During this period the 13th Battalion, supported by the 1st Egyptian, had been operating on a detached hill to the left and suffering from an enfilading fire from some concealed riflemen. The battalion had already lost seventy of its men, when General Grenfell ordered the hill to be stormed. The two battalions together then advanced, and, after a severe hand-to-hand fight with the Dervish spearmen, swarmed up the hill and captured the position.
Repeated attempts were made to retake the lost ground, and even after the Egyptian troops had gained the summit of the hill, small bodies of the enemy collected on the off side and charged upwards with the greatest determination. These attempts only ended when the last of the brave a.s.sailants was shot dead only a few paces in front of the Egyptian line.
Only one hill out of those chosen by Nejumi for his position was now held by the enemy, and this was soon stormed and carried at the point of the bayonet by the united 9th, 10th, and 13th Soudanese Battalions.
By this operation, which was achieved at 11.30 a.m., the whole of the enemy"s position was taken, and the two guns of the Horse Battery were occupied in sh.e.l.ling a defeated foe, in full retreat.
At this period, Wad-en-Nejumi personally made an heroic effort to rally his dispersed followers, and the cavalry, which, during the fight, had been stationed in the rear of the infantry, had to be sent to stop the movement. The Egyptian squadrons led the charge, followed by the British Hussars, and, dashing into the midst of such of the enemy as were collected, completed the rout. The Camel Corps a.s.sisted in the final fight by a carefully directed fire on the enemy"s flank, and in a few minutes not an Arab was to be seen on the plain.
There was, however, reason to believe that Nejumi, so far from fleeing, had, with his defeated band, taken up a new position in the temporary camp formed for his camp-followers and baggage behind the hills.
Therefore Grenfell, desirous of following up at once the advantage gained, at noon directed a general advance in that direction. The troops moved forward with the 11th Soudanese and 1st and 2nd Egyptian Battalions in front, and the 2nd Brigade in support. The artillery sh.e.l.led the enemy"s position as the troops advanced. The resistance encountered was but trifling, the foe, by this time, being in full retreat, leaving his camp, with a large collection of arms and military accoutrements, to fall into the hands of the victors. The cavalry then pursued the defeated Dervishes for over two miles, and captured a great number of prisoners, and amongst them several women and children.
At the moment when the fighting was deemed finished, a loaded camel, surrounded by about forty men, was observed following the line of retreat, and was fired upon by a troop of cavalry. The camel and most of the men fell apparently killed. The cavalry then approached and summoned the survivors to surrender. This was met by the Arabs springing to their feet and making a charge on the cavalry, in which all the Dervish warriors were killed except one, who escaped on a stray horse. The load carried on the camel turned out to be the body of the brave Wad-en-Nejumi, who, though badly wounded early in the day, had refused to fly, and devoted his last moments to an heroic attempt to rally his dispersed followers.[147]
The defeat amounted practically to annihilation, and Wad-en-Nejumi"s force as an army ceased to exist. On the day of the fight and during the three days following 4,000 prisoners were taken, and the enemy"s loss in killed was estimated at over 1,200. The Egyptian loss was but 25 killed and 140 wounded.
In this, as in many of the other fights, it was simply the same old story: on the one side a ma.s.s of reckless, fanatical, and courageous savages; on the other trained and disciplined troops, acting under the orders of a skilful general. In a conflict conducted under such conditions, there could be but one result, and nothing remains but to regret the appalling loss of life which formed one of its inevitable concomitants.
On the 9th August, as soon as arrangements had been made for the disposal of the numerous prisoners, the troops returned to a.s.souan, and the Nile field force was distributed amongst the various points where it was deemed necessary to retain garrisons. The British brigade, which had not succeeded in arriving in time to partic.i.p.ate in the fight, was gradually moved down to Cairo.
The victory at Toski marked the turning point in the invasion, and was a shock to the cause of Mahdism which it took years to recover. The reinforcements, which were on their way down the Nile to join Nejumi, beat an immediate retreat, and all further operations for the invasion of Egypt were suspended. Numerous deserters from the Dervish force, as well as hundreds of dest.i.tute refugees, crowded into Wady Halfa, and were provided with relief. Though there was no longer any talk of invasion, as a protection for the frontier a battalion of Egyptian infantry reoccupied and held Sarras, and peace and tranquillity now reigned once more.
CHAPTER LVIII.
THE EASTERN SOUDAN AGAIN.
In January, 1889, things at Souakim had drifted back pretty much into the same old groove, and the petty attacks of Osman Digna"s followers were constantly renewed. The enemy"s mounted men used, time after time, to approach the outlying forts, fire a few shots, and then retire.
The military authorities, not feeling themselves equal to the task of clearing the neighbourhood of the hostile Arabs, hit upon the expedient of inviting the tribes suspected of being unfriendly to the Mahdist cause to do so. The invitation, which took the form of a Proclamation issued by General Grenfell, was not favourably responded to. The att.i.tude of the tribes was one of expectancy, and all the Sheikhs who responded stated pretty much the same thing, namely, that they would come in and help as soon as Osman Digna"s power should be broken, and that they were perfectly willing to a.s.sist in cutting off stragglers, but they declined for the present to compromise themselves further.
On the other hand, Osman Digna was not more successful in inducing the tribes to flock to his standard. On the 11th February, he burnt his camp at Handoub, and transported the remainder of his forces to Tokar, which now became the central point of rebel authority in the Eastern Soudan.
After Osman"s departure, matters around Souakim visibly improved. The tribes brought in cattle frequently, a little trade sprang up, and things generally wore a more peaceful aspect.
By the month of August, the Haddendowa and Amarar tribes combined against the Baggara, who were Osman"s chief allies, and, obtaining a.s.sistance, in money and food, from the Souakim authorities, advanced upon Sinkat, intending, if successful there, to attack Osman"s position at Tokar. The united warriors, 700 strong, succeeded only in capturing some cattle at the former place, after which, meeting with a superior force, they were compelled to fall back on Tamanieb. No further a.s.sistance being given them, they then broke up and dispersed.
On the 7th October, Osman Digna departed from Tokar to attend a council held by the Khalifa at Omdurman, in consequence of the defeat and death of Wad-en-Nejumi, which had meanwhile taken place at the fight at Toski.
In December, Osman left Omdurman, and proceeded by way of Gedaref and Ka.s.sala with the object of gathering followers with whom to renew the struggle in the Tokar district.
With great difficulty, owing to tribal dissensions, he after some months got together a force of 10,000, including women and children, which he conducted to the scene of his former exploits. Owing, however, to the grain supply from Souakim, on which he had relied for his requirements, being suddenly stopped, he had a difficulty in feeding his new levies.
The result was that many of them left him and went in search of food and shelter elsewhere.
In November, 1890, Osman Digna was again at Tokar with a greatly reduced force, estimated indeed at only 1,000 men, whilst at Handoub but about 150 of his followers remained. From this last point they made occasional raids in the neighbourhood of Souakim, hara.s.sing the friendly tribes, and generally making things unpleasant so far as the limited numbers of the aggressors would allow.
The misery and starvation of the well-disposed inhabitants round Souakim at this time was intense, owing to the gates of the town being closed, and a cordon being drawn round the forts as a measure of precaution against the cholera, thus stopping all trade. The Haddendowa, Beni-Amer, and Amarar tribes implored the Government to a.s.sist them in casting off the Dervish yoke.
This was the position when the moment was deemed favourable for striking a final blow at Osman Digna, taking Tokar, and pacifying the Eastern Soudan.
In January, 1891, the situation became all the more favourable for these operations inasmuch as Osman Digna, towards the end of the month, again left Tokar, taking with him many of his already reduced garrison.
On 27th January, Colonel Holled-Smith, then in command of the troops at Souakim, advanced to Handoub with the Egyptian cavalry and the 11th and 12th Battalions of Soudanese Infantry, and, after a short engagement, captured and occupied the place. Over forty of the Dervishes fell in the fight, and the remainder dispersed and fled to the hills.
Handoub having fallen, the attack on Tokar was next taken in hand.
For this purpose, on the 8th February, an expeditionary force under Colonel Holled-Smith was formed. With the addition of some companies of the 1st Egyptian Battalion, which joined a few days later, it consisted of nearly 2,000 men, and was composed of 180 cavalry, two large Krupp guns, two mountain guns, and four battalions of infantry, viz., the 1st and 4th Egyptian and the 11th and 12th Soudanese. Following the course pursued in all the former campaigns, the force was sent by sea to Trinkitat, which was selected as the base of operations. At the same time a force of 500 friendly natives was raised and sent by land towards Temerin, to intercept the retreat of the Tokar garrison if opportunity offered.
By the 15th, the expeditionary troops had reached Trinkitat, and on the morning of the following day the advance, directed in the first instance towards the wells of El Teb, commenced. The line of march led over the site of General Baker"s defeat exactly seven years before, and heaps of white bones still marked the spot. At 3 p.m., the column reached the wells without encountering any resistance. Here the troops bivouacked, every precaution being taken to guard against a surprise. On the 18th, a severe sand-storm prevented the march being resumed, and the troops remained in camp. In the interval news was received that Osman Digna was now at a place called Afafit, a village a mile and a half beyond the ruined town of Tokar, and had with him considerable reinforcements.
On the 19th, at daylight, the column, after leaving a small garrison at El Teb, advanced upon Tokar. The cavalry in advance first seized and occupied the ruined Mamourieh or Government buildings, and then at 10 a.m. the infantry were brought up to the north-eastern side of the village, which consisted merely of crumbling walls. Scarcely was the place reached when the enemy were seen advancing through the bush surrounding the "Mamourieh." There was no time to be lost, and the infantry moved up at the double and formed a semi-circular line of defence, the 4th Battalion lining the ruined buildings on the right, the 11th Battalion those on the left, whilst the 12th Battalion held those in the centre of the position. So rapidly was the attack developed that some Dervishes had actually taken possession of some of the ruins on the left flank of the Egyptian position before the 11th Battalion had taken up the defence a.s.signed to them. The main body of the enemy, now only fifty yards from the front rank of the troops, proceeded to extend to the right and left to envelop the entire position. Firing began along the whole line as the enemy came on. The bulk of their force was directed against the 12th Battalion, their attack being pushed home with the usual dash and fearlessness. The troops, however, stood their ground, and did not yield an inch throughout the whole line. Their firing settled down to steady volleys, which quickly began to check the onward rush. As soon as this was perceived, the 11th Battalion, moving from the left, advanced into the bush and cleared it of the attacking force, taking, at the point of the bayonet, some ruins occupied in front. The 11th then halted at a commanding point to the south-east of the original position. The 4th Battalion remained in position on the right of the line, and, with the transport escort column, protected the rear, which at one time was seriously threatened by the enemy"s hors.e.m.e.n.
The Dervishes, after the charge of the 11th Battalion, at once commenced to retreat, followed closely by the cavalry, which, advancing into the bush on the right, found some open ground, where they did great execution.
This completed the rout of the Dervish attacking column, which gradually disappeared to the south in the direction of Temerin.
The troops then formed up on the high ground occupied by the 11th Battalion and halted for a rest prior to advancing on the Dervish head-quarters at the village of Afafit. It was reported that Afafit was occupied in force, but as the troops advanced the enemy, who had occupied some intervening sand hills, hurriedly retreated, and at 4 p.m.
the village was entered by the cavalry, the inhabitants coming out in numbers and welcoming the troops with many expressions of joy.
The strength of the Dervish force was estimated at 4,000, but this included 2,000 men whom Osman Digna kept in reserve, and who never came into the fight at all. The enemy"s loss was put at as high a figure as 700 men, and it must have been considerable even allowing for bad shooting, no less than 60,000 cartridges having been fired away by the Egyptian force. This last lost Captain Barrow, of the South Lancashire Regiment, and nine men killed, besides forty-eight wounded.
On the morning of the following day it was ascertained by a cavalry reconnaissance that Osman Digna, deserted by all but 300 followers, had pa.s.sed through Temerin, going off in the direction of Ka.s.sala.
Communication by land was now established with Souakim, and on the 22nd Afafit was visited by General Grenfell, who reviewed the troops and congratulated them on their victory of the 19th.[148]
On the 2nd March the expeditionary force was broken up, and after leaving garrisons at Afafit, El Teb, and Trinkitat, the rest of the troops returned in triumph to Souakim.
Disturbances in the Eastern Soudan then for a while ceased; a general amnesty was proclaimed; the tribes hastened to offer a.s.surances of their loyalty; trade revived; and steps were taken to resume the cultivation of the fertile lands in the Tokar district.
The concluding events in the Eastern Soudan, though not chronologically in their place in the present chapter, are here inserted to avoid recurring to the subject. They may be briefly stated as follows:--
In 1892 the indefatigable Osman Digna once more appeared in the neighbourhood of Souakim, with a force varying in number from time to time. His princ.i.p.al object was to raid the local Arabs. In the summer of that year he attacked the Egyptian post established at Temerin, but was driven off by Major Hunter, with a loss of seventy men. This and other attempts led to the strengthening of the Souakim garrison, and Osman made no further attempts.
Although in 1893 Osman was reported to have received considerable reinforcements and to be contemplating a fresh advance, it did not come off.
After a long interval, in 1895, Osman, from his position in the hills, made a raid into the now cultivated lands of the Tokar delta.
On the 15th April, 1896, an Egyptian force of 1,000 officers and men, under Colonel Lloyd, left Souakim to co-operate with a detachment of 250 soldiers, under Major Sidney, from Tokar, in supporting a party of friendly Arabs, headed by a sheikh called Omar t.i.ta, at Horasab, in the Erkowit Hills, where Osman Digna and a number of Dervishes had established themselves.
The column, which marched in square formation, arrived at the Teroi Wells in the afternoon, having covered a distance of nineteen miles.
Here the force bivouacked, and the animals were watered.
The cavalry, under Captain Fenwick, was then ordered to reconnoitre and to endeavour to establish touch with the Tokar force and inform the commanding officer that the Souakim force would remain where it was for the night, so as to enable the Tokar contingent to join. It had been arranged previously with Omar t.i.ta that he should hold the heights and the pa.s.s of Khor Wintri while the two Egyptian forces concentrated.
While the cavalry were proceeding towards the Khor Wintri they were suddenly attacked by a body of 200 hors.e.m.e.n, supported by a large force on foot. The men were ordered to trot, but it was soon seen that the Dervishes were gaining upon them. The reconnoitring party then galloped towards the open country. Some, becoming entangled in the bush, fell off their horses and were speared. Fenwick, with thirty-eight officers and men, retired to the left flank and ascended a hillock, where they kept the enemy off by firing volleys all night. The Dervishes made four attempts to storm the hill, but were on each occasion repulsed.