On the 16th May a half-battalion of English troops was moved up the Nile to Wady Halfa. A few weeks later some other positions on the Nile were occupied by portions of the Army of Occupation. Naval officers were also sent up the river to examine and report upon the cataracts and other impediments to navigation. Still it was not till the 5th August that Mr.
Gladstone rose in the House of Commons to move a vote of credit of 300,000 to enable the Government to undertake operations for the relief of Gordon, "in case it might be necessary."
The Government policy on the subject of Gordon had been repeatedly attacked in Parliament. On July the 8th Lord Hartington formally declared to the House of Commons that it was not the intention of the Government to despatch an expedition for the relief of Gordon, unless it was clearly shown that such was the only means by which Gordon and those dependent on him could be relieved. "We have received," added the Secretary of State for War, "no information making it desirable that we should depart from that decision." Urged on, however, by the public press, and plied day after day with questions in the House of Commons, the Government at last brought forward the vote of credit. The money was granted, and the War Office then began to take action.
Lord Wolseley had as early as April 8th pressed the Government on the subject, and on the 24th July he wrote that he thought no time should be lost in pushing up a small brigade of 3,000 or 4,000 British troops to Dongola. He believed that such a force would most probably settle the whole business, adding, "But you must know that time presses. I believe that such a force could be sent from England and reach Dongola about October 15th if the Government is in earnest, and acts at once. Remember we cannot command things, and all the gold in England will not affect the rise and fall of the Nile, or the duration of the hot and cold seasons in Egypt.
"Time is a most important element in this question, and indeed it will be an indelible disgrace if we allow the most generous, patriotic, and gallant of our public servants to die of want, or fall into the hands of a cruel enemy, because we would not hold out our hands to save him.
Dongola can be reached without fighting, and our presence there in force might secure for us all the objects we wish to obtain."
On the 20th July Gordon sent a message asking where the reinforcements were, and what was their number. On the 30th he announced, "Retreat is impossible. I recommend as a route for troops Wady Halfa, but fear it is too late." On the 31st he expressed himself to Sir Evelyn Baring as follows:--"You ask me to state cause and intention of staying at Khartoum. I stay at Khartoum because Arabs have shut us up and will not let us out."
The views of the British Government as to the rescue of Gordon were communicated by the Marquis of Hartington to General Stephenson, commanding the Army of Occupation, on the 8th August. The Government, the former wrote, were not convinced that it would be impossible for Gordon to secure the withdrawal from Khartoum, either by the employment of force or by pacific means, of the Egyptian garrisons, and of such of the inhabitants as might desire to leave. Nevertheless, he added, "Her Majesty"s Government were of opinion that the time had arrived when some further measures for obtaining accurate information as to his position, and, if necessary, for rendering him a.s.sistance, should be adopted."
As to what "further measures" were to be adopted considerable difference of opinion existed amongst the advisers of the Government. It was agreed that there were but two routes by which Khartoum could be approached by an expedition, one by way of the Nile, and the other _via_ Souakim and Berber, but which of the two presented the least difficulty was a point upon which the highest authorities differed.
The first involved sending the force a distance of 1,650 miles from its base at Cairo, by a river in which were innumerable obstacles in the shape of cataracts, rocks, and shoals. The expedition would have to proceed against the stream, thus making progress slow, and in boats, every one of which would have to be specially constructed for the purpose.
The second necessitated a march from Souakim to Berber of some 280 miles over a country furnished only with a few wells, the supply from which might have to be supplemented by water to be carried by the expedition, in addition to a journey of 200 miles from Berber to Khartoum.
In the last case there was an almost absolute certainty that the march would have to be made in the face of an opposing force.
General Stephenson, who may be considered as the highest authority on the subject, was in Cairo, and therefore in a certain sense on the spot.
He had, moreover, the advantage of conferring with Commander Hammill of the _Monarch_ and other officers, who had for weeks previously been engaged on the Nile in examining into the facilities for getting steamers and boats past the cataracts, and other obstacles in the way of river navigation. His opinion was strongly adverse to the Nile route, and in favour of that by Souakim and Berber.
Lord Wolseley, however, basing his calculations on the success of the Red River Expedition, had formed an opposite opinion to that of General Stephenson, and Lord Wolseley being all-powerful at the War Office, his views were adopted by the Government.
On the 15th of August Lord Hartington further explained his views of the measures to be adopted, insisting that the movement must be made by the Nile Valley, instead of by the Souakim-Berber route, with the sole and exclusive object of relieving Gordon, adding, "This renders it essential that, in framing any plans for the movement of troops south of Wady Halfa, the possibility of being obliged to advance as far as Khartoum itself should be included in and form a necessary part of such plans."
His Lordship at the same time declared it to be essentially necessary to provide for the return of the troops before the end of the winter season.
Lord Hartington telegraphed to Stephenson to report fully as to what he proposed, and to state the number of the force and of camels which would be required. On the 21st General Stephenson telegraphed to Lord Hartington, with the information asked for, adding, "My own opinion still is in favour of the Souakim-Berber route:--
"Should this be adopted, Egyptian troops should be sent to New Dongola, consisting of two battalions, one regiment of cavalry, one battery of artillery; one English battalion retained at Wady Halfa; half battalion Egyptian, Korosko; and one English and one and a half battalions Egyptian at a.s.souan, leaving about 2,000 Egyptians with Marines available for garrisoning Souakim and line of communication to Berber."
But Lord Hartington was evidently too much impressed by the arguments of Lord Wolseley to be inclined for further discussion. On the 22nd August he wrote:--
"I gather from the telegraphic correspondence which I have had with you since my despatch of the 15th instant that, in acting on the instructions communicated to you in my despatch of the 8th instant, you have to this date based your preparations on a scheme of operations which is substantially that sketched out in the report of Commander Hammill, dated 4th August. I also learn from your telegram of the 21st instant that, while it is in your opinion possible by the means indicated in that report to send the small force described in my despatch of the 8th to New Dongola, it would not be practicable by those means to push forward such a force as would in your opinion be required to reach Khartoum, and to bring it back within the next winter.
Influenced by this consideration, you state that your opinion is still, if such an operation should be undertaken, in favour of the Souakim-Berber route. For the reasons stated in my despatch of the 8th, I am not now prepared to authorize a movement on that line."
Then came the intimation that Wolseley was to command the expedition.
"To Lieut.-General Stephenson.
"_War Office_, _August 26, 1884_, Midnight.
"After anxious consideration, Her Majesty"s Government have come to the conclusion that it is unjust to you to ask you to be responsible for directing an operation which, after full knowledge of the plan, you consider to be impracticable. They have, therefore, decided to send Lord Wolseley to take temporarily the chief command in Egypt. Government highly appreciate the manner in which you have carried out the important and difficult duties of your command, and earnestly hope that you may feel yourself able to remain in Egypt while Lord Wolseley is there, and a.s.sist him with your advice."
In making the choice of routes, the one vital question of time seems to have been insufficiently considered. Gordon was known to be hard pressed, and the object should have been for the expedition for his rescue to arrive at its destination with as little delay as possible.
From Souakim to Berber occupied Hicks Pasha less than three weeks, and from Berber to Khartoum five or six days more; of course, it is not pretended that a force so large as Wolseley had under his orders could march nearly as rapidly as Hicks" small detachment. But it may be argued that a.s.suming that the route by Souakim was _possible_, and of this there seems no doubt, the relief expedition, even if it had to fight its way step by step, must eventually have arrived in much less time than the many months occupied by Wolseley on the river route.
CHAPTER x.x.xVII.
PROGRESS TO DONGOLA.
The Nile route having been decided on, preparations on a large scale were begun.
The first thing was to obtain boats for the transport up the Nile; and for these, contracts were at once entered into with various firms in England. Eight hundred in all were ordered. From their shape they were called whalers, and they were to be each thirty feet in length, with six feet six inches beam, and a draught of two feet six inches. Each was to weigh nine hundredweight, and was to be fitted with twelve oars and two masts with lug sails. Every boat was to be fitted to carry a dozen men, viz., two boatmen and ten soldiers, besides provisions and ammunition.
The price of each boat was 75.
Eight steam pinnaces were equipped for the expedition, as well as two stern-wheel paddle-boats.
At the same time a contract was entered into with Messrs. Thos Cook and Son, the well-known tourist agents, for the transport of the entire force as far as Sarras, just above the Second or Great Cataract.
To a.s.sist in the Nile navigation 380 boatmen, called "_Voyageurs_" were engaged; 290 of them were French or English-speaking Canadians, with a few half-breeds, all from the St. Maurice or Ottawa districts, and about fifty were Iroquois Indians from Caughnaw.a.n.ga. The remainder were Salteaux from Manitoba.[102] In addition to the Canadians 300 Kroomen were obtained from the West Coast of Africa to carry stores round the cataracts.
All the Nile steamers in serviceable condition belonging to the Egyptian Government, including those under contract to Messrs. Cook and Son, were requisitioned for the transport of the whalers and men of the expedition.
It next became requisite to fix the numbers of the force to be placed under Wolseley"s command. In doing this allowance had to be made for the many posts which it would be necessary to establish in order to keep up the line of communication.
It was at first arranged that not more than 5,000 men should form the expedition, but later on the number was raised to 7,000. Two regiments were ordered from India, three battalions from Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, one battalion from Barbadoes, and several companies of the Royal Engineers and some batteries of the Royal Artillery, with drafts of the Commissariat Transport and Army Hospital Corps, from England.
These, with the troops already in Egypt, and a contingent of seamen and Marines, made up a total force of 14,000 men, from which Lord Wolseley was to select the 7,000 required for the expedition. Colonels Sir Charles Wilson, Brackenbury, Harrison, Henderson, and Maurice, and Lord Anson, were appointed to the force for special service. General Sir Redvers Buller was named Chief of the Staff, and General Earle was told off to command a brigade.
The instructions given to Lord Wolseley stated that the primary object of the expedition was to bring away Gordon from Khartoum; and when that purpose should be effected, no further offensive operations of any kind were to be undertaken. The Government even questioned the necessity of advancing as far as Khartoum, and expressed a desire that the sphere of military operations should be limited as much as possible.
Throughout the month of August the a.r.s.enals in Great Britain were in full activity, and every effort was made to get the expedition forward in time to take advantage of the high Nile. During the latter part of the month, and during September, troops and stores were arriving almost daily in Alexandria and were being forwarded at once to the front.
One may judge of the measures taken from the fact that on the 1st September, within sixteen days after the order for the Nile boats had been given, many of them were already shipped, and a fortnight later 400, or half the total number, had been sent off.
The whalers on arriving in Egypt were at once forwarded by rail and river to a.s.siout. Thence they were towed by steamer to a.s.souan, over 300 miles further, and just below the First Cataract. Here most of them were placed upon trucks for conveyance by a railway eight miles long to Sh.e.l.lal, on the south side of the cataract. Some few were hauled through the rapids and past the Isle of Philae. Once through the cataract all was fair sailing as far as Wady Halfa, 200 miles further, where the Second Cataract forms another obstacle to Nile navigation.
Lord Wolseley arrived at Alexandria in company with Lord Northbrook on the 9th September, and left the same day for Cairo.
Meanwhile the Nile, from a.s.siout to the Second Cataract, presented a scene of unwonted bustle and activity. Posts were established at a.s.siout, a.s.souan, Wady Halfa, and other places for the purpose of forwarding supplies. Coaling stations were provided for the steamers, and almost interminable processions of steamers, barges, whalers, and native craft pa.s.sed up daily with men, horses, and stores.
Prior to Lord Wolseley"s departure from England, Sir Evelyn Wood and Commander Hammill had started up the Nile to superintend the operations.
The 1st Battalion of the Royal Suss.e.x was conveyed from a.s.souan to Wady Halfa by the _Benisouef_ steamer, and then hurried on to Dongola with three months" rations for a thousand men on board some of the boats which the Mudir had in the meanwhile despatched to Sarras. The Royal Suss.e.x was replaced at Wady Halfa by the Staffordshire Regiment, and then the Mounted Infantry came up by water to Sarras and proceeded to Dongola. Throughout the earlier part of September troops were constantly advancing, Lord Wolseley having expressed the desire that they should be pushed on to Dongola without waiting for his arrival. The men were conveyed by train to a.s.siout, and thence by steamer to a.s.souan.
A large number of the whalers had already arrived at Wady Halfa, when, on September 27th, Lord Wolseley, who had completed his plan of operations, left Cairo with his staff for Upper Egypt. Journeying along the Nile in the yacht _Ferouz_, he made frequent halts on the way, inspecting the military arrangements and visiting various points of interest. Arriving at a.s.souan on October 1st, he inspected the Egyptian and British troops encamped there, and, after visiting the Temple of Philae, again embarked with Sir Redvers Buller and his staff.
Even before Wolseley had left Cairo Generals Earle and Sir Herbert Stewart had already reached Wady Halfa. The latter at once set out for Dongola, and arrived at his destination on September 30th, at the same time as two hundred and fifty men of the Mounted Infantry, who made the journey up the Nile from Sarras in "nuggars," or native boats.
On the 5th October Wolseley reached Wady Halfa. This had become temporarily the base of the British operations as well as the permanent chief depot of commissariat and ordnance stores for the expedition. The railway at Wady Halfa, running for a distance of thirty three miles along the east bank of the Nile, was utilized for forwarding stores, &c, to Sarras. Some of the whalers were landed at Bab-el-Kebir ("The Great Gate") and carried overland above the Second Cataract, whilst others were hauled through it. A good number of the whalers had already pa.s.sed prior to the arrival of Wolseley at Wady Halfa. The first boat, indeed, was hauled up the rapids on September 25th without any other appliances than its own gear and some towing ropes, the operation occupying but a quarter of an hour. The second boat was then hauled up by means of Commander Hammill"s cleverly-arranged tackle, and the operation was carried out even more rapidly and safely.
At Wady Halfa, Wolseley got news respecting Colonel Stewart, which he telegraphed as follows:--