Already there were early signs of the imperial dilemma. Should the British push forward and take control of the turbulent zone where whites and blacks raided and counter-raided? Could they impose a real separation between the quarrelsome frontier communities? Were Boer and black misdeeds to be punished with an even hand? Should the colonial government in Cape Town seek treaty partners among the Xhosa chiefs and extend protection to its African allies? Behind all this was the question of whether control of the South African Cape required command of the South African interior. But, after 1836, it was no longer just a matter of the Eastern Cape and its border wars. The British had to define their imperial interest across the whole sub-continent.
For by that time a double revolution was transforming the nature of the imperial problem. The drastic consolidation of the Zulu state under Shaka (c.17871828) had released a huge wave of demographic turmoil affecting much of modern South Africa and beyond: the mfecane mfecane or "crushing". or "crushing".3 Communities and tribes were disrupted, defeated and displaced. As Shaka"s victims sought safety beyond his reach, they invaded new neighbourhoods and provoked fresh conflicts. Over a vast swathe of the interior highveld, the Communities and tribes were disrupted, defeated and displaced. As Shaka"s victims sought safety beyond his reach, they invaded new neighbourhoods and provoked fresh conflicts. Over a vast swathe of the interior highveld, the mfecane mfecane unleashed a chaotic process of forced migration and ethnic conflict. As old communities fragmented, rival leaders competed to build a following, claim land and a.s.sert their rule. The effects were felt all along the porous frontier of the Cape. As a result, white traders, trekkers and missionaries, as well as runaway slaves and servants, moved easily into the masterless realm beyond the Orange. Then, in the later 1830s, a large movement of Cape farmers from the embattled Eastern Province some 15,000 between 1834 and 1840 trekked north and east to found a Boer republic in Natal. Between them, the unleashed a chaotic process of forced migration and ethnic conflict. As old communities fragmented, rival leaders competed to build a following, claim land and a.s.sert their rule. The effects were felt all along the porous frontier of the Cape. As a result, white traders, trekkers and missionaries, as well as runaway slaves and servants, moved easily into the masterless realm beyond the Orange. Then, in the later 1830s, a large movement of Cape farmers from the embattled Eastern Province some 15,000 between 1834 and 1840 trekked north and east to found a Boer republic in Natal. Between them, the mfecane mfecane and the Great Trek sucked the Colony"s human frontier deep into the interior. In a few short years, the zone of imperial concern had been driven north from the Orange to the Limpopo, and was on its way to the Zambezi. and the Great Trek sucked the Colony"s human frontier deep into the interior. In a few short years, the zone of imperial concern had been driven north from the Orange to the Limpopo, and was on its way to the Zambezi.
To a succession of governors in Cape Town, the case for extending their imperial mandate over the whole sub-continent seemed unanswerable. The Cape"s strategic value would be lost if any harbour in the region was controlled by independent whites: sooner or later they would solicit the presence of a foreign power. On this argument, Natal, with its magnificent port, was annexed in 1844, persuading the disgruntled trekkers to seek republican freedom on the interior highveld. Maritime supremacy was easy enough. But there was also a case for d.o.g.g.i.ng the steps of the emigrant Boers wherever they went. For it soon became clear that the wars of expansion between the trekkers and rival statebuilders in the mfecane mfecane aftermath like the Sotho ruler Moshesh or the Griqua captains Kok and Waterboer aftermath like the Sotho ruler Moshesh or the Griqua captains Kok and Waterboer4 destabilised the whole frontier. Endless border wars forced up the imperial garrison but held back the Cape Colony"s commercial and political growth. Without an inland paramountcy to impose order on all its warring communities, the sub-continent would remain a costly colonial backwater, a constant embarra.s.sment to the humanitarian conscience and an inconvenient, perhaps dangerous, drain on the scarce resource of military power. destabilised the whole frontier. Endless border wars forced up the imperial garrison but held back the Cape Colony"s commercial and political growth. Without an inland paramountcy to impose order on all its warring communities, the sub-continent would remain a costly colonial backwater, a constant embarra.s.sment to the humanitarian conscience and an inconvenient, perhaps dangerous, drain on the scarce resource of military power.
The argument was persuasive but the means were lacking. Governor after governor claimed that peace and plenty would follow an extended paramountcy. One proposed an elaborate scheme of treaties, magistrates and police beyond the Orange.5 Three years later, Sir Harry Smith swept aside chiefly rule in Xhosaland and annexed the whole northern frontier up to the Vaal, to bring the Boers back under British rule. "My position", he declared in a revealing a.n.a.logy, Three years later, Sir Harry Smith swept aside chiefly rule in Xhosaland and annexed the whole northern frontier up to the Vaal, to bring the Boers back under British rule. "My position", he declared in a revealing a.n.a.logy, has been a.n.a.logous to that of every Governor General who has proceeded to India. All have been fully impressed with the weakness of that Policy which extended the Company"s possessions...[F]ew...especially the men of more gifted talents, have ever resigned...without having done that, which...circ.u.mstances demanded and imperatively imposed upon them. Such has been my case. has been a.n.a.logous to that of every Governor General who has proceeded to India. All have been fully impressed with the weakness of that Policy which extended the Company"s possessions...[F]ew...especially the men of more gifted talents, have ever resigned...without having done that, which...circ.u.mstances demanded and imperatively imposed upon them. Such has been my case.6 The Colonial Secretary gave reluctant sanction: enlargement, he said, was inevitable.7 But, in 1851, after spending millions, the Colonial Office called a halt. The Boers were in revolt. The Eighth Xhosa War, provoked by Smith"s policy, had been a military shambles hastily abandoned by Smith"s successor. Further north, the Zulu state still loomed over the tiny colony in Natal. With black resistance unbroken, further coercion of the independent Boers beyond the Orange was politically futile and militarily dangerous. London made the best of a bad job. In 18524, in the conventions of Sand River and Bloemfontein, it conceded the Boer republics practical autonomy and patched up peace on the Cape frontier. A further advance under Governor Grey aimed to incorporate the whole border zone between the Cape"s eastern frontier and Natal. It was aborted by the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, and the hasty removal of much of Grey"s force, and then by the deepening crisis in New Zealand to where Grey himself was transferred although not before the great Xhosa cattle-killing of 1857 (a despairing act of self-immolation) had allowed him to push the settler frontier forward to the river Kei. But, in 1851, after spending millions, the Colonial Office called a halt. The Boers were in revolt. The Eighth Xhosa War, provoked by Smith"s policy, had been a military shambles hastily abandoned by Smith"s successor. Further north, the Zulu state still loomed over the tiny colony in Natal. With black resistance unbroken, further coercion of the independent Boers beyond the Orange was politically futile and militarily dangerous. London made the best of a bad job. In 18524, in the conventions of Sand River and Bloemfontein, it conceded the Boer republics practical autonomy and patched up peace on the Cape frontier. A further advance under Governor Grey aimed to incorporate the whole border zone between the Cape"s eastern frontier and Natal. It was aborted by the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, and the hasty removal of much of Grey"s force, and then by the deepening crisis in New Zealand to where Grey himself was transferred although not before the great Xhosa cattle-killing of 1857 (a despairing act of self-immolation) had allowed him to push the settler frontier forward to the river Kei.8 But, for nearly twenty years, the Imperial Factor withdrew from the South African interior, on the argument that, with the coast (mostly) under British control, the inland republics were no threat to the strategic command that was the But, for nearly twenty years, the Imperial Factor withdrew from the South African interior, on the argument that, with the coast (mostly) under British control, the inland republics were no threat to the strategic command that was the ultima ratio ultima ratio of the imperial presence. of the imperial presence.
The "conventions policy" was a grudging recognition of the underlying weakness vitiating all attempts to make the sub-continent as "British" as Canada or Australia, or to master it imperially as the British had mastered India. The Imperial government would not finance a vast campaign of territorial conquest in Southern Africa. There (as elsewhere) imperial expansion waited on local agents to create a framework of information, order and opportunity: without it, reinforcements of capital and manpower were hard to attract. Nor was British military power a decisive weapon without the follow-through of local force. But, in South Africa, the coastal colonies in the Cape and Natal were cripplingly weak. They had no great staples like timber, wheat or wool (though wool came closest), attracted few migrants and borrowed little capital. Overland transport was costly and slow. The interior yielded few commodities. The commercial energy that drove forward the settler frontier elsewhere was in short supply. As a settler society, South Africa was a pale shadow of Canada. Nor, despite Sir Harry Smith, could it be a second India. There was no peasant economy to tax, no sepoy army to recruit, and no means to pay for the "hire" of imperial troops the three conditions which had allowed Anglo-Indian sub-imperialism to flourish unchecked by London"s veto. Far from being the dominant force in Southern Africa, the coastal colonies found themselves in frustrating equipoise with the interior states, white and black. Black societies could be hara.s.sed and threatened, but they were mobile, resilient and difficult to incorporate partly because, in the primitive state of the colonial economy, that meant seizing their land by force and conscripting their labour. The Boer republics were an even harder nut to crack.
It was easy to mistake the crudity of the Boer states for weakness. But the Boers had developed a highly effective means of "primitive acc.u.mulation" to complement their social and military system.9 On the highveld gra.s.sland and around its margins, their horse-borne mobility and firepower allowed them to capture African cattle, land and labour far more easily than in the dense bush and deep valleys of the old Cape borderlands. The Boer states existed to seize this wealth and redistribute it among their citizen-warriors organised into the key unit of their social and political life, the commando. The Boer elite were the commandants who had first pick of the spoils and on whose military prowess their followers depended. Boer inst.i.tutions may have been simple, On the highveld gra.s.sland and around its margins, their horse-borne mobility and firepower allowed them to capture African cattle, land and labour far more easily than in the dense bush and deep valleys of the old Cape borderlands. The Boer states existed to seize this wealth and redistribute it among their citizen-warriors organised into the key unit of their social and political life, the commando. The Boer elite were the commandants who had first pick of the spoils and on whose military prowess their followers depended. Boer inst.i.tutions may have been simple,10 but their pastoral economy, drawing labour and foodcrops from black dependants, allowed a thinly spread but highly effective occupation of the highveld to be imposed in less than twenty years. Boer warfare was perfectly adapted to the open veld. Against it, the square and the infantry charge, the standard British tactics, were largely ineffective. but their pastoral economy, drawing labour and foodcrops from black dependants, allowed a thinly spread but highly effective occupation of the highveld to be imposed in less than twenty years. Boer warfare was perfectly adapted to the open veld. Against it, the square and the infantry charge, the standard British tactics, were largely ineffective.
Stalemate was thus the rule in South African politics. When the British tried again to break it in the 1870s, the outcome was crushing failure. Once more, the reason for a forward move was the chorus of settler and official alarm at growing black resistance in the c.o.c.kpit of peoples between the Cape, Natal and the Boer republics. Once more the blame was laid on disunity and compet.i.tion among the whites. Federal union of the white settler states, British and Boer, favoured by Cape governors as the acceptable face of annexation, was endorsed by official opinion in London.11 Cape Colony was given Responsible (self-) Government in 1872 in the hope that its leaders would take up the federal cause. They refused, fearing that the whole burden of frontier control would fall on them. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, turned instead to the junior colony, Natal, and to Sir Theophilus Shepstone. Cape Colony was given Responsible (self-) Government in 1872 in the hope that its leaders would take up the federal cause. They refused, fearing that the whole burden of frontier control would fall on them. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, turned instead to the junior colony, Natal, and to Sir Theophilus Shepstone.12 Shepstone was the son of a British settler in the Eastern Cape. He became an official interpreter and, in the border warfare of the 1830s, rose quickly to be the government"s spokesman among the Xhosa chiefs. By 1846, he was "diplomatic agent" to the Africans in Natal and to the Zulu kingdom beyond the Tugela. A large, impa.s.sive, secretive man, Shepstone became the uncrowned king of Natal. He was an imperial official, but a colonial patriot: an unrelenting Natal sub-imperialist, a proto-Rhodes without the diamonds. His aim was to build a greater Natal: to find new "locations" for its blacks; to free more land for its whites; to annex the northern coast; to control the northern trade to the Zambezi; to conquer Zululand. Carnarvon"s rebuff at the Cape gave him his chance, for London was now willing to throw the Imperial Factor and its army into his puny settler bridgehead. Natal would be the springboard for colonial federation. Shepstone"s local influence, his mastery of frontier politics, his command of "native policy", made him the obvious choice as the new supremo of the northern interior. At first all went well. Worsted in its war against the Pedi, the Transvaal in 1876 was bankrupt, divided and demoralised. Shepstone talked its dejected president into surrendering independence and conjured up a pet.i.tion for annexation which he declared in February 1877. Shepstone was the son of a British settler in the Eastern Cape. He became an official interpreter and, in the border warfare of the 1830s, rose quickly to be the government"s spokesman among the Xhosa chiefs. By 1846, he was "diplomatic agent" to the Africans in Natal and to the Zulu kingdom beyond the Tugela. A large, impa.s.sive, secretive man, Shepstone became the uncrowned king of Natal. He was an imperial official, but a colonial patriot: an unrelenting Natal sub-imperialist, a proto-Rhodes without the diamonds. His aim was to build a greater Natal: to find new "locations" for its blacks; to free more land for its whites; to annex the northern coast; to control the northern trade to the Zambezi; to conquer Zululand. Carnarvon"s rebuff at the Cape gave him his chance, for London was now willing to throw the Imperial Factor and its army into his puny settler bridgehead. Natal would be the springboard for colonial federation. Shepstone"s local influence, his mastery of frontier politics, his command of "native policy", made him the obvious choice as the new supremo of the northern interior. At first all went well. Worsted in its war against the Pedi, the Transvaal in 1876 was bankrupt, divided and demoralised. Shepstone talked its dejected president into surrendering independence and conjured up a pet.i.tion for annexation which he declared in February 1877.13 The Pedi were defeated with imperial help. The Pedi were defeated with imperial help.14 Then, in the second stage of Shepstone"s grand design, the army Carnarvon had sent invaded Zululand, and (after the disaster at Isandhlwana) decisively broke its power. In a single forward movement, the British had broken the cycle of frustration and transformed the geopolitics of Southern Africa. Or so it seemed. Then, in the second stage of Shepstone"s grand design, the army Carnarvon had sent invaded Zululand, and (after the disaster at Isandhlwana) decisively broke its power. In a single forward movement, the British had broken the cycle of frustration and transformed the geopolitics of Southern Africa. Or so it seemed.
The moment of triumph was short. There was barely time to broach federation before the Transvaal Boers began to throw off their new colonial state with its courts and taxes. Paul Kruger"s fame as a frontier fighter made him the natural leader of revolt. With the shattering of Zulu and Pedi power, caution was redundant. In 1880, colonial control in the Transvaal crumbled rapidly. At Majuba, in February 1881, Boer commandos destroyed the imperial force sent to uphold annexation, killing General Colley, the high commissioner for South East Africa. With this fiasco, the Gladstone government threw in the towel, intimidated by reports that to prolong the struggle would unite Afrikaners in the Cape and Orange Free State against them.15 With the Convention of Pretoria they sc.r.a.pped the Transvaal"s annexation and threw away the federal plan. Shepstone and Natal had been broken reeds. The coalition of colonial and imperial power had never materialised. As in 184852, the Imperial Factor had come, failed and gone. The interior had kept its autonomy: London fell back on its old strategy of coastline control. But its hand in the sub-continent was now much weaker than before. A self-governing Cape Colony, with its (white) Afrikaner majority, was a sandy foundation for imperial influence. The final demolition of black independence (though not of all resistance) the by-product of forward policy in 187880 left the Boer republics much stronger by default. With the Convention of Pretoria they sc.r.a.pped the Transvaal"s annexation and threw away the federal plan. Shepstone and Natal had been broken reeds. The coalition of colonial and imperial power had never materialised. As in 184852, the Imperial Factor had come, failed and gone. The interior had kept its autonomy: London fell back on its old strategy of coastline control. But its hand in the sub-continent was now much weaker than before. A self-governing Cape Colony, with its (white) Afrikaner majority, was a sandy foundation for imperial influence. The final demolition of black independence (though not of all resistance) the by-product of forward policy in 187880 left the Boer republics much stronger by default.16 And, by the mid-1880s, French and German influence had begun to arrive in the region. And, by the mid-1880s, French and German influence had begun to arrive in the region.
Kruger versus Rhodes The Convention of Pretoria in 1881 settled the terms on which the Transvaal was to regain its freedom. The British withdrew, but not unconditionally. The Transvalers were forced to acknowledge British "suzerainty" a detached oversight of their internal affairs and imperial control of their foreign relations. They were enc.u.mbered with debts and, most galling of all, forbidden to encroach on remaining African territory inside or outside the Transvaal boundary. The mistreatment of Africans within the Transvaal could be reported to the British resident.17 It was hardly surprising that, when Kruger became the Transvaal president in 1883, he was determined to cut down the scope for imperial meddling and regain the old republican freedom conferred in 1852. He had little choice. The social economy of the Transvaal Boers was inimical to fixed boundaries. The acquisition of fresh land for speculation was the chief means of acc.u.mulating wealth in an underdeveloped pastoral economy. "Encroachment has been their very life", observed Lord Salisbury, the scion of an encroaching aristocracy. It was hardly surprising that, when Kruger became the Transvaal president in 1883, he was determined to cut down the scope for imperial meddling and regain the old republican freedom conferred in 1852. He had little choice. The social economy of the Transvaal Boers was inimical to fixed boundaries. The acquisition of fresh land for speculation was the chief means of acc.u.mulating wealth in an underdeveloped pastoral economy. "Encroachment has been their very life", observed Lord Salisbury, the scion of an encroaching aristocracy.18 Indeed, the Convention had hardly been signed before groups of burghers began to push their way on to African land to east and west, threatening a new round of frontier disturbance and missionary outrage. Indeed, the Convention had hardly been signed before groups of burghers began to push their way on to African land to east and west, threatening a new round of frontier disturbance and missionary outrage.
As Kruger sensed, the British position was getting weaker and their grip on the interior more tenuous. They had no will to confront the Boer filibusters and by 1883 scarcely any means. By 1883, the imperial garrison in South Africa was a mere 2,100 men. Besieged by Egyptian anxieties, the Gladstone cabinet had no appet.i.te for quixotic adventures on the highveld. Most of all, senior ministers in London were now convinced that a false move in Southern Africa would unite all Afrikaners against them, wrecking what remained of imperial paramountcy and putting the Cape"s strategic function at risk.19 They dared not coerce the Transvaal Boers and needed Kruger"s help in settling the frontier disputes. So, when Kruger came to London in 1883, it seemed a foregone conclusion that he would get his way and regain the "independence" conceded in 1852. They dared not coerce the Transvaal Boers and needed Kruger"s help in settling the frontier disputes. So, when Kruger came to London in 1883, it seemed a foregone conclusion that he would get his way and regain the "independence" conceded in 1852.
Indeed, the Transvaal president got much of what he wanted and might have got more. In the new Convention of 1884, British oversight of African interests disappeared. So did all reference to "suzerainty", though the bar to diplomatic freedom (and thus full independence) remained. The Transvaal was allowed to resume the grandiloquent t.i.tle of "South African Republic". But, in return, Kruger made a fateful concession. He agreed to leave a corridor of land between the Transvaal and the Kalahari desert under British protection. This green strip, with its forage for oxen, was the "Road to the North", the vital link between Cape Colony and the great unopened hinterland of Zambezia beyond the Limpopo. At the last minute, the High Commissioner in Cape Town had persuaded the Cape ministers to share the costs of British rule, and tipped the balance against surrender to Kruger"s territorial demands. When later the Cape reneged and the Transvaal Boers violated the new boundary, an embarra.s.sed government in London had no choice but to expel them by force and to a.s.sume the administrative burden of a Bechua.n.a.land protectorate it had refused to consider before the Convention.
Part of Kruger"s logic in accepting the western frontier of 1884 had been the urgency of debt relief London"s carrot.20 Even in the mid-1880s, the Transvaal had not thrown off the spectre of bankruptcy. Its annual revenues were puny: the Cape"s were fifteen times as great. On any reckoning, the new republic was an impoverished backwater, a threadbare ruffian on the fringe of empire. Its nuisance value was local, not imperial. Kruger had rea.s.serted the old autonomy of the South African interior but its persistent economic weakness remained. Then, in 1886, the discovery of the great gold reef on the Wit.w.a.tersrand signalled a drastic reversal of fortune. Within four years, the Transvaal"s gold production was worth nearly 2 million a year. By 1892, its revenues had reached half the Cape figure. Even in the mid-1880s, the Transvaal had not thrown off the spectre of bankruptcy. Its annual revenues were puny: the Cape"s were fifteen times as great. On any reckoning, the new republic was an impoverished backwater, a threadbare ruffian on the fringe of empire. Its nuisance value was local, not imperial. Kruger had rea.s.serted the old autonomy of the South African interior but its persistent economic weakness remained. Then, in 1886, the discovery of the great gold reef on the Wit.w.a.tersrand signalled a drastic reversal of fortune. Within four years, the Transvaal"s gold production was worth nearly 2 million a year. By 1892, its revenues had reached half the Cape figure.21 Six years later they were almost equal. The danger of bankruptcy (and political implosion) vanished. Rising land values created a wealthy ruling cla.s.s. With commercial concessions to distribute, Kruger could build a patronage state among the Transvaal whites and complete the subjugation of the Transvaal blacks. He could construct a railway to Delagoa Bay. With open access to the outside world and a gold economy, the half-promise of 1884 could become the whole-hog of republican freedom. Six years later they were almost equal. The danger of bankruptcy (and political implosion) vanished. Rising land values created a wealthy ruling cla.s.s. With commercial concessions to distribute, Kruger could build a patronage state among the Transvaal whites and complete the subjugation of the Transvaal blacks. He could construct a railway to Delagoa Bay. With open access to the outside world and a gold economy, the half-promise of 1884 could become the whole-hog of republican freedom.
Historians have made much of the "mineral revolution" which blew away the old a.s.sumptions of imperial strategy and made the rebellious Transvaal the strongest state on the sub-continent. In fact, Southern Africa had not one mineral revolution but two. The diamond rush at Kimberley came first (from 1867), and Kimberley became colonial not republican soil. But, for that other, earlier, revolution, Kruger might have carried his goldstate to independence and destroyed the remnants of British primacy in Southern Africa. Instead, he was confronted by a local rival whose ruthlessness matched his own and whose resources, leveraged with reckless lack of scruple, built a roadblock in his path. This rival was Cecil Rhodes.
Rhodes had come to South Africa in 1870.22 By 1876, still only twenty-three, he had made a small fortune in the diamond fields. Within a few years more, he emerged as a commanding figure in this rough speculative mining world whose voracious demand for imports, capital, railways and black labour transformed the Southern African economy. For the rest of his life, Kimberley remained the real centre of Rhodes" business and political ventures, the capital of the "Rhodesian" empire. It was here that his wealth was concentrated. It was here that he met many of those who became his partners, allies and agents. It was from here that Rhodes looked north towards Zambezia. This jerry-built outpost of colonial South Africa had become a commercial dynamo. It was a magnet for capital and enterprise and the natural springboard for the penetration of the northern interior by traders, prospectors, speculators and land-hungry settlers. It was the forward base-camp of sub-imperialism. By 1876, still only twenty-three, he had made a small fortune in the diamond fields. Within a few years more, he emerged as a commanding figure in this rough speculative mining world whose voracious demand for imports, capital, railways and black labour transformed the Southern African economy. For the rest of his life, Kimberley remained the real centre of Rhodes" business and political ventures, the capital of the "Rhodesian" empire. It was here that his wealth was concentrated. It was here that he met many of those who became his partners, allies and agents. It was from here that Rhodes looked north towards Zambezia. This jerry-built outpost of colonial South Africa had become a commercial dynamo. It was a magnet for capital and enterprise and the natural springboard for the penetration of the northern interior by traders, prospectors, speculators and land-hungry settlers. It was the forward base-camp of sub-imperialism.
And it was here that Rhodes" idle fantasies of imperial aggrandis.e.m.e.nt took on a local shape. In 1877, the Transvaal"s annexation promised a new field for Kimberley"s influence. Kruger"s triumph closed it off; but, six weeks after the battle of Majuba, Rhodes entered the Cape Parliament. At first, he was preoccupied with defending the interest of the diamond fields against taxation and state interference. But, by 1883, Rhodes had grasped the importance of the "Road to the North", the "Suez Ca.n.a.l of South Africa" as he called it, stretching away from Kimberley towards Mafeking, Tuli and Bulawayo, capital of Lobengula"s Ndebele state. By controlling access to this untold hinterland, Kimberley"s ultimate mastery of the north, including Kruger"s obstreperous Ruritania, would be a.s.sured. Under new Kimberley management, Cape Colony would throw off its rustic myopia and become the head and centre of a unified British South Africa.
Like his Canadian counterpart, John A. Macdonald, Rhodes saw that success depended upon mobilising the colonial state behind the programme for expansion. In South Africa, geography and economics demanded state sponsorship for the railway-building without which the whole sub-imperial plan would be still-born. Once in the Cape Parliament, Rhodes also grasped the need to win over the Afrikaner members who, under the leadership of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, had made the Afrikaner Bond the strongest political force in the Colony. The task seemed difficult. The Bond had emerged from a farmers" protection movement in the Western Cape, opposed to free trade; and from the cultural nationalism of the Dutch-speaking clerical elite hostile to the anglicising secularising effects of commercial growth.23 In fact, the Bond"s antipathy to British influence was surprisingly ambivalent. Afrikaners were prominent in the Cape"s legal and professional elite. They prospered with its new diamond wealth and warmed to its parliamentary rule. Like the colonial elites in Quebec (or Bengal), they found much to admire in an imperial system which promised self-government, liberal culture and material progress. In fact, the Bond"s antipathy to British influence was surprisingly ambivalent. Afrikaners were prominent in the Cape"s legal and professional elite. They prospered with its new diamond wealth and warmed to its parliamentary rule. Like the colonial elites in Quebec (or Bengal), they found much to admire in an imperial system which promised self-government, liberal culture and material progress.
Rhodes played on this ambivalence with astonishing skill. By the mid-1880s, he had repositioned himself not as a British "imperialist" nor as a Kimberley capitalist but as a Cape Colony patriot. His programme was Cape not British expansion. It was the Cape"s claim to the north that he touted, a Cape sub-empire that he wanted to win, as a fair field for "English" and Afrikaner alike. Nor were Rhodes" motives crudely tactical. In politics as in business his instinct was always fusion. The "great amalgamator" preferred a merger to an open struggle: rivals should be "squared" not left to fight a bitter rearguard action. By drawing the Cape Afrikaners into his expansionist project, he hoped to build a "progressive alliance". Rural interests and cultural prejudice would be carefully appeased. But new wealth would breed an Anglo-Afrikaner elite loyal to its own parliamentary inst.i.tutions and to the Imperial crown. Proud of their Cape heritage and of the Colony"s growing status, they would share Rhodes" vision of a unified sub-continent and dismiss the Kruger republic as an ethnic cul-de-sac. Kimberley and Stellenbosch (the seedbed of Afrikaner culture) would unite to build a "Greater Cape".
Between 1888 and 1890, the stalemate of South African politics began to break up. Rhodes was acc.u.mulating wealth and power with sensational rapidity. In 1888, with his close partner, the financial "genius" Alfred Beit, he centralised diamond production in a single great combine, De Beers Consolidated. Rhodes did not have full control especially over the London partners but at the South African end his influence was supreme.24 De Beers became the treasure-chest from which he could fund his political activity and his schemes of sub-imperial expansion. De Beers became the treasure-chest from which he could fund his political activity and his schemes of sub-imperial expansion.25 It helped provide collateral for the new share issues, which Rhodes could turn to his own profit and from which he could reward patrons, friends and allies. In the same year, Rhodes and another partner, Charles Rudd, persuaded the Ndebele ruler Lobengula to grant the right to prospect for minerals in his kingdom. This was the notorious Rudd Concession, largely paid for in rifles. Rhodes now had a long lead over his compet.i.tors for the hinterland beyond the Limpopo and the goldfields it was thought to conceal. But, before he could invade Zambezia and build a private empire in the North the first stage of the "Greater Cape" he needed an imperial licence to sanction political control by his agents on the spot. He also needed the promise of imperial support against any rival territorial claim by Portugal (which regarded modern Zimbabwe as the natural hinterland of Mozambique), Germany or the Transvaal republic. He needed a charter. It helped provide collateral for the new share issues, which Rhodes could turn to his own profit and from which he could reward patrons, friends and allies. In the same year, Rhodes and another partner, Charles Rudd, persuaded the Ndebele ruler Lobengula to grant the right to prospect for minerals in his kingdom. This was the notorious Rudd Concession, largely paid for in rifles. Rhodes now had a long lead over his compet.i.tors for the hinterland beyond the Limpopo and the goldfields it was thought to conceal. But, before he could invade Zambezia and build a private empire in the North the first stage of the "Greater Cape" he needed an imperial licence to sanction political control by his agents on the spot. He also needed the promise of imperial support against any rival territorial claim by Portugal (which regarded modern Zimbabwe as the natural hinterland of Mozambique), Germany or the Transvaal republic. He needed a charter.
Rhodes came to England in 1889, a little-known colonial businessman. He departed (with his charter) as the great white hope of speculative investors and imperial enthusiasts. It was the turning point of his career. He had become a promethean figure in imperial politics: the supreme sub-imperialist who combined local power with ready access to wealth and influence at home. Rhodes outmanoeuvred his doubters and critics (including the Colonial Office) and squared every interest. A merger was arranged with his most dangerous rivals.26 The idea of a chartered company to prospect for gold excited the City. The "South Africa Committee" of parliamentarians, philanthropists and missionary interests, chaired by Joseph Chamberlain, was expected to resist the charter as a colonial land-grab. But Rhodes captured two of its key members for his Company, including the ardent imperialist Albert Grey The idea of a chartered company to prospect for gold excited the City. The "South Africa Committee" of parliamentarians, philanthropists and missionary interests, chaired by Joseph Chamberlain, was expected to resist the charter as a colonial land-grab. But Rhodes captured two of its key members for his Company, including the ardent imperialist Albert Grey27 and won it over by a promise to help the struggling missionaries on Lake Nyasa. One of his henchmen, Cawston, had the effrontery to claim that the charter was intended to benefit the Zambezian blacks. and won it over by a promise to help the struggling missionaries on Lake Nyasa. One of his henchmen, Cawston, had the effrontery to claim that the charter was intended to benefit the Zambezian blacks.28 With the eager support of the High Commissioner in Cape Town, Rhodes now carried all before him. To Alfred Milner, then private secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it seemed obvious that, like it or not, northern expansion would make Rhodes more amenable to imperial control. With the eager support of the High Commissioner in Cape Town, Rhodes now carried all before him. To Alfred Milner, then private secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it seemed obvious that, like it or not, northern expansion would make Rhodes more amenable to imperial control.29 To the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, his promise of a British sphere in Central Africa at no public cost was a strategic windfall in hard times. To the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, his promise of a British sphere in Central Africa at no public cost was a strategic windfall in hard times.
It was an extraordinary coup. Rhodes had made his own luck. But he also deftly exploited a political climate without which he might have needed much more. Anxiety over Ireland, the vulnerability of Egypt, and the global pressure exerted by Britain"s imperial rivals created a jittery mood, especially among Liberal Unionists (like Milner and Chamberlain) who were attracted to ideas of imperial federation with the settlement colonies. To these uneasy imperialists Rhodes offered a winning combination of imperial patriotism and colonial expansion, uninhibited by the financial and diplomatic fetters they found so galling. Garnished with speculative profit, it was a seductive version of the imperial idea. Indeed, Rhodes" campaign for the charter and the const.i.tuency of admirers he created formed the basis for the public sympathy in Britain on which he (and Milner) were to draw so heavily after 1897. In the meantime, Rhodes returned to South Africa to make his paper empire real. His "Pioneer Column", paid for by De Beers, trekked into Mashonaland and founded "Salisbury" now Harare. In the Cape, Rhodes was now the undisputed supremo. 1890 was his annus mirabilis annus mirabilis. He was already managing director of De Beers, the greatest fount of wealth in the Colony, and of the British South Africa Company, over whose domain in Zambezia (soon "Rhodesia") his authority was absolute. Now he became Cape premier as well.
Over the next four years Rhodes used this remarkable portfolio of political, financial and territorial power to drive forward his aim of Cape supremacy and strangle the Transvaal"s independence. His system seemed unstoppable. In the Cape, his alliance with the Bond was sealed by the artful distribution of his company shares at par. Rhodes made no secret of his dislike of Downing Street. This was the usual language of British settler politicians from New Zealand to British Columbia: but it was soothing syrup to Afrikaner opinion. Rhodes identified himself with the Cape Dutch origins of South Africa"s "manifest destiny" as a "white man"s country". His enthusiasm for Cape Dutch architecture, his purchase and restoration of Groote Schuur, his interest in agriculture, and his Afrikaner a.s.sociates were all a reflection of his half-formed project for an Anglo-Afrikaner "middle nation" within a wider Britannic confederacy.30 As Cape premier, Rhodes oversaw the extension of the Colony"s railway to the Rand, the great inland market. As the uncrowned king of Rhodesia, he approved the Ndbele war of 1893 by which white rule was somewhat precariously extended from Mashonaland to Matabeleland. He pressed for the hand-over of Bechua.n.a.land to the Chartered Company as the land bridge from the Cape to its new inland empire. He made an abortive attempt to buy Delagoa Bay and also the railway that Kruger was building to the last accessible harbour outside British territory. As Cape premier, Rhodes oversaw the extension of the Colony"s railway to the Rand, the great inland market. As the uncrowned king of Rhodesia, he approved the Ndbele war of 1893 by which white rule was somewhat precariously extended from Mashonaland to Matabeleland. He pressed for the hand-over of Bechua.n.a.land to the Chartered Company as the land bridge from the Cape to its new inland empire. He made an abortive attempt to buy Delagoa Bay and also the railway that Kruger was building to the last accessible harbour outside British territory.
But, by 1894, it was becoming clear that he had over-reached himself. There was a critical weakness in his grand geopolitical design. Seizing Rhodesia had been meant to give him a stranglehold on the Boer republics. A great gold reef in the Chartered territory would draw in a torrent of capital and migrants from Britain, boosting the trade and revenues of the Cape. It would drive home the lesson that it was futile to stand out against a Cape-led South Africa. Kimberley would revenge Majuba. This was Rhodes" gamble: but it did not come off. By 1894, he knew that there was no great reef to be found: Rhodesia would not eclipse the Rand.31 Nor could Rhodes and his allies exert economic control over Kruger by their grip on the Rand. Nor could Rhodes and his allies exert economic control over Kruger by their grip on the Rand.
The Rand in fact was Rhodes" nemesis. Preoccupied by the struggle for De Beers, Rhodes had failed to foresee the Rand"s vast potential. His company, "Goldfields", was only one among several large mining houses that emerged in the 1890s. Rhodes lacked the capital to attempt the great amalgamation he achieved at Kimberley. Nor did the Rand lend itself to the tactics that had worked well with diamonds. It was easy for his rivals to raise money in London. The violent fluctuations in the value of shares, and the scale of speculative activity, ruled out the "squaring" of interests, Rhodes" favoured technique. Nor would Kruger allow the commercial free rein that Rhodes enjoyed in the Cape. Instead, his sale of concessions, like the dynamite monopoly, his control of the railways and the black labour supply, and his canny restriction of political rights, kept the gold-mining houses in a state of grudging dependence. Rhodes" best hope was to use his connections with the "Corner House", the largest mining house on the Rand and controlled by two of his partners in De Beers, Wernher and Beit, to foment opposition to Kruger. The danger was that the mining interests and the immigrant population the Uitlanders or foreigners would prefer an independent republic to domination by Rhodes" Cape conglomerate. This was what made the defeat of Kruger so urgent; this was why his overthrow had to be staged by rebels loyal to Rhodes.32 The Jameson Raid in December 1895 was Rhodes" attempt to seize control of the anti-Kruger movement in Johannesburg and master-mind the transfer of power in the Transvaal. Rhodes hoped to exploit the tacit sympathy of the Imperial government in London for Uitlander grievances and its willingness to intervene once Kruger"s authority had been successfully challenged.33 Jameson, Rhodes" closest henchman, was meant to arrive in Johannesburg in a show of solidarity with the local rebellion, but really to stamp on it Rhodes" authority. A complicit High Commissioner at the Cape would rule in his favour. By a dazzling coup, rather than slow attrition, the grand design would be forged. Notoriously, everything went wrong. The Johannesburg conspirators were tardy and disorganised, so that Jameson"s "raid" was recklessly premature. Kruger was forewarned. Jameson"s force was no match for the Boer commandos who caught up with him before he reached the city. The High Commissioner and Imperial government (both implicated in the original plan) disavowed Rhodes" crude filibuster. The Johannesburg conspirators were rounded up, tried and imprisoned (commuting their death sentences cost Rhodes 300,000). Jameson, Rhodes" closest henchman, was meant to arrive in Johannesburg in a show of solidarity with the local rebellion, but really to stamp on it Rhodes" authority. A complicit High Commissioner at the Cape would rule in his favour. By a dazzling coup, rather than slow attrition, the grand design would be forged. Notoriously, everything went wrong. The Johannesburg conspirators were tardy and disorganised, so that Jameson"s "raid" was recklessly premature. Kruger was forewarned. Jameson"s force was no match for the Boer commandos who caught up with him before he reached the city. The High Commissioner and Imperial government (both implicated in the original plan) disavowed Rhodes" crude filibuster. The Johannesburg conspirators were rounded up, tried and imprisoned (commuting their death sentences cost Rhodes 300,000).34 Worst of all, Rhodes" Afrikaner allies in the Cape whom he had kept in ignorance (believing perhaps that they would favour the end while loathing the means), turned against him in rage. His premiership collapsed. The "Colossus" had suffered a huge reversal of fortune. Far from succ.u.mbing to the Rhodesian juggernaut, Kruger now seemed stronger than ever. His internal position was secure. And, after Rhodes" treachery, he could be sure that the Cape Afrikaners would block any move to coerce him again. As the compet.i.tion between rival imperialisms reached its climax in Afro-Asia, Kruger"s chances of wriggling out of the British sphere seemed better than ever. Worst of all, Rhodes" Afrikaner allies in the Cape whom he had kept in ignorance (believing perhaps that they would favour the end while loathing the means), turned against him in rage. His premiership collapsed. The "Colossus" had suffered a huge reversal of fortune. Far from succ.u.mbing to the Rhodesian juggernaut, Kruger now seemed stronger than ever. His internal position was secure. And, after Rhodes" treachery, he could be sure that the Cape Afrikaners would block any move to coerce him again. As the compet.i.tion between rival imperialisms reached its climax in Afro-Asia, Kruger"s chances of wriggling out of the British sphere seemed better than ever.
The decision for war, 18969 In his bid to pull Kruger down and absorb the Transvaal, Rhodes had wanted to keep the Imperial government at arm"s length, while exploiting the authority of its agent (the High Commissioner) in his intended coup on the Rand. Rhodes intended to remake South Africa to his design not Downing Street"s. To this aim the disastrous outcome of the Jameson Raid was a ma.s.sive but not fatal setback. It forced Rhodes and his local allies into partnership with the Imperial Factor since London alone had the power to coerce coerce Kruger. But whether London would be willing to do so was another matter entirely. Kruger. But whether London would be willing to do so was another matter entirely.
Indeed, it might have been expected that, after the Jameson Raid, the Imperial government would revert to the policy of disengagement adopted after 1881. Amid suspicion that it was implicated in the Jameson Raid, its influence was weaker than ever. An imperial initiative to promote federation was out of the question. In fact, whatever its inclinations, the Salisbury cabinet was drawn deeper and deeper into the thicket of South African politics. Chamberlain"s own prestige was invested heavily in preventing Kruger from exploiting his triumph. Threatening language and a squadron in Delagoa Bay served notice that Britain"s claim claim to regional primacy was undiminished. Chamberlain"s deputy, Lord Selborne (the prime minister"s son-in-law), was imbued with a "Rhodesian" outlook. His memorandum of March 1896 warning against a secessionist "United States of South Africa" forming around a cosmopolitan English-speaking Transvaal republic to regional primacy was undiminished. Chamberlain"s deputy, Lord Selborne (the prime minister"s son-in-law), was imbued with a "Rhodesian" outlook. His memorandum of March 1896 warning against a secessionist "United States of South Africa" forming around a cosmopolitan English-speaking Transvaal republic35 was inspired by the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, and derived almost certainly from Rhodes. Nor, for all its absurdity, had the Jameson Raid failed to leave its mark on British policy. The furore over the Parliamentary enquiry into the Raid and indignation over the Kaiser"s congratulatory telegram to Kruger helped to turn the Uitlander grievances into a political issue in Britain and a nagging index of imperial prestige. In South Africa, the ironic legacy of Rhodes" fall had been the deliberate mobilisation of "English" sentiment in Cape Colony behind a demand for imperial self-a.s.sertion against the Transvaal. Cool British detachment from South African affairs was hardly an option. was inspired by the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, and derived almost certainly from Rhodes. Nor, for all its absurdity, had the Jameson Raid failed to leave its mark on British policy. The furore over the Parliamentary enquiry into the Raid and indignation over the Kaiser"s congratulatory telegram to Kruger helped to turn the Uitlander grievances into a political issue in Britain and a nagging index of imperial prestige. In South Africa, the ironic legacy of Rhodes" fall had been the deliberate mobilisation of "English" sentiment in Cape Colony behind a demand for imperial self-a.s.sertion against the Transvaal. Cool British detachment from South African affairs was hardly an option.
For Chamberlain, the immediate need was a capable proconsul: to watch Kruger closely against any breach of the Convention, especially the ban on his diplomatic freedom; to press the Uitlanders" case; and to avoid the dependence on Rhodes to which Robinson had succ.u.mbed. His choice was Sir Alfred Milner, then chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue. This was not as eccentric as it seemed. Like Chamberlain, Milner was a Liberal Unionist who had rebelled against the Irish Home Rule bill in 1886. He was deeply sympathetic to the idea of closer union between the settlement colonies of "Greater Britain" to which Chamberlain was privately committed. He shared Chamberlain"s concern that a unified "British South Africa" should form part of this larger imperial a.s.sociation. He had served under Cromer in Egypt (188992) and had published an influential defence of the imperial "mission" there.36 As a safe pair of hands with wide friendships in both political camps, he enjoyed the prestige to place the government"s South African policy on a fresh footing. The question was: what could he do? As a safe pair of hands with wide friendships in both political camps, he enjoyed the prestige to place the government"s South African policy on a fresh footing. The question was: what could he do?
To Milner himself, the immediate answer seemed not very much. He would do his best to persuade the Transvaal government down the path of reform, but without drawing in the Imperial government.37 But the Uitlander franchise was out of the question. But the Uitlander franchise was out of the question.38 The best hope was that the irrepressible growth of Johannesburg would force a change. Part of the difficulty lay in Cape politics where Rhodes" sudden removal had brought confusion. "At present they are all dwarfs", Milner told his old political mentor, George Goschen, "except Rhodes who is a really big man but thoroughly untrustworthy." The best hope was that the irrepressible growth of Johannesburg would force a change. Part of the difficulty lay in Cape politics where Rhodes" sudden removal had brought confusion. "At present they are all dwarfs", Milner told his old political mentor, George Goschen, "except Rhodes who is a really big man but thoroughly untrustworthy."39 By this time, Milner had already begun to drift towards the alliance with Rhodes against which Chamberlain had warned him. By this time, Milner had already begun to drift towards the alliance with Rhodes against which Chamberlain had warned him.40 He had little choice. Rhodes was the "real" head of the Cape government, and the premier, Sprigg, his mouthpiece. More to the point, for all the disaster of the Jameson Raid, only Rhodes had the means to push forward the grand project which Milner saw as the real purpose of his proconsulship: the unification of British South Africa and the re-absorption of the Transvaal. He had little choice. Rhodes was the "real" head of the Cape government, and the premier, Sprigg, his mouthpiece. More to the point, for all the disaster of the Jameson Raid, only Rhodes had the means to push forward the grand project which Milner saw as the real purpose of his proconsulship: the unification of British South Africa and the re-absorption of the Transvaal.
The key was the north, Rhodes" private empire in Rhodesia. Foiled on the Rand and frustrated at the Cape, Rhodes" best hope was to speed up Rhodesia"s development and build a grand new colony embracing the Bechua.n.a.land Protectorate (then still under imperial control). The Protectorate would be Rhodesia"s land bridge to the Cape. As part of "Greater Rhodesia" it would help surround the Transvaal on two sides. The third stage of Rhodes" plan was to promote the federal union of the Cape, Natal and Greater Rhodesia. Then "the three combined will bring peaceful peaceful pressure to bear upon the republics to drive them into a S[outh] African federation". pressure to bear upon the republics to drive them into a S[outh] African federation".41 Milner proposed to fasten imperial policy once more to Rhodes" chariot wheels. But, this time, the "Colossus" was to be kept on a leash "unless he is to make a shipwreck of his own ambitions and our permanent interests". The persistent African risings against Rhodes" Company government cast doubt on his schemes at least for the moment. It was vital to preserve some imperial control over Rhodesia and to make him wait for the eventual transfer of the Protectorate. "His projected game is a good game but...he is desperately anxious to have another slap at old Kruger by "peaceful means"." Milner proposed to fasten imperial policy once more to Rhodes" chariot wheels. But, this time, the "Colossus" was to be kept on a leash "unless he is to make a shipwreck of his own ambitions and our permanent interests". The persistent African risings against Rhodes" Company government cast doubt on his schemes at least for the moment. It was vital to preserve some imperial control over Rhodesia and to make him wait for the eventual transfer of the Protectorate. "His projected game is a good game but...he is desperately anxious to have another slap at old Kruger by "peaceful means"."42 As Milner recognised, Rhodes "was much too strong to be merely used". His cooperation had to be bought. But his "Northern" strategy was the only shot in the imperial locker. Milner settled in for the long haul, and a "qualified success". "A united and loyal S[outh] Africa on the Canadian pattern if it ever comes about is a thing of the very distant future", he told one of his oldest and closest friends. As Milner recognised, Rhodes "was much too strong to be merely used". His cooperation had to be bought. But his "Northern" strategy was the only shot in the imperial locker. Milner settled in for the long haul, and a "qualified success". "A united and loyal S[outh] Africa on the Canadian pattern if it ever comes about is a thing of the very distant future", he told one of his oldest and closest friends.43 But Britain"s strategic interests, thought this "civilian soldier of the Empire" (Milner"s self-description), were safe enough: "I don"t mean in the least that I despair of the maintenance of British supremacy." But Britain"s strategic interests, thought this "civilian soldier of the Empire" (Milner"s self-description), were safe enough: "I don"t mean in the least that I despair of the maintenance of British supremacy."44 Cautious pragmatism was the keynote of an imperial policy which waited on the maturing of Rhodes" schemes. The Transvaal was "bound to topple", Milner told Asquith, the future prime minister.45 There was little point taking up the mine-owners" main grievance, the dynamite monopoly imposed by Kruger"s government. Scarcely three months later, Milner performed an astonishing u-turn. Now he urged an openly aggressive policy towards the Transvaal, and, in a notorious speech (at Graaff Reinet on 3 March 1898), questioned the loyalty of the Cape Afrikaners to the imperial connection. Milner may have been reacting to Kruger"s unexpectedly resounding success in the Transvaal"s presidential election in February. He may have been anxious about Rhodes" grip on Rhodesia. But there was another reason for his harder line. Early in 1898, Rhodes too was switching tactics. With the Parliamentary inquiry into the Jameson Raid behind him, and the black revolt in Rhodesia broken, he was ready to re-enter Cape politics. His old alliance with the Bond was irreparable; but he had a new vehicle. He had become the darling of the "English" in the towns. In the Cape"s Eastern Province, the South African League had been formed to rally loyalty to the Empire and (by a deft a.s.sociation) to Rhodes. In 1897, the League created the "Progressive" party to campaign for free trade, agrarian improvement and the redistribution of seats causes carefully identified with imperial loyalty. Before the end of 1897, a private understanding had been reached between the Progressives and Rhodes" own followers. There was little point taking up the mine-owners" main grievance, the dynamite monopoly imposed by Kruger"s government. Scarcely three months later, Milner performed an astonishing u-turn. Now he urged an openly aggressive policy towards the Transvaal, and, in a notorious speech (at Graaff Reinet on 3 March 1898), questioned the loyalty of the Cape Afrikaners to the imperial connection. Milner may have been reacting to Kruger"s unexpectedly resounding success in the Transvaal"s presidential election in February. He may have been anxious about Rhodes" grip on Rhodesia. But there was another reason for his harder line. Early in 1898, Rhodes too was switching tactics. With the Parliamentary inquiry into the Jameson Raid behind him, and the black revolt in Rhodesia broken, he was ready to re-enter Cape politics. His old alliance with the Bond was irreparable; but he had a new vehicle. He had become the darling of the "English" in the towns. In the Cape"s Eastern Province, the South African League had been formed to rally loyalty to the Empire and (by a deft a.s.sociation) to Rhodes. In 1897, the League created the "Progressive" party to campaign for free trade, agrarian improvement and the redistribution of seats causes carefully identified with imperial loyalty. Before the end of 1897, a private understanding had been reached between the Progressives and Rhodes" own followers.46 Six days after Milner"s speech, Rhodes announced his conversion to the Progressive programme and opened fire on the Bond for its hostility to northern expansion and its resistance to an imperial naval contribution. Six days after Milner"s speech, Rhodes announced his conversion to the Progressive programme and opened fire on the Bond for its hostility to northern expansion and its resistance to an imperial naval contribution.47 Rhodes, sneered his bitterest enemy in the Cape, wanted a majority "not to unify South Africa, but to purchase...the Bulawayo railway and...that very bad egg Rhodesia". Rhodes, sneered his bitterest enemy in the Cape, wanted a majority "not to unify South Africa, but to purchase...the Bulawayo railway and...that very bad egg Rhodesia".48 But Rhodes was also determined to give urban (and "English") voters a fairer share of seats. His new alliance would bring him the townsmen"s vote. With firm control of the Cape Parliament he could tighten the knot round Kruger"s neck. Milner had little choice but to follow him. But Rhodes was also determined to give urban (and "English") voters a fairer share of seats. His new alliance would bring him the townsmen"s vote. With firm control of the Cape Parliament he could tighten the knot round Kruger"s neck. Milner had little choice but to follow him.
In fact, throughout 1898, Milner"s dependence on Rhodes grew deeper. His own attempt to draw Chamberlain into the struggle for "reform" in the Transvaal misfired badly. A sharp rebuke arrived from London. Chamberlain had other fish to fry and was preoccupied with the struggle for hinterlands in West West Africa. At Rhodes" direct request, Africa. At Rhodes" direct request,49 Milner pleaded for his grandiose scheme to build a new railway beyond the Zambezi and open a vast new northern extension. Britain"s strategy in South Africa, he urged, depended upon the gamble of Rhodesia"s development. Capital would be attracted by the sheer scale of Rhodes" project; a great new railway empire, pivoted on Bulawayo, would kick-start the Rhodesian economy as a counterpoise to the Transvaal. Milner pleaded for his grandiose scheme to build a new railway beyond the Zambezi and open a vast new northern extension. Britain"s strategy in South Africa, he urged, depended upon the gamble of Rhodesia"s development. Capital would be attracted by the sheer scale of Rhodes" project; a great new railway empire, pivoted on Bulawayo, would kick-start the Rhodesian economy as a counterpoise to the Transvaal.50 Two weeks earlier, Milner had warned Rhodes against "worrying" Chamberlain with this scheme. Two weeks earlier, Milner had warned Rhodes against "worrying" Chamberlain with this scheme.51 But in the course of the year the prospects of direct imperial action grew steadily fainter. The British press was distracted by other imperial excitements in the Sudan and China. In South Africa, everything turned upon Rhodes. Chamberlain was anxious to hear about his gold prospects in Rhodesia. But in the course of the year the prospects of direct imperial action grew steadily fainter. The British press was distracted by other imperial excitements in the Sudan and China. In South Africa, everything turned upon Rhodes. Chamberlain was anxious to hear about his gold prospects in Rhodesia.52 The Transvaal was "in a twitter" about his plans. The Transvaal was "in a twitter" about his plans.53 Redistribution and electoral victory would make Rhodes master of the Cape. His reward might be Bechua.n.a.land. Redistribution and electoral victory would make Rhodes master of the Cape. His reward might be Bechua.n.a.land.54 After two years in the wilderness, Rhodes seemed once more near the pinnacle of power. After two years in the wilderness, Rhodes seemed once more near the pinnacle of power.
Rhodes may have calculated that an election victory in the Cape and a third premiership would give him scope for some rapprochement with his erstwhile allies in the Bond. The Cape Afrikaners were as anxious as he to promote South African unity (though not at imperial command) and just as fearful of Kruger"s dabblings in great power diplomacy a vice attributed to his "Hollander" advisers. With their help, Kruger might yet be overcome. The triumph and the spoils would be his, not Downing Street"s. It was perhaps not so much Rhodes" failure as the circ.u.mstances of his defeat that made conflict unavoidable. In the Cape elections of 1898, Rhodes had denounced "Krugerism" and demanded "equal rights for every white man south of the Zambezi".55 But, contrary to most prediction, and despite lavish spending, Rhodes" Progressives were narrowly defeated although winning a majority of votes cast. A Bond ministry took office. Rapprochement went out of the window: a fresh round of "racial" politics came in at the door. English "race-sentiment", the stock-in-trade of the South African League, was turned up to whip in the remaining "English" politicians who had stood out against Rhodes. Rhodes harried the Bond ministry in parliament a