_"Wady Halfa, October 5, 1884._
"Stewart bombarded Berber, and, taking one steamer and some of the boats, with forty soldiers, proceeded down the river. Other steamers continued bombardment of Berber, and then returned towards Khartoum. Stewart"s steamer struck on a rock at El-Kamar, one day"s journey above Merawi. They arranged for camels to continue journey with Suleiman Wad Gamr, who went on board to undertake to supply camels and guide them, and received a sword and dress; when they went ash.o.r.e to start, they were set upon and killed. Suleiman afterwards took the steamer, and killed all but four on board. Express sent out to find out who those four are."
The statements made by different natives, who subsequently reached Dongola with reports of the murder, varied considerably as to date, time, and place, but as the informants one and all spoke from hearsay, this was not surprising. It was ultimately ascertained that the rumours were perfectly true, and that Stewart, after accomplishing two-thirds of his journey from Khartoum to Dongola, had been murdered, together with Mr. Power, the British Consul at Khartoum and correspondent of the "Times"; M. Herbin, the French Consul at Khartoum, and a number of Greeks and Egyptians.
From Gordon"s despatches and Sir Charles Wilson"s subsequent report, it appears that the expedition, consisting of three steamers, left Khartoum on the night of September 10th, and proceeded to Shendy. The steamers then went on to Berber, and, after sh.e.l.ling the forts, two of them returned southward under the command of Gordon"s man, Khasm-el-Mus, while Stewart and his companions tried to reach Dongola with the steamer _Abbas_, which carried one gun, and had in tow two boats full of men and women. All went well with the party until they approached Abu Hamid, when the rebels swarming along the sh.o.r.e opened so severe a fire that those on board the steamer had to cast the boats adrift. The boats fell into the hands of the rebels below Abu Hamid, and the Greeks and Egyptians they contained were taken in captivity to Berber. The _Abbas_, however, with forty-four men on board, pursued its course through the country inhabited by the Mona.s.sir tribe.
On the 18th September, while the steamer was approaching the village of Hebbeh, it ran upon a hidden rock, got caught when partly over, and was badly injured towards the stern. What afterwards occurred was subsequently related by an Egyptian stoker, named Hussein Ismail, who, taken prisoner at the time, ultimately escaped from the rebels and joined General Earle"s column.
He said as follows:--
"We were pa.s.sing at the time through Sheikh Wad Gamr"s country, and had seen the people running away into the hills on both sides of the river. When it was found that the steamer could not be got off the rock, the small boat (a dingey with which the launch was provided) was filled with useful things, and sent to a little island near us. Four trips were made. Then Colonel Stewart drove a nail into the steamer"s gun, filed off the projecting head, and threw both gun and ammunition overboard.
The people now came down to the right bank in great numbers, shouting, "Give us peace and grain." We answered, "Peace."
Suleiman Wad Gamr himself was in a small house near the bank, and he came out and called to Colonel Stewart to land without fear, but he added that the soldiers must be unarmed or the people would be afraid of them. Colonel Stewart, after talking it over with the others, then crossed in the boat, with the two European Consuls (Mr. Power and M. Herbin), and Ha.s.san Effendi, and entered a house belonging to a blind man named Fakri Wad Etman, to arrange with Suleiman for the purchase of camels to take us all down to Dongola. None of the four had any arms, with the exception of Colonel Stewart, who carried a small revolver in his pocket. While they were in the house the rest of us began to land. Shortly afterwards we saw Suleiman come out of the house with a copper water-pot in his hand and make signs to the people who were gathered near the place. They immediately divided into two parties, one entering the house and the other rushing towards us on the banks, shouting and waving their spears. I was with the party which had landed when they charged down. We all threw ourselves into the river, whereupon the natives fired, and killed some of those in the water; several others were drowned, and the rest were speared as they approached the sh.o.r.e. I swam to the island, and hid there till dark, when I was made prisoner with some others, and sent to Berti. I heard that Colonel Stewart and the two Europeans were killed at once, but Ha.s.san Effendi held the blind man before him, so that they could not spear him. They accordingly spared his life, and he afterwards escaped to Berber. Two artillerymen, two sailors, and three natives, are, I believe, still alive at Berber, where they were sent by Suleiman. All the money found on board and in the pockets of the dead was divided among the murderers, and everything else of value was placed in two boxes and sent under a guard to Berber. The bodies of Colonel Stewart and the others were thrown at once into the river."
Hussein Ismail, the stoker, did not actually witness the death of Stewart, but heard of it from natives, who acknowledged that he fought desperately for his life, killing one of his a.s.sailants and wounding a second one with his revolver.
According to Gordon"s Diaries, Stewart, Herbin, and Power left Khartoum of their own free will. The situation at the time was felt to be desperate. Herbin asked to go. Stewart said he would go if Gordon would exonerate him from deserting. Gordon, in reply, said that by remaining and being made prisoner Stewart could do no good, whereas by going down and telegraphing Gordon"s views, Stewart would be doing him a service.
The Greeks, nineteen in number, were sent as a body-guard, as Gordon subsequently stated. Stewart took with him the journal of events at Khartoum, from 1st March to 9th September, with the Foreign Office cypher, all the doc.u.ments relating to Gordon"s mission, and 60 in gold.[103] As to Gordon"s reason for not accompanying the party, he stated in his Diary that "he couldn"t if he would, as the people were not such fools as to let him, and that he wouldn"t if he could, desert them." He added that it was generally believed that the pa.s.sage of the _Abbas_ down was an absolute certainty without danger.
Forty more whalers reached Wady Halfa in tow of the steamer _Ferouz_ on the 16th October, and ten days later the Canadians also arrived.
Wolseley now gave orders for the troops to hurry forward with all possible despatch. There was as yet but a mere advance guard at Dongola, including the Mounted Infantry, the first battalion of the Royal Suss.e.x, some squadrons of the 19th Hussars and the Camel Corps; the main body of the expeditionary force being still at Wady Halfa, or even lower down the Nile. However, on November 2nd, the general advance practically commenced by the South Staffordshire Regiment embarking for Dongola.
The start of the South Staffordshire was followed by that of the Cornwall Regiment, some detachments of the Ess.e.x Regiment, the Royal Engineers, the West Kent, the Royal Irish, the Gordon Highlanders, and such portions of the Camel Corps, Artillery, and Transport Service as had not yet moved forward. While the mounted detachments proceeded by road along the western bank of the Nile, the foot-soldiers rowed up the river in the whale-boats.
From Wady Halfa to Dal, a distance of 123 miles, the course of the Nile comprises a series of dangerous rapids and intricate pa.s.sages, the cataracts of Samneh, Attireh, Ambigol, Tangour, Akasha, and Dal following each other in swift succession. The two first are not so difficult, but the rapids of Ambigol, which extend some four or five miles, are impa.s.sable at low Nile, and a severe trial even when the water is high. A short distance further, the Tangour Cataract bars the way, and it is as difficult of pa.s.sage as that of Ambigol.
A quant.i.ty of dynamite had been sent out from England for blasting the rocks at this and other points, but when it reached Wady Halfa any such proceeding was impracticable, as the river was then too high. The dynamite being useless, the boats had either to be carried beyond the cataracts or to ascend them, navigated by the Canadians or hauled along by natives specially engaged for the purpose. The difficulties of navigation between Wady Halfa and Samneh were ill.u.s.trated by the experience of the Royal Engineers.
The detachment of Engineers under Major Dorward, numbering fifty-seven, left Sarras in five boats at ten a.m., and by two o"clock next day had just succeeded in making the pa.s.sage of the nearest cataract. For the greater portion of the distance, seven miles in all, the work was of a most difficult and exhausting description, the current being in some places exceedingly strong, and the banks rough and most unsuitable for towing. The boats proved to be not nearly strong enough for the work for which they were intended. The rudders, too, were found to be too small to be of use, and the Canadians found fault with the boats having been provided with keels, which were not only useless but in the way. The difficulties of the ascent were increased by the falling of the Nile, which, instead of running quietly and smoothly as before, now rushed in broken water over the shallows, and increased the number of rapids indefinitely. Two new and formidable rapids made their appearance in two days between Sarras and Samneh. The pa.s.sage of the rapids was aided by natives sent down from Dongola; without their help the soldiers could never have hauled the boats up; the cargoes had to be taken out at the foot of the cataracts and carried overland to the upper end; it was not till noon on the 5th of November that Major Dorward arrived at Ambukol, the voyage occupying over a month. Three of the boats which had been injured in the ascent were repaired with tin and lead plates and made ready to continue the journey. The work of navigation was described as most severe, beginning at daylight, and only ending when it became too dark for the men to see what they were doing; the crews were frequently breast-deep in water.
To provide for the wants and the relief of the men on the way, a series of stations had been established at Ambigol, Akasheh, Tangour, Zarkamatto (or Dal), Absarat, Kaibar, and Abu Fatmeh, there being on an average one for every thirty-three miles of the river"s course between Sarras and Dongola. Each station was commanded by an officer, with a detachment of Egyptian soldiers under him and a commissariat depot.
The hauling of the steamers sent up the river for the conveyance of stores or for towing purposes proved extremely difficult. It was necessary to sling them in cables pa.s.sed under their keels, and secure them with steel hawsers round their hulls, and even then accidents frequently befell them. Some thousands of men were employed in hauling the vessels through the intricate and winding pa.s.sages among the granite rocks that lie in the bed of the river. The s.s. _Ghizeh_ pa.s.sed successfully through the cataract of Akabat-el-Banet beyond Sarras, but on reaching Tangour she was wrecked and sunk, only her masts and funnel being above water. At one moment it seemed as if the _Na.s.sif-el-Kheir_ steamer would meet with a similar fate, and it was only by the greatest exertions and by a wonderful display of skill that she was eventually got past the rapids at Samneh.
About the same time the twin screw steamer _Montgomery_ reached Samneh, having pa.s.sed through the western channel, thus avoiding the full force of the cataract. The first of the steam-pinnaces from England was likewise launched at Sarras, being successfully hauled down an improvised slip from the railway to the river, although the drop was a steep one, and the engineers had no proper appliances for such work. One of the stern-wheel steamers built by Messrs. Yarrow and Co. was brought by barges in 700 pieces to Samneh, and riveted up and launched there.
This vessel, which was 80 feet in length, 18 feet in beam, and only 16 inches in draught, was capable of carrying from 400 to 500 men and a machine-gun.
As may be supposed, there was no slight trouble in forwarding the stores which had been collected at Wady Halfa to Dongola. From Wady Halfa they went a little way by rail, and then to Ambigol by camel; between Ambigol and Tangour, and thence to Korti, by native boats and by whalers.
The Camel Corps, above referred to, which had been formed in accordance with Lord Wolseley"s instructions at an early stage, numbered in all some 1,500 men, and consisted of detachments from the Household Cavalry, and other mounted regiments, and from the Guards, each forming a separate division--Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, and Guards, with a fourth regiment of Mounted Infantry. The detachment of Marines was attached to the Guards.
The idea of forming such a corps was by no means novel, having been adopted by Napoleon I., who, when in Egypt, organized a similar force, mounted on dromedaries. This French Dromedary Corps, it is said, would march ninety miles in a day over the desert, without provisions or water. The practice, when in action, was for the animals to lie down, and for the men to fire over them.
Lord Wolseley"s Camel Corps met on the road from Wady Halfa to Dongola with frequent mishaps and delays. The camels, only really at home on their native sands, often got so entangled amongst the rocks and blocks of granite that they could with difficulty be persuaded to advance. As the march was made along the east bank of the Nile, it became necessary to ferry the animals over the river at Dongola, and considerable time was spent in this operation, as boats were not always ready at the crossing places.
On the 28th October Wolseley and his staff left Wady Halfa by train for Sarras, whence they proceeded by camels to Hannek, escorted by a small detachment of Egyptian troops, and guided by Arab sheikhs. _En route_ they met the Guards" Camel Corps, under Colonel Sir William c.u.mmings, and pushed forward to the point where the steamer _Na.s.sif-el-Kheir_ was waiting to convey them to Dongola.
On the 3rd November Wolseley arrived at Dongola,[104] and was received by Sir Herbert Stewart and the Mudir, or Governor. The native troops lined the avenue from the river bank to the Mudirieh, and a detachment from the Suss.e.x Regiment formed a guard of honour.
A firman from the Khedive to the Mudirs, the notables, and the people was read, ordering them to obey Lord Wolseley, "who had been sent to the Soudan to carry out such military operations as he might consider necessary."
His Lordship conferred on the Mudir the Order of the Second Cla.s.s of St.
Michael and St. George. It is said that the Mudir subsequently underwent a process of purification to rid himself from the contamination thus caused. The same Mudir was afterwards found to be in direct communication with the enemy.
CHAPTER x.x.xVIII.
ADVANCE TO KORTI.
Meanwhile disquieting rumours with regard to Gordon had reached Cairo, and Sir Evelyn Baring telegraphed to Lord Wolseley on November 3rd, asking him whether he had any reason to believe that there was any foundation for the reports which had been current in Cairo for the last few days, that Khartoum had been taken, and that Gordon was a prisoner.
Lord Wolseley telegraphed from Dongola the same day to the following effect:--
"Major Kitchener telegraphs to Sir C. Wilson that he has seen a man named Ibrahim Wad-Beel, who recently came from the Arabs some distance south. He said all was quiet, and when Gordon received our messenger, he fired a salute, and held a parade of troops. A second telegram from Major Kitchener, dated November 3, announces that Haji Abdallah had arrived, and stated that a man from Shendy reported that the Mahdi came with a strong force to Omdurman and asked General Gordon to surrender. General Gordon replied that he would hold Khartoum for years."
The information as to the position of Khartoum up to this date was as follows:--
On the 8th October a letter had reached Cairo from M. Herbin, the French Consular Agent at Khartoum. It was as follows:--
"_Khartoum, July 29, 1884._
"We are in a strong position at Khartoum. No need for alarm, unless it be the want of provisions (in two months our provisions will be exhausted). There is abundance of ammunition. The least a.s.sistance would enable us to relieve the town. If at the moment of eating our last biscuit we were to attempt to retire in a body northwards, the retreat could only be effected at the cost of immense exertions and dangers (the means of transport are wanting). Besides this, the people would rise to a man to pillage the convoy. A few determined men might attempt to escape southwards to the Equator, but it would be necessary to abandon most of our soldiers, and all the women and children. Gordon Pasha has decided that he will share the fate of the town, and I think it my duty to share that of the few Frenchmen shut up here. Except for unforeseen circ.u.mstances, you can even now foresee what will happen."
On October 31st Sir E. Baring had received a telegram stating that an Arab of the Kababish tribe had brought the news that the Mahdi"s troops had attacked Gordon"s force at Omdurman opposite Khartoum, a few days before, but the attack was repulsed. In a telegram dated Debbeh, November 2nd, a correspondent gave the following additional news:--
"Gordon attacked the rebels at Omdurman with a flotilla of twelve vessels, including steamers. For eight hours the engagement lasted. There were 25,000 rebels, and they had four Krupp guns. One gun burst. They retreated, leaving enormous numbers of dead behind them. The fugitives retired to Markeat, but were returning with an additional force."
On the 1st November, Sir E. Baring had received communications from Gordon to the effect that on the date they were sent off, viz., 13th July, Khartoum was "all right and could hold out for four months."
The next letter received from Gordon appears to have been the following.
Though dated in August, it was not received till the 23rd November.
It was as follows:--
"_General Gordon to Sir E. Baring._ "_Khartoum, August 5, 1884._
"We are sending up steamers to Senaar, on Blue Nile, to open route. Arabs have left our vicinity in nearly all directions.
When steamers come back we hope to recapture Berber by surprise, to place garrison in it, and Stewart and Power will descend Nile to Dongola and communicate with you. The garrison of Berber (to which I shall give provisions for three months) will be the Egyptian troops from this place; and I also shall make the foreign Consuls go down to Berber. I can look after security of Berber for two months, after which time I cannot be longer responsible for it, and you must relieve it from Dongola, or let the garrison perish and Berber be again taken by Arabs. You will dislike this arrangement, perhaps, but I have no option; and it would entail no risks to you, seeing that Berber will be held during your advance.
"All well here, and troops elated at the result of their recent victories."
Notwithstanding every effort to get the troops up the river as rapidly as possible, so many difficulties intervened that the task occupied much longer than had been antic.i.p.ated. Early in November Wolseley telegraphed that, owing to steamers breaking down, difficult coaling, and scarcity of native labour, he did not expect to concentrate his force at Ambukol, on the Nile just above Old Dongola, until the end of the year.
The necessity for pushing forward with all possible despatch was made clear to Wolseley by a letter of much later date, received from Gordon on the 17th November, saying that he could hold out for forty days with ease, but that after that time it would be difficult. The following is an extract:--