was felt to be improbable. Further, it was recognized that on the date at which Hicks was stated to have entered Obeid he must, according to his calculated rate of progress, have been at least a week"s march from that town. The report received no sort of confirmation, official or otherwise, and was soon generally disbelieved.
On the 18th November the French Consul-General received a short telegram from his agent at Khartoum, stating that, according to information from a private source, Hicks" army was surrounded and in want of provisions.
On the 19th two messengers arrived at Duem with letters. According to their statements, a fight had taken place between Egyptian troops and a great number of rebels at a place called Kaz. During the first two days"
fighting the Dervishes suffered great loss. The Mahdi, seeing this, advanced with his regular troops from Obeid, all well armed. The fighting continued from the 2nd to 5th November, when Hicks" whole army was destroyed, all being killed but about fifty men.
This news was confirmed by other persons, including a Copt, who, disguised as a Dervish, arrived at Khartoum from Kordofan on the 21st November. He a.s.serted that he was an eye-witness of the fight, in which, according to him, the Egyptian troops, with the exception of 200, were totally destroyed. The later accounts received contained more details; but as these are in many respects conflicting, it is proposed to give a short summary of one or two of the different narratives, omitting only such portions as would be mere repet.i.tion.
According to a camel-driver, who followed in the service of Kenaui Bey, the army, after leaving Duem, met the rebels, with whom some skirmishes took place, and arrived at Rahad without serious fighting. There was a lake at Rahad, from which they got a supply of water, and then started for Alouba. On this march the rebels attacked in great numbers, but were defeated. The army pa.s.sed the night at Alouba. The next day (2nd of November), after three hours" marching through a forest, a large force of rebels suddenly appeared, and the Egyptians halted and formed square.
Fighting went on all that day, and after an engagement, in which there were losses on both sides, the rebels were again defeated. Intrenchments were thrown up, and the night was pa.s.sed on the field of battle. On the 3rd the march was resumed. Again the rebels attacked in considerable numbers, endeavouring to surround the army, but after a serious engagement, in which both sides lost severely, they were once more defeated. The night was pa.s.sed on this new field of battle. On the 4th the army directed its course towards Kashgil. After four hours"
marching, the force was surprised by the rebels, who directed against it a well-sustained fire. The soldiers were halted in square, and returned the fire. They suffered terribly from thirst; nevertheless they continued to fight all that day and during the night.
On the morning of the 5th, the firing having ceased, the army advanced towards the wells. After half an hour"s march, the Dervishes, who were hidden in the woods, surrounded the troops on all sides, and opened fire. The force replied with a strong fusillade, which was well kept up till towards mid-day, when the enemy made a general charge with guns, spears, and lances, and destroyed the whole army with the exception of 200 soldiers.
On the 1st December a telegram from Khartoum stated that for the last week there had been an Arab rumour that there were dissensions between Hicks and Al-ed Din Pasha prior to the battle, and that these dissensions were known to all. Hicks, according to the rumour, was weary of waiting near the water at Melbeis. Al-ed Din Pasha refused to move further, because there was no water, and half the army went over to him, and refused to obey Hicks. Hicks therefore pushed ahead with all his European staff, artillery, and seven or eight thousand men, was entrapped into an ambush, and fought for three days, not having a drop of water or a reserve cartridge. All his army was destroyed. The rumour added that Al-ed Din and his party, who stood by the water, were afterwards attacked, and that they were at the far side of Obeid, fighting every day, with large losses; and that there was with them a white officer, English or German, who escaped, badly wounded, from the ma.s.sacre of Hicks and his army. There was also Mr. Vizetelly, an artist, a prisoner in El-Obeid.
The story of a Greek merchant who escaped from Obeid was that when Hicks started from Duem, large bodies of Arabs encamped each night on the place occupied by the army the night before. Hicks frequently wished to turn back and disperse these men, but Al-ed Din Pasha a.s.sured him that they were friendly natives following in support of the army.
On the sixth or seventh day Hicks sent back a small body of his men.
These were fired upon by the Arabs, and Hicks then insisted that these should be dispersed. Al-ed Din refused, and Hicks then drew his sword and threw it on the ground, saying that he resigned, and would no longer be responsible if Al-ed Din did not permit his orders to be obeyed.
Hicks also declared that from the time he left Duem Al-ed Din had caused his orders to be disobeyed. After some time Hicks was persuaded to resume the command; but things went on as before, the body of rebels in the rear always growing larger.
After some slight engagements, Kashgil was reached. Here an ambuscade had been formed some days before, the guide employed having been told to lead the army thither. When the Arabs opened fire it was from behind rocks and trees, where they were wholly covered, and could fire with impunity. The sh.e.l.ls and bullets of the Egyptian force were harmless, so thick was the cover. Hicks wheeled his army to gain the open, but found the defile blocked by Al-ed Din"s so-called friendly natives, who had so long been following him. They also had got under shelter, and opened fire on the army. The Arabs, from behind their protection, kept up the fire for three days, and in the whole affair lost only from 270 to 300 men. The Egyptian soldiers were then lying on the ground, dying or in convulsions from thirst, and the Arabs found them in groups of twenty or more, unable to rise. They were all speared where they lay. Hicks" staff and escort alone had water, and were in a group on horseback. When the Arabs came out of cover, Hicks charged, leading his staff, and shooting down all the rebels in his way. They galloped past towards a sheikh (supposed by the Egyptians to be the Mahdi). Hicks rushed on him with his sword, and cut his face and arm. The man had on a Darfur steel mail shirt. Just then a thrown club struck Hicks on the head and unhorsed him; the horses of the staff were speared, but the officers fought on foot till all were killed. Hicks was the last to die.[91] The Mahdi was not in the battle, but came to see Hicks" body. As each sheikh pa.s.sed, he pierced it with his lance (an Arab custom), that he might say he a.s.sisted at his death.
Later still, a boy who had been with Hicks" army, made a statement to the following effect:--At Lake Rahad Hicks made a fort and mounted twenty-three guns. The troops rested there for three days. The enemy was hemming them in, and Hicks determined to push on to Obeid. The army advanced at daybreak. It had not marched an hour when the enemy for the first time opened fire, at long range. Some camels only were wounded.
The army halted for the night, intrenched itself, making a zeriba. For two days the army remained in camp. It then marched to Shekan, where it again halted for two days in consequence of being surrounded by the enemy, whose fire began to kill both men and camels. Leaving Shekan, the force marched till noon. It then halted, as the enemy were firing from the bushes on all sides. On the third day the cavalry made a sortie, and encountering the enemy"s hors.e.m.e.n, put them to flight, capturing several horses. This was early in the day. The square then resumed its march.
Shortly after, the galloping of horses was heard, and countless Arabs appeared on all sides, waving their banners and brandishing their spears above the bushes. The square was halted, and, opening fire, killed a great many, whilst the Egyptians at the same time lost heavily. The bushes were too thick for the Krupp guns to do much execution, but the machine-guns were at work day and night. Next morning Arabs were seen lying six deep killed by these guns. There were nine Englishmen with the force besides Hicks. The Egyptians lay down to hide, but Hicks ordered his English officers to go round and make them stand up. At noon he sounded the a.s.sembly, to ascertain who was left alive. The force was shortly after joined by Al-ed Din and his division. The next morning the entire force marched together through a forest. Through field-gla.s.ses an immense number of the enemy could be seen. The men insisted on continuing their march to the water instead of halting to fight. Hicks, yielding to their remonstrance, continued to march in square. Before noon, Melbeis, where there was abundance of water, was in sight. About noon the Arabs in overwhelming numbers burst upon the front face of the square. It was swept away like chaff before the wind. Seeing this, the other sides of the square faced inwards, and commenced a deadly fusillade, both on the enemy and crossways on each other. Terrible slaughter ensued. Seeing that all hope of restoring order was gone, Hicks and the few English officers who remained then spurred their horses and sprang out of the confused ma.s.s of dead and dying. The officers fired their revolvers, killing many, and clearing a s.p.a.ce around them till all their ammunition was expended. They had then got clear outside the square, and took to their swords, fighting till they fell. Hicks alone remained. He was a terror to the Arabs. They said his sword never struck a man without killing him. They named him "the heavy-armed." He kept them all at bay until a cut on the wrist compelled him to drop his sword. He then fell. The struggling and slaughtering went on for hours. The black troops forming the rear of the square remained in good order when all else was confusion. They marched some distance and formed a square of their own. They were pursued, and the Dervishes shouted to them to surrender. They replied, "We will not surrender. We will not eat the Effendina"s (Khedive"s) bread for nothing. We will fight till we die, but many of you shall die too!"
Whilst the parleying was going on, an unexpected rush was made which broke the square, and the blacks were all killed.
This last account, which is the most circ.u.mstantial that has come to light, bears, it will be observed, a certain resemblance to the narrative of the camel-driver already quoted. In both, the serious fighting is made to begin at Lake Rahad. The advance, accompanied by frequent halts, was made through trees and bushes. The attacks made under cover were received in square formation, the men were suffering from want of water, and the final onslaught was made about mid-day. The final scene in which Hicks and his staff charged their foes also agrees with the previous accounts.
Of the number of Hicks" force which perished it is impossible to give a correct estimate. According to Gordon they were so numerous that the Mahdi made a pyramid with their skulls.
Of the number of the Mahdi"s forces engaged no very accurate accounts exist. The Copt whose narrative has already been referred to put it at the preposterous figure of 300,000. The soldiers who brought the news of Hicks" pretended victory put the Mahdi"s forces at from 25,000 to 30,000, but Orientals, in the matter of numbers, are notoriously inexact. The Greek merchant, whose account has been quoted, mentioned the Mahdi"s whole standing army as 35,000 men. Gordon Pasha, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that the enemy did not exceed 4,000 in number. It is certain that a considerable portion of the Mahdi"s forces consisted of the trained soldiers, formerly belonging to Arabi"s army, and who had surrendered at Bara and Obeid. These alone amounted to 5,500, and were provided with Remington rifles and an ample supply of ammunition. It is said that these soldiers were placed in the front rank, with the Soudanese behind to prevent their running away.
There is reason to believe that Adolf Klootz,[92] a late sergeant of the Pomeranian army, who was servant to Major Seckendorff, and deserted some days before the battle of Kashgil, took part in the action, and commanded the Mahdi"s artillery. A Christian lay-sister of the Austrian Convent at Obeid, who succeeded in escaping a month later, reported that this man was then with the Mahdi, and was the only European saved from Hicks" army.
Of the Mahdi"s losses in the battle with Hicks no record exists.
The Mahdi, after his victory, returned to Obeid, where a great religious ceremony took place to celebrate the event. The heads of the European officers were cut off and placed on spikes over the gates of the town.
Of the crushing nature of the blow inflicted by the defeat of Hicks"
army it is scarcely necessary to say more than a few words. It destroyed the only army which Egypt had ready to put in the field. It increased the prestige of the Mahdi enormously, and placed all the country south of Khartoum at his mercy.
Khartoum itself was in a situation of very great peril. Its garrison numbered only some 2,000 men to defend four miles of earthworks and keep in order 60,000 natives, of whom 15,000 were avowed rebels.
Measures for the defence of the town and the calling in, as far as possible, of the outlying garrisons were at once taken, and reinforcements were demanded from Cairo. In the meantime a panic prevailed, and all the Europeans began to take flight.
Happily the Mahdi did not follow up his success, but remained in the neighbourhood of Obeid for several weeks, occupied, probably, in dividing with his followers the spoils of victory.
CHAPTER x.x.x.
ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN--OSMAN DIGNA.
On the 31st of October, 1883, at the suggestion of Cherif Pasha, it was resolved that the British Army of Occupation, which now numbered 6,700 men, should be reduced to a total force of 3,000 men and six guns, to be concentrated in Alexandria. Speaking of the change proposed, Ministers declared, at the Guildhall banquet on Lord Mayor"s day, that by the 1st of January, 1884, the last British soldier would have left Cairo. How far this prediction was verified will be seen later on.
On the arising of trouble in the Soudan the question was submitted in Parliament to Mr. Gladstone whether or not Her Majesty"s Government regarded the Soudan as forming part of Egypt, and, if so, whether they would take steps to restore order in that province. Mr. Gladstone enigmatically replied that the Soudan "has not been included in the sphere of our operations, and we are by no means disposed to admit without qualifications that it is within the sphere of our responsibility."
On the 19th November Sir Evelyn Baring wrote to Lord Granville that bad news was expected from Hicks Pasha, and if his force were defeated Khartoum would probably fall into the hands of the rebels. The Egyptian Government had no funds to meet the emergency, and it was not improbable that the Egyptian Government would ask Her Majesty"s Government to send English or Indian troops, or would themselves send part of Sir Evelyn Wood"s army to the front.
On the 20th Sir Evelyn Baring was informed that the British Government could not lend English or Indian troops, and advised the abandonment of the Soudan within certain limits. This was at once communicated to Cherif Pasha.
On the 22nd news reached Cairo of the destruction of Hicks" army. The political consequences of this disaster will be seen from what follows.
On the 24th Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed that the recent success of the Mahdi was a source of danger to Egypt proper, and that the danger would be greatly increased if Khartoum fell, which seemed not improbable. On the 25th Lord Granville replied that under existing circ.u.mstances the British force in Egypt should be maintained at its then present strength, and, in view of the alarming condition of the Soudan, informed Sir Evelyn Baring that the Egyptian Government must take the sole responsibility of operations in that country.
On the 3rd December Sir Evelyn Baring expressed a hope that Her Majesty"s Government would adhere steadfastly to the policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Soudan. As a natural outcome of this policy, it appeared to him that neither English nor Indian troops should be employed in the Soudan, and that Sir E. Wood"s army, which was officered by English officers on the active list, should, as was originally intended by Lord Dufferin, be employed only in Egypt proper.
On the 13th Lord Granville again telegraphed that Her Majesty"s Government had no intention of employing British or Indian troops in the Soudan. They recommended the Khedive"s Ministers to come to an early decision to abandon the territory south of a.s.souan, or at least of Wady Halfa.
On the 14th Sir Evelyn Baring reported as to the immediate steps necessary if the policy of abandonment were carried out. As it was impossible to say beforehand what the effect on the population of Egypt proper would be, he recommended that Her Majesty"s Government should be prepared at a short notice to send a couple of battalions from the Mediterranean garrison, and that immediate steps should be taken to bring the force of the Army of Occupation up to its full strength.
On the 16th Sir Evelyn Baring informed Cherif Pasha that Her Majesty"s Government had no idea of sending English or Indian troops to the Soudan, that Her Majesty"s Government would not object to the employment of Turkish troops exclusively in the Soudan, with a base at Souakim, if they were paid by the Sultan. He added that Her Majesty"s Government recommended the abandonment of all the territory south of a.s.souan, or at least of Wady Halfa, and that they were prepared to a.s.sist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it and the ports of the Red Sea.
On the 20th Sir Evelyn Baring was authorized to inform Cherif Pasha that Her Majesty"s Government adhered entirely to the policy which they had laid down with regard to Egyptian affairs, which had been interrupted owing to the destruction of Hicks" army, and they were of opinion that ineffectual efforts on the part of the Egyptian Government to secure their position in the Soudan would only endanger its success. Her Majesty"s Government adhered to the advice given on the 13th inst. with regard to the course which should be pursued by Egypt in view of the disaster which had occurred in the Soudan.
The advice given to yield up the Soudan was most unpalatable to the Egyptian Government, and Cherif Pasha communicated to Sir Evelyn Baring his objections in a _note verbale_ dated 21st December. In forwarding the note Sir Evelyn added he felt sure that under no amount of persuasion or argument would the present Ministers consent to the adoption of the policy of abandonment. The only way in which it could be carried out would be for him to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty"s Government insisted on the adoption of this course, and that if his present Ministers would not carry out the policy, others must be named who would consent to do so.
On the 2nd January, 1884, Cherif wrote to Lord Granville that the former had already pointed out the necessity imposed on the Government of His Highness of retaining the Upper Nile, and the pressing need they had of obtaining the temporary a.s.sistance of an armed force of 10,000 men, with a view to opening up the Souakim-Berber road. The news which reached them from Baker Pasha confirmed the opinion that the means at their disposal were inadequate for coping with the insurrection in the Eastern Soudan. Under these circ.u.mstances, and taking into consideration that they could not get any help from Her Majesty"s Government as regarded the Soudan, the Government of His Highness found themselves compelled to apply to the Porte without delay for a contingent of 10,000 men to be sent to Souakim.