"The strength and composition of this little army was calculated for the relief, not the siege and capture, of Khartoum, the two operations being entirely different in character and magnitude. The former meant one or more engagements in the open with an enemy who, owing to the geographical position of Khartoum, could not concentrate his forces without raising the siege, and who, in order to concentrate, would have had to pa.s.s his troops, guns, ammunition, &c., over two unfordable rivers of considerable breadth, in the face of General Gordon"s armed steamers.
"If he opposed my advance along the right bank of the Nile upon Khartoum, he must have fought in a position where defeat would have been his destruction. I think I may say that, as long as Khartoum held out, he could not have prevented my entering it, although he might afterwards have awaited my attack in a selected position on the left bank of the White Nile to the south or south-west of the city.
"With Khartoum in the enemy"s possession, the whole conditions are reversed, and the Mahdi, strengthened by the large number of rifles, guns, ammunition, &c., taken in that place, and by the captured troops, who would certainly fight on his side, could concentrate an overwhelming force to oppose my advance; and, if defeated, could still fall back upon the city, the siege and capture of which, situated as it is in the fork of two unfordable rivers, would be an impossible operation for the little army under my command, more especially as it would then be inc.u.mbered by a large number of wounded men. As I have already said, the force under my command was not intended for any operation of that magnitude, nor was such an operation even contemplated in the instructions I received from Her Majesty"s Government. Khartoum, in the hands of the enemy, cannot be retaken until the force under my command has been largely augmented in numbers and in artillery."
Although operations against Khartoum were for the moment out of the question, the necessity of doing something seems to have occurred both to the Government and Lord Wolseley, if only for the sake of satisfying public opinion and restoring the prestige of the British army.
Seeing the position occupied by the British forces at this time, it is not surprising that Wolseley should have had the idea of seizing Berber by means of a combined attack by the River column under General Earle and by the Desert column from Metammeh under General Buller. It was intended that this operation should be accompanied by an onslaught upon Osman Digna in the neighbourhood of Souakim, which it was hoped would have the effect of keeping open the road between that place and Berber.
On 8th February, Wolseley telegraphed to General Earle as follows:--
"Government have decided that Mahdi"s power at Khartoum must be overthrown. This most probably means a campaign here next cold weather, and certainly the retention in the Soudan of all troops now here. A strong force of all arms goes as soon as possible to Souakim to crush Osman Digna. We must now take Berber. Buller will take Metammeh. Let me know date you will reach Berber, so that Buller"s force may co-operate with you."
The same day Wolseley telegraphed to Lord Hartington as follows:--
"The sooner you can now deal with Osman Digna the better. I should recommend brigade of Indian Infantry and one regiment of Punjaub Cavalry to be sent to Souakim as soon as possible to hold that place during summer, and co-operate with me in keeping road to Berber open; the English troops you send now to Souakim might then either go to mountains near there for summer, or to Egypt to be ready for autumn campaign."[129]
It is clear from the two preceding despatches that there had been some communication between the General and the Government which has not been disclosed, on the subject of the English force which it was intended to send to Souakim.
On 9th February, a further despatch from Wolseley to Earle stated that the Government had decided that the troops were to stay in the Soudan till the Mahdi"s power at Khartoum was destroyed; that if they could not do this before the hot weather they must wait till autumn; that Buller had left Gakdul on the 8th for Gubat, and would take Metammeh as soon as the Royal Irish reached Gubat; that on the River column reaching Berber, Buller, who would be in the neighbourhood with four or six guns and about 1,500 men on the left bank, would meet Earle and co-operate with him in the attack on Berber.
The Government lost no time in carrying out the Souakim project, and on the 9th General Stephenson in Cairo received instructions to arrange for the immediate purchase of camels for the expedition,[130] and on the 9th February Lord Hartington telegraphed to Wolseley the composition of the force which the Government proposed sending to Souakim, making altogether 9,000 men. The despatch added that the Indian Brigade and cavalry asked for had also been ordered. The General was asked to give his opinion as between this and the smaller force, which could move more quickly.[131]
On the 11th Wolseley"s plans were so far matured that he telegraphed to Lord Hartington that he proposed leaving for Gubat to direct the operations himself.
To this Lord Hartington replied on the 13th that there appeared to be great advantages in Wolseley"s present position for communicating with both columns, and with Souakim and Egypt, and stated that the Government relied on him not to allow his natural wish to take an active part in the operations to influence his decision. The General replied that, as he did not expect to take Berber before the 16th March, there was no immediate necessity to decide the question of his leaving. He added that he proposed to leave General Dormer in command at Korti in case he (Wolseley) felt it desirable in the interests of the service to go forward.
On the 17th Lord Hartington telegraphed to Wolseley further details as to the Souakim force, and also the arrangements made with Messrs. Lucas and Aird for the construction of a railway from Souakim to Berber.
This seems to have been the first mention of the railway. Wolseley replied that if he could take Berber before the hot weather set in, which was very doubtful, the railway could then be made through to that place without any cessation of construction; but, if Berber were in the enemy"s hands, in all probability it could only be made to the neighbourhood of Ariab. In the meantime, rails, sleepers, &c., for the construction of the desert section of 110 miles, from Ariab to Berber, should be collected at Ariab.
A few days later the news of Buller"s retreat from Gubat apparently caused Wolseley to modify his plans.
Reporting that movement on the 18th, his Lordship added as follows:--
"I think he (Buller) acted with wisdom and discretion; for, since the fall of Khartoum, the whole of the Mahdi"s army is disposable, and could have invested him at Gubat with a large force, not only of men, but of guns; this they cannot do either at Abu Klea or Gakdul. My instructions to General Buller were on no account to allow himself to be shut in near Metammeh; and, with the information he had of the Mahdi"s movements, in proceeding to Abu Klea, he has rightly interpreted the spirit of these instructions. The fall of Khartoum set free for the Mahdi a considerable army; and furnished him with an a.r.s.enal containing a great number of guns and rifles, and about 1,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. Operations which before could be carried out under only the ordinary hazards of war cannot now be undertaken without incurring inordinate risks.
When Khartoum fell, moreover, the main object for which General Stewart"s force was sent to Metammeh ceased to exist. That object was to be prepared to march at once, even at considerable hazard, to the a.s.sistance of Gordon, should it be found that he required immediate aid.
"The capture of Khartoum left his force without an objective; while, at the same time, it greatly increased the insecurity of its position. Its isolated situation, separated from me by 180 miles of desert, and liable at any moment to have its communications cut by a movement of the Mahdi down the Nile, has latterly caused me considerable anxiety."
At the opening of Parliament on the 19th February the Government announced that it had decided on going to Khartoum to break the power of the Mahdi. On the 20th February Lord Wolseley telegraphed that the state of his supplies would not admit of his going to Berber, even if he thought his lines of communication sufficiently secure, which he did not think they were, to warrant such a forward movement so late in the season. He would hold the line of river from Merawi to Dongola and Hanneck Cataract during the summer, and prepare for an autumn campaign.
To do anything else would, he thought, be unwise.
With a view to carrying out the plan of holding the river as indicated, Wolseley now sent orders to Earle"s Nile Column, to stop the advance upon Berber and to return to Merawi.
On the 21st, Lord Hartington asked Wolseley if anything more could be done for supplies for the summer.
Lord Wolseley replied on the 22nd as follows:--
"When I have concentrated my force on this part of the Nile, I have no fear for my communications, so I do not want any more troops here now. It is important to thoroughly crush Osman Digna, and restore peace to the country now under his influence, in order to push forward the railway, and, by a brilliant success near Souakim, make the Soudanese realize what they must expect when we move forward in the autumn."
Wolseley"s views on the military situation, and on the operations to be conducted, were communicated to Lord Hartington in a despatch dated 6th March, 1885, from which the following is an extract:--
"In reply to my telegram, your Lordship informed me that my immediate duty was to protect the province of Dongola--the only province of the Soudan which is still clear of the enemy--and that, as soon as the necessary arrangements could be completed, Her Majesty"s Government had determined to destroy the Mahdi"s power at Khartoum, in order that peace, order, and a settled government might be established there. This I conceive to be in general terms a fair description of the new mission with which I have been intrusted, and which I shall endeavour to carry out next autumn.
"I take this opportunity of congratulating Her Majesty"s Government upon having adopted the Nile route as the line of advance for this force on Khartoum. Had this army been despatched from Souakim as a base, and upon arrival at, or near, Berber, learnt that Khartoum had fallen, it could not possibly have transferred its base to the Mediterranean, for it could not have been fed under those circ.u.mstances in this part of the Nile Valley. The province of Dongola would have been at the enemy"s mercy, and the frontiers of Egypt would have been open to his attack.
"As it is impossible for me to undertake any offensive operations until about the end of summer, it is important that in the meanwhile Osman Digna"s power in the Souakim district should be crushed. The defeat will, in some measure, act as a counterpoise to the Mahdi"s capture of Khartoum. This operation is not difficult, as the forces are near the seaboard, and it should be immediately followed by the occupation of the Tokar and Sinkat districts. A railway should also be begun without delay at Souakim in the direction of Berber. Your Lordship has informed me that a contract has been entered into for the construction of this railway on a gauge of 4 ft. 8-1/2 inches.
"Although I do not for a moment entertain the idea that a railway of such a gauge can be completed over the 250 miles (about) of country lying between Souakim and Berber in time to have any very direct or immediate effect upon our operations towards Khartoum next autumn, I am convinced that active progress made upon it will bring home to Mohammed Ahmed, and to all intelligent Sheikhs, the fact that we are now in earnest, and do not mean to leave the country until we have re-established order and a settled government at Khartoum.
"I am now engaged in distributing the army along the left bank of the Nile on the open reach of water that extends from the Hanneck Cataract to Abu Dom, opposite Merawi. There I shall be quite prepared to meet Mohammed Ahmed at any time during the summer, should he, by any good fortune, be tempted to advance in this direction. During the summer I shall collect the supplies which this army will require for its advance in the autumn. The railway from Souakim to Berber would take about two years and five months to complete."
In reading this despatch it will be seen that Wolseley lays stress upon the necessity of crushing Osman Digna"s force at Souakim. He also recommends the immediate construction of the Souakim-Berber railway. But on the 20th February instructions had already been given to Graham to effect both these objects. Of this Wolseley was fully aware at the time, and it strikes one as singular that so late in the day he should be found advising the Government to take two steps which had already been decided on.
Further, it will be noticed that his Lordship, whilst approving of the construction of the railway (which he reckons would require two years and five months) is careful to point out that he does not for a moment entertain the idea that it could be constructed in time to have any direct or immediate effect upon the operations towards Khartoum, to be undertaken in the autumn.
Another singular feature in the despatch is the complacency with which his Lordship, after the total failure of the expedition by way of the Nile, congratulates the Government on having chosen that route.
The difficulties in the way of further operations during the summer now began to be apparent. The hot weather had set in at Korti. The thermometer on the 5th March registered 104 degrees under the shade of the trees. Later on it went up two degrees higher still. The wind blowing from the desert was like a blast from a furnace. Under these conditions the tents with which the soldiers were provided offered little or no protection. Sickness, too, began to break out, and several cases of enteric fever were reported.
The Nile Column, as already stated, got back on the 8th March, and the last troops of the Desert Column arrived from Abu Klea on the 16th, and, with the exception of the detachment left at Merawi, the whole of Wolseley"s army was now a.s.sembled at Korti.[132]
CHAPTER XLVIII.
THE SOUAKIM EXPEDITION OF 1885.
The real object and intention of the Gladstone Administration in directing the despatch of the Souakim expedition of 1885 will probably remain for ever a mystery.
Wolseley had, it is true, pointed out the necessity of losing no time in dealing a crushing blow to Osman Digna, and had suggested the sending of a brigade of Indian Infantry and a regiment of Punjaub Cavalry to Souakim to hold that place during the summer and to co-operate with him in keeping open the road to Souakim. He also approved the commencement of the Souakim-Berber railway. But his demands, so far as the published papers show, appear to have gone no further than that. The expedition told off to Souakim was nevertheless fixed at 9,000 men, and comprised nearly every arm of the service. In addition, there were all the plant, materials, and labour required for the purpose of making the Souakim-Berber railway. The season chosen for the expedition, too, was singularly unfortunate, as it coincided with the precise time of the year at which, a twelvemonth before, the hot weather had compelled the withdrawal of Graham"s army, and when even the one or two squadrons of Cavalry which Gordon had asked to be sent to Berber were refused him.
There is some reason to suppose that at the time the expedition was resolved upon the idea was that it should co-operate with Wolseley"s forces in a movement upon Khartoum as soon as the Nile force should have succeeded in taking Berber, and that when the movement on Berber was postponed till the autumn the object of the expedition had to be limited to "the crushing of Osman Digna and the opening up of the Souakim-Berber route." At all events, this was announced as the official programme. It will not fail to strike the reader that this was to undertake in March, 1885, with troops from England, precisely the enterprise which the Government, in March, 1884, declined to undertake with troops on the spot. The only change in the situation was that then the expedition would have been in time to have saved Khartoum, whereas now it was too late. It seems to have been fated that the policy of "Rescue and retire"
should always be adopted, the former too late, and the latter too soon.
Probably the true explanation is to be found in the exigencies of the political situation. The Gladstone Administration felt the necessity for doing something, if only to satisfy public opinion, intensely excited by the news from Khartoum. The Government had allowed Khartoum to fall and Gordon to perish. The result was neither creditable to the Ministry nor favourable to British prestige. On the 19th February Lord Salisbury, replying to Lord Granville"s announcement that the Government had "decided upon going on to Khartoum to break the power of the Mahdi,"
declared that "Gordon had been sacrificed to the squabbles of a Cabinet and the necessities of party politics."
This was followed on the 23rd by Sir Stafford Northcote moving a vote of censure in the House of Commons on the Soudan policy of the Government.
The motion was only lost by fourteen votes, a similar motion by Lord Salisbury being carried in the House of Lords by no less than 121 votes.
Whatever may have been the motives of the Government in deciding upon the expedition to Souakim, no time was lost in making the necessary preparations. This time it was determined to carry out the operations on a grand scale.
The force was fixed at considerably more than double the number engaged in the Souakim expedition of 1884.