FABRIZIO: I have not yet finished discussing everything I proposed on two matters: first, that a good man cannot take up soldiery as his profession, and second, that a well-ordered republic or kingdom would never permit its subjects or citizens to exercise soldiery as a profession. As for the first matter, I have in fact told you everything that occurred to me, so it remains for me to speak of the second, with which I shall reply to your question concerning the Roman generals. Pompey and Caesar, and almost all the generals in Rome after the last Punic War, gained fame as valiant men, not as good men. Those who had lived before them, however, had acquired glory as valiant and good men, which happened because they did not take up the practice of war as their profession, while it was the profession of Pompey, Caesar, and the generals of their times. As long as the Roman Republic was uncorrupted, no great citizen ever attempted to gain power during times of peace through soldiery, breaking laws, despoiling provinces, imposing himself in every way, and usurping and tyrannizing his state. Nor did anyone of lower rank think of violating his oath to Rome, entering into conspiracies, and, without fear of the Senate, joining the ranks of someone seeking to be tyrant simply in order to be able to live by soldiery in peaceful times as well as in times of war. Those who were generals were content with triumph during wartime and very happy to return to private life, while those who were regular soldiers had a greater desire to lay down their arms than they had had to take them up. Everyone returned to the profession by which he made his living, and n.o.body hoped to live off plunder and the profession of war. I have not yet finished discussing everything I proposed on two matters: first, that a good man cannot take up soldiery as his profession, and second, that a well-ordered republic or kingdom would never permit its subjects or citizens to exercise soldiery as a profession. As for the first matter, I have in fact told you everything that occurred to me, so it remains for me to speak of the second, with which I shall reply to your question concerning the Roman generals. Pompey and Caesar, and almost all the generals in Rome after the last Punic War, gained fame as valiant men, not as good men. Those who had lived before them, however, had acquired glory as valiant and good men, which happened because they did not take up the practice of war as their profession, while it was the profession of Pompey, Caesar, and the generals of their times. As long as the Roman Republic was uncorrupted, no great citizen ever attempted to gain power during times of peace through soldiery, breaking laws, despoiling provinces, imposing himself in every way, and usurping and tyrannizing his state. Nor did anyone of lower rank think of violating his oath to Rome, entering into conspiracies, and, without fear of the Senate, joining the ranks of someone seeking to be tyrant simply in order to be able to live by soldiery in peaceful times as well as in times of war. Those who were generals were content with triumph during wartime and very happy to return to private life, while those who were regular soldiers had a greater desire to lay down their arms than they had had to take them up. Everyone returned to the profession by which he made his living, and n.o.body hoped to live off plunder and the profession of war.
Marcus Attilius is an example of a great citizen of that kind. He was general of the Roman armies in Africa and on the point of defeating the Carthaginians when he asked the Senate for permission to return home to look after his estates, which were being ruined by his laborers. It is clear as day that if Marcus Attilius had practiced war as his profession, intending to profit from it-there being so many provinces he could plunder-he would not have asked permission to return home to take care of his fields. Every single day he was on the campaign he could have seized more than their entire value. But as these good men, who did not practice soldiery, expected nothing of war except hardship, danger, and glory, once they had sufficient glory, they wanted to return home and live by their professions. As for men of lower rank and the common soldiers, they too acted the same way. They gladly withdrew from warfare, for when they were not fighting they desired not to fight, and when they were fighting they wanted to be discharged. This can be verified in many ways, particularly as it was among the first privileges the Roman populace gave to a citizen, that he should not be constrained to fight against his will. Therefore while Rome was a well-ordered state, which it was up to the time of the Gracchi,14 it did not have a single soldier who took up soldiery as a profession. Only a few soldiers were bad, and they were severely punished. it did not have a single soldier who took up soldiery as a profession. Only a few soldiers were bad, and they were severely punished.
A well-ordered state should use military training in times of peace as an exercise, and in times of war as a necessity and for glory. The state alone should be allowed to use it as a profession, as Rome did. Any citizen who has other aims in using the military is not a good citizen, and any state that acts otherwise is not a well-ordered state.
COSIMO: I am very pleased and satisfied with what you have said up to now, and I like your conclusion. I believe that what you say is true when it comes to republics; but I am not certain if the same can be said of kings, because I believe a king would want to surround himself with men who have taken up soldiery as their profession. I am very pleased and satisfied with what you have said up to now, and I like your conclusion. I believe that what you say is true when it comes to republics; but I am not certain if the same can be said of kings, because I believe a king would want to surround himself with men who have taken up soldiery as their profession.
FABRIZIO: A well-ordered kingdom must avoid the soldierly profession even more, since those men corrupt the king and are the ministers of tyranny. And do not counter what I say with an example of some kingdom from our times, because I cannot accept these as well-ordered kingdoms. A well-ordered kingdom does not grant its king absolute power, except over the army, because it is only for the army that quick decisions and hence absolute power are necessary. In other matters, the king should not be able to do anything without counsel, and those who advise him must fear that there might be a counselor close to him who desires war in times of peace because the counselor cannot live without it. But I would like to show some indulgence here, by seeking not a kingdom that is entirely good, but one like those that exist today, where the king has to fear those who make war their profession, because the backbone of every army is without doubt the infantry. If a king does not organize his army so that in a time of peace his infantrymen are happy to return home and live by practicing their own professions, the king will inevitably come to ruin, for no infantry is more dangerous than one composed of men who make war their profession. In the latter case, the king is forced either to make war continuously, or to pay his infantry continuously if he does not want to risk their seizing his kingdom from him. As it is impossible to wage war all the time, and also impossible to pay an infantry all the time, the king is faced with losing his kingdom. A well-ordered kingdom must avoid the soldierly profession even more, since those men corrupt the king and are the ministers of tyranny. And do not counter what I say with an example of some kingdom from our times, because I cannot accept these as well-ordered kingdoms. A well-ordered kingdom does not grant its king absolute power, except over the army, because it is only for the army that quick decisions and hence absolute power are necessary. In other matters, the king should not be able to do anything without counsel, and those who advise him must fear that there might be a counselor close to him who desires war in times of peace because the counselor cannot live without it. But I would like to show some indulgence here, by seeking not a kingdom that is entirely good, but one like those that exist today, where the king has to fear those who make war their profession, because the backbone of every army is without doubt the infantry. If a king does not organize his army so that in a time of peace his infantrymen are happy to return home and live by practicing their own professions, the king will inevitably come to ruin, for no infantry is more dangerous than one composed of men who make war their profession. In the latter case, the king is forced either to make war continuously, or to pay his infantry continuously if he does not want to risk their seizing his kingdom from him. As it is impossible to wage war all the time, and also impossible to pay an infantry all the time, the king is faced with losing his kingdom.
As I have said, the Romans, while they were still wise and good, never permitted their citizens to take up soldiery as a profession, notwithstanding that they could have employed them continuously, as the Romans were continuously at war. They sought, however, to avoid the damage that the continuous practice of soldiery could do, and since the circ.u.mstances did not vary, they kept varying the men and continued temporizing, so that the legions were entirely renewed every fifteen years. Thus they made use of men in their prime, which is from the age of eighteen to thirty-five, during which time a man"s eyes, hands, and legs work in unison. Nor did they wait for the soldiers" strength to diminish or their penchant for evil deeds to grow, as the Romans did later in corrupt times. Augustus and then Tiberius,15 thinking more of their own power than of the public good, began to disarm the Roman populace in order to control them more easily, and kept the same armies continually at the frontiers of the empire. Since they believed that these armies would not hold the Roman populace and the Senate in check, they set up an army called the Praetorian Guard, which remained near the walls of Rome and acted like a fortress hovering over the city. The emperors began freely permitting men to practice soldiery as their profession, and this soon resulted in their becoming arrogant, dangerous to the Senate, and harmful to the emperor. As a result, many emperors were killed because of the armies" arrogance in giving and taking away power as they pleased, several armies creating a number of emperors simultaneously. This ultimately resulted in the division of the Roman Empire, and finally its ruin. thinking more of their own power than of the public good, began to disarm the Roman populace in order to control them more easily, and kept the same armies continually at the frontiers of the empire. Since they believed that these armies would not hold the Roman populace and the Senate in check, they set up an army called the Praetorian Guard, which remained near the walls of Rome and acted like a fortress hovering over the city. The emperors began freely permitting men to practice soldiery as their profession, and this soon resulted in their becoming arrogant, dangerous to the Senate, and harmful to the emperor. As a result, many emperors were killed because of the armies" arrogance in giving and taking away power as they pleased, several armies creating a number of emperors simultaneously. This ultimately resulted in the division of the Roman Empire, and finally its ruin.
Therefore, if kings want to live securely, they must have an infantry composed of men who, when it is time for war, will willingly march forth out of love for the king, and afterward, when peace comes, even more willingly return home. This will always happen if the king selects men who know how to live by a profession other than soldiery. When peace comes, the king should expect his leaders to return to governing their people, his gentlemen to return to the cultivation of their possessions, and his infantry to their particular trades. The king must want them all to make war willingly in order to have peace, and not seek to break peace in order to have war.
COSIMO: Your reasoning strikes me as well considered. Nevertheless, as it is almost contrary to what I have believed until now, my mind is not yet purged of all doubt. I see many lords and gentlemen providing for themselves in times of peace through training for war, as do other condottieri like yourself who are funded by princes and states. I also see almost all cavalrymen retaining their stipends after a war, and I see many infantrymen remaining within the garrisons of cities and fortresses. So it does appear to me that there is a place for every soldier during times of peace. Your reasoning strikes me as well considered. Nevertheless, as it is almost contrary to what I have believed until now, my mind is not yet purged of all doubt. I see many lords and gentlemen providing for themselves in times of peace through training for war, as do other condottieri like yourself who are funded by princes and states. I also see almost all cavalrymen retaining their stipends after a war, and I see many infantrymen remaining within the garrisons of cities and fortresses. So it does appear to me that there is a place for every soldier during times of peace.
FABRIZIO: I cannot imagine you would believe that all soldiers have a place in time of peace. The small number alone of men who remain in the garrisons and fortresses should suffice to remove any doubts you may have. What is the proportion of infantry needed in war to that needed in peace? A fortress and a city are guarded in times of peace, but much more so during times of war. Not to mention that the large number of soldiers kept in the field during wartime are all let go in times of peace. And as for the armed guards of the state, who are small in number, Pope Julius and you Florentines have proved to what extent one must fear men whose only profession is war. You Florentines have removed them from your garrisons because of their insolence and replaced them with the Swiss, who are born and raised under strict laws and selected by their communities in fair elections. So you must reconsider the idea that there really is a place in peacetime for every soldier. As for the cavalrymen who stay enlisted after a war, the problem seems more difficult; nevertheless, anyone considering the matter carefully will easily find the answer, for the method of retaining cavalrymen is corrupt and unsatisfactory. The reason is that they are men for whom soldiery is a profession, and this consequently gives rise to a thousand problems every day in the cities in which they are stationed, if they are backed up by sufficient numbers. But as they are few, and unable to gather into an army on their own, they usually cannot cause serious damage; but still they have done so many times, as I have said of professional soldiers such as Francesco Sforza and his father, and of Braccio da Montone. In short, I do not approve of the practice of keeping cavalrymen. It is corrupt and can cause great evils. I cannot imagine you would believe that all soldiers have a place in time of peace. The small number alone of men who remain in the garrisons and fortresses should suffice to remove any doubts you may have. What is the proportion of infantry needed in war to that needed in peace? A fortress and a city are guarded in times of peace, but much more so during times of war. Not to mention that the large number of soldiers kept in the field during wartime are all let go in times of peace. And as for the armed guards of the state, who are small in number, Pope Julius and you Florentines have proved to what extent one must fear men whose only profession is war. You Florentines have removed them from your garrisons because of their insolence and replaced them with the Swiss, who are born and raised under strict laws and selected by their communities in fair elections. So you must reconsider the idea that there really is a place in peacetime for every soldier. As for the cavalrymen who stay enlisted after a war, the problem seems more difficult; nevertheless, anyone considering the matter carefully will easily find the answer, for the method of retaining cavalrymen is corrupt and unsatisfactory. The reason is that they are men for whom soldiery is a profession, and this consequently gives rise to a thousand problems every day in the cities in which they are stationed, if they are backed up by sufficient numbers. But as they are few, and unable to gather into an army on their own, they usually cannot cause serious damage; but still they have done so many times, as I have said of professional soldiers such as Francesco Sforza and his father, and of Braccio da Montone. In short, I do not approve of the practice of keeping cavalrymen. It is corrupt and can cause great evils.
COSIMO: Would you prefer to do without them? Or if you were to keep them, how would you go about it? Would you prefer to do without them? Or if you were to keep them, how would you go about it?
FABRIZIO: I would use conscription. Not the way the King of France I would use conscription. Not the way the King of France16 does, because his cavalry is as dangerous and insolent as ours. I mean the kind of conscription practiced by the ancients, who created a cavalry from among their subjects, and in times of peace sent them back to their homes to live off their own professions, as I shall talk about at greater length before I finish this discussion. So if the cavalry can continue living by means of soldiery even when there is peace, it stems from corrupt inst.i.tutions. As for the stipends granted to generals such as myself, I declare that this is just as corrupted, because a wise state will not grant a stipend to a professional general. It will use its own citizens as leaders in war, and in times of peace expect those citizens to return to their professions. Hence a wise king, too, will not grant stipends, or if he does, they ought to be either as a reward for some exceptional deed or because the king wishes to benefit from such a man in peacetime as well as in war. You have mentioned my case, and so I will propose myself as an example. First I would like to say that I have never practiced war as a profession, as my profession is to govern my subjects and to defend them. does, because his cavalry is as dangerous and insolent as ours. I mean the kind of conscription practiced by the ancients, who created a cavalry from among their subjects, and in times of peace sent them back to their homes to live off their own professions, as I shall talk about at greater length before I finish this discussion. So if the cavalry can continue living by means of soldiery even when there is peace, it stems from corrupt inst.i.tutions. As for the stipends granted to generals such as myself, I declare that this is just as corrupted, because a wise state will not grant a stipend to a professional general. It will use its own citizens as leaders in war, and in times of peace expect those citizens to return to their professions. Hence a wise king, too, will not grant stipends, or if he does, they ought to be either as a reward for some exceptional deed or because the king wishes to benefit from such a man in peacetime as well as in war. You have mentioned my case, and so I will propose myself as an example. First I would like to say that I have never practiced war as a profession, as my profession is to govern my subjects and to defend them.17 For me to defend them, I must love peace and know how to make war. My king For me to defend them, I must love peace and know how to make war. My king18 does not reward and esteem me for my knowledge of war, but more importantly for my knowledge and counsel during peacetime. No wise king seeking to govern prudently should want someone next to him who is not of this kind, for the king will be led astray if he surrounds himself with too many lovers of peace or too many lovers of war. I cannot say more in this first discussion. Should this not suffice, you must seek someone else who might satisfy you. But I trust that you now see the many difficulties involved in introducing ancient methods into the wars of our times, the preparations a wise man must make, and what opportunities he can hope for to execute them. does not reward and esteem me for my knowledge of war, but more importantly for my knowledge and counsel during peacetime. No wise king seeking to govern prudently should want someone next to him who is not of this kind, for the king will be led astray if he surrounds himself with too many lovers of peace or too many lovers of war. I cannot say more in this first discussion. Should this not suffice, you must seek someone else who might satisfy you. But I trust that you now see the many difficulties involved in introducing ancient methods into the wars of our times, the preparations a wise man must make, and what opportunities he can hope for to execute them.
2. Fabrizio Colonna (d. 1520) was a n.o.bleman of the powerful Colonna family and a mercenary general for King Ferdinand the Catholic (14521516), King of Aragon, Sicily, Castile, and Naples. Fabrizio Colonna (d. 1520) was a n.o.bleman of the powerful Colonna family and a mercenary general for King Ferdinand the Catholic (14521516), King of Aragon, Sicily, Castile, and Naples.3. Lorenzo de" Medici, to whom Machiavelli dedicated Lorenzo de" Medici, to whom Machiavelli dedicated The Prince The Prince, was the ruler of Florence. His uncle, Pope Leo X (Giuliano de" Medici), made him Duke of Urbino.4. Cosimo Rucellai (14941519), the host at the gardens of the Orti Oricellari. Cosimo Rucellai (14941519), the host at the gardens of the Orti Oricellari.5. The three young men were frequent guests at the meetings in the Orti Oricellari (the gardens of Cosimo Rucellai) and were close friends and admirers of Machiavelli. Zan.o.bi Buondelmonti (14911527) was a wealthy Florentine merchant, banker, and patron of the arts. The The three young men were frequent guests at the meetings in the Orti Oricellari (the gardens of Cosimo Rucellai) and were close friends and admirers of Machiavelli. Zan.o.bi Buondelmonti (14911527) was a wealthy Florentine merchant, banker, and patron of the arts. The Discourses Discourses are dedicated to him and Cosimo Rucellai, and are dedicated to him and Cosimo Rucellai, and The Life of Castruccio Castracani The Life of Castruccio Castracani is dedicated to him and Luigi Alamanni. is dedicated to him and Luigi Alamanni.6. Machiavelli borrowed this formula from Cicero"s Machiavelli borrowed this formula from Cicero"s On Friendship On Friendship (I, 3): "So that I may avoid always repeating "I say" and "he says," I shall use the form of a dialogue." (I, 3): "So that I may avoid always repeating "I say" and "he says," I shall use the form of a dialogue."7. Machiavelli is quoting Diogenes Laertius"s Machiavelli is quoting Diogenes Laertius"s Lives of Eminent Philosophers Lives of Eminent Philosophers, "Diogenes" (Book 6:2:23): "In summer he rolled in the hot sand and in winter embraced statues covered with snow, always practicing to endure anything."8. A Roman commander and statesman (c. third century A Roman commander and statesman (c. third century BCE BCE), praised by Roman historians as a model of incorruptible Roman virtue. After King Pyrrhus of Epirus invaded Italy and defeated the Romans at Heraclea, he was so impressed by Gaius Fabricius Luscinus"s refusal to accept a bribe that he released all Roman prisoners without ransom.9. Polybius in Polybius in Histories Histories (I, 69) identifies Mathos as a regular Libyan soldier in the Carthaginian army and Spendius as a runaway Roman slave, who through violence and intimidation incited the Carthaginian army to rebellion and had themselves appointed sole commanders. Machiavelli also mentions the incident in (I, 69) identifies Mathos as a regular Libyan soldier in the Carthaginian army and Spendius as a runaway Roman slave, who through violence and intimidation incited the Carthaginian army to rebellion and had themselves appointed sole commanders. Machiavelli also mentions the incident in The Prince The Prince, chapter 12: "As for mercenary armies in ancient times, we have the example of the Carthaginians, who were almost overwhelmed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, even though the Carthaginians had their own citizens as generals."10. Francesco Sforza (140166) had been a condottiere in the service of Duke Filippo Maria Visconti of Milan. In 1450 he blockaded the city, causing a rebellion by the starving inhabitants, until he finally marched in with his army as the new Duke of Milan. Francesco Sforza (140166) had been a condottiere in the service of Duke Filippo Maria Visconti of Milan. In 1450 he blockaded the city, causing a rebellion by the starving inhabitants, until he finally marched in with his army as the new Duke of Milan.11. Machiavelli uses almost the same words in Machiavelli uses almost the same words in The Prince The Prince, chapter 12: "Francesco Sforza"s father, a mercenary to Queen Giovanna of Naples, left her defenseless, and she was forced to throw herself on the mercy of the King of Aragon so as not to lose her realm."12. Braccio da Montone (13681424), a rival of Muzio Attendolo Sforza, was one of the greatest condottieri of his time, becoming Prince of Capua. Braccio da Montone (13681424), a rival of Muzio Attendolo Sforza, was one of the greatest condottieri of his time, becoming Prince of Capua.13. Machiavelli writes in Machiavelli writes in Discourses Discourses, Book I, chapter 27: "Men often do not know how to be perfectly good or honorably evil, and when an evil deed has grandeur or is in some part generous, a man will often not know how to carry it off."14. The reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus acted as a catalyst to end the Roman Republic, opening the way to imperial Rome. The reforms of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus acted as a catalyst to end the Roman Republic, opening the way to imperial Rome.15. Augustus (63 Augustus (63 BCE BCE-14 CE CE), the first Roman emperor, and Tiberius (42 BCE BCE-37 CE CE), the second Roman emperor.16. See See The Prince The Prince, chapter 13: "Louis XI"s father, King Charles VII, who freed France from the English with the help of Fortune and his skill, recognized the importance of having his own army. He issued a decree in his kingdom to enlist an infantry and a cavalry. After him, his son Louis disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss mercenaries. This mistake, followed by others, has led, as we have seen, to the many dangers France has had to face."17. Fabrizio Colonna, like many other Italian mercenary generals of the time, was also a feudal n.o.bleman. He was Duke of Palliano and Marsi, and Count of Tagliacozzo and Celano. Fabrizio Colonna, like many other Italian mercenary generals of the time, was also a feudal n.o.bleman. He was Duke of Palliano and Marsi, and Count of Tagliacozzo and Celano.18. Ferdinand the Catholic. Ferdinand the Catholic.
BOOK II.
[...] COSIMO: COSIMO: I would like you to tell me-if you have ever deliberated on the matter-what has caused the vileness, disorder, and laxity in the armies of our times? I would like you to tell me-if you have ever deliberated on the matter-what has caused the vileness, disorder, and laxity in the armies of our times?
FABRIZIO: I will gladly tell you my thoughts on this. You know that many men in Europe have been considered excellent in war, but few in Africa, and even fewer in Asia. This is because Africa and Asia had one or two princ.i.p.alities and only a few republics. Europe, on the other hand, has had several kingdoms and an infinite number of republics. Men become excellent and show their skill according to how their prince, republic, or king makes use of them and gives them authority. Where there are many rulers, there are many valiant figures, and where there are few rulers, valiant figures are few. In Asia there were Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, and Mithradates, I will gladly tell you my thoughts on this. You know that many men in Europe have been considered excellent in war, but few in Africa, and even fewer in Asia. This is because Africa and Asia had one or two princ.i.p.alities and only a few republics. Europe, on the other hand, has had several kingdoms and an infinite number of republics. Men become excellent and show their skill according to how their prince, republic, or king makes use of them and gives them authority. Where there are many rulers, there are many valiant figures, and where there are few rulers, valiant figures are few. In Asia there were Ninus, Cyrus, Artaxerxes, and Mithradates,19 but there were not many others in their league. The great warriors of Africa, if we leave aside those of ancient Egypt, were Ma.s.sinissa, Jugurtha, but there were not many others in their league. The great warriors of Africa, if we leave aside those of ancient Egypt, were Ma.s.sinissa, Jugurtha,20 and the generals of the Carthaginian Republic. Compared to European warriors, they too were few in number, for in Europe there was an infinite number of excellent men, and there would have been many more were one to add those whose names have been extinguished by the ravages of time, for there has been more skill in the world when there have been more states that favored it, either from necessity or from some particular interest. Consequently, Asia created few exceptional men because it was ruled by a single kingdom: Much indolence resulted from its size, which hampered men who excelled in their vocation. The same is true of Africa, though the Carthaginian Republic gave rise to valiant men. More excellent men come from republics than from kingdoms because skill is usually honored in republics, while in kingdoms it is feared. As a result, republics encourage men of skill, while kingdoms destroy them. and the generals of the Carthaginian Republic. Compared to European warriors, they too were few in number, for in Europe there was an infinite number of excellent men, and there would have been many more were one to add those whose names have been extinguished by the ravages of time, for there has been more skill in the world when there have been more states that favored it, either from necessity or from some particular interest. Consequently, Asia created few exceptional men because it was ruled by a single kingdom: Much indolence resulted from its size, which hampered men who excelled in their vocation. The same is true of Africa, though the Carthaginian Republic gave rise to valiant men. More excellent men come from republics than from kingdoms because skill is usually honored in republics, while in kingdoms it is feared. As a result, republics encourage men of skill, while kingdoms destroy them.
Whoever, therefore, considers Europe will find it to have been full of republics and princ.i.p.alities which out of fear of one another were compelled to keep their military inst.i.tutions alive and to honor those who rose to eminence within them. In Greece, besides the kingdom of the Macedonians, there were many republics, each producing excellent men. In Italy there were the Romans, the Samnites, the Etruscans, and the Cisalpine Gauls. France and Germany had many republics and princ.i.p.alities, as did Spain. And if besides the great Roman figures we hear of only a few heroes of these other peoples, it is because of the baseness of the historians who, in pursuit of Fortune, usually found it more to their advantage to praise the victors.21 Would it not be reasonable to surmise that the Samnites and the Etruscans, who fought the Romans for a hundred and fifty years before being defeated, would have had many excellent warriors too? The same is true of France and Spain. And yet the greatness that historians will not praise in individual men they praise in a people as a whole, exalting to the heavens the single-mindedness with which they defended their liberty. Would it not be reasonable to surmise that the Samnites and the Etruscans, who fought the Romans for a hundred and fifty years before being defeated, would have had many excellent warriors too? The same is true of France and Spain. And yet the greatness that historians will not praise in individual men they praise in a people as a whole, exalting to the heavens the single-mindedness with which they defended their liberty.
As it is true that more valiant men arise where there are more states, it follows of necessity that when those states are destroyed, valor and skill are also destroyed little by little, there being fewer reasons for men to become valiant. The Roman Empire grew, extinguishing all the republics and princ.i.p.alities of Europe and Africa, and the greater part of those in Asia, and no other path to valor was left, except for Rome. The result was that valorous men began to be as few in Europe as they were in Asia, valor and skill ultimately falling into utter decline since it had all concentrated in Rome. But once Rome was corrupted, almost the whole world followed suit, and the Scythians were able to plunder Rome, which had extinguished the skill of others but did not know how to maintain its own. And even though the flood of barbarians caused the Roman Empire to split into several parts, the skill the empire had ama.s.sed did not resurge: first, because it is a long ordeal to rebuild inst.i.tutions once they have been destroyed, and second because of the way of life today, where Christianity does not impose on man the necessity to fight and defend himself that existed in ancient times. In those times, men who were defeated in war either were slaughtered or remained slaves forever, living a life of misery22 Conquered states were either entirely devastated, or their inhabitants-their property seized-were driven out and scattered throughout the world. Those vanquished in war suffered extreme misery, and the ancients, terrified of this, kept their armies active, honoring those who excelled within them. But in our times this fear has for the most part been lost. Few of those defeated are slaughtered, and no one is kept prisoner for a long time, as prisoners can easily be freed. Cities might rebel a thousand times, but they are not destroyed, and their citizens are allowed to retain their property, so that the greatest evil they need fear is new levies. As a result, men do not want to subject themselves to military inst.i.tutions and face continuous privation under them in order to escape dangers of which they have little fear. Furthermore, when compared to the past, the states of Europe exist under very few leaders, for all of France obeys a single king, all of Spain another, and Italy is divided into a few states. Hence weak cities defend themselves by allying themselves with victors, while the powerful states do not fear complete destruction, for the reasons I have just mentioned. Conquered states were either entirely devastated, or their inhabitants-their property seized-were driven out and scattered throughout the world. Those vanquished in war suffered extreme misery, and the ancients, terrified of this, kept their armies active, honoring those who excelled within them. But in our times this fear has for the most part been lost. Few of those defeated are slaughtered, and no one is kept prisoner for a long time, as prisoners can easily be freed. Cities might rebel a thousand times, but they are not destroyed, and their citizens are allowed to retain their property, so that the greatest evil they need fear is new levies. As a result, men do not want to subject themselves to military inst.i.tutions and face continuous privation under them in order to escape dangers of which they have little fear. Furthermore, when compared to the past, the states of Europe exist under very few leaders, for all of France obeys a single king, all of Spain another, and Italy is divided into a few states. Hence weak cities defend themselves by allying themselves with victors, while the powerful states do not fear complete destruction, for the reasons I have just mentioned.
19. Ninus was a legendary king of a.s.syria and the founder of the city of Nineveh; Cyrus the Great (d. c. 529 Ninus was a legendary king of a.s.syria and the founder of the city of Nineveh; Cyrus the Great (d. c. 529 BCE BCE), founder of the Persian Empire, is also discussed in Discourses Discourses, Book II, chapter 13, and in The Prince The Prince, chapters 6, 14, and 26; Artaxerxes II (early fourth century) was King of Persia and described in Plutarch"s Parallel Lives Parallel Lives; Mithradates the Great (d. 63 BCE BCE) was King of Pontus and a formidable enemy of Rome in Asia Minor.20. Ma.s.sinissa (d. 148 Ma.s.sinissa (d. 148 BCE BCE) was an influential ruler of Numidia in North Africa and an ally of Rome in the Second Punic War (218201 BCE BCE). Jugurtha (d. 104 BCE BCE) was the grandson of Ma.s.sinissa and fought the Romans to end their rule in Numidia.21. See the preface to See the preface to Discourses Discourses, Book II, in which Machiavelli develops this theme: "Most historians bow to the fortunes of conquerors."22. See also See also Discourses Discourses, Book II, chapter 2, in which Machiavelli discusses the weakening effect of Christianity from a different perspective: "Our religion glorifies men who are humble and contemplative rather than men of action. [...] If our religion does demand that you be strong, it is so that you will be able to bear suffering rather than carry out feats of strength."
BOOK VII.
FABRIZIO: [...] I know that I have spoken to you of many things that you could have understood yourselves. And yet I spoke of these matters, as I said earlier this afternoon, in order to demonstrate better what kind of military training is best, and also to satisfy those (should there be any) who do not understand these matters as readily as you do. It seems to me that there is nothing left for me to say, other than to give you some general rules which I am sure you will find familiar. [...] I know that I have spoken to you of many things that you could have understood yourselves. And yet I spoke of these matters, as I said earlier this afternoon, in order to demonstrate better what kind of military training is best, and also to satisfy those (should there be any) who do not understand these matters as readily as you do. It seems to me that there is nothing left for me to say, other than to give you some general rules which I am sure you will find familiar.23 They are: They are: What benefits the enemy will harm you, and what benefits you will harm the enemy.
He who in war is more vigilant in scrutinizing the enemy"s designs, and more tireless in training his army, will face fewer dangers and have greater hope for victory.
Never lead your soldiers into battle before you are certain of their courage, that they are without fear, and that they are well ordered. Do not engage your troops unless you can see that they hope for victory.
It is better to defeat the enemy with hunger than with steel, for in victory with steel you will see Fortune playing a greater role than skill.
The best strategy is that which remains concealed from the enemy until it has been carried out.
In war, knowing how to recognize and seize an opportunity is the most important ability.
Nature creates few brave men-diligence and training create many.
Discipline in war is more vital than fury.
Soldiers leaving the enemy"s side to come to yours are an optimal acquisition if they are loyal, because the forces of your enemy diminish more with the loss of those who desert than with those who are slain, even though the word "deserter" wakes suspicion in new friends and hatred in old.
It is better when arranging your formations to set up considerable support behind the front line than to spread out your soldiers so that you can make the front line more imposing.
He who knows his forces and those of the enemy will be hard to vanquish.
The soldiers" skill is worth more than their number, and the site of a battle can sometimes be of greater benefit than skill.
What is new and unexpected will take an army aback, while the army looks down on what is customary and predictable. You will therefore give your army both practice and knowledge of a new enemy by engaging him in minor skirmishes before you face him in battle.
Whoever pursues a routed enemy in a disorderly manner is seeking to become a defeated victor.
Whoever does not prepare his provisions will be defeated without steel.
Whoever places more trust in cavalry than in infantry, or more in infantry than in cavalry, must accommodate himself to the site of battle.
If you want to ascertain whether a spy has entered your camp, have all men in the middle of the day return to their a.s.signed quarters.
Change your battle plan when you see that your enemy has predicted it.
Seek the counsel of many on what you should do, but then confer with only a few on what you will do.
Soldiers are kept in their quarters by fear and punishment; when they are marched into battle, they are led by hope and reward.
Good generals never engage in battle unless necessity compels or opportunity beckons.
Make sure that your enemy does not know how you plan to order your ranks in battle, and in whatever way you order them, be certain that the first line can be absorbed by the second and third.
Never use a division in battle for another purpose than the one to which you a.s.signed it, unless you want to cause disorder.
Sudden upsets are countered with difficulty, unless one can think on one"s feet.
Men, steel, money, and bread are the backbone of war; but of these four the first two are more necessary, because men and steel can find money and bread, but money and bread cannot find men and steel.
The unarmed rich man is the prize of the poor soldier.
Accustom your soldiers to despise comfortable living and luxurious attire.
All this is what has generally occurred to me, though I know I could have told you many more things in our discussion: for example, in how many different ways the ancients organized their ranks, how they dressed, how they trained, and many other things. I could have brought up many other particulars, which I did not, however, judge necessary because you can read about them quite readily, and also because my intention was not to show exactly how the ancient army was created, but how an army should be organized in our times so that it might have more skill and ability than it does. Hence I felt it unnecessary to discuss ancient matters in greater depth beyond what I felt necessary as an introduction.
23. In the following, Machiavelli translates, adapts, and paraphrases maxims from In the following, Machiavelli translates, adapts, and paraphrases maxims from De re militari De re militari by Flavius Vegetius Renatus (fourth century by Flavius Vegetius Renatus (fourth century CE CE), a work that advocates and codifies the arrangement of armies according to a cla.s.sical Roman ideal. Machiavelli expands and adapts Vegetius"s Latin maxims and adds a few of his own.
Selections from FLORENTINE H HISTORIES.
Machiavelli"s final major work was written in the last few years of his life. In 1520, after eight years of exclusion from politics and living in impoverishment on his farm, Machiavelli was offered the post of historiographer of Florence by Cardinal Giulio de" Medici, who in 1523 was to become Pope Clement VII The contract Giulio de" Medici offered Machiavelli specified that it would be left up to Machiavelli to choose whether this work-"annalia et cronacas fiorentinas"-would be written in Latin or the "Tuscan tongue." Machiavelli chose the elegant and modern Tuscan Italian in which he had written The Prince, The Discourses, The Prince, The Discourses, and his graceful works of prose and poetry and his graceful works of prose and poetry.
In Florentine Histories, Florentine Histories, Machiavelli, who for much of his life had been a sophisticated Florentine diplomat, could not refrain from producing a daring and at times highly critical rendition of Florence"s history, much of which had been stamped by the Medici, who had been extremely hostile to him. But Giulio de" Medici Machiavelli, who for much of his life had been a sophisticated Florentine diplomat, could not refrain from producing a daring and at times highly critical rendition of Florence"s history, much of which had been stamped by the Medici, who had been extremely hostile to him. But Giulio de" Medici-Pope Clement VII-to whom the book was dedicated, was a Renaissance prince and patron of the arts, and was pleased with this work.
PREFACE.
When I first decided to write down the deeds of the people of Florence within their city and without, it was my intention to begin my narration in the year of our Lord 1434, when the Medici family, through the qualities of Cosimo and his father Giovanni, achieved power beyond that of any other family in Florence. I resolved to begin in 1434 because two excellent historians, Messer Leonardo d"Arezzo and Messer Poggio,1 had narrated in great detail all the events that took place before that date. I read their histories diligently in order to ascertain the modes and methods they followed, so that by imitating them my own histories would meet with greater acceptance among readers. I noted that in their descriptions of all the wars waged by the Florentines against foreign princes and peoples, Messer Leonardo d"Arezzo and Messer Poggio were most diligent, but when it came to civil disorders and internal enmities and the effects these had, they were either entirely silent or described them so briefly that readers could derive no use or pleasure from them. I surmise the reason for this could only have been that these historians judged these events to be so negligible that they thought them unworthy of being recorded for posterity or that they feared that the descendants of those they would have had to criticize in their narration might be offended. Both reasons, however, seem to me entirely unworthy of great men (may their souls rest in peace), for if anything in a history delights and instructs, it is that which is described in detail. If no other lesson is useful to citizens who govern republics, then it is the lesson that reveals the reasons for the hatreds and divisions within a city, so that the citizens who govern can gain wisdom from the perils of others and choose to remain united. If every example of the workings of a republic can affect readers, then readers encountering examples of the workings of their own republic will be affected even more and derive more benefit. And if divisions in any republic have been momentous, those in Florence were momentous indeed. Most republics of which we know were content with a single division which, depending on circ.u.mstances, either furthered or destroyed the republic; but Florence, not content with a single division, has had many. In Rome, as everybody knows, after the kings were expelled a division between the n.o.bles and the plebeians ensued, and this division preserved Rome until its ruin. had narrated in great detail all the events that took place before that date. I read their histories diligently in order to ascertain the modes and methods they followed, so that by imitating them my own histories would meet with greater acceptance among readers. I noted that in their descriptions of all the wars waged by the Florentines against foreign princes and peoples, Messer Leonardo d"Arezzo and Messer Poggio were most diligent, but when it came to civil disorders and internal enmities and the effects these had, they were either entirely silent or described them so briefly that readers could derive no use or pleasure from them. I surmise the reason for this could only have been that these historians judged these events to be so negligible that they thought them unworthy of being recorded for posterity or that they feared that the descendants of those they would have had to criticize in their narration might be offended. Both reasons, however, seem to me entirely unworthy of great men (may their souls rest in peace), for if anything in a history delights and instructs, it is that which is described in detail. If no other lesson is useful to citizens who govern republics, then it is the lesson that reveals the reasons for the hatreds and divisions within a city, so that the citizens who govern can gain wisdom from the perils of others and choose to remain united. If every example of the workings of a republic can affect readers, then readers encountering examples of the workings of their own republic will be affected even more and derive more benefit. And if divisions in any republic have been momentous, those in Florence were momentous indeed. Most republics of which we know were content with a single division which, depending on circ.u.mstances, either furthered or destroyed the republic; but Florence, not content with a single division, has had many. In Rome, as everybody knows, after the kings were expelled a division between the n.o.bles and the plebeians ensued, and this division preserved Rome until its ruin.2 The same was true of Athens and the other republics that flourished in the past. But in Florence there was first a division among the n.o.bles themselves, then a division between the n.o.bles and the populace, and finally a division between the populace and the plebeians. It often happened that whatever faction gained the upper hand proceeded to split in two. These divisions resulted in more citizens being killed and exiled, and more families destroyed, than in any other city in history. And truly, in my view no other example shows as effectively the power of Florence as the example of these divisions, which would have been powerful enough to destroy any other great and ill.u.s.trious city The same was true of Athens and the other republics that flourished in the past. But in Florence there was first a division among the n.o.bles themselves, then a division between the n.o.bles and the populace, and finally a division between the populace and the plebeians. It often happened that whatever faction gained the upper hand proceeded to split in two. These divisions resulted in more citizens being killed and exiled, and more families destroyed, than in any other city in history. And truly, in my view no other example shows as effectively the power of Florence as the example of these divisions, which would have been powerful enough to destroy any other great and ill.u.s.trious city3 But our city only seemed to become even greater, as the skill of the Florentines and the strength of their wit and spirit enabled them to make themselves and their city great, so that those who remained free from evil influence had more chance to exalt Florence than the dire circ.u.mstances the city faced had to diminish her and crush her. Should Florence, after freeing herself from the Holy Roman Empire, have been fortunate enough to adopt a form of government that would have maintained her united, I cannot think of a modern or ancient republic that could have been superior to her; But our city only seemed to become even greater, as the skill of the Florentines and the strength of their wit and spirit enabled them to make themselves and their city great, so that those who remained free from evil influence had more chance to exalt Florence than the dire circ.u.mstances the city faced had to diminish her and crush her. Should Florence, after freeing herself from the Holy Roman Empire, have been fortunate enough to adopt a form of government that would have maintained her united, I cannot think of a modern or ancient republic that could have been superior to her;4 she would have had a skill in productivity and arms beyond compare. Even after Florence had expelled the Ghibellines in such numbers that Tuscany and Lombardy were filled with them, she would have had a skill in productivity and arms beyond compare. Even after Florence had expelled the Ghibellines in such numbers that Tuscany and Lombardy were filled with them,5 the Guelphs, along with those who remained in Florence, still managed to draw from the city twelve hundred men at arms and twelve thousand infantry in the war against Arezzo a year before the Battle of Campaldino. the Guelphs, along with those who remained in Florence, still managed to draw from the city twelve hundred men at arms and twelve thousand infantry in the war against Arezzo a year before the Battle of Campaldino.6 And in the war against Duke Filippo Visconti of Milan, when Florence had to make use of her riches and not her own weakened army, the Florentines spent three and a half million florins in the five years that the war lasted. When that war was over, not content with peace, the Florentines marched on Lucca to give more evidence of their city"s power. And in the war against Duke Filippo Visconti of Milan, when Florence had to make use of her riches and not her own weakened army, the Florentines spent three and a half million florins in the five years that the war lasted. When that war was over, not content with peace, the Florentines marched on Lucca to give more evidence of their city"s power.7 I cannot imagine why these divisions should not merit being described in detail. If our most n.o.ble historians refrained from such descriptions so as not to offend the memory of those whose actions they had to a.s.sess, they were mistaken, and showed little understanding of the ambition of men and their desire to perpetuate their own names and those of their ancestors. It also escaped them that many who did not have the opportunity to achieve fame through some laudable deed strove to achieve it by contemptible means. Nor did they consider how actions that have greatness in them, like the actions of governments and states, however they are considered or whatever aim they have, seem to bestow on men more honor than blame.
Having given thought to these matters, I changed my original plan and decided to start my history from our city"s beginnings. But as it is not my intention to tread where others have trod, I shall describe in detail only those incidents that occurred within the city up to 1434. Of incidents outside the city I shall report only what is necessary for a better understanding of what occurred within it. Beyond 1434, I shall write in detail about both. Furthermore, so that this history can be better understood in all its periods, before I come to Florence I shall describe by what means Italy came to be under the powers that governed it in those times. [...]
BOOK II.
25.
Uguccione della f.a.ggiuola became lord of Pisa and soon thereafter of Lucca, where he was installed by the Ghibelline faction.8 With the backing of Pisa and Lucca he did serious harm to the neighboring cities, and to escape this threat the Florentines asked King Roberto to send his brother Piero to take command of their armies. With the backing of Pisa and Lucca he did serious harm to the neighboring cities, and to escape this threat the Florentines asked King Roberto to send his brother Piero to take command of their armies.9 Uguccione, in the meantime, relentlessly continued to increase his power, and through force and deceit seized many fortresses in the Valdarno and the Val di Nievole. But when he besieged Montecatini, the Florentines concluded that they had to come to its aid, otherwise Uguccione"s rage would wreak havoc on all their lands. They gathered a large army and entered the Val di Nievole, where they encountered Uguccione and were routed after a great battle. King Roberto"s brother Piero was killed-his body was never recovered-and with him more than two thousand men perished. But the victory was not a happy one for Uguccione either, for one of his sons was slain, as were many of his commanders. Uguccione, in the meantime, relentlessly continued to increase his power, and through force and deceit seized many fortresses in the Valdarno and the Val di Nievole. But when he besieged Montecatini, the Florentines concluded that they had to come to its aid, otherwise Uguccione"s rage would wreak havoc on all their lands. They gathered a large army and entered the Val di Nievole, where they encountered Uguccione and were routed after a great battle. King Roberto"s brother Piero was killed-his body was never recovered-and with him more than two thousand men perished. But the victory was not a happy one for Uguccione either, for one of his sons was slain, as were many of his commanders.
After this rout the Florentines fortified the towns of their territories, and King Roberto sent them as general for their army Count d"Andria, known as Count Novello.10 Either because of the count"s behavior, or because Florentines tend to find every government irksome and every incident divisive, the city, despite the war with Uguccione, split into friends and enemies of the king. The leaders of the king"s enemies in Florence were Simone della Tosa, the Magalotti, and some other powerful men, members of the populace, in all outnumbering their opponents in government. They sent to France and then Germany to seek leaders and forces to drive out the count whom the king had appointed governor, but Fortune was against them. All the same, they did not abandon their enterprise, and though they did not find a leader in France or Germany they could look up to, they found one in Gubbio, Either because of the count"s behavior, or because Florentines tend to find every government irksome and every incident divisive, the city, despite the war with Uguccione, split into friends and enemies of the king. The leaders of the king"s enemies in Florence were Simone della Tosa, the Magalotti, and some other powerful men, members of the populace, in all outnumbering their opponents in government. They sent to France and then Germany to seek leaders and forces to drive out the count whom the king had appointed governor, but Fortune was against them. All the same, they did not abandon their enterprise, and though they did not find a leader in France or Germany they could look up to, they found one in Gubbio,11 and, expelling Count Novello, brought Lando da Gubbio as chief magistrate to Florence and gave him absolute authority over her citizens. and, expelling Count Novello, brought Lando da Gubbio as chief magistrate to Florence and gave him absolute authority over her citizens.
Lando da Gubbio was a rapacious and cruel man who went about town with a large armed guard, putting this or that man to death at the will of those who had elected him. His arrogance reached such heights that he used the Florentine stamp to coin false money without anyone daring to oppose him: That was how powerful the discord in Florence had made him! A truly great and miserable city, which neither the memory of past divisions, nor the fear of Uguccione, nor the authority of a king could keep stable, Florence now found itself in a terrible state, plundered from without by Uguccione, and from within by Lando da Gubbio.
The friends of King Roberto and all who opposed Lando and his followers were Guelphs, mostly n.o.bles and powerful men of the populace. Nevertheless, as their adversaries were in control of the state, they could not reveal themselves without putting themselves in grave danger. They were, however, determined to break free from Lando"s reprehensible tyranny, and secretly wrote to King Roberto asking him to appoint Count Guido da Battifolle as his governor in Florence. The king immediately made the arrangements, and the enemy party, even though the Signori12 were against the king, did not dare oppose the count owing to his fine qualities. Nevertheless, he did not have much authority, because the Signori and the Gonfalonieri of the companies were against the king, did not dare oppose the count owing to his fine qualities. Nevertheless, he did not have much authority, because the Signori and the Gonfalonieri of the companies13 favored Lando and his party. favored Lando and his party.
While Florence was in the midst of these troubles, the daughter of King Albert of Germany arrived on her way to meet her husband Carlo, the son of King Roberto of Naples.14 She was welcomed with great honor by supporters of King Roberto, who complained to her of the dire state Florence was in and of the tyranny of Lando and his partisans. Through her influence and the a.s.sistance of the king, the citizens united, and Lando was stripped of his office and sent back to Gubbio, weighed down with plunder and blood. With the change in government King Roberto kept sovereignty over the city for another three years, and as seven Signori of Lando"s faction had already been elected, six more were elected from among the king"s faction. There followed some magistracies made up of thirteen Signori, after which their number reverted back to seven, which it had always been previously. She was welcomed with great honor by supporters of King Roberto, who complained to her of the dire state Florence was in and of the tyranny of Lando and his partisans. Through her influence and the a.s.sistance of the king, the citizens united, and Lando was stripped of his office and sent back to Gubbio, weighed down with plunder and blood. With the change in government King Roberto kept sovereignty over the city for another three years, and as seven Signori of Lando"s faction had already been elected, six more were elected from among the king"s faction. There followed some magistracies made up of thirteen Signori, after which their number reverted back to seven, which it had always been previously.
26.
It was during this time that Uguccione was stripped of the sovereignty of Lucca, and Pisa, and Castruccio Castracani, from being citizen of Lucca became lord of Lucca.15 As Castruccio was young, bold, and fierce, and fortunate in his campaigns, in a very short time he became prince of the Ghibellines in Tuscany. The Florentines now put aside their civil discords for several years, and initially concentrated on how they might keep Castruccio"s increasing power in check, and then, when his power increased despite their efforts, how they might best defend themselves. So that the Signori could deliberate with broader advice and carry out their decisions more efficiently, they appointed twelve citizens called As Castruccio was young, bold, and fierce, and fortunate in his campaigns, in a very short time he became prince of the Ghibellines in Tuscany. The Florentines now put aside their civil discords for several years, and initially concentrated on how they might keep Castruccio"s increasing power in check, and then, when his power increased despite their efforts, how they might best defend themselves. So that the Signori could deliberate with broader advice and carry out their decisions more efficiently, they appointed twelve citizens called Buoni Uomini Buoni Uomini-"Good Men"-without whose counsel and consent the Signori could not act on anything of importance.
The period of King Roberto"s sovereignty over Florence ended, and the city became its own lord again. It reorganized itself with its customary rectors and magistrates, its great fear of Castruccio keeping it united. Castruccio, after his campaigns against the lords of Lunigiana, attacked Prato. Florence was determined to come to Prato"s aid, and the Florentines closed their shops, armed the populace, and marched to Prato with twenty thousand foot soldiers and fifteen hundred hors.e.m.e.n. In order to reduce Castruccio"s forces and enlarge their own, the Florentine Signori decreed that every exiled rebel of the Guelph faction who came to the aid of Prato would be allowed to return to Florence after the campaign. As a result, more than four thousand rebels came over to their side. This great army marched on Prato with such speed that Castruccio was alarmed enough to retreat to Lucca without putting Fortune to the test in battle. In the Florentine camp this sparked a dispute between the n.o.bles and the populace, the latter wanting to pursue Castruccio and destroy him, while the n.o.bles wanted to return home. They argued that it was enough that they had put Florence in peril in order to free Prato: They had been compelled by necessity to fight, but as that was no longer the case, it was not worth tempting Fortune when they stood to lose so much and gain so little. As the two factions were not able to agree, the judgment was referred to the Signori, who found the same disparity between the n.o.bles and the populace in their council. This news spread through the city, drawing great crowds to the town squares, shouting such threats against the n.o.bles that they yielded out of fear. As this resolution was adopted too late, an