The British loss in the day"s fighting was twenty killed and sixty wounded. The officers and newspaper correspondents killed were as follows: Officers, 19th Hussars, Quartermaster A. G. Lima; Commissariat and Transport Corps, A. C. Jewell; correspondents, Messrs. St. Leger Herbert and Cameron.
A few minutes" halt to enable the men to have a drink of water and fill up their ammunition pouches was allowed, and then the column continued its march towards the hill. When the gravelly ridge was occupied the sun was about setting, and the river, which had been so long looked for, was not yet in sight. Parties were pushed on in search of it in the darkness, and eventually, half an hour after nightfall, the Nile was reached.[113]
The wounded were at once taken to the most suitable place to be found on the river bank, whilst the men went down by companies to drink. The camels, which were by this time as worn out as the men, were turned adrift to graze in the surrounding vegetation. The men were so exhausted that when they came up from their drink they fell down like logs, and difficulty was experienced in rousing them and getting them into their places for the night.
The force was allowed to bivouac in peace on the Nile bank, and both officers and men, lying on the bare ground, found the rest of which they were so much in need. The only sign of the enemy"s presence was the beating of the "tom-toms," which went on all night.
On the 20th the adjacent village of Abu Kru (which for some unknown reason was called Gubat) was occupied, and a small garrison being placed there, the rest of the troops, recruited and refreshed, marched back to relieve the party at the zeriba. As the returning column neared the work, the small garrison greeted it with hearty cheers. The task of removing the wounded, together with the rest of the camels, the baggage, and guns, was then commenced, and continued until the whole were brought to the new position at Gubat.[114] The Hussars" horses by this time had been two days and the camels five days without water.
Sir Charles Wilson"s dash for the Nile was one of the most hazardous of military operations, and has been condemned by nearly all professional critics. He not only divided his already reduced forces in the face of the enemy, but cut himself off from his baggage, artillery, and supplies. On the other hand, there was an absolute necessity for gaining a position on the river with the least possible delay, and, if a further justification were wanted, Sir Charles can point to the complete success which attended the movement. If one regards closely the question of risk, it is impossible not to feel that the despatch of Stewart"s column of only 1,800 men across the desert against an enemy of unknown strength was in itself a highly venturesome proceeding, and one which, if undertaken by a less able commander or with inferior troops, must have ended in disaster. This, in fact, was very nearly being the case with the column at Abu Klea, where nothing but the steadiness of the men saved the day. "Success justifies all risks," but it is a curious circ.u.mstance that, whilst one argument against adopting the Souakim-Berber route was that it involved a long desert march with a fight at the end at Berber, this was practically what happened to Stewart"s force, which, after a long and trying march, had to fight towards its end both at Abu Klea and Metammeh. There was this difference, however, between the two, that the result of Stewart"s operations was to open a line of communications from Metammeh to Cairo of more than 1,300 miles, instead of one of only 280 miles from Berber to the Red Sea. There was the further consideration that, from the disposition of the Mahdi"s forces, less resistance would probably have been met with at Berber than was encountered in the Bayuda desert, whilst Khartoum being almost as accessible from Berber as from Metammeh, the former would have been nearly as important as the latter as an objective point for the purposes of the expedition.
On the 21st, a garrison having been left in camp to protect the wounded, the rest of the column marched towards Metammeh, which was found to be a long village of mud houses with loopholed walls and two or three mountain guns. If, as was thought possible after the events of the previous day, it was found to be undefended, Wilson"s idea was to take possession of the place. The advance commenced at daybreak. On nearing the town it was found to be full of people and strongly held. An adjoining village was occupied by Wilson"s men, who had to sustain a well-aimed fire from the loopholed buildings, whilst they could hit n.o.body in return. Two of the British guns were brought up, but did little harm, the sh.e.l.l merely going through the mud walls without bursting. Wilson"s force was too small and already too much inc.u.mbered with wounded to justify an attack at close quarters, and the town if taken was too big to hold. So he determined to retire without pressing the attack. The troops, whose casualties amounted to only one man killed and one officer wounded, now deployed and fell back covered by skirmishers and the artillery.
Just at the moment when the attacking force was nearest the town, and the guns were attempting to make a breach in the enemy"s walls, four steamers flying the Egyptian flag came down stream and anch.o.r.ed. Every one knew at once that they were from General Gordon, and greeted them with loud cheers. They were commanded by Nusri Pasha, and were sent by Gordon from Khartoum to communicate with the expeditionary force. They had on board some Soudanese and Egyptians and some bra.s.s howitzers. Four of the latter were at once landed and run into action by a force of Soudanese from the steamers under Khasm-el-Mus, a native sheikh with the rank of bey. These made excellent practice at the town up to the moment when the retreat sounded.
Khasm-el-Mus stated that he had seen a force under Feki Mustapha marching down the west bank from Khartoum, and that it would reach Metammeh by sunset or very early next morning. The camp at Gubat was therefore hurriedly placed in a state to resist an attack, and arrangements were made for bringing in such of the stores as still remained at the zeriba.
CHAPTER XLII.
GORDON"S JOURNALS.
Gordon"s journals began on 10th September, 1884, and continued to 14th December, 1884. Want of s.p.a.ce renders it necessary to give but a few extracts.
Gordon seems to have felt the announcement that the object of Lord Wolseley"s expedition was to relieve him not less acutely than the neglect with which he had been treated by the Government. More than once he recurs to the subject, and the receipt of some newspapers mentioning the departure of the Gordon Relief Expedition drew from him the following comments:--
"I altogether decline the imputation that the projected expedition has come to _relieve me_; it has come to save our national honour in extricating the garrisons, &c., from the position our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons in....
_I came up to extricate the garrisons and failed; Earle comes up to extricate garrisons, and, I hope, succeeds_. _Earle does not come to extricate me_.... I am not the _rescued lamb_, and will not be."
In another pa.s.sage he refers again to the personal question:--
"It may be said that the object of the present expedition is for my relief personally; but how is it possible for me to go away and leave men whom I have egged on to fight?"
On the subject of how the expedition should advance, and of what it ought to do on arrival, he wrote the following:--
"My view is this, as to the operations of British forces. I will put three steamers, each with two guns on them, and an armed force of infantry at disposal of any British authority. Will send these steamers to either Metammeh, opposite Shendy, or to the cataract below Berber to there meet any British force which may come across country to the Nile. These steamers with this force coming across country will (D.V.) capture Berber and then communicate with Khartoum.... When Berber is taken I should keep the bulk of the forces there, and send up the fighting column to Khartoum."
On the same subject he adds:--
"I cannot too much impress on you that this expedition will not encounter any enemy worth the name in a European sense of the word; the struggle is with the climate and dest.i.tution of the country. It is one of time and patience, and of small parties of determined men, backed by native allies, which are got by policy and money. A heavy lumbering column, however strong, is nowhere in this land. Parties of forty or sixty men, swiftly moving about, will do more than any column. If you lose two or three, what of it? It is the chance of war. Native allies above all things, at whatever cost. It is the country of the irregular, not of the regular. If you move in ma.s.s, you will find no end of difficulties, whereas, if you let detached parties dash out here and there, you will spread dismay in the Arab ranks."
Later on he wrote:--
"All that is absolutely necessary is for fifty of the expeditionary force to get on board a steamer and come up to Halfiyeh, and thus let their presence be felt; this is not asking much, but it must happen at once, or it will (as usual) be too late."
It will not excite any great surprise that Gordon should have felt bound to come to the conclusion that--
"We are wonderful people; it was never our Government that made us a grand nation; our Government has been ever the drag upon our wheels. It is, of course, on the cards that Khartoum is taken under the nose of the expeditionary force, which will be _just too late_."
As indicated in this last sentence, Gordon seems to have had a presentiment that the relief which he had been looking to, more for the sake of his followers than of himself, would fail to arrive in time.
Thus, on October 24th, he wrote, "If they do not come before the 30th November, the game is up, and Rule Britannia." And then comes the following paragraph, in characteristic style:--
"I dwell on the joy of never seeing Great Britain again, with its horrid, wearisome dinner-parties and miseries. How we can put up with those things pa.s.ses my imagination! It is a perfect bondage. I would sooner live like a Dervish with the Mahdi than go out to dinner every night in London. I hope, if any English general comes to Khartoum, he will not ask me to dinner. Why men cannot be friends without bringing their wretched stomachs in, is astounding."
The variety of Gordon"s ideas, military, political, and humorous, is forcibly ill.u.s.trated throughout the journals. Now he is describing a battle with clearness and graphic power, now he is criticizing a Government or a Minister, and now and again he is indulging his love of fun, at one time in pure jest, and at others in brilliant satire.
Speaking of the tendency of his men to duck their heads in order to avoid the Arab rifle-fire, he says:--
"In the Crimea it was supposed and considered mean to bob, and one used to try and avoid it. ---- used to say, "It is all well enough for you, but I am a family man," and he used to bob at every report. For my part, I think judicious bobbing is not a fault, for I remember seeing on two occasions sh.e.l.ls before my eyes, which certainly had I not bobbed would have taken off my head. "And a good riddance, too," the Foreign Office would say."
One of the most amusing pa.s.sages is that in which he says, "I must say I hate our diplomatists." Here follows a rough sketch of two figures, one intended for Sir Evelyn Baring, and the other for Mr. Egerton, his deputy in Cairo. The former is represented as saying, "Most serious, is it not? He called us humbugs--arrant humbugs." Egerton is made to reply, "I can"t believe it; it"s too dreadful." Gordon, with characteristic candour, continues, referring to diplomatists in general, "I think with few exceptions they are arrant humbugs, and I expect they know it."
The foregoing is accompanied by one of the many extracts from the Scriptures, which abound. It is as follows: "Blessed is the man who does not sit in the seat of the scornful" (Ps. i. 1).
Hearing the news that to prevent outrage the Roman Catholic nuns at Obeid had been compelled to declare themselves married to the Greek priests, Gordon remarks, "What a row the Pope will make about the nuns marrying the Greeks; it is the union of the Greek and Latin Churches."
On the 23rd of September Gordon says, that from 12th March till 22nd September the garrison had expended 3,240,770 Remington cartridges, 1,570 Krupp cartridges, and 9,442 mountain-gun cartridges. He calculated that of the Remington cartridges perhaps 240,000 had been captured by the enemy, so that the number fired away would be only three millions.
As the rebels lost perhaps 1,000 men in all, he reckons that each man killed required 3,000 cartridges to kill him.
There is less in the Diaries than might have been expected in the way of personal attack on the Government which sent Gordon to Khartoum. He says, indeed:--
"I could write volumes of pent-up wrath on this subject if I did not believe things are ordained and work for the best. I am not at all inclined to order half rations with a view to any prolongation of our blockade; if I did so it would probably end in a catastrophe before the time when, if full rations are given, we should have exhausted our supplies. I should be an angel (which I am not, needless to say) if I was not rabid with Her Majesty"s Government; but I hope I may be quiet on the subject of this Soudan and Cairo business, with its indecision; but to lose all my beautiful black soldiers is enough to make one angry with them who have the direction of our future."
The diaries refer frequently to the Stewart incident, already mentioned in these pages. Gordon resolved to send the _Abbas_ down, and upon his a.s.suring Stewart, in reply to his inquiry, that he "could go in honour,"
Stewart left. Stewart asked for an order, but this Gordon refused, as he would not send him into any danger he did not share. It was the wish of Stewart and Mr. Power (the "Times" correspondent) to leave Khartoum and proceed down the Nile, and Gordon placed no restraint on their wish.
Further, when they left he took every step in his power to provide for their security. He sent his river boats to escort them past Berber, and he gave them much advice, which, if it had been implicitly followed, should have brought them in safety to Dongola. Once reconciled to their departure and the despatch of some of his steamers northwards, he formed his plan for the co-operation of the latter with the Relief Expedition.
It has been shown how this was actually carried out; but while thus endeavouring to facilitate the progress of the expedition, Gordon seriously weakened his own position in Khartoum.
That these steamers, each of which he considered worth 2,000 men, had to run no inconsiderable danger is shown by the following extract:--
"If any officer of the expedition is on board, he will know what it is to be in a penny boat under cannon-fire. The _Bordein_ has come in; she has seven wounded and one woman killed."
The news of the loss of the _Abbas_ was a terrible blow to Gordon, and although at the time he knew nothing certain as to the fate of those on board, yet he feared treachery. Many of his antic.i.p.ations as to the ultimate fall of Khartoum and other events were prophetic; and although he did not foresee the exact circ.u.mstances of the loss of the _Abbas_, he foresaw the fate of Stewart and those with him. After he heard that the _Abbas_ had been captured, but had received no information as to the circ.u.mstances of the loss, he writes:--
"Stewart was a man who did not chew the cud, he never thought of danger in prospective; he was not a bit suspicious (while I am made up of it). I can see, in imagination, the whole scene, the Sheikh inviting them to land, saying, "Thank G.o.d, the Mahdi is a liar!"--bringing in wood--men going on sh.o.r.e and dispersed. The _Abbas_ with her steam down, then a rush of wild Arabs and all is over!"
Throughout the journals reference is made to various important doc.u.ments, the most notable of which is a letter from the Mahdi to Gordon, dated 2nd Moharrem, 1302 (22nd October, 1884). In it the writer says:--
"We have now arrived at a day"s journey from Omdurman, and are coming, please G.o.d, to your place. If you return to the Most High G.o.d, and become a Moslem, and surrender to His order and that of His Prophet, and believe in us as the Mahdi, send us a message after laying down your arms and giving up all thought of fighting, so that I may send you some one with safe-conduct, by which you will obtain (a.s.surance of) benefit and blessing in this world and the next. Otherwise, and if you do not act thus, you will have to encounter war with G.o.d and His Prophet. And know that the Most High G.o.d is mighty for your destruction, as He has destroyed others before you, who were much stronger than you, and more numerous."
In reply, Gordon sent a telegram to the Commandant of Omdurman, to be communicated to the Mahdi, with the memorable words "I am like iron, and hope yet to see the English arrive."
The following pa.s.sages record some of the later incidents of the siege:--
"12th November, 10.20 a.m.--For half an hour firing lulled, but then recommenced, and is still going on. The _Ismailia_ was struck with a sh.e.l.l, but I hear is not seriously damaged. The _Husseinyeh_ is aground (I feel much the want of my other steamers at Metammeh). 11.15 a.m.--Firing has lulled; it was very heavy for the last three-quarters of an hour from _Ismailia_ and Arabs. It is now desultory, and is dying away.