In short, anyone ready to lose battles should avail himself of such troops, because they are far more dangerous than mercenaries. For if you use auxiliary troops the cards are stacked against you, since they are united under the command of an outsider. But for mercenary troops to harm you, even if they are victorious, takes a certain amount of time and the right opportunity. Mercenary troops are not a single body, as it is you who a.s.semble them and pay them. An outsider whom you appoint as their commander cannot establish his authority quickly enough to do you harm. In essence, the most dangerous aspect of mercenaries is their indolence, while that of auxiliary troops is their prowess. Wise princes have always avoided auxiliary troops and relied on their own. They have preferred defeat with their own army rather than victory with that of another, judging that a victory won with another"s army is not a true victory.
I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. He entered the Romagna at the head of an auxiliary army made up entirely of Frenchmen, and with it took Imola and Forl. But the moment he felt that this army was not reliable, he turned to mercenaries, considering them less dangerous, and hired the Orsini and the Vitelli. When he subsequently saw that they too were unreliable, disloyal, and dangerous, he destroyed them54 and went back to using his own men. It is easy to see the difference between these types of armies, considering Cesare Borgia"s standing when he had only the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he was self-sufficient with his own soldiers. Then his standing increased. His reputation was at its height when men saw him in every way as the master of his own army. and went back to using his own men. It is easy to see the difference between these types of armies, considering Cesare Borgia"s standing when he had only the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he was self-sufficient with his own soldiers. Then his standing increased. His reputation was at its height when men saw him in every way as the master of his own army.
Though I intended to focus on recent Italian examples, I do not wish to pa.s.s over Hiero of Syracuse, as I have already mentioned him.55 The Syracusans had made him general of their army, and he was quick to see that the mercenary troops, much like our own Italian condottieri, were useless. As he felt that he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, he had them slashed to pieces. The Syracusans had made him general of their army, and he was quick to see that the mercenary troops, much like our own Italian condottieri, were useless. As he felt that he could neither keep them nor dismiss them, he had them slashed to pieces.56 After that, he made war using his own troops and not those of others. I also wish to cite an example from the Old Testament. David stepped forward to fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger. Saul offered him his own armor to give him courage, but no sooner had David put it on than he cast it off again, saying that he could not make use of his own strength with another"s armor. He wanted to face the enemy with his own slingshot and knife. In short, the arms of another will either fall off your back, weigh you down, or hamper you. After that, he made war using his own troops and not those of others. I also wish to cite an example from the Old Testament. David stepped forward to fight Goliath, the Philistine challenger. Saul offered him his own armor to give him courage, but no sooner had David put it on than he cast it off again, saying that he could not make use of his own strength with another"s armor. He wanted to face the enemy with his own slingshot and knife. In short, the arms of another will either fall off your back, weigh you down, or hamper you.
Louis XI"s father, King Charles VII, who freed France from the English57 with the help of Fortune and his skill, recognized the importance of having his own army. He issued a decree in his kingdom to enlist an infantry and a cavalry. After him, his son Louis disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss mercenaries. This mistake, followed by others, has led, as we have seen, to the many dangers France has had to face. Having given power to the Swiss, Louis undermined his own, because he disbanded his infantry and made his cavalry dependent on the mercenaries" skill. And the cavalry, once accustomed to fighting alongside the Swiss, felt it could not win without them. As a result, the French cannot stand up to the Swiss, but neither are they willing to face others on the battlefield without them. Hence the French army has become mixed-in part mercenary, in part French citizens-which is still better than an army that is entirely auxiliary or mercenary, but far inferior to an army made up entirely of one"s own citizens. This example should suffice, because France would have been undefeatable had King Charles"s decrees been followed and developed. But man"s scant prudence will make him relish a dish that appears delicious while it conceals poison within. with the help of Fortune and his skill, recognized the importance of having his own army. He issued a decree in his kingdom to enlist an infantry and a cavalry. After him, his son Louis disbanded the infantry and began hiring Swiss mercenaries. This mistake, followed by others, has led, as we have seen, to the many dangers France has had to face. Having given power to the Swiss, Louis undermined his own, because he disbanded his infantry and made his cavalry dependent on the mercenaries" skill. And the cavalry, once accustomed to fighting alongside the Swiss, felt it could not win without them. As a result, the French cannot stand up to the Swiss, but neither are they willing to face others on the battlefield without them. Hence the French army has become mixed-in part mercenary, in part French citizens-which is still better than an army that is entirely auxiliary or mercenary, but far inferior to an army made up entirely of one"s own citizens. This example should suffice, because France would have been undefeatable had King Charles"s decrees been followed and developed. But man"s scant prudence will make him relish a dish that appears delicious while it conceals poison within.
A prince who does not perceive the ills in his princ.i.p.ality as they arise is not truly astute. Such astuteness is afforded to few. If one considers the beginning of the decline of the Roman Empire, one will find that it began when Goth mercenaries were hired. It was then that the strength of the Roman army started to flag. All the skill and valor that was sapped from the Romans went to strengthen the Goths. Thus I conclude that no princ.i.p.ality is safe without its own army. It is entirely at the mercy of Fortune, having failed to preserve the valor that will defend it in adversity. Wise men have always held to the maxim quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixa. quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixa.58 And "your own power" is an army composed either of your subjects, your citizens, or your dependents. Anything else const.i.tutes a mercenary or auxiliary army. How one"s army should be organized is easy to see if one weighs the four examples I have cited above And "your own power" is an army composed either of your subjects, your citizens, or your dependents. Anything else const.i.tutes a mercenary or auxiliary army. How one"s army should be organized is easy to see if one weighs the four examples I have cited above59 and if one takes into account the method by which Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princ.i.p.alities armed themselves-a method I fully support. and if one takes into account the method by which Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, and many republics and princ.i.p.alities armed themselves-a method I fully support.
53. In April 1512, the French army fought a battle with the Spanish, Venetian, and papal troops outside Ravenna. The French were victorious, but were then forced by the Swiss (then the pope"s main allies) to evacuate Milan. In 1513 the Swiss routed the French at Novara. In April 1512, the French army fought a battle with the Spanish, Venetian, and papal troops outside Ravenna. The French were victorious, but were then forced by the Swiss (then the pope"s main allies) to evacuate Milan. In 1513 the Swiss routed the French at Novara.54. At Sinigallia in 1502. See "How Duke Valentino Killed the Generals Who Conspired Against Him." At Sinigallia in 1502. See "How Duke Valentino Killed the Generals Who Conspired Against Him."55. See chapter 6. See chapter 6.56. Polybius, Polybius, Histories Histories, Book 1, chapter 9: "Finding the old mercenaries disaffected and seditious, he led an expedition against the barbarians who had occupied Messene. [...] But he held back his citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance and under his personal command, as if he meant to use them to attack another side, but sent the mercenaries on ahead, allowing them to be completely slaughtered by the barbarians."57. King Charles VII of France (140361) was the father of Louis XI (142383). King Charles drove the English out of France (with the aid of Joan of Arc), and inst.i.tuted sweeping reforms in his army by a series of ordinances, improving its recruitment and efficiency. King Charles VII of France (140361) was the father of Louis XI (142383). King Charles drove the English out of France (with the aid of Joan of Arc), and inst.i.tuted sweeping reforms in his army by a series of ordinances, improving its recruitment and efficiency.58. An altered quotation from Tacitus"s An altered quotation from Tacitus"s Annales Annales. 13.19.1: Nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum est quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixae Nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum est quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixae. (No human matter is as unstable and changeable as the reputation of power that has no support of its own.)59. Cesare Borgia, Hiero of Syracuse, David, and Charles VII of France. Cesare Borgia, Hiero of Syracuse, David, and Charles VII of France.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN.
OF A PRINCE"S DUTIES CONCERNING THE MILITARY A prince must therefore have no other thought or objective, nor dedicate himself to any other art, but that of war with its rules and discipline, because this is the only art suitable for a man who commands. It is such a powerful art that it will maintain the position of one who is born a prince, but will also often raise mere private citizens to that rank. Princes who give more thought to luxury than to arms often lose their princ.i.p.ality. In fact, the quickest way to lose a princ.i.p.ality is to neglect the art of war, and the best way of acquiring one is to be a master in this art.60 Francesco Sforza, from being a private citizen, became Duke of Milan because he was armed, while his sons after him, shrinking from the hardships of military life, ended up as private citizens after having been dukes. Furthermore, being unarmed makes you, among other things, despised, which is one of the infamies from which a prince must shield himself, as I will discuss later.61 There is no comparison between an armed man and an unarmed one. It is not reasonable to think that an armed man might be compelled to obey an unarmed one, or that an unarmed man might be safe among the armed mercenaries he has hired. The unarmed prince will always be wary of these mercenaries, whereas they will harbor disdain for him. There is no way for them to work well together. Hence, beside the other misfortunes already mentioned, a prince who does not understand military matters will not be respected by his soldiers and cannot trust them. There is no comparison between an armed man and an unarmed one. It is not reasonable to think that an armed man might be compelled to obey an unarmed one, or that an unarmed man might be safe among the armed mercenaries he has hired. The unarmed prince will always be wary of these mercenaries, whereas they will harbor disdain for him. There is no way for them to work well together. Hence, beside the other misfortunes already mentioned, a prince who does not understand military matters will not be respected by his soldiers and cannot trust them.
The prince must therefore never shift his attention from the exercise of war, even in times of peace, and he must do this both in action and in mind. As for action, he must not only keep his troops well trained and organized, but must also himself continuously go out hunting, keeping his body accustomed to hardship, while learning the lay of the land: how the mountains rise and the valleys dip, how the plains lie, and the nature of the rivers and marshes. He must do this with the greatest application, for such knowledge is useful in two ways. First, he will familiarize himself intimately with his own country and understand how to defend it; second, with the knowledge and experience of his own terrain, he will more easily get to know any foreign terrain he might have to explore, because any hill, valley, river, plain, or marsh that exists in Tuscany will resemble those of other provinces. In short, familiarizing one with the terrain of one"s own province helps to familiarize one with the terrain of other provinces as well. A prince who lacks this knowledge lacks the most essential quality in a general, because this will train him how to hunt the enemy, choose a campsite, lead troops, and direct them in the field and in besieging towns.
Among the things Prince Philopoemen of the Achaeans has been praised for by writers is that in times of peace he thought of nothing but ways of waging war.62 When he was out riding in the country with his friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If the enemy were up in those hills and we were here with our army, who would have the advantage? How could we attack without breaking formation? If we wanted to retreat, how would we do that? If they were to retreat, how would we pursue them?" And as Prince Philopoemen and his companions rode on, he would lay out all the circ.u.mstances that could befall an army. He would listen to the opinions of the others and share his opinions with them, which he would back up with detailed explanation, his aim being that through continuous deliberations, nothing unforeseen for which he might have no remedy would ever occur in battle. When he was out riding in the country with his friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them: "If the enemy were up in those hills and we were here with our army, who would have the advantage? How could we attack without breaking formation? If we wanted to retreat, how would we do that? If they were to retreat, how would we pursue them?" And as Prince Philopoemen and his companions rode on, he would lay out all the circ.u.mstances that could befall an army. He would listen to the opinions of the others and share his opinions with them, which he would back up with detailed explanation, his aim being that through continuous deliberations, nothing unforeseen for which he might have no remedy would ever occur in battle.
As for the exercise of the mind, a prince must read histories and study the actions of great men so he can see how they conducted themselves in war and examine the reasons for their victories and defeats, in order to imitate the former and avoid the latter. Above all, the prince must follow the example of some great man of the past, who in turn followed the example of another great man who had been praised and honored before him, always keeping his predecessor"s deeds and actions in mind. For it is said that Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, that Caesar imitated Alexander, and that Scipio imitated Cyrus. Anyone who reads Xenophon"s life of Cyrus can see in Scipio"s actions how much glory his imitation of Cyrus brought him, and to what extent Scipio conformed with what Xenophon wrote about Cyrus in matters of chast.i.ty, openness, humanity, and liberality.
A wise prince must observe such methods, and never remain idle in times of peace but vigorously take advantage of them so he can be ready for times of adversity, so that when Fortune changes, she will find him prepared to resist her.
60. See note 48 above. See note 48 above.61. See chapter 19. See chapter 19.62. Philopoemen (c. 252182 Philopoemen (c. 252182 BCE BCE) was a renowned general of the Achaean League, known for his innovations in Greek military tactics. Machiavelli closely follows Livy"s text (Book x.x.xV, chapter 28): "Philopoemen had a great talent for directing a campaign and choosing advantageous positions, which was the result of his experience acquired through much reflection in times of peace as well as war."
CHAPTER FIFTEEN.
OF THE THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND PRINCES IN PARTICULAR, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED.
It remains now to discuss what methods and measures a prince should employ with his subjects or friends. Many have written about this, and I fear I might be considered presumptuous, particularly as I intend to depart from the principles laid down by others. As my intention is to write something useful for discerning minds, I find it more fitting to seek the truth of the matter rather than imaginary conceptions. Many have imagined republics and princ.i.p.alities that have never been seen or heard of, because how one lives and how one ought to live are so far apart that he who spurns what is actually done for what ought to be done will achieve ruin rather than his own preservation. A man who strives to make a show of correct comportment in every circ.u.mstance can only come to ruin among so many who have other designs. Hence it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain his position to learn how to be able not to be good, and to use or not use this ability according to circ.u.mstances.
Casting aside imagined things about a prince, and considering only things that are true, I argue that all men, particularly princes, since they have a higher position, are judged by qualities that attract praise or blame. This is why some princes are considered generous and others miserly;63 one is regarded as a giver, the other as a taker; one is seen as cruel, the other as merciful; one faithless, the other faithful; one effeminate and pusillanimous, the other fierce and spirited; one humane, the other haughty; one lascivious, the other chaste; one frank, the other sly; one rigid, the other flexible; one grave, the other jovial; one religious, the other unbelieving; and so on. I know everyone will maintain that it would be commendable for a prince to have all the qualities I have just mentioned that are held to be good. But because a prince cannot wholly have or espouse all these qualities, as the human condition will not allow it, he must be wise enough to know how to evade the infamy of the qualities that are thought to be bad, which will cause him to lose his state. If possible he should also avoid the qualities which are considered bad but will not actually lose him his state, but if he must indulge in them, he need not concern himself about their consequences. He also should not concern himself about incurring the infamy of qualities that are considered bad if he needs them to save his state. For there are cases in which people might think a certain path is valorous, but following it would be the prince"s ruin, while there are also cases in which a certain way might seem evil, but following it will result in the prince"s safety and well-being. one is regarded as a giver, the other as a taker; one is seen as cruel, the other as merciful; one faithless, the other faithful; one effeminate and pusillanimous, the other fierce and spirited; one humane, the other haughty; one lascivious, the other chaste; one frank, the other sly; one rigid, the other flexible; one grave, the other jovial; one religious, the other unbelieving; and so on. I know everyone will maintain that it would be commendable for a prince to have all the qualities I have just mentioned that are held to be good. But because a prince cannot wholly have or espouse all these qualities, as the human condition will not allow it, he must be wise enough to know how to evade the infamy of the qualities that are thought to be bad, which will cause him to lose his state. If possible he should also avoid the qualities which are considered bad but will not actually lose him his state, but if he must indulge in them, he need not concern himself about their consequences. He also should not concern himself about incurring the infamy of qualities that are considered bad if he needs them to save his state. For there are cases in which people might think a certain path is valorous, but following it would be the prince"s ruin, while there are also cases in which a certain way might seem evil, but following it will result in the prince"s safety and well-being.
63. Machiavelli"s note: "I am using the Tuscan term Machiavelli"s note: "I am using the Tuscan term misero misero here, as here, as avaro avaro (miserly) in Italian still carries the implication of someone who wishes to acquire by robbery, while we use (miserly) in Italian still carries the implication of someone who wishes to acquire by robbery, while we use misero misero in Tuscan to mean someone who excessively abstains from using what is his own." in Tuscan to mean someone who excessively abstains from using what is his own."
CHAPTER SIXTEEN.
OF GENEROSITY AND PARSIMONY.
To begin with the first of these qualities: I propose that it is good to be thought generous. And yet generosity pursued in a way that makes people perceive you as generous will harm you, because if you exercise generosity in all modesty, as is appropriate, it will not be recognized, and you will not be able to avoid the reputation of miserliness. Hence, if one wishes to be perceived as generous among men, one will have to indulge in a great deal of sumptuous display. A prince who chooses this path will consume all his resources and eventually will have to overburden the populace with taxes, extort money from them, and do whatever else is necessary to raise money to maintain his reputation for being generous. This will make him hateful to his subjects, and, should he become poor, despised by all. With his generosity he will have hurt many and rewarded few. He will be vulnerable to the slightest unrest and fall prey to the first danger. When the prince who has chosen this path realizes this, his impulse is to draw back, which quickly brings him a reputation for miserliness.
Therefore a wise prince, seeing that he is unable to practice ostentatious generosity without harming himself, must not mind acquiring a reputation for miserliness. With time he will come to be considered generous once people see that his parsimony has produced sufficient funds and enabled him to defend himself from those who make war on him, and to launch campaigns without burdening the populace. In this way he will be considered generous by the great number of men from whom he takes nothing, and miserly by the few to whom he gives nothing. In our times we have seen great deeds accomplished only by those who were considered miserly; all the others came to ruin. Pope Julius II, though he made use of his reputation for generosity to gain the papacy, did not strive to maintain it afterward. This was so that he could wage wars. The present king of France64 has launched many wars without imposing extra taxes on his people, which he has been able to do only because the additional expenditures have been provided for by his long parsimony. The present king of Spain, has launched many wars without imposing extra taxes on his people, which he has been able to do only because the additional expenditures have been provided for by his long parsimony. The present king of Spain,65 had he been considered generous, could not have undertaken or won so many campaigns. Consequently, a prince must care little about gaining a reputation for parsimony if he does not want to rob his subjects and yet wishes to be able to defend himself without becoming poor and contemptible or being forced to become rapacious. Parsimony is one of the vices that permit him to reign. had he been considered generous, could not have undertaken or won so many campaigns. Consequently, a prince must care little about gaining a reputation for parsimony if he does not want to rob his subjects and yet wishes to be able to defend himself without becoming poor and contemptible or being forced to become rapacious. Parsimony is one of the vices that permit him to reign.
Were someone to argue that Caesar acquired his empire through generosity, and that many others achieved the highest ranks because they were generous and were seen as such, my answer is: Either you are already a prince, or you are on your way to becoming one. In the first case, such generosity is damaging; in the second, it is quite necessary to be considered generous. Caesar was one of those who wanted to rule Rome. However, had he survived after he gained his princ.i.p.ality and not tempered his spending, he would have destroyed Rome. But were someone to counter that there have been many princes who were considered most generous and who did great things with their armies, I would reply: A prince spends either his own wealth, or that of his subjects or of others. In the first case he must be frugal, while in the second, he must show every generosity. A prince who rides out with his army, sustaining himself by looting, sacking, and plundering, controlling the a.s.sets of others, such a prince needs to be generous. Otherwise his soldiers will not follow him. And it is easier to be a generous giver when the possessions you are giving away are not your own or those of your subjects. Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander were of this cla.s.s. Spending what belongs to others does not diminish your standing but increases it. Only spending what is your own harms you. There is nothing that consumes itself like generosity: The more you use it, the more you lose the capacity of using it. You either become poor and disdained, or, to escape poverty, rapacious and hated. There is nothing a prince must avoid more than being at once disdained and hated, and generosity leads to both. It is therefore wiser to settle for a reputation of miserliness which incurs disdain without hatred, than to try to gain a reputation for generosity that brings with it a reputation for rapacity, incurring disdain with hatred.
64. Louis XII. Louis XII.65. Ferdinand II. Ferdinand II.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN.
OF CRUELTY AND MERCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED, OR THE CONTRARY.
Proceeding to the other qualities I have already mentioned,66 1 maintain that every prince must wish to be considered merciful and not cruel. Nevertheless, he must avoid using mercy inappropriately. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, yet his cruelty brought order to the Romagna, uniting it and making it peaceful and loyal. All things considered, Borgia proved far more merciful than the people of Florence, who allowed Pistoia to be destroyed simply in order to avoid a reputation for cruelty. A prince, therefore, must not fear being reproached for cruelty when it is a matter of keeping his subjects united and loyal, because with a few exemplary executions he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow the kind of disorder to spread that gives rise to plunder and murder. This harms the whole community, while an execution ordered by a prince harms only a single individual. 1 maintain that every prince must wish to be considered merciful and not cruel. Nevertheless, he must avoid using mercy inappropriately. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, yet his cruelty brought order to the Romagna, uniting it and making it peaceful and loyal. All things considered, Borgia proved far more merciful than the people of Florence, who allowed Pistoia to be destroyed simply in order to avoid a reputation for cruelty. A prince, therefore, must not fear being reproached for cruelty when it is a matter of keeping his subjects united and loyal, because with a few exemplary executions he will be more merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow the kind of disorder to spread that gives rise to plunder and murder. This harms the whole community, while an execution ordered by a prince harms only a single individual.
Unlike an established prince, a new prince cannot escape a reputation for cruelty, since newly acquired states are filled with danger. As Virgil has Dido say: Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt / Moliri, et late fines custode tueri Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt / Moliri, et late fines custode tueri (The harsh situation and the newness of my kingdom force me to act this way and post guards at my borders). Nevertheless, a prince must not be quick to believe the worst and act impulsively, becoming afraid of his own shadow. His actions must be tempered by prudence and humanity so that too much trust does not render him incautious, nor too much mistrust intolerable. (The harsh situation and the newness of my kingdom force me to act this way and post guards at my borders). Nevertheless, a prince must not be quick to believe the worst and act impulsively, becoming afraid of his own shadow. His actions must be tempered by prudence and humanity so that too much trust does not render him incautious, nor too much mistrust intolerable.
This raises the question whether it is better to be loved than feared, or the contrary. My reply is that one would like to be both, but as it is difficult to combine love and fear, if one has to choose between them it is far safer to be feared than loved. Because it can be said of men that they are ungrateful and inconstant, simulators and dissimulators,67 and that they are hungry for profit and quick to evade danger. While you do them good they are devoted to you, offering you their lives, their possessions, their children, as I have said before-but only as long as danger is far off. The moment danger is at hand, they turn away. A prince who has based everything on their word without taking other precautions is ruined, because friendships acquired at a price and not through magnanimity and n.o.bility of spirit can be bought but not owned, nor do they bring a return in difficult times. Men have less compunction about harming someone who has made himself loved than harming someone who has made himself feared, because love is held in place by chains of obligation, which, as men are evil, will quickly be broken if self-interest is at stake. But fear is held in place by a dread of punishment, which one can always rely on. and that they are hungry for profit and quick to evade danger. While you do them good they are devoted to you, offering you their lives, their possessions, their children, as I have said before-but only as long as danger is far off. The moment danger is at hand, they turn away. A prince who has based everything on their word without taking other precautions is ruined, because friendships acquired at a price and not through magnanimity and n.o.bility of spirit can be bought but not owned, nor do they bring a return in difficult times. Men have less compunction about harming someone who has made himself loved than harming someone who has made himself feared, because love is held in place by chains of obligation, which, as men are evil, will quickly be broken if self-interest is at stake. But fear is held in place by a dread of punishment, which one can always rely on.
The prince, however, must make himself feared so that he avoids hatred, even if he does not acquire love. Being feared and not hated go well together, and the prince can always achieve this if he does not touch the property or the women of his citizens and subjects. If he finds he must execute someone, he should do so only if there is adequate justification and a manifest cause. But above all he must refrain from seizing the property of others, because a man is quicker to forget the death of his father than the loss of his patrimony. Furthermore, there are always ample reasons for seizing another"s property, and he who begins to live by plunder will always find reasons to take what belongs to others, whereas the reasons for having to execute someone are rare, and frequently altogether lacking.68 Yet when a prince is with his army and has a mult.i.tude of soldiers under his command, he must not scruple about gaining a reputation for cruelty, because without it he can never keep his army united or willing to follow him into battle. One of Hannibal"s many admirable achievements was that he marched his enormous army of myriad nationalities into battle in foreign lands. Whether Fortune smiled on him or not, there was never any dissension among them nor any rebellion against him. The only reason for this was his inhumane cruelty, which, combined with his infinite skill, made him venerated and feared in the eyes of his men. Without this quality, his other abilities would not have produced this effect. Some careless historians admire this quality while condemning the princ.i.p.al reason for it.
That his other abilities would not have sufficed to keep his army in check can be seen from the example of Scipio, an exceptional man not only in his time, but in all of history. His army rebelled in Spain for no other reason than his undue lenience, which allowed the soldiers more freedom than is suitable in military discipline. He was reproached for this in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, who called him the corrupter of the Roman army. The Locrians had been savaged and plundered by one of Scipio"s officers, after which Scipio neither made reparations nor punished the officer, a consequence of Scipio"s easygoing nature.69 Subsequently, a Locrian spoke before the Senate and, in an attempt to excuse Scipio, said that there were many men who were better at not transgressing than they were at punishing the transgressions of others. With time, Scipio"s nature would have thrown a shadow on his fame and glory had he been a general in the times of the empire, but as he lived under the government of the Senate, this weakness was not only concealed, but brought him glory. Subsequently, a Locrian spoke before the Senate and, in an attempt to excuse Scipio, said that there were many men who were better at not transgressing than they were at punishing the transgressions of others. With time, Scipio"s nature would have thrown a shadow on his fame and glory had he been a general in the times of the empire, but as he lived under the government of the Senate, this weakness was not only concealed, but brought him glory.
Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I conclude that since men love at their own will and fear at the will of the prince, a wise prince must build a foundation on what is his own, and not on what belongs to others. At the same time, he must do all in his power to escape being hated, as I have already said.
66. Chapter 15, paragraph 2. Chapter 15, paragraph 2.67. Sall.u.s.t, in his account of the Catiline conspiracy in Sall.u.s.t, in his account of the Catiline conspiracy in De conjurations Catilinae De conjurations Catilinae, described Catiline as simulator ac dissimulator simulator ac dissimulator.68. See See Discourses Discourses, Book III, chapter 6, in which Machiavelli develops these ideas in the paragraph beginning "The injury princes do to citizens is usually against their property, their honor, or their life. In the case of injury against life, threats are more dangerous than executions. In fact, threats are extremely dangerous, while executions are not at all: He who is dead cannot think about revenge, while he who remains alive will usually leave such thoughts to the dead."69. Livy (Book XXIX, chapter 8) writes: "But Pleminius so surpa.s.sed General Hamilcar in crime and greed-the Roman soldiers so surpa.s.sing the Carthaginians-that they seemed to be rivaling one another not in battle but in vice. Nothing that renders the power of the strong hateful to the weak was left undone by the Roman general and his soldiers toward the townspeople." Livy (Book XXIX, chapter 8) writes: "But Pleminius so surpa.s.sed General Hamilcar in crime and greed-the Roman soldiers so surpa.s.sing the Carthaginians-that they seemed to be rivaling one another not in battle but in vice. Nothing that renders the power of the strong hateful to the weak was left undone by the Roman general and his soldiers toward the townspeople."
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN.
OF THE NEED FOR PRINCES TO KEEP THEIR WORD.
Everyone knows how commendable it is for a prince to keep his word and live by integrity rather than by cunning. And yet our own era has shown that princes who have little regard for their word have achieved great things, being expert at beguiling men"s minds. In the end, these princes overcame those who relied solely on loyalty.
There are two ways of fighting: either with laws or with force. The first is peculiar to men, the second to beasts. But because the first way often does not suffice, one has to resort to the second. Nevertheless, a prince must be expert in using both. This has been taught to princes allegorically by ancient writers, who tell us that Achilles and many other ancient princes were sent to Chiron the Centaur to be raised and tutored. What this means is that the ancient princes, whose tutor was half man and half beast, learned to use both natures, neither of which can prevail without the other.
Since a prince must know how to use the nature of the beast to his advantage, he must emulate both the fox and the lion, because a lion cannot defy a snare, while a fox cannot defy a pack of wolves. A prince must therefore be a fox to spot the snares, and a lion to overwhelm the wolves. The prince who models himself only on the lion does not grasp this, but a wise ruler cannot and should not keep his word when it would be to his disadvantage to do so, and when the reasons that made him give his word have disappeared. If all men were good, this rule would not stand. But as men are wicked and not prepared to keep their word to you, you have no need to keep your word to them. Nor does a prince ever lack legitimate pretexts for concealing the fact that he has broken his word. There are countless examples from our times of the many peace treaties and promises that have been rendered null and void through the fickleness of princes. The princes who have best used the nature of the fox to their advantage have been the most successful. But one must know how to conceal this quality and be a great simulator and dissimulator,70 for men are so simple, and so p.r.o.ne to being won over by the necessity of the moment, that a deceiver will always find someone willing to be deceived. for men are so simple, and so p.r.o.ne to being won over by the necessity of the moment, that a deceiver will always find someone willing to be deceived.
There is an example from recent times that I do not want to pa.s.s over. Pope Alexander VI never thought or did anything except to deceive, and he always found someone to deceive. Never has a man made more grandiose promises or sworn greater oaths, and kept them less. And yet he always got away with his deceptions, because he was so well acquainted with this aspect of the world.
Consequently, although a prince need not have all the good qualities that I have mentioned, it is most necessary for him to appear to have them.71 I will even be so bold as to say that it actually does a prince harm to have those good qualities and always observe them. But appearing to have them will benefit him. Of course, it is best to both seem and be merciful, loyal, humane, upright, and scrupulous. And yet one"s spirit should be calculated in such a way that one can, if need be, turn one"s back on these qualities and become the opposite. It is vital to understand that a prince, particularly a new prince, cannot afford to cultivate attributes for which men are considered good. In order to maintain the state, a prince will often be compelled to work against what is merciful, loyal, humane, upright, and scrupulous. He must have a spirit that can change depending on the winds and variations of Fortune, and, as I have said above, he must not, if he is able, distance himself from what is good, but must also, when necessary, know how to prefer what is bad. I will even be so bold as to say that it actually does a prince harm to have those good qualities and always observe them. But appearing to have them will benefit him. Of course, it is best to both seem and be merciful, loyal, humane, upright, and scrupulous. And yet one"s spirit should be calculated in such a way that one can, if need be, turn one"s back on these qualities and become the opposite. It is vital to understand that a prince, particularly a new prince, cannot afford to cultivate attributes for which men are considered good. In order to maintain the state, a prince will often be compelled to work against what is merciful, loyal, humane, upright, and scrupulous. He must have a spirit that can change depending on the winds and variations of Fortune, and, as I have said above, he must not, if he is able, distance himself from what is good, but must also, when necessary, know how to prefer what is bad.
Therefore a prince must be very careful that no word escape his mouth that is not filled with the five qualities I have mentioned. When one sees and hears him, he should be a paragon of mercy, loyalty, humaneness, integrity, and scrupulousness. Indeed, there is nothing more important than appearing to have this last quality. Men in general judge more with the eye than with the hand, because everyone can see, but few can feel. Everyone sees what you seem to be, but few feel what you are, and those few will not dare oppose the opinion of the many who have the majesty of the state behind them: In the actions of all men, and particularly the prince, where there is no higher justice to appeal to, one looks at the outcome.
The prince must acquire and keep his princ.i.p.ality, and the means by which he does this will always be praised and judged honorable by all, because the common people will be convinced by appearances and by the end result. And the world is made up of common people, among whom the few dissenters who can see beyond appearances do not count when the majority can point to the prince"s success. A certain prince of our times (whom I shall not name) preaches nothing but peace and loyalty, while he could not be more hostile to both.72 Yet if he lived by what he preaches, he would by now have lost both his reputation and his state many times over. Yet if he lived by what he preaches, he would by now have lost both his reputation and his state many times over.
70. See text for note 67 above. See text for note 67 above.71. This idea is also echoed in This idea is also echoed in Discourses Discourses, Book I, chapter 25: "Men cherish something that seems like the real thing as much as they do the real thing itself: In fact, they are often more affected by that which seems than by that which is."72. Almost certainly an allusion to Ferdinand II. Almost certainly an allusion to Ferdinand II.
CHAPTER NINETEEN.
OF HOW TO AVOID CONTEMPT AND HATRED.
As I have already discussed the most important qualities73 that attract praise or blame, I would like to touch on others in more general terms, so that the prince may note (as I have to some extent mentioned) how to avoid the things that would make him hated and scorned. that attract praise or blame, I would like to touch on others in more general terms, so that the prince may note (as I have to some extent mentioned) how to avoid the things that would make him hated and scorned.74 If he manages to do this he will have accomplished his duty, and will not face any risk should he perpetrate other infamies. What will make him hated above all, as I have said, is rapaciousness and seizing the property and women of his subjects, which he must refrain from. Men will generally live contentedly as long as their property and honor are not touched, and the prince need only counter the ambition of a few, which can be done easily and in many ways. What will make the prince contemptible is for him to be perceived as undependable, frivolous, effeminate, pusillanimous, and irresolute, against which a prince must guard himself as from the plague. He must do his utmost so that his actions will be perceived as imbued with greatness, courage, dignity, and power. And as for the private affairs of his subjects, he must be adamant that his decisions are irrevocable. He must maintain a standing such that no man would venture to cheat or deceive him. If he manages to do this he will have accomplished his duty, and will not face any risk should he perpetrate other infamies. What will make him hated above all, as I have said, is rapaciousness and seizing the property and women of his subjects, which he must refrain from. Men will generally live contentedly as long as their property and honor are not touched, and the prince need only counter the ambition of a few, which can be done easily and in many ways. What will make the prince contemptible is for him to be perceived as undependable, frivolous, effeminate, pusillanimous, and irresolute, against which a prince must guard himself as from the plague. He must do his utmost so that his actions will be perceived as imbued with greatness, courage, dignity, and power. And as for the private affairs of his subjects, he must be adamant that his decisions are irrevocable. He must maintain a standing such that no man would venture to cheat or deceive him.
A prince who creates this opinion of himself will be greatly esteemed, and it is difficult to attack or conspire against one who is greatly esteemed, so long as he is perceived as excellent and is revered by his people. But a prince must have two fears: one internal, based on his subjects; the other external, based on foreign powers. From the foreign enemy the prince can defend himself with good arms and good friends (and he who has good arms will always have good friends); and internal matters will always be stable when external matters are stable, so long as they have not been clouded by conspiracy. But even if external matters are volatile, the prince will always counter every violence if he has lived and ruled as I have mentioned and does not lose courage (as I have said Nabis of Sparta did).75 When external affairs are stable, the prince must still fear that his subjects might conspire secretly against him. But he will be quite safe from this as long as he avoids being hated or despised and keeps the populace on his side. It is important that he do this, as I have said at length above. One of the strongest remedies a prince has against conspiracy is not to be hated by the ma.s.ses, because conspirators are invariably certain that they will satisfy the populace by killing the prince. But if on the other hand they think they will enrage the populace, they will not pluck up the courage for such an act, because the difficulties facing conspirators are infinite. Experience has taught that there have been many conspiracies, but few that have ended well, because whoever conspires cannot do so alone, nor can he attract cohorts other than those who he believes are malcontents. And the moment you take a malcontent into your confidence, you give him the opportunity to become quite content, pursuing his own advantage by betraying you.76 So much so, that seeing the certain gain in that direction, and seeing doubt and peril in the other, it must be a rare friend or a most determined enemy of the prince who will keep his word to you. So much so, that seeing the certain gain in that direction, and seeing doubt and peril in the other, it must be a rare friend or a most determined enemy of the prince who will keep his word to you.
In short, from the conspirator"s point of view there is nothing but fear, rivalry, and the prospect of horrific punishment, whereas from the prince"s perspective there are the majesty of the princ.i.p.ality, the laws, and the protection afforded by friends and the state. If one also adds the goodwill of the people, it is unlikely that anyone would be so bold as to conspire against the prince, since under normal circ.u.mstances conspirators have much to fear before committing the evil deed, but in this case they have just as much to fear afterward, as they will have the whole populace against them. Once their deed is done, they cannot hope for refuge anywhere.
I could cite infinite examples of this, but shall limit myself to one incident that took place within the memory of our fathers. Annibale Bentivoglio, the Prince of Bologna and grandfather of the present Annibale Bentivoglio, was killed by the Canneschi, who conspired against him, leaving no one to succeed him except his son Giovanni, at that time still in swaddling clothes. Immediately after the murder, the people rose and killed all the Canneschi, a result of the people"s goodwill toward the house of Bentivoglio. In all Bologna, after Annibale"s death, there were no heirs who could rule the state, but the people"s goodwill was so great that when they heard that there was a Bentivoglio living in Florence, who had been thought to be the son of a blacksmith, they went there to offer him the government of Bologna, which he accepted until young Giovanni Bentivoglio came of age.
I therefore conclude that a prince need not worry unduly about conspiracies when the people are well disposed toward him. But if they are his enemies and hate him, he must fear everything and everybody. Well-ordered states and wise princes have been careful not to anger the n.o.bles and to keep the populace content, because this is one of the most important tasks that falls on a prince.
Among the well-ordered and well-governed states of our times is France. It has countless good inst.i.tutions on which the king"s liberty and security depend, of which the foremost is the parlement parlement and its authority and its authority77 For he who set up this system was aware of the n.o.bles" insolence and ambition and deemed that they needed a harness to keep them in check, but he was also aware of the people"s hatred of the n.o.bles, a hatred based on fear. The idea was to a.s.suage both factions, but without the king"s being seen to be involved. This removed any allegations the n.o.bles might make that the king was favoring the populace, or any allegations the populace might make that he was favoring the n.o.bles. This was the reason for establishing an independent inst.i.tution that could keep the n.o.bles in check, and favor the people without compromising the king. Such a decision could not have been better or more wise, nor could there be a better guarantee for the security of the king and the kingdom. From which one can draw another notable principle: Princes must delegate difficult tasks to others and keep popular ones for themselves. Once more I conclude that a prince has to respect the n.o.bles, but must not make himself hated by the populace. For he who set up this system was aware of the n.o.bles" insolence and ambition and deemed that they needed a harness to keep them in check, but he was also aware of the people"s hatred of the n.o.bles, a hatred based on fear. The idea was to a.s.suage both factions, but without the king"s being seen to be involved. This removed any allegations the n.o.bles might make that the king was favoring the populace, or any allegations the populace might make that he was favoring the n.o.bles. This was the reason for establishing an independent inst.i.tution that could keep the n.o.bles in check, and favor the people without compromising the king. Such a decision could not have been better or more wise, nor could there be a better guarantee for the security of the king and the kingdom. From which one can draw another notable principle: Princes must delegate difficult tasks to others and keep popular ones for themselves. Once more I conclude that a prince has to respect the n.o.bles, but must not make himself hated by the populace.
Many who have considered the way that certain Roman emperors lived and died might argue that they present examples that contradict my opinions, as some of these emperors did live excellently, showing much skill and spirit, but nevertheless lost their throne or were killed by their own men who conspired against them. I will respond to these objections by discussing the qualities of a few emperors, demonstrating that the reasons for their ruin are in accord with what I have cited. This should be of interest to anyone reading about the events of that era. I will limit myself to the emperors who came to the throne between the reigns of Marcus the Philosopher and Maximinus. These were Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julia.n.u.s, Severus, his son Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.
First of all I would like to point out that while in most princ.i.p.alities one merely has to contend with the ambitions of the great and the hostility of the populace, the Roman emperors had to face a third problem: contending with the cruelty and plundering of their soldiers. This was so difficult that it proved the ruin of many, since it is hard to satisfy both army and populace. The populace wants peace and hence a modest prince, while the army wants a prince with a military spirit who is arrogant, cruel, and rapacious, and ready to unleash these qualities on the populace so that the soldiers can double their pay and give free rein to their greed and cruelty. The result was that those emperors who by nature or education did not have the standing that could keep the army or the populace in check invariably came to grief. Most of these emperors, particularly those who came to power as new princes, knew the difficulty of balancing these two opposing factions and chose to reward the soldiers with little thought of how this would harm the populace. This was a necessary decision. A prince cannot avoid being hated by one of the two factions. Hence he must first strive not to be hated by the people, and should that not be possible, he should do his utmost to avoid the hatred of the faction that is more powerful. Therefore emperors who were new princes and especially needed strong backing preferred to side with the army rather than the populace. This proved to be to the emperor"s benefit or not, depending on whether he knew how to maintain his standing with the army.
It was for these reasons that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander-modest men who loved justice, spurned cruelty, and were kind and humane-met tragic ends. All, that is, except for Marcus, who lived and died with honor. He had come to the imperial throne by inheritance and did not need to show grat.i.tude to the army or the populace, and he was a man of great skill, which made him venerated by all. Throughout his life he kept the soldiers in check and the people within bounds, and was never hated or disdained. But Pertinax was made emperor despite the opposition of the soldiers, who had been used to living licentiously under Commodus and could not bear the honest way of life that Pertinax wanted to force on them. Pertinax inspired hatred, and as he was an old man, contempt as well, so he came to ruin at the very start of his reign. And here one must note that hatred can be caused through good deeds as much as through bad. As I have said before, a prince who wants to maintain his state is often forced not to be good, because when the faction that you believe you need in order to rule is corrupt-whether it is the populace, the army, or the n.o.bles-it is to your advantage to satisfy them, in which case good deeds are your enemy. But let us come to Emperor Alexander, who was so good that among the many things he was praised for was that not a single man was put to death without trial during his fourteen-year reign. Nevertheless, he was considered effeminate and a man who let himself be governed by his mother. This brought derision upon him, and the army conspired against him and killed him.
Let us now discuss, in contrast, the qualities of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, all of whom you will find most cruel and rapacious. To satisfy their soldiers they did not spare any violence that could be inflicted on the populace. All these emperors, with the exception of Severus, came to a bad end. Severus was so skilled that he managed to keep the army on his side even though he oppressed the populace, and so had a successful reign. His skill made him so formidable in the eyes of the army and the populace that the former remained satisfied and reverent, and the latter awestruck and stupefied. For a new prince, Severus"s actions were great and noteworthy, and so I would like briefly to demonstrate how well he used the traits of both the fox and the lion, which I have already referred to as necessary for a prince to emulate. When Severus was general of the Roman army in Slavonia he was aware of the indolence of Emperor Julia.n.u.s, and he persuaded his men to follow him to Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had died at the hands of the Praetorian Guard. Under this pretext Severus marched his army against Rome without revealing that he had any aspirations to the imperial throne, and was in Italy before anyone even realized that he had set out. When he arrived in Rome, the Senate elected him emperor out of fear, and sentenced Julia.n.u.s to death. Severus now faced two difficulties in a.s.serting his authority over the whole empire: One was Asia, where Niger, general of the Asiatic armies, had had himself proclaimed emperor, and the other was the West, where Albinus was aspiring to the throne.78 Severus deemed it dangerous to declare himself an enemy to both men, and so decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that although the Senate had elected him, Severus, emperor, he wanted to share the throne with Albinus, and was sending him the t.i.tle of Caesar. He informed him that through a p.r.o.nouncement of the Senate he had made him his co-ruler. All of this Albinus believed. But no sooner had Severus defeated and killed Niger, bringing Asia under his control, than he returned to Rome and denounced Albinus in the Senate, charging that Albinus was plotting to kill him instead of showing grat.i.tude for the favors he had been accorded. Severus announced that he was compelled to punish Albinus"s ingrat.i.tude. He confronted him in France and took from him his state and his life. Severus deemed it dangerous to declare himself an enemy to both men, and so decided to attack Niger and deceive Albinus. He wrote to Albinus that although the Senate had elected him, Severus, emperor, he wanted to share the throne with Albinus, and was sending him the t.i.tle of Caesar. He informed him that through a p.r.o.nouncement of the Senate he had made him his co-ruler. All of this Albinus believed. But no sooner had Severus defeated and killed Niger, bringing Asia under his control, than he returned to Rome and denounced Albinus in the Senate, charging that Albinus was plotting to kill him instead of showing grat.i.tude for the favors he had been accorded. Severus announced that he was compelled to punish Albinus"s ingrat.i.tude. He confronted him in France and took from him his state and his life.
Whoever considers Severus"s actions will see that he was a ferocious lion and a cunning fox, feared and revered by all, and not hated by the army. One should not be surprised that as a new prince he managed to secure so much authority for his exceptional standing always shielded him from the hatred that his rapaciousness might have sparked among the people.
Severus"s son Antoninus was also a man with qualities that made him formidable in the eyes of the people and popular with his soldiers.79 He was a military man who could bear any hardship and who scorned delicate dishes and every other weakness. This raised him in the esteem of his soldiers. Nevertheless, Antoninus"s ferocity and cruelty were so great and so unprecedented-after untold murders he had a large part of the population of Rome and the entire populace of Alexandria put to death-that all the world came to despise him. Antoninus was feared even by his own entourage, which resulted in his being killed by a centurion in the midst of his own army. From which it is to be noted that a prince cannot avoid a.s.sa.s.sination resulting from the deliberations of a determined mind, because he can be a.s.saulted by anyone who does not care about dying himself. A prince need not fear this unduly, because such men are very rare. He was a military man who could bear any hardship and who scorned delicate dishes and every other weakness. This raised him in the esteem of his soldiers. Nevertheless, Antoninus"s ferocity and cruelty were so great and so unprecedented-after untold murders he had a large part of the population of Rome and the entire populace of Alexandria put to death-that all the world came to despise him. Antoninus was feared even by his own entourage, which resulted in his being killed by a centurion in the midst of his own army. From which it is to be noted that a prince cannot avoid a.s.sa.s.sination resulting from the deliberations of a determined mind, because he can be a.s.saulted by anyone who does not care about dying himself. A prince need not fear this unduly, because such men are very rare.80 He has only to refrain from inflicting grave injury on those who serve him and whom he keeps about himself in service of the state. Antoninus did inflict such injury shamefully killing the brother of one of his own centurions and threatening the centurion every day, even though he retained him as his bodyguard. He has only to refrain from inflicting grave injury on those who serve him and whom he keeps about himself in service of the state. Antoninus did inflict such injury shamefully killing the brother of one of his own centurions and threatening the centurion every day, even though he retained him as his bodyguard.81 Such rash conduct was bound to bring about his own ruin, and it did. Such rash conduct was bound to bring about his own ruin, and it did.
But let us come to Commodus, who, having inherited his throne from his father, Emperor Marcus, should have been able to hold on to it with ease. He had only to follow in his father"s footsteps to satisfy both the army and the people, but he had a cruel and feral nature. In order to exercise his rapacity on the populace, he chose to favor the army, and allowed it every dissipation. Furthermore, he did not maintain his dignity, often descending into the arenas to fight with gladiators and doing other things that were contemptible and unworthy of imperial majesty becoming a figure of scorn in the eyes of the soldiers. Being hated on one hand and scorned on the other, he was conspired against and killed.
It remains for us to consider the qualities of Maximinus. He was extremely pugnacious, but as the army had become weary of Alexander"s weakness, which I discussed above, when he died, they elected Maximinus to the imperial throne. But Maximinus did not rule for long. Two things made him hated and disdained: First, he came from a very humble background, having herded sheep in Thrace (a fact that was widely known and looked down upon by all), and second, at the beginning of his reign he resisted going to Rome to take possession of the imperial throne. He also gave the impression of being unusually cruel, since through his prefects he had exercised great brutality in Rome and throughout the empire. As a result, everyone was filled with contempt for his lowly birth and with hatred that arose from fear of his ferocity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate and the populace of Rome, and finally all of Italy conspired against him. His own soldiers rebelled during a difficult siege of Aquileia, and, tired of his cruelty and fearing him less because he had so many enemies, they killed him.
I will not discuss Elagabalus, Macrinus, or Julia.n.u.s, who were so widely disdained that they were quickly eliminated, but shall come to the conclusion of this discourse. The princes of our era do not face the Roman emperors" problem of having to indulge their soldiers by unlawful means, though they do have to make some concessions to them. Issues are now resolved quickly, as none of our princes have the kind of established armies that evolved with the government and with the administration of the provinces, as was the case in imperial Rome. If in Roman times it was necessary to favor the army more than the people, that was because the soldiers carried more weight than the people. Now it is necessary for all princes, except the Ottoman sultan and the Sultan of Egypt, to favor the people above the army, because it is the people who carry more weight.