The Dervish chief was in a dilemma whilst the Sirdar was in front of him; the projected move on Berber was impossible. On the other hand, the reports received of the strength of the Anglo-Egyptian force convinced him that to move out into the open and attack would be simply to court destruction. To leave the shelter of his intrenchments, and retire on Omdurman, was not only a hazardous operation, but one which must result in the demoralization and desertion of his followers. Even if he succeeded in reaching Omdurman, Mahmoud may well have had misgivings as to the nature of the reception that he would meet with at the hands of the Khalifa. Under these circ.u.mstances, he decided that there was nothing for it but to remain where he was, and trust to the strength of his position to repel any attack the Sirdar might make.
This was not at all what the Sirdar wished for. It would have suited him much better to be attacked in the open desert, where his superior rifle and artillery fire would give him an immense advantage, than to have to attack Mahmoud in his zeriba in the bush, amid endless intrenchments and unknown obstructions. On the other hand, it was clear that something must be done. The Anglo-Egyptian force could not sit down for ever watching Mahmoud at a distance of only twenty miles. The difficulty of supplying 13,000 men by camel transport only was immense. The British troops, too, were beginning to suffer from the heat, inferior food, and inadequate shelter, and dysentery and enteric fever began to break out.
Realizing all this, the Sirdar determined on a general advance, and on the 4th of April struck his camp at Ras-el-Hudi, and moved up the river to Abadar. Though this as a camping place much resembled the last, the troops, who had got tired of Ras-el-Hudi, with its endless sand storms and discomforts, rejoiced at the change, and the more so because it appeared to indicate fighting.
On the 5th, a final effort to draw Mahmoud was made. At daybreak General Hunter went out with eight squadrons of cavalry, eight Maxims, and a battery of horse artillery. When about 1,000 yards from the front of the enemy"s position, the troops halted, and Hunter, with a few of his officers, went forward to obtain a nearer view.
The Dervishes showed themselves in no mood to be trifled with, and soon gave Hunter as much fighting as he wanted, for, at 9 a.m., two large bodies of Baggara hors.e.m.e.n came out of the bush right and left from the enemy"s zeriba, and directed their efforts to getting round the flanks of the cavalry, whilst a third party fiercely charged them in front.
Hunter, to avoid being cut off, had to gallop back to the main body, now engaged in repelling the attack.
In this they were a.s.sisted by the guns and Maxims on the left of the cavalry, and after a sharp struggle, in which the officers had to use their swords and revolvers, the Dervish onslaught was repulsed. A large body of footmen then streamed forth from Mahmoud"s zeriba, and Hunter"s force found it necessary to retreat to avoid being surrounded. As the cavalry fell back their retiring movement was covered by the Maxims, which continued firing, and practically saved the situation. The Dervish hors.e.m.e.n still followed, and pressed the rear and flanks of the retreating Egyptians, who more than once had to turn and charge to lessen the pressure. When this had been effected, the retreat was continued more deliberately, two squadrons from time to time dismounting, and with their carbines keeping the foe in check, whilst other squadrons took up a position one or two hundred yards in the rear. At last, about 10 a.m., a combined charge of cavalry, headed by Colonel Broadwood, drove back the a.s.sailants, and both the opposing forces withdrew at 1 p.m. The Egyptian troops, without being further molested, got back to camp, where, the sound of the cannonading having been heard, the army had turned out ready for action.
The Egyptian loss in the fight was not heavy, being only eight men killed and fourteen wounded. The Dervish loss was put as high as 200.
This, however, was only an estimate, as the retreating Egyptians did not stop to count the slain. At the same time, as the Maxims fired 6,000 rounds, it seems only reasonable to suppose that someone was. .h.i.t.
Although the engagement on the 5th showed that Mahmoud meant fighting, it indicated that, so far as related to moving his army out into the open to be destroyed, he was still a "conscientious objector," and, with a view to attacking him in his position, the forward movement of the Sirdar"s army was resumed on the 6th April, when the troops brought up at the deserted village of Umdabbia, seven and a half miles from the Dervish camp. Here they remained for two days, whilst the final preparations for the attack were made.
At 5 p.m. on the 7th, after the stores and all superfluous baggage had been left in camp in charge of a half battalion of Egyptian infantry, the rest of the troops marched out into the desert. They moved in echelon, with the British brigade in front. Behind them was Macdonald"s brigade; then came Lewis"s brigade and the Camel Corps, Maxwell"s brigade bringing up the rear. The route selected was parallel to the river, and over broken ground and desert sand. Although when night fell there was a bright moon, the sand, driven by a strong wind, obscured the view a good deal, and frequent halts had to be made to preserve the formation. When, after marching for three hours, a spot called Mutrus, three miles distant from the enemy, was reached, a halt was ordered, and the men, lying down in the desert, rested.
CHAPTER LXV.
THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA.
The Sirdar"s troops were left unmolested during the short rest which they took at Mutrus.
At 1 a.m. on the 8th April, the order was quietly given to fall in, and the men promptly obeyed without noise or bustle. Half an hour later the final march began, and the full moon being now well overhead, it was possible to see a considerable distance. There was no smoking or talking in the ranks, and the orders were given in a low voice or by a wave of the hand. The rumble of the gun-carriages and the dull thud of thousands of tramping feet were the only sounds which broke the stillness of the desert.
At 3 a.m. a huge column of flame was seen on the right. After burning a few minutes it dwindled away, and whether it was a beacon to notify to Mahmoud the approach of the army or whether it was the result of accident was never ascertained.
At 4 o"clock the troops were abreast of Mahmoud"s position, where the camp fires could be seen burning. There was then a halt of half an hour.
When the advance was resumed at 4.30, the men were no longer in square, but marched in attack formation, the British brigade on the left, Macdonald"s in the centre, Maxwell"s on the right, and Lewis"s in reserve. The artillery and Maxims accompanied the infantry marching in the rear upon the right and left. The cavalry and Horse Artillery were away half a mile to the left.
In this formation the troops continued to advance till 6 a.m., when they halted in a commanding position 600 yards from the enemy"s camp, which was plainly visible now that the sun began to rise. From the number of men seen running to and fro, and from other signs of activity, it was clear that the approach of the Sirdar"s force had been perceived.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The enemy"s works presented a sufficiently formidable appearance. Behind the long row of cut mimosa bushes forming the zeriba, and const.i.tuting the outer line of defence, were palisades of dom palm logs stuck endways in the ground; and further back amongst the trees was an encircling trench, with numerous cross-trenches, a few earthworks, and a great many shelter huts made of palm branches and gra.s.s.
At 6.15, the guns were run into position, and opened fire. Two batteries of six guns each were placed on the extreme right of the Egyptians, and the like number on their left, at the interval between the Egyptian and British troops. In this way a cross-fire of twenty-four guns was brought to bear on the position.
The artillery was a.s.sisted by a rocket battery under Lieutenant Beatly, R.N.
The artillery fire, carefully directed, told with much effect on the zeriba, and soon many of the palisades were seen to be knocked away, whilst the sh.e.l.ls at the same time made havoc with the earthworks. The rocket battery, after a few rounds, set fire to the gra.s.s huts forming the Dervish camp, causing a furious conflagration.
The Dervishes had hitherto kept well out of sight, but all at once, whilst the cannonade was in full operation, a large party of Baggara hors.e.m.e.n was observed galloping from the bush at the southern side of the zeriba and forming up, as if intending to charge the British left.
On the Maxims opening on them, the Baggara at once turned and disappeared in the bush to the south.
The bombardment went on for an hour and a half, during which time there was no reply from the zeriba except a few bullets which were fired in the direction of Macdonald"s and Maxwell"s brigades, but, being aimed too high, the missiles pa.s.sed harmlessly overhead.
The order to cease firing was now given, and the infantry, who had hitherto been lying down, interested spectators of the scene, formed up for the a.s.sault. The Camerons, extended in line, composed the front of the British brigade. Behind them, in column of companies, were the Warwicks on the left, the Seaforths in the centre, and the Lincolns on the right; continuing the line to the right was Macdonald"s brigade, with six companies in line and the remainder behind in column of companies as a support. Still further to the right was Maxwell"s brigade, with eight companies in line and four companies in support, and on the extreme right were one of Maxwell"s battalions, the 8th, and one of Lewis"s, the 15th Soudanese, also in column of companies. A squadron of cavalry was sent down towards the river on this flank. On the extreme left, in the rear of the Warwicks, Lewis"s reserve brigade of two battalions was placed to prevent any flank attack on that side. The cavalry and Horse Artillery were placed half a mile off in the desert to the left of the whole force. The four batteries of artillery were posted on the right of the line, and the Maxims, twelve in number, were distributed between the right and left flanks and the centre.
At a quarter-past eight, the Sirdar and his staff having selected a post of observation, about 900 yards from the zeriba, and General Gatacre and most of the field officers having dismounted and placed themselves at the head of their men, the "advance" sounded. Then the pipes of the Highlanders skirled, the bugles of the other British regiments and the bands of the native battalions played inspiriting tunes, and the whole line, with bayonets fixed, advanced in quick time.
The Camerons, headed by General Gatacre and Colonel Money, and with a huge Union Jack (the regimental colours were all left in Cairo) in the centre, marched in advance of the British troops.
At intervals of every few yards the men halted, and "independent firing"
was kept up. Then the line again moved forward, and the same thing was repeated. Suddenly, when the front rank had got within 200 yards of the zeriba, the return fire from the Dervishes commenced. It was mostly aimed too high, but here and there the bullets came dropping in, and the men in front began to fall, sometimes singly and sometimes in little groups of two or three together. Still the line swept onward, the troops, both British and Egyptian, preserving their formation as perfectly as if on parade.
As the Camerons reached some elevated ground sloping towards the zeriba, then only a hundred yards off, they became more exposed, and the bullets came more thickly. At last a halt was sounded, and for a minute or two "independent firing" was resumed with good effect, the Lee-Metfords making no smoke to obstruct the view, whilst, on the other hand, the little white wreaths from the Dervish fire indicated to the soldiers the points on which to direct their rifles.
The "advance" was then sounded, cries of "Come on, men!" were heard, and, amid ringing cheers, the Camerons rushed for the zeriba. The first to reach it were General Gatacre and Captain Brooke, his aide-de-camp.
Seizing the bush with both hands, the General tried to pull it aside, nearly losing his life in the attempt. A Dervish rushed upon him with a spear; the General called out to his orderly, Private c.o.x, of the Camerons, "Give it to him, my lad!" and Private c.o.x bayoneted the Dervish, just in time.
Immediately after, the Camerons, closely followed by the Warwicks, Seaforths, and Lincolns, were up to the zeriba, and beginning to pull away the thorn bushes, being covered, as far as possible, by their comrades. Alternate companies dragged at the bushes, whilst the others replied to the Dervish fire. In a few minutes, the men succeeded in making gaps in the hedge sufficiently wide to allow of the troops entering, and, in a quarter of an hour from the advance being sounded, the zeriba was entered. It was found necessary to modify the original plan of attack. According to this, the Camerons having cleared a sufficient pathway, the battalions in their rear were to pa.s.s through their ranks, deploy, and join in a general advance by the whole line.
A deployment, however, in face of the rifle fire which was encountered, was not to be thought of, and it could hardly be expected that the Camerons, who had hitherto occupied the front rank, were going to stand aside and give place to the men of the other regiments. Realizing this, Gatacre called on the Camerons to push forward, and the battalion, headed by its officers, and with the Union Jack in front, dashed through the openings. Captain Findlay, a young officer of the Camerons, six feet two inches in height, was the first to enter the zeriba. With sword in one hand and revolver in the other, he sprang over the palisade and first trench, and fell mortally wounded.
The rush of the Camerons was closely followed by the Seaforths and the Warwicks, the men pushing on as nearly in line as the obstacles in their way would allow.
Here the real fighting began. The trenches were full of crouching Dervishes, firing point-blank as fast as they could load, and neither asking nor receiving quarter. It soon became, not so much a question of clearing the trenches as of killing every Dervish separately. The latter never lost an opportunity. Major Urquhart, of the Camerons, and one of the first to enter the zeriba, was shot dead, from behind, by a Dervish who, concealed amongst a heap of dead and dying, was waiting his chance to kill.
The enemy"s riflemen were not particular in their choice of weapons, and Remingtons, Martinis, fowling-pieces, and elephant guns were brought into play indiscriminately. Major Napier, also of the Camerons, was so severely wounded with a shot from an elephant gun, as to have to be carried off the field. He died afterwards in Cairo. His regiment lost sixty men, either killed or wounded, in less than an hour.
The Seaforths also suffered severely. Lieutenant Gore, the first of his regiment to enter the enemy"s lines, was shot through the heart, and Colonel Murray, of the same regiment, was shot in the arm by a round bullet from a fowling-piece.
Captain Baillie had his leg shattered, and died subsequently in Cairo.
Sergeant-Major Mackay, also of the Seaforths, had an experience which is probably unique. When jumping the palisades, a Dervish spearman made a drive at him in mid-air, as he was, so to speak, "on the wing."
Fortunately, the spear only tore the sergeant"s kilt, and he then finished his a.s.sailant with pistol and claymore. The leading company of the Seaforths had eleven men killed or wounded.
Colonel Verner, of the Lincolns, a man of such gigantic stature that he could hardly be missed even by an indifferent marksman, had bad luck.
One bullet cut his helmet strap and grazed his cheek, whilst a third hit him in the mouth, gouging away his upper lip, and taking off his moustache. The gallant officer refused to retire, and, with a bandaged head, continued with his men till the end.
As the men pushed on through the bush, several small mud-built forts had to be carried. Each of these mounted an old bra.s.s cannon, and was garrisoned by riflemen, who had necessarily to be slain.
Meanwhile, the Egyptians, away on the right, gallantly led by General Hunter, had entered a zeriba a little in advance of the British brigade, and steadily fought their way, step by step, across the trenches.
Several of their English officers fell wounded, though, fortunately, none were killed. Some of their hardest fighting took place at a sort of inner zeriba or stockade, situated some thirty yards in the rear of the trenches, and strongly held. From this work a deadly rifle fire was directed upon the advancing troops, and one company of the 11th Soudanese, which was the first to try to take it, was nearly annihilated. Other companies of the same regiment then came on in support, and, after hard fighting, effected an entrance and occupied the place.
Once this position was taken, the combined troops had little difficulty in making their way across the entire zeriba, the Dervishes fleeing before them in scattered ma.s.ses through the palm trees to the Atbara river.
Occasionally a group of fugitives would stop, under cover of the bank, and open a rifle fire on their pursuers, but after a few volleys all made off down the dry bed of the river, which formed the limit of the Anglo-Egyptian advance.
The battle of the Atbara was then won, and the order to cease firing was given. This was just twenty-six minutes from the final advance to the a.s.sault.
Then, on the banks of the river, the troops crowded together and indulged in mutual congratulations. The Soudanese soldiers wildly danced with joy, and, waving their rifles in the air, shook hands with every British soldier whom they came in contact with.