The most thorough-going refutation of them is given by Hume in his _Essay on Suicide_. This did not appeal until after his death, when it was immediately suppressed, owing to the scandalous bigotry and outrageous ecclesiastical tyranny that prevailed in England; and hence only a very few copies of it were sold under cover of secrecy and at a high price. This and another treatise by that great man have come to us from Basle, and we may be thankful for the reprint.[2] It is a great disgrace to the English nation that a purely philosophical treatise, which, proceeding from one of the first thinkers and writers in England, aimed at refuting the current arguments against suicide by the light of cold reason, should be forced to sneak about in that country, as though it were some rascally production, until at last it found refuge on the Continent. At the same time it shows what a good conscience the Church has in such matters.
[Footnote 1: See my treatise on the _Foundation of Morals_, -- 5.]
[Footnote 2: _Essays on Suicide_ and the _Immortality of the Soul_, by the late David Hume, Basle, 1799, sold by James Decker.]
In my chief work I have explained the only valid reason existing against suicide on the score of mortality. It is this: that suicide thwarts the attainment of the highest moral aim by the fact that, for a real release from this world of misery, it subst.i.tutes one that is merely apparent. But from a _mistake_ to a _crime_ is a far cry; and it is as a crime that the clergy of Christendom wish us to regard suicide.
The inmost kernel of Christianity is the truth that suffering--_the Cross_--is the real end and object of life. Hence Christianity condemns suicide as thwarting this end; whilst the ancient world, taking a lower point of view, held it in approval, nay, in honor.[1]
But if that is to be accounted a valid reason against suicide, it involves the recognition of asceticism; that is to say, it is valid only from a much higher ethical standpoint than has ever been adopted by moral philosophers in Europe. If we abandon that high standpoint, there is no tenable reason left, on the score of morality, for condemning suicide. The extraordinary energy and zeal with which the clergy of monotheistic religions attack suicide is not supported either by any pa.s.sages in the Bible or by any considerations of weight; so that it looks as though they must have some secret reason for their contention. May it not be this--that the voluntary surrender of life is a bad compliment for him who said that _all things were very good_? If this is so, it offers another instance of the cra.s.s optimism of these religions,--denouncing suicide to escape being denounced by it.
[Footnote 1: _Translator"s Note_.--Schopenhauer refers to _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol. i., -- 69, where the reader may find the same argument stated at somewhat greater length. According to Schopenhauer, moral freedom--the highest ethical aim--is to be obtained only by a denial of the will to live. Far from being a denial, suicide is an emphatic a.s.sertion of this will. For it is in fleeing from the pleasures, not from the sufferings of life, that this denial consists. When a man destroys his existence as an individual, he is not by any means destroying his will to live. On the contrary, he would like to live if he could do so with satisfaction to himself; if he could a.s.sert his will against the power of circ.u.mstance; but circ.u.mstance is too strong for him.]
It will generally be found that, as soon as the terrors of life reach the point at which they outweigh the terrors of death, a man will put an end to his life. But the terrors of death offer considerable resistance; they stand like a sentinel at the gate leading out of this world. Perhaps there is no man alive who would not have already put an end to his life, if this end had been of a purely negative character, a sudden stoppage of existence. There is something positive about it; it is the destruction of the body; and a man shrinks from that, because his body is the manifestation of the will to live.
However, the struggle with that sentinel is, as a rule, not so hard as it may seem from a long way off, mainly in consequence of the antagonism between the ills of the body and the ills of the mind. If we are in great bodily pain, or the pain lasts a long time, we become indifferent to other troubles; all we think about is to get well. In the same way great mental suffering makes us insensible to bodily pain; we despise it; nay, if it should outweigh the other, it distracts our thoughts, and we welcome it as a pause in mental suffering. It is this feeling that makes suicide easy; for the bodily pain that accompanies it loses all significance in the eyes of one who is tortured by an excess of mental suffering. This is especially evident in the case of those who are driven to suicide by some purely morbid and exaggerated ill-humor. No special effort to overcome their feelings is necessary, nor do such people require to be worked up in order to take the step; but as soon as the keeper into whose charge they are given leaves them for a couple of minutes, they quickly bring their life to an end.
When, in some dreadful and ghastly dream, we reach the moment of greatest horror, it awakes us; thereby banishing all the hideous shapes that were born of the night. And life is a dream: when the moment of greatest horror compels us to break it off, the same thing happens.
Suicide may also be regarded as an experiment--a question which man puts to Nature, trying to force her to an answer. The question is this: What change will death produce in a man"s existence and in his insight into the nature of things? It is a clumsy experiment to make; for it involves the destruction of the very consciousness which puts the question and awaits the answer.
IMMORTALITY:[1] A DIALOGUE.
[Footnote 1: _Translator"s Note_.--The word immortality--_Unsterblichkeit_--does not occur in the original; nor would it, in its usual application, find a place in Schopenhauer"s vocabulary. The word he uses is _Unzers...o...b..rkeit--indestructibility_.
But I have preferred _immortality_, because that word is commonly a.s.sociated with the subject touched upon in this little debate. If any critic doubts the wisdom of this preference, let me ask him to try his hand at a short, concise, and, at the same time, popularly intelligible rendering of the German original, which runs thus: _Zur Lehre von der Unzers...o...b..rkeit unseres wahren Wesens durch den Tod: Meine dialogische Schlussbel.u.s.tigung_.]
THRASYMACHOS--PHILALETHES.
_Thrasymachos_. Tell me now, in one word, what shall I be after my death? And mind you be clear and precise.
_Philalethes_. All and nothing!
_Thrasymachos_. I thought so! I gave you a problem, and you solve it by a contradiction. That"s a very stale trick.
_Philalethes_. Yes, but you raise transcendental questions, and you expect me to answer them in language that is only made for immanent knowledge. It"s no wonder that a contradiction ensues.
_Thrasymachos_. What do you mean by transcendental questions and immanent knowledge? I"ve heard these expressions before, of course; they are not new to me. The Professor was fond of using them, but only as predicates of the Deity, and he never talked of anything else; which was all quite right and proper. He argued thus: if the Deity was in the world itself, he was immanent; if he was somewhere outside it, he was transcendent. Nothing could be clearer and more obvious! You knew where you were. But this Kantian rigmarole won"t do any more: it"s antiquated and no longer applicable to modern ideas. Why, we"ve had a whole row of eminent men in the metropolis of German learning--
_Philalethes_. (Aside.) German humbug, he means.
_Thrasymachos_. The mighty Schleiermacher, for instance, and that gigantic intellect, Hegel; and at this time of day we"ve abandoned that nonsense. I should rather say we"re so far beyond it that we can"t put up with it any more. What"s the use of it then? What does it all mean?
_Philalethes_. Transcendental knowledge is knowledge which pa.s.ses beyond the bounds of possible experience, and strives to determine the nature of things as they are in themselves. Immanent knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge which confines itself entirely with those bounds; so that it cannot apply to anything but actual phenomena. As far as you are an individual, death will be the end of you. But your individuality is not your true and inmost being: it is only the outward manifestation of it. It is not the _thing-in-itself_, but only the phenomenon presented in the form of time; and therefore with a beginning and an end. But your real being knows neither time, nor beginning, nor end, nor yet the limits of any given individual. It is everywhere present in every individual; and no individual can exist apart from it. So when death comes, on the one hand you are annihilated as an individual; on the other, you are and remain everything. That is what I meant when I said that after your death you would be all and nothing. It is difficult to find a more precise answer to your question and at the same time be brief. The answer is contradictory, I admit; but it is so simply because your life is in time, and the immortal part of you in eternity. You may put the matter thus: Your immortal part is something that does not last in time and yet is indestructible; but there you have another contradiction! You see what happens by trying to bring the transcendental within the limits of immanent knowledge. It is in some sort doing violence to the latter by misusing it for ends it was never meant to serve.
_Thrasymachos_. Look here, I shan"t give twopence for your immortality unless I"m to remain an individual.
_Philalethes_. Well, perhaps I may be able to satisfy you on this point. Suppose I guarantee that after death you shall remain an individual, but only on condition that you first spend three months of complete unconsciousness.
_Thrasymachos_. I shall have no objection to that.
_Philalethes_. But remember, if people are completely unconscious, they take no account of time. So, when you are dead, it"s all the same to you whether three months pa.s.s in the world of consciousness, or ten thousand years. In the one case as in the other, it is simply a matter of believing what is told you when you awake. So far, then, you can afford to be indifferent whether it is three months or ten thousand years that pa.s.s before you recover your individuality.
_Thrasymachos_. Yes, if it comes to that, I suppose you"re right.
_Philalethes_. And if by chance, after those ten thousand years have gone by, no one ever thinks of awakening you, I fancy it would be no great misfortune. You would have become quite accustomed to non-existence after so long a spell of it--following upon such a very few years of life. At any rate you may be sure you would be perfectly ignorant of the whole thing. Further, if you knew that the mysterious power which keeps you in your present state of life had never once ceased in those ten thousand years to bring forth other phenomena like yourself, and to endow them with life, it would fully console you.
_Thrasymachos_. Indeed! So you think you"re quietly going to do me out of my individuality with all this fine talk. But I"m up to your tricks. I tell you I won"t exist unless I can have my individuality.
I"m not going to be put off with "mysterious powers," and what you call "phenomena." I can"t do without my individuality, and I won"t give it up.
_Philalethes_. You mean, I suppose, that your individuality is such a delightful thing, so splendid, so perfect, and beyond compare--that you can"t imagine anything better. Aren"t you ready to exchange your present state for one which, if we can judge by what is told us, may possibly be superior and more endurable?
_Thrasymachos_. Don"t you see that my individuality, be it what it may, is my very self? To me it is the most important thing in the world.
_For G.o.d is G.o.d and I am I_.
_I_ want to exist, _I, I_. That"s the main thing. I don"t care about an existence which has to be proved to be mine, before I can believe it.
_Philalethes_. Think what you"re doing! When you say _I, I, I_ want to exist, it is not you alone that says this. Everything says it, absolutely everything that has the faintest trace of consciousness. It follows, then, that this desire of yours is just the part of you that is _not individual_--the part that is common to all things without distinction. It is the cry, not of the individual, but of existence itself; it is the intrinsic element in everything that exists, nay, it is the cause of anything existing at all. This desire craves for, and so is satisfied with, nothing less than existence in general--not any definite individual existence. No! that is not its aim. It seems to be so only because this desire--this _Will_--attains consciousness only in the individual, and therefore looks as though it were concerned with nothing but the individual. There lies the illusion--an illusion, it is true, in which the individual is held fast: but, if he reflects, he can break the fetters and set himself free. It is only indirectly, I say, that the individual has this violent craving for existence. It is _the Will to Live_ which is the real and direct aspirant--alike and identical in all things. Since, then, existence is the free work, nay, the mere reflection of the will, where existence is, there, too, must be will; and for the moment the will finds its satisfaction in existence itself; so far, I mean, as that which never rests, but presses forward eternally, can ever find any satisfaction at all.
The will is careless of the individual: the individual is not its business; although, as I have said, this seems to be the case, because the individual has no direct consciousness of will except in himself.
The effect of this is to make the individual careful to maintain his own existence; and if this were not so, there would be no surety for the preservation of the species. From all this it is clear that individuality is not a form of perfection, but rather of limitation; and so to be freed from it is not loss but gain. Trouble yourself no more about the matter. Once thoroughly recognize what you are, what your existence really is, namely, the universal will to live, and the whole question will seem to you childish, and most ridiculous!
_Thrasymachos_. You"re childish yourself and most ridiculous, like all philosophers! and if a man of my age lets himself in for a quarter-of-an-hour"s talk with such fools, it is only because it amuses me and pa.s.ses the time. I"ve more important business to attend to, so Good-bye.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.
There is an unconscious propriety in the way in which, in all European languages, the word _person_ is commonly used to denote a human being. The real meaning of _persona_ is _a mask_, such as actors were accustomed to wear on the ancient stage; and it is quite true that no one shows himself as he is, but wears his mask and plays his part.
Indeed, the whole of our social arrangements may be likened to a perpetual comedy; and this is why a man who is worth anything finds society so insipid, while a blockhead is quite at home in it.
Reason deserves to be called a prophet; for in showing us the consequence and effect of our actions in the present, does it not tell us what the future will be? This is precisely why reason is such an excellent power of restraint in moments when we are possessed by some base pa.s.sion, some fit of anger, some covetous desire, that will lead us to do things whereof we must presently repent.
_Hatred_ comes from the heart; _contempt_ from the head; and neither feeling is quite within our control. For we cannot alter our heart; its basis is determined by motives; and our head deals with objective facts, and applies to them rules which are immutable. Any given individual is the union of a particular heart with a particular head.
Hatred and contempt are diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive.
There are even not a few cases where hatred of a person is rooted in nothing but forced esteem for his qualities. And besides, if a man sets out to hate all the miserable creatures he meets, he will not have much energy left for anything else; whereas he can despise them, one and all, with the greatest ease. True, genuine contempt is just the reverse of true, genuine pride; it keeps quite quiet and gives no sign of its existence. For if a man shows that he despises you, he signifies at least this much regard for you, that he wants to let you know how little he appreciates you; and his wish is dictated by hatred, which cannot exist with real contempt. On the contrary, if it is genuine, it is simply the conviction that the object of it is a man of no value at all. Contempt is not incompatible with indulgent and kindly treatment, and for the sake of one"s own peace and safety, this should not be omitted; it will prevent irritation; and there is no one who cannot do harm if he is roused to it. But if this pure, cold, sincere contempt ever shows itself, it will be met with the most truculent hatred; for the despised person is not in a position to fight contempt with its own weapons.
Melancholy is a very different thing from bad humor, and of the two, it is not nearly so far removed from a gay and happy temperament.