That the Ca.n.a.l should be open to both merchant vessels and men-of-war both in time of war and peace; that the Ca.n.a.l should not be subject to the exercise of the right of blockade; that no act of hostility should be committed in the Ca.n.a.l, its ports of access, or within a radius of three miles; that vessels of belligerents should only take in supplies so far as they were actually necessary, and that their stay in port should be limited to twenty-four hours; that the like interval should elapse between the sailing of a belligerent vessel and the departure of a vessel of a hostile Power; that no belligerent Power should disembark or embark either troops or munitions of war; that no vessel of war belonging to the contracting Powers should be stationed in the Ca.n.a.l, and not more than two at Port Sad or Suez; that the restrictions imposed should not apply to measures which the Sultan or the Khedive might take for the defence of Egypt by their own forces or for the maintenance of public order; and that no fortifications should be erected.
Referring to a former chapter dealing with M. de. Lesseps" contention as to the neutrality of the Ca.n.a.l, it is worthy of note that in no part of the Convention does the word "neutrality" occur, and it is a fact that in Lord Salisbury"s instructions to the British delegates they were expressly warned to avoid using that expression and to subst.i.tute for it the term "freedom of navigation."
_The Army of Occupation._ In August, 1885, the continued presence of the Army of Occupation (then 14,000 in number) had for some time been producing increased irritation on the part of the Sultan, and also of the French Government. Sir H. Drummond-Wolff was then sent to the East with the object of endeavouring to arrive at some understanding with regard to the withdrawal of the British troops. The British envoy was also, in combination with the Turkish commissioner Moukhtar Pasha, to consider the steps to be taken for tranquillizing the Soudan, and to inquire what changes might be necessary in the civil administration of Egypt.
The British commissioner was received by the Sultan on 29th August, and having signed a preliminary convention with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs at Constantinople, came on to Cairo two months later, where he was joined by his colleague.
Their joint inquiry lasted till the end of 1886, and resulted in various suggestions which were not adopted.
In January, 1887, the Sultan, backed by France, was pressing the British Government to name a day for the evacuation, and, with a view to meeting his views as far as possible, a definite convention on the subject was signed by the two commissioners on the 22nd May, 1887.
According to this agreement, the British troops were to withdraw at the end of three years, unless at the expiration of that period external or internal danger should render the postponement of the evacuation necessary, in which case the troops were to be withdrawn as soon as the danger should have disappeared. Two years after the withdrawal, the supervision exercised by Great Britain over the Egyptian army was to cease. Thenceforward Egypt was to enjoy territorial immunity, and, on the ratification of the Convention, the Powers were to be invited to recognize and guarantee the inviolability of Egyptian territory.
Nevertheless, the Convention continued, the Turkish Government was to have the right to occupy the country militarily if there should be danger from invasion without, or if order and security were threatened within. On the other hand, the British Government reserved the right to send, in the above-mentioned cases, troops which would take the measures necessary to remove those dangers. Lastly, both the Ottoman and British troops were to withdraw as soon as the causes calling for their intervention should be removed.
The essential point in the agreement was the recognition, by the Sultan, of England"s right to reoccupy Egypt, on emergency, and this at once gave rise to trouble.
As soon as the terms of the Convention were communicated to the French Government, the French Amba.s.sador was rampant everywhere, and both he and his Russian colleague at Constantinople made the most violent opposition. They lost no opportunity of putting pressure on the Sultan, who at first was disposed to abide by the arrangement. They went so far as to declare that, if he ratified the Convention, France and Russia would thereby have a right to occupy provinces of the Turkish Empire, and to leave only after a similar convention should be concluded with them. They also hinted that France might do this in Syria, and Russia in Armenia. Austria, Germany, and Italy, on the other hand, urged the ratification of the Convention, but the poor Sultan was too much alarmed to consent, and, on the 14th July, proposed to England to throw over the agreement which his Ministers had signed, and to reopen negotiations for a new convention altogether.
This was a little too much for Lord Salisbury, then Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. Needless to say the mission of the British envoy, upon which 25,046 in money and two years in time had been wasted, came to an end, and Sir H. Drummond-Wolff, who had already been waiting for a month to obtain the desired ratification, left Constantinople on the 15th. His colleague, Moukhtar Pasha, whose occupation was now gone, nevertheless remained in Egypt, where he is to be found at the present date, drawing a handsome salary, but with no defined duties.
The failure of the negotiations was probably as little regretted by Lord Salisbury as it was by everybody else having the welfare of Egypt at heart. Although the time may arrive when that country will be in a position to walk alone, in 1890 (the period fixed for the withdrawal of the Army of Occupation) that time had not been reached. The reforms inaugurated were then only beginning to bear fruit, and, without the supporting influence afforded by the presence of British troops, ran the risk of being only imperfectly carried into effect, even if they did not perish altogether.
It must be conceded that, considered merely as a military force, the presence of the Army of Occupation has for years ceased to be necessary.
British Ministers have over and over again declared that England"s intervention in Egypt was for the purpose of suppressing anarchy, supporting the authority of the Khedive, and restoring public order. No one can deny that all these objects have long since been attained, and those who attempt to justify the retention of the British troops on the supposition that their withdrawal might be followed by fresh troubles adopt an argument similar to that of a person who, having extinguished a conflagration in his neighbour"s house, should persist in occupying it on the pretence that the fire might break out again.
But regarded as a moral support to England in carrying out her extended programme of reforming Egyptian inst.i.tutions, the presence of the Army of Occupation may be for some time to come a necessity.
Writing on this subject, Sir Alfred Milner, in his admirable work "England in Egypt," remarks as follows:--
"The British troops have of course no sort of status in the country. They are not the soldiers of the Khedive, or foreign soldiers invited by the Khedive; they are not the soldiers of the protecting Power, because in theory there is no protecting Power. In theory, their presence is an accident, and their character that of simple visitors. At the present moment they are no longer, from the military point of view, of vital importance, for their numbers have been repeatedly reduced, and for several years past they have not exceeded, and do not now (1892) exceed, 3,000 men. It is true that their presence relieves a certain portion of the Egyptian army from duties it would otherwise have to perform, and that, if the British troops were altogether withdrawn, the number of Egyptian soldiers might have to be somewhat increased. But its value as part of the defensive forces of the country does not, of course, const.i.tute the real importance and meaning of the British Army of Occupation. It is as the outward and visible sign of the predominance of British influence, of the special interest taken by Great Britain in the affairs of Egypt, that that army is such an important element in the present situation. Its moral effect is out of all proportion to its actual strength. The presence of a single British regiment lends a weight they would not otherwise possess to the counsels of the British Consul-General.
Take the troops away, and you must either run the risk of a decline of British influence, which would imperil the work of reform, or devise, for a time at least, some new and equivalent support for that influence, a problem not perhaps impossible, but certainly difficult of solution."
CHAPTER LV.
THE EASTERN SOUDAN.
Any history of the military operations in Egypt, during the period comprised in the accompanying chapters, would be incomplete without a notice of the events which were in the meantime taking place in the Eastern Soudan.
In May, 1885, when Graham"s force withdrew from Souakim, General Hudson took over the command. The troops left to protect the town consisted of 930 Europeans, 2,405 Indians, and the Egyptians forming the regular garrison.
Osman Digna, with the greater part of his followers, was again at Tamaai, and had also a small force at Hasheen. The fall of Ka.s.sala soon after, by setting free the besieging force, enabled Osman still further to strengthen his position in the neighbourhood of Souakim.[142] Under these circ.u.mstances, General Hudson was compelled to remain strictly on the defensive.
It would be both long and wearisome to attempt to describe the various incidents which occurred during many of the succeeding months.
Day after day the Dervish scouts approached the forts, and cavalry patrols went out and fired upon them; night after night parties of the enemy took up positions from which they fired on the town, and remained until dislodged by the sh.e.l.l fired from the forts and from the man-of-war stationed in the harbour. Thus Souakim continued to be besieged, the enemy refraining from any serious attack, and devoting themselves princ.i.p.ally to raiding the friendly tribes in the adjoining territory.
On 11th May, 1886, the remainder of the British and Indian troops left, and Major Watson took command as Governor-General of the Eastern Soudan.
The garrison at this time consisted of 2,500 Egyptians.
In June, the prospect began to brighten. The Dervishes withdrew their patrols round Souakim, and evacuated Hasheen and Handoub. The friendlies then began to take courage, and made advances upon Tamaai, which they blockaded, and eventually occupied on 11th September, the Soudanese garrison retiring with loss into a fort near the village.
On the 7th October the friendlies scored a further success. After being twice repulsed, they a.s.saulted and took the fort after an hour"s fighting, killing some 200 of the defenders and capturing eighteen guns.
The redoubtable Osman Digna, being wanted at Omdurman, had previously withdrawn, and no hostile force now remained in the Eastern Soudan.
Two thousand pounds was paid to the friendlies by way of subsidy, and trade with the interior was opened.
In November, Colonel Kitchener, who had succeeded Major Watson, reported "the collapse of Osman Digna"s power," and a season of greater tranquillity than Souakim had known for years was experienced.
In January, 1887, affairs at Souakim had even further settled down, and many of the hostile tribes expressed a desire to come to terms, but, in June, news arrived that from 2,000 to 3,000 Dervishes, mostly Baggaras, were advancing from Ka.s.sala to relieve Tokar, at that time besieged by the friendlies. The arrival of the Baggaras at Tokar tended to revive the fanatical spirit at that place, but had not much influence on the surrounding tribes, who refused to present themselves there when summoned by Osman Digna.
In July, Osman was again called to Omdurman, and in his absence nothing particular was done in the neighbourhood of Souakim. During the autumn, things looked so peaceful that the garrison was reduced by the withdrawal of two battalions, and news of this circ.u.mstance reaching Osman, who had then returned to Ka.s.sala, he at once collected some 5,000 men and marched to Handoub. By 18th December he was again master of the whole country up to the walls of Souakim, which once more was in a state of siege. On 17th December, an attack was made on the Water Forts, and repulsed. A deserter reported that at Handoub and Tamaai a fighting force of 5,000 men was preparing to capture Souakim by a rush, and that the scheme would be carried out at daybreak very shortly.
In January, 1888, frequent night attacks were made; but they were invariably repulsed by the fire from the men-of-war in the harbour. On the 17th, a party of friendlies attacked the Dervish camp at daybreak.
Mounted troops from Souakim went in support. The friendlies surprised and captured the enemy"s camp. Then the Dervishes scattered in the pursuit re-entered the position from the rear, and drove off the friendlies with considerable loss. The whole Egyptian force then retreated to Souakim, pursued for four or five miles by the victorious Dervishes. In this engagement Kitchener and Lieutenant McMurdo were wounded, and eleven soldiers and friendlies were killed. As a result of the engagement, Kitchener was warned that in future he should not take part in similar operations with British officers or Egyptian regulars.
The intention was to capture Osman Digna, but although seen in the distance, he succeeded in escaping at the moment when the fortune of war appeared to be going against him.
Emboldened by this success, the Dervishes began to display increased activity round Souakim, the neighbourhood of which was infested with marauding bands. On the 3rd March, a large party established themselves by night at a disused position called Fort Hudson, and kept up a continuous fire on the town. On the morning of the 4th, numbers of the enemy were seen advancing, and H.M.S. _Dolphin_ opened fire at 10 a.m.
The Egyptian forces, to the number of 450 men, advanced to endeavour to drive the enemy from Fort Hudson, the friendly Amarar tribe a.s.sisting.
The position, however, was too strong, and they were repulsed. To make matters worse, just at the moment when a reinforcement of the enemy necessitated the retirement a sh.e.l.l from the man-of-war, aimed at the Dervishes, burst among the friendlies, who, suddenly scared, fell back in disorder upon the regulars, who had nothing left to do but retreat with all possible speed. The Dervish force maintained its position during the remainder of the day under a heavy cross-fire. At nightfall the Dervishes drew off and made no further attempt to reoccupy the position. The Egyptian loss in this highly unsuccessful sortie was Colonel Tapp and eight men killed and seventeen wounded, without counting the poor friendlies.
After the affair of the 4th March things resumed a comparatively quiet condition for some months. The enemy"s cavalry from time to time came within range, and a few shots were exchanged, but nothing serious was attempted on either side. The inaction of the blockading force was doubtless due in great measure to the dissensions which at this period broke out amongst the hostile tribes, some of whom were anxious to take Souakim by a.s.sault, whilst others deemed it useless to make the attempt.
The result was a series of quarrels, which nearly led to actual fighting.
On the night of the 17th September, however, the aspect of things changed, and without any previous warning a force of some 500 men of the Jaalin and Baggara tribes intrenched themselves at a distance of 1,000 yards from the Water Forts, with the intention of cutting off the water supply, and commenced firing on the town. This was kept up continuously for some time by day and night, and frequent casualties occurred. On the 22nd the enemy placed a gun on the ridge between the Water Forts, and sh.e.l.led the town until compelled by the fire from the lines to withdraw.
It was now evident that at any moment a determined attempt might be made to capture the town, and reinforcements were urgently called for. In response to the appeal, an additional vessel of war and another battalion were sent to Souakim.
Meanwhile, the besiegers still continued active in the trenches, which they pushed forward to within 600 yards of the defensive works. Their fire began to get exceedingly accurate, though but little harm was done.
Early in November General Grenfell arrived with two divisions of Horse Artillery and six mortars, which it was hoped would make the enemy"s position in the trenches untenable. After taking a survey of the situation, Grenfell decided that it was necessary to drive the Arabs from their trenches as soon as a sufficient force should be a.s.sembled to make the operation practicable.
Two more Egyptian battalions, marching _via_ Keneh and Kosseir, reached Souakim in the beginning of December. In addition to this reinforcement, and in consequence of doubts being entertained at home as to how far the Egyptian troops could be relied on to face the Soudanese alone and unsupported, the 2nd Battalion of the Scottish Borderers and 100 of the British Mounted Infantry were sent from Cairo. This brought the entire force up to 750 British troops, 2,000 Egyptians, and 2,000 Soudanese.
A reconnaissance made by the cavalry on the 9th December having been forced to retire before a strong body of the enemy"s hors.e.m.e.n, it was recognized that the cavalry force ought to be strengthened. In consequence of this, a squadron of the 20th Hussars was sent from Cairo.
Apprehension being still expressed as to the sufficiency of Grenfell"s force, half of the 1st Battalion of the Welsh Regiment was also despatched.
By the 18th, the additional troops had all arrived, and everything was prepared for the impending attack.[143] The enemy"s trenches were situated between 800 and 900 yards south-west of the two Water Forts, Ghemaiza and Shaata, and extended in a long irregular line. The ground to the west of the northern flank was clear and practicable for cavalry, while to the north of the northern flank was a depression which would enable the troops to form up for attack before coming under fire. This circ.u.mstance decided General Grenfell to attack on the north flank, whilst at the same time making a feint on the south flank.
It was arranged to make the attack a surprise, and with this object a naval demonstration was prepared at Mersa Kuwai, eight miles to the north of Souakim, and visible from Osman Digna"s camp at Handoub. It was also decided that, previous to the actual attack, the trenches were to be vigorously cannonaded by the guns from the lines, and H.M.S. _Racer_.
At 6 a.m. on the 20th, the artillery fire commenced along the whole line of defence, and the troops marched out to the attack. The 1st Brigade, under Colonel Kitchener, was composed of the 9th, 10th, and 12th Soudanese Battalions; the 2nd Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Holled-Smith, consisted of the 4th Egyptian Battalion and the 11th Soudanese. The Scottish Borderers and the 3rd Egyptian Battalion marched out independently, and took up a position in the rear of the Water Forts at 6.30 a.m.