CHAPTER SIXTEEN.
IF SOME INCIDENT SHOULD FREE A POPULACE ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS FREEDOM ONLY WITH DIFFICULTY.
In the annals of ancient history there are countless examples that demonstrate the difficulty a populace that is accustomed to living under a prince have in conserving their freedom should they by some chance obtain it, as the Romans did after the Tarquins were expelled. This difficulty is to be expected, because such a populace is not unlike a wild animal, which might be fierce and feral by nature but has been raised in captivity and servitude. If this animal is released into the open, not used to feeding itself or knowing where to take shelter, it will fall prey to the first man who seeks to chain it up again.
The same thing happens to a populace who are accustomed to living under the government of others without knowing how to reach decisions in matters of public defense or offense. Not understanding the new rulers or being understood by them, this populace quickly end up under a yoke that is often heavier than the one they had managed to shake off. Although their nature is not corrupted, the populace find themselves in this difficulty because a people that is corrupted through and through cannot live in liberty for even a short period, as I shall discuss in the following two chapters. Therefore our discourse will concern peoples in whom corruption has not spread too widely, and in whom there remains more of the good than the corrupted.
Added to this difficulty is that a state which becomes free creates hostile factions, as opposed to factions that are on its side. All those who took advantage of the previous tyrannical state and fed off the wealth of the prince become hostile factions. Having lost the opportunity of partaking of the tyrant"s wealth, they cannot live contentedly in the new state, and will try to restore the tyranny so they can regain their power. Nor will this new state acquire friendly supporters, as I have already said, because a free state can offer honors and prizes on only a few honest occasions, beyond which it will offer neither prizes nor honors to anyone. For once a man has secured the honors and benefits he thinks he deserves, he no longer feels obligated to those who rewarded him. Furthermore, the common benefit that results from living in freedom is not recognized by people while they possess it: In other words, being able to enjoy one"s possessions freely and without fear, not having to worry about the honor of one"s women or sons, or to fear for oneself. In fact, no one will ever admit to owing an obligation to someone who does not harm him.
But, as I have said above, a state that is free and newly created inevitably has hostile factions and not friendly ones. To resolve this problem, and the turmoil created by the difficulties I mentioned above, there is no stronger remedy or one more valid, secure, and vital, than killing the sons of Brutus.71 These, as history shows, were driven to conspire with other Roman youths against their city for no other reason than that they did not enjoy the same status under the consuls as they had under the kings. These, as history shows, were driven to conspire with other Roman youths against their city for no other reason than that they did not enjoy the same status under the consuls as they had under the kings.72 In their eyes, the liberty of the people had brought about their own slavery. In their eyes, the liberty of the people had brought about their own slavery.
Whoever undertakes to govern a mult.i.tude, either by means of liberty or by means of a princ.i.p.ality, and does not secure himself from those who are hostile to the new order, is creating a state that will be short-lived. In fact, I consider those princes unfortunate who are compelled to secure their state by exceptional means because the populace is their enemy, for he who has as his enemy the few can secure himself easily and without much turmoil, but he who has the whole populace as his enemy can never secure himself. And the more cruelty he employs, the weaker his princ.i.p.ality becomes. Hence the best remedy is to seek to make the populace his friend.73 My discussion here might deviate from what I have written above, as I am speaking here of princes and there of republics, but I would nevertheless like to mention this matter briefly so that I will not have to return to it again. Should a prince wish to win over a populace hostile to him-I am speaking of princes who have become tyrants of their own cities-he has to weigh what the people desire. He will find that they always want two things: first, to avenge themselves against those who are the cause of their becoming enslaved, and second, to regain their liberty. The first desire the prince can fulfill entirely, the second partially. I can offer a perfect example of how a ruler can fulfill the first desire: Clearchus, the tyrant of Heraclea, was in exile when there was a clash between the people and the n.o.bles of Heraclea.74 Realizing that they were at a disadvantage, the n.o.bles turned to Clearchus for support and, conspiring with him, put him in power against the will of the people, taking away their liberty. Clearchus, finding himself caught between the arrogance of the n.o.bles, whom he could neither curb nor satisfy, and the anger of the populace, who could not endure having lost their freedom, he decided to free himself from the ballast of the n.o.bles and win over the people in a single stroke. A good opportunity arose and he seized it, ma.s.sacring all the n.o.bles, to the great satisfaction of the populace. By this means he fulfilled one of the populace"s desires, that of vengeance. But as for their second desire-to regain their liberty-the prince, unable to fulfill it, would have to examine the reasons that made them want liberty. Here the prince will find that a small part of the populace desire liberty so they can rule, but that all the rest, who are innumerable, desire liberty only so that they can live securely. In all states, regardless of how they are organized, the ranks of command are never attained by more than forty or fifty citizens. As this is a small number, the prince can easily protect himself, either by getting rid of these few citizens or by heaping them with so many honors that, depending on their status, they will for the most part be happy. The rest of the citizenry, desiring merely to live securely, can easily be satisfied with inst.i.tutions and laws that protect both the prince"s power and public safety. When a prince does this, and the populace see that he will not break those laws under any circ.u.mstances, they will soon enough begin living securely and happily. We have the example of the kingdom of France, which exists securely for no other reason than that its kings are bound by innumerable laws that also ensure the security of all their subjects. The founder of the French state intended these kings to act as they pleased in military and financial matters, but in all other things under their jurisdiction they had to do as the laws specified. The princes or republics that do not secure themselves at the beginning must do so as soon as they can, as the Romans did. The ruler who lets the opportunity slip by will later regret that he did not do what he should have done. Realizing that they were at a disadvantage, the n.o.bles turned to Clearchus for support and, conspiring with him, put him in power against the will of the people, taking away their liberty. Clearchus, finding himself caught between the arrogance of the n.o.bles, whom he could neither curb nor satisfy, and the anger of the populace, who could not endure having lost their freedom, he decided to free himself from the ballast of the n.o.bles and win over the people in a single stroke. A good opportunity arose and he seized it, ma.s.sacring all the n.o.bles, to the great satisfaction of the populace. By this means he fulfilled one of the populace"s desires, that of vengeance. But as for their second desire-to regain their liberty-the prince, unable to fulfill it, would have to examine the reasons that made them want liberty. Here the prince will find that a small part of the populace desire liberty so they can rule, but that all the rest, who are innumerable, desire liberty only so that they can live securely. In all states, regardless of how they are organized, the ranks of command are never attained by more than forty or fifty citizens. As this is a small number, the prince can easily protect himself, either by getting rid of these few citizens or by heaping them with so many honors that, depending on their status, they will for the most part be happy. The rest of the citizenry, desiring merely to live securely, can easily be satisfied with inst.i.tutions and laws that protect both the prince"s power and public safety. When a prince does this, and the populace see that he will not break those laws under any circ.u.mstances, they will soon enough begin living securely and happily. We have the example of the kingdom of France, which exists securely for no other reason than that its kings are bound by innumerable laws that also ensure the security of all their subjects. The founder of the French state intended these kings to act as they pleased in military and financial matters, but in all other things under their jurisdiction they had to do as the laws specified. The princes or republics that do not secure themselves at the beginning must do so as soon as they can, as the Romans did. The ruler who lets the opportunity slip by will later regret that he did not do what he should have done.
As the Roman populace was not yet corrupted when they regained their liberty after the death of Brutus"s sons and the elimination of the Tarquin kings, they managed to maintain it through the means and inst.i.tutions I have already discussed. Had the Roman populace been corrupted, there would have been no effective way for them to keep their liberty, as I will show in the following chapter.
71. According to Roman tradition, Lucius Junius Brutus, a legendary figure of the sixth century According to Roman tradition, Lucius Junius Brutus, a legendary figure of the sixth century BCE BCE, ousted the last Tarquin king of Rome in 509, founding the Roman Republic. He condemned his own sons to death when they joined in a conspiracy to restore the Tarquins. See also Book III, chapter 3 above.72. Livy (Book II, chapter 3) writes: "[The youths] missed their former freedom to do as they pleased, and complained that the liberty others enjoyed had turned into slavery for them." Livy (Book II, chapter 3) writes: "[The youths] missed their former freedom to do as they pleased, and complained that the liberty others enjoyed had turned into slavery for them."73. See See The Prince The Prince, chapter 9: "A prince who obtains a state with the help of the people maintains his position with less difficulty than a prince who acquires it with the help of the n.o.bility, because in the latter case he is surrounded by men who consider themselves his equals and whom he therefore cannot command or govern as he pleases."74. Clearchus (d. 353 Clearchus (d. 353 BCE BCE) was tyrant of Heraclea, a Greek city on the Black Sea. Machiavelli closely follows the incidents described by Justin in Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus (Book XVI, chapters 4 and 5). (Book XVI, chapters 4 and 5).
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN.
ON HOW, WHEN CORRUPT POPULACES GAIN THEIR FREEDOM, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN IT ONLY WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY.
I believe that had the kings of Rome not been eliminated, Rome would very quickly have become worthless and weak. If we consider how corrupt these kings had become, if two or three more generations of their kind had followed, and the corruption within them had begun to spread throughout their branches, once the branches were corrupted, it would have been impossible ever to reform Rome again. But because the head was lost while the body was still whole, the Romans could easily adjust to living in freedom and good order. We must accept as an absolute truth that a corrupt state under a prince will not be able to adjust to liberty, even if the prince and all his offspring are eliminated. In fact, it would be better if one prince ousted another. Without the creation of a new ruler, the state will never be sound if the goodness and skill of a single ruler does not keep it free. But this liberty will last only for the duration of that ruler"s life, as was the case in Syracuse with Dion and Timoleon. Their skill kept the state free while they were alive, but after their deaths it reverted to its former tyranny. However, there is no better example than that of Rome, which managed immediately to seize and maintain that liberty once the Tarquins were expelled. But with the deaths of Caesar, Gaius Caligula, and Nero, and the whole of Caesar"s line extinguished,75 Rome could not maintain its liberty, let alone lay a foundation for it. Such diverse results came about only because in the era of the Tarquin kings the Roman populace were not yet corrupted, while by the later imperial times they had become quite corrupt. In the early years it was sufficient to make the populace swear that they would never consent to anyone becoming king of Rome. In later years, Brutus"s authority and severity, with all his eastern legions, were not enough to make the Romans want to maintain the liberty that he, like the first Brutus, Rome could not maintain its liberty, let alone lay a foundation for it. Such diverse results came about only because in the era of the Tarquin kings the Roman populace were not yet corrupted, while by the later imperial times they had become quite corrupt. In the early years it was sufficient to make the populace swear that they would never consent to anyone becoming king of Rome. In later years, Brutus"s authority and severity, with all his eastern legions, were not enough to make the Romans want to maintain the liberty that he, like the first Brutus,76 had restored to them. This was the result of the corruption that the factions of Caius Marius had triggered among the people. Caesar, as the leader of these factions, could blind the ma.s.ses so that they did not see the yoke into which they were slipping their own heads. had restored to them. This was the result of the corruption that the factions of Caius Marius had triggered among the people. Caesar, as the leader of these factions, could blind the ma.s.ses so that they did not see the yoke into which they were slipping their own heads.
This Roman example is the best, but I would nonetheless like to mention examples from our times. I suggest, for instance, that no incident, however momentous or violent, could ever render Milan or Naples free, their natures being so corrupt.77 This can be seen after Filippo Visconti"s death, when Milan strove to regain its liberty but did not know how to maintain it. This can be seen after Filippo Visconti"s death, when Milan strove to regain its liberty but did not know how to maintain it.78 Hence it was Rome"s great fortune that its kings became corrupt quickly, so that they were driven out before their corruption could spread into the bowels of the city. This absence of corruption in the Roman populace was the reason that Rome"s infinite clashes and tumults, sparked by men of good intentions, did no harm but were in fact beneficial to the republic. Hence it was Rome"s great fortune that its kings became corrupt quickly, so that they were driven out before their corruption could spread into the bowels of the city. This absence of corruption in the Roman populace was the reason that Rome"s infinite clashes and tumults, sparked by men of good intentions, did no harm but were in fact beneficial to the republic.
One can come to the following conclusion: When a city"s nature is not corrupted, the clashes and tumults are not harmful, but when it is corrupted, even the soundest laws are of no use unless they are enacted by someone who can ensure with great force that they are observed, so that the state"s nature becomes good. I do not know whether this has ever occurred or if it even can occur, because it is clear that a state which has gone into decline through the corruption of its nature can rise again only through the skill of a single ruler who happens to be alive at the time, and not by the skill of the whole populace supporting the good inst.i.tutions. But the moment that ruler dies, the state will regress to its original ways, as happened in Thebes, which through the skill of Epaminondas was able, while he was alive, to have the form of a republic and an empire. When Epaminondas died, Thebes returned to its previous disarray79 The reason is that no man can live long enough to tame a state that has had bad habits for a long time. One ruler with an exceptionally long life, or two skillful rulers in a row, can restore a state, but the lack of such rulers, as I said above, will ruin it, unless with great danger and much blood they have brought about its rebirth. Hence, such corruption and lack of capacity for maintaining a life of liberty arise from an inequality that exists in such a state. Should one wish to restore equality, it will be necessary to use the most exceptional measures, which few want or know how to use, as I will discuss in greater detail elsewhere. The reason is that no man can live long enough to tame a state that has had bad habits for a long time. One ruler with an exceptionally long life, or two skillful rulers in a row, can restore a state, but the lack of such rulers, as I said above, will ruin it, unless with great danger and much blood they have brought about its rebirth. Hence, such corruption and lack of capacity for maintaining a life of liberty arise from an inequality that exists in such a state. Should one wish to restore equality, it will be necessary to use the most exceptional measures, which few want or know how to use, as I will discuss in greater detail elsewhere.80 75. Nero (d. 68 Nero (d. 68 CE CE) was the fifth Roman emperor and, by adoption, the last descendant of Caesar.76. Machiavelli is contrasting Lucius Junius Brutus, who led the revolt that overthrew the last king of Rome, with Marcus Junius Brutus, who was one of Caesar"s a.s.sa.s.sins. Machiavelli is contrasting Lucius Junius Brutus, who led the revolt that overthrew the last king of Rome, with Marcus Junius Brutus, who was one of Caesar"s a.s.sa.s.sins.77. See chapter 55 below, in which Machiavelli further discusses the corruption of the Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy. See chapter 55 below, in which Machiavelli further discusses the corruption of the Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, the Romagna, and Lombardy.78. When Filippo Maria Visconti died in 1447, the short-lived Ambrosian Republic of Milan (144750) followed. After internal dissension, Francesco Sforza, who had married Visconti"s daughter Bianca, took over the city and had himself declared duke. When Filippo Maria Visconti died in 1447, the short-lived Ambrosian Republic of Milan (144750) followed. After internal dissension, Francesco Sforza, who had married Visconti"s daughter Bianca, took over the city and had himself declared duke.79. Epaminondas (c. 410362 Epaminondas (c. 410362 BCE BCE) was a Theban statesman and general who ended Spartan dominance over Thebes and the other Greek city-states when he defeated the Spartans at the Battle of Leucra in 371. His Theban empire, or predominance over the other Greek states, lasted only from 371 to 362 BCE BCE, when he was killed in the Battle of Mantineia.80. See chapter 26 below, in which Machiavelli outlines some of the "exceptional measures" a ruler must take to restore equality: "He must create a new government with new offices that have new names and new powers and are occupied by new men. He must make the rich poor and the poor rich." See chapter 26 below, in which Machiavelli outlines some of the "exceptional measures" a ruler must take to restore equality: "He must create a new government with new offices that have new names and new powers and are occupied by new men. He must make the rich poor and the poor rich."
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN.
ON HOW A FREE GOVERNMENT CAN BE MAINTAINED IN A CORRUPTED STATE IF A FREE GOVERNMENT ALREADY EXISTS, OR, IF IT DOES NOT, HOW IT CAN BE ESTABLISHED.
I do not believe it is out of place or at odds with what I have been discussing to consider whether one can maintain a free government in a corrupted state if a free government already exists, or, if it does not, how to establish it. I would like to point out right away that it is extremely difficult to do one or the other. It is almost impossible to lay down a rule on how to proceed, because in such a situation it would be necessary to act according to the extent of the corruption. However, I do not want to pa.s.s over this, as it is good to discuss all cases. As an example, I would like to consider a state that is extremely corrupted, though this will make the subject more difficult, because such a state will not have any laws or inst.i.tutions formidable enough to halt a corruption that is widespread. For just as good customs require good laws so that they can be maintained, laws require good customs in order to be observed. Furthermore, the inst.i.tutions and laws created in a state at its birth, when men were good, are no longer relevant once men have become evil. Even if laws in a state vary according to circ.u.mstances, its inst.i.tutions rarely, if ever, do. This means that new laws are not enough, because the inst.i.tutions that remain unchanged will corrupt them.
To clarify this further, I suggest that in Rome there was originally a system of government, or rather of the state, and later, laws, that, in conjunction with magistrates, kept the citizens in check. The system of the state included the power of the populace, the Senate, the tribunes, and the consuls, as well as the method of proposing and appointing magistrates and the method of making laws. During all that occurred in Rome, these inst.i.tutions changed little, if at all. What did change as citizens became increasingly corrupted were the laws that put a check on them: the adultery law, the sumptuary law, the law against ruthless ambition, and many others.81 But the inst.i.tutions of the state remained fixed, unable to counter the corruption, while the laws that were being redrawn did not suffice to keep men good. And yet such laws would have been quite useful if the inst.i.tutions of the state had been changed along with them. But the inst.i.tutions of the state remained fixed, unable to counter the corruption, while the laws that were being redrawn did not suffice to keep men good. And yet such laws would have been quite useful if the inst.i.tutions of the state had been changed along with them.
That it is true that such inst.i.tutions in a corrupted state would not be good can be clearly seen in two princ.i.p.al matters: the creating of magistrates and the making of laws. The Roman populace accorded the consulship and the other foremost positions of the city only to men who sought these positions. This system was good in the beginning, because those who wanted these positions were citizens who judged themselves worthy, and to be rejected would have been a disgrace. Hence, in order to be judged worthy, they comported themselves well. Later, in the corrupted city, this system became extremely destructive, for it was no longer the men with the greatest skill who stood as candidates for the magistrature, but those with the most power, while men without power, though skillful, declined to stand out of fear.
Rome did not reach this dire condition all at once, but by degrees, as all dire conditions are reached. Once the Romans had subjugated Africa and Asia and had reduced almost all of Greece to their rule, they became complacent about their liberty and did not feel that they had any enemies left whom they needed to fear. This sense of security, and the weakness of their enemies, made the Roman populace value popularity over ability when selecting their consuls, electing those who were best at amusing the populace and not those best at conquering the enemy. Then the Romans slipped even further, not giving the office to men who were popular but to men with the most power. The faultiness of this system resulted in worthy men being entirely excluded from office. A tribune or any other citizen could propose a law, and every citizen could debate either in favor or against it before the law was put in effect. This system worked when the citizens were good, because it has always been proper for anyone who thinks something is for the common benefit to propose it. And it is right that everyone can speak his mind so that the populace, having heard all sides, can then choose what is best. But once the citizens had become corrupt, this system became very bad indeed, because only those with power proposed laws, and the laws they proposed were not for the common good but for their own power. Out of fear of the powerful, n.o.body could speak up against this, so that the populace ended up being either deceived or forced into choosing their own ruin.
If Rome was to remain free amid the corruption, it was therefore necessary for it to create new inst.i.tutions, just as it had created new laws throughout its history, because when a populace is corrupt, inst.i.tutions and ways of living must be organized differently than when a populace is good. There cannot be the same form in matter that is completely different. These inst.i.tutions must be reformed either in a single stroke the moment it is clear that they are no longer good, or little by little before everyone realizes they are no longer good. But I maintain that both these options are practically impossible to execute. If one wants to reform the inst.i.tutions little by little, then the reformer must be someone extremely prudent, who can see the nascent problems from a distance as they begin to emerge. Such a man might never appear during the entire existence of a state, and even if he does, he might not be able to persuade the other citizens of what he himself can discern. Men used to living in a certain way do not wish to change, especially if they cannot actually see the evil for themselves, but need to have it explained to them with theories and conjectures. As for changing the state"s inst.i.tutions all at once, when everyone can clearly see that they are not good, I propose that a problem, once it is clearly visible, is difficult to set right again. It will not be enough to use ordinary means, as ordinary means will have become corrupt. Exceptional means such as violence and arms will be necessary, and the legislator will have to strive to become the prince of that state so that he will be able to set it up as he wishes. Rearranging a state in order to make it a vital civic system presupposes a good man, while becoming a prince through violent means presupposes a bad man. Therefore it is quite rare that a good man will want to become a prince through evil means even if his aims are good, or that an evil man, once he has become a prince, would want to do good or would ever consider using beneficially the authority he has acquired in such an evil way.
The difficulty or the impossibility of a corrupt state"s creating or maintaining a republic arises from all the things I have mentioned above. Such a state would have to be shaped more as a monarchy than a democracy, so that arrogant men who cannot be controlled by the laws would in one way or another be held in check by an authority that is almost regal. Attempting to make them good by other means would be either an extremely cruel undertaking or entirely impossible. I have already cited the example of Cleomenes. He murdered the ephors in order to rule alone, just as Romulus killed his brother and t.i.tus Tatius for the same reason.82 After these deeds, Cleomenes and Romulus made good use of the power they gained, but we must nevertheless remember that neither of them had subjects tainted by the corruption we have been discussing in this chapter. Therefore they could set their goal and achieve it. After these deeds, Cleomenes and Romulus made good use of the power they gained, but we must nevertheless remember that neither of them had subjects tainted by the corruption we have been discussing in this chapter. Therefore they could set their goal and achieve it.
81. The The Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis (18 (18 BCE BCE) made conjugal unfaithfulness a public and private offense; various sumptuary laws were pa.s.sed to prevent general extravagance in the private expenses of citizens, such as inordinate expenditure for banquets and clothes; the Lex Cornelia de ambitu Lex Cornelia de ambitu proscribed the purchasing of votes or public offices. proscribed the purchasing of votes or public offices.82. See chapter 9 above, in which Machiavelli describes Cleomenes"s tactics in detail, and discusses Romulus"s murder of his brother and the death of his co-ruler, t.i.tus Tatius. In that chapter, however, Machiavelli does not state that Romulus murdered t.i.tus Tatius, but only that he "consented to the death of t.i.tus Tatius." See chapter 9 above, in which Machiavelli describes Cleomenes"s tactics in detail, and discusses Romulus"s murder of his brother and the death of his co-ruler, t.i.tus Tatius. In that chapter, however, Machiavelli does not state that Romulus murdered t.i.tus Tatius, but only that he "consented to the death of t.i.tus Tatius."
CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR.
STATES THAT ARE WELL ORGANIZED INTRODUCE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS FOR THEIR CITIZENS, BUT NEVER LET THE GOOD DEEDS EXCUSE THE BAD.
Horatius"s merit was great, as evidenced by his skill in defeating the Curiatii. But as he killed his sister, his sin was atrocious, and the murder so infuriated the Romans that they wanted to condemn him to death despite his merit having been so great and so recently demonstrated.83 Whoever considers this matter cursorily might regard it as an example of the ingrat.i.tude of the populace. But if one examines the matter more closely and gives some thought to the inst.i.tutions that a state must have, one will sooner blame the populace for ultimately absolving Horatius than for having wanted to condemn him for his deed. The reason is that no state that is properly set up will ever allow a citizen"s merits to cancel out his demerits. A state ensures rewards for a good deed and punishment for a bad one. In other words, having rewarded a man for having done something good, the state must also punish him if he acts badly, and this without regard for any past good deeds. If this system is observed, a city will live in freedom for a long time; otherwise, it will rapidly come to ruin. Citizens who have committed a notable deed for the state are given the status that this deed brings them, but if they then become overweening and confident that they can commit bad deeds without fear of punishment, they will soon become so insolent that every form of civil life will disappear. Whoever considers this matter cursorily might regard it as an example of the ingrat.i.tude of the populace. But if one examines the matter more closely and gives some thought to the inst.i.tutions that a state must have, one will sooner blame the populace for ultimately absolving Horatius than for having wanted to condemn him for his deed. The reason is that no state that is properly set up will ever allow a citizen"s merits to cancel out his demerits. A state ensures rewards for a good deed and punishment for a bad one. In other words, having rewarded a man for having done something good, the state must also punish him if he acts badly, and this without regard for any past good deeds. If this system is observed, a city will live in freedom for a long time; otherwise, it will rapidly come to ruin. Citizens who have committed a notable deed for the state are given the status that this deed brings them, but if they then become overweening and confident that they can commit bad deeds without fear of punishment, they will soon become so insolent that every form of civil life will disappear.
If one wishes to punish evil deeds it is also necessary to offer rewards for good deeds, as we have seen was the case in Rome. Even if a state is poor and can give only a little, it must not abstain from doing so, because any small gift given to reward a good deed, regardless of how great the deed might be, will be esteemed by him who receives it as an honorable and great reward. The story of Horatius Codes is well known, as is that of Mucius Scaevola: The first held off the enemy at a bridge until the bridge was destroyed, the other burned his hand for failing to kill Porsenna, the King of the Etruscans. The public gave each of these men a plot of land for their deeds.84 The story of Manlius Capitolinus is also noteworthy: The story of Manlius Capitolinus is also noteworthy:85 He saved the Capitol from the Gauls who were besieging it, and was given as a reward a small measure of flour by his fellow citizens, who were besieged alongside him. This was a great reward if one considers the ill fortune that had befallen Rome. He saved the Capitol from the Gauls who were besieging it, and was given as a reward a small measure of flour by his fellow citizens, who were besieged alongside him. This was a great reward if one considers the ill fortune that had befallen Rome.86 And yet when Manlius, moved either by envy or his evil nature to stir up sedition in Rome, tried to rouse the populace in dissension, he was cast down from the same Capitol that he had saved with so much glory, without regard for his past merits. And yet when Manlius, moved either by envy or his evil nature to stir up sedition in Rome, tried to rouse the populace in dissension, he was cast down from the same Capitol that he had saved with so much glory, without regard for his past merits.
83. In Roman legend, there were two sets of warring triplet brothers, the Roman Horatii and the Alban Curiatii. After two of the Horatii triplets were killed, the third-the Horatius whom Machiavelli mentions-killed the Curiatii triplets single-handedly. His sister, who was betrothed to one of the Curiatii, could not conceal her grief and was killed by Horatius. In Roman legend, there were two sets of warring triplet brothers, the Roman Horatii and the Alban Curiatii. After two of the Horatii triplets were killed, the third-the Horatius whom Machiavelli mentions-killed the Curiatii triplets single-handedly. His sister, who was betrothed to one of the Curiatii, could not conceal her grief and was killed by Horatius.84. Machiavelli writes Machiavelli writes due staiora due staiora, two bushels, meaning the amount of land that can be sown with two bushels of grain.85. See chapter 8 above, in which Machiavelli discusses Manlius Capitolinus"s envy of Marcus Furius Camillus and Manlius"s subsequent sedition. See chapter 8 above, in which Machiavelli discusses Manlius Capitolinus"s envy of Marcus Furius Camillus and Manlius"s subsequent sedition.86. Livy writes in Book V, chapter 47: "Each brought half a pound of grain and a dram of wine to his quarters, which had been set up in the fortress. It does not sound like much, but the scarcity made it a prodigious evidence of their affection." Livy writes in Book V, chapter 47: "Each brought half a pound of grain and a dram of wine to his quarters, which had been set up in the fortress. It does not sound like much, but the scarcity made it a prodigious evidence of their affection."
CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE.
ON HOW A RULER WHO WANTS TO REFORM AN OLD SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN A FREE STATE MUST KEEP AT LEAST A VENEER OF THE OLDER INSt.i.tUTIONS.
A ruler who desires to reform the government of a state and wants the government to be accepted and maintained to the satisfaction of everyone will have to keep at least a veneer of the old ways, so that it will not seem to the populace that the inst.i.tutions have changed, even if the new inst.i.tutions are completely different from the old ones. Men cherish something that seems like the real thing as much as they do the real thing itself: In fact, they are often more affected by that which seems than by that which is.87 When they achieved liberty at the beginning of the republic, the Romans knew that in creating two consuls instead of one king, they would not want them to have more than twelve lictors, When they achieved liberty at the beginning of the republic, the Romans knew that in creating two consuls instead of one king, they would not want them to have more than twelve lictors,88 so that they would not surpa.s.s the number that had ministered to the king. There was also an annual sacrifice in Rome that had been offered only by the king, and since the state did not want the people, for want of a king, to lack any of the old practices, they created a "king" of the sacrifice, and made him subordinate to the high priest. so that they would not surpa.s.s the number that had ministered to the king. There was also an annual sacrifice in Rome that had been offered only by the king, and since the state did not want the people, for want of a king, to lack any of the old practices, they created a "king" of the sacrifice, and made him subordinate to the high priest.89 In this way the populace was satisfied by the sacrifice, and never had a reason, through its absence, to desire the return of the kings. This path must be followed by all who wish to eliminate an old way of life in a state and introduce a new and free way of life: because as new things change men"s minds, one must do one"s utmost to keep as much of the old as possible. If new magistrates differ in number, authority, and duration of office from the old ones, they should at least retain the t.i.tles that they had. This, as I have said, must be done by a legislator who wishes to set up a vital civic system, either by way of a republic or kingdom. But he who wishes to create a despotism, which the ancient authors called "tyranny," will have to make everything new, as I will discuss in the following chapter. In this way the populace was satisfied by the sacrifice, and never had a reason, through its absence, to desire the return of the kings. This path must be followed by all who wish to eliminate an old way of life in a state and introduce a new and free way of life: because as new things change men"s minds, one must do one"s utmost to keep as much of the old as possible. If new magistrates differ in number, authority, and duration of office from the old ones, they should at least retain the t.i.tles that they had. This, as I have said, must be done by a legislator who wishes to set up a vital civic system, either by way of a republic or kingdom. But he who wishes to create a despotism, which the ancient authors called "tyranny," will have to make everything new, as I will discuss in the following chapter.
87. See also See also The Prince The Prince, chapter 18: "Though a prince need not have all the good qualities that I have mentioned, it is most necessary for him to appear to have them."88. Functionaries who walked before the consuls when they appeared in public, carrying the fasces, a bundle of rods bound together around an ax as an emblem of authority. Functionaries who walked before the consuls when they appeared in public, carrying the fasces, a bundle of rods bound together around an ax as an emblem of authority.89. Livy writes in Book II, chapter 2: "Certain public rites had always been performed by the kings in person, and so that the lack of a king be nowhere regretted, a "King of Sacrifices" was created. This office was made subordinate to the high priest, lest the combination of office and name threaten the people"s liberty, which at that time was a leading fear." Livy writes in Book II, chapter 2: "Certain public rites had always been performed by the kings in person, and so that the lack of a king be nowhere regretted, a "King of Sacrifices" was created. This office was made subordinate to the high priest, lest the combination of office and name threaten the people"s liberty, which at that time was a leading fear."
CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX.
ON HOW A NEW PRINCE MUST MAKE EVERYTHING NEW IN A CITY OR STATE HE HAS TAKEN.
A man who becomes the ruler of a city or state and does not follow the path of a monarchy or republic in establishing a civic life will find that, as a new ruler, the best way to keep this city or state is to make everything in it new. This is even more advisable when his footing is weak. In other words, he must create a new government with new offices that have new names and new powers and are occupied by new men. He must make the rich poor and the poor rich, as David did when he became king: "He has filled the hungry with good things and sent the rich away empty"90 Furthermore, he must build new cities and demolish those already built, move inhabitants from one place to another, and not leave a single thing intact in all the land. There must be no rank, inst.i.tution, government, or wealth of which the owner does not acknowledge that it comes from the prince. The prince must take as his model Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, who by these methods turned himself from a small king into the King of Greece. Justinius, writing about Philip, says that he moved men from province to province the way shepherds move their flocks. Furthermore, he must build new cities and demolish those already built, move inhabitants from one place to another, and not leave a single thing intact in all the land. There must be no rank, inst.i.tution, government, or wealth of which the owner does not acknowledge that it comes from the prince. The prince must take as his model Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, who by these methods turned himself from a small king into the King of Greece. Justinius, writing about Philip, says that he moved men from province to province the way shepherds move their flocks.91 These methods are very cruel and hostile to every way of life, not only the Christian, and a ruler should avoid them and prefer to live as a private citizen rather than as a king who unleashes so much ruin on people. Nevertheless, if he wishes to remain in power, a prince who does not want to choose the good course must choose the course of evil. Men, however, usually take a middle course that is most destructive, because they do not know how to be entirely good or entirely bad, as I will discuss in the following chapter. These methods are very cruel and hostile to every way of life, not only the Christian, and a ruler should avoid them and prefer to live as a private citizen rather than as a king who unleashes so much ruin on people. Nevertheless, if he wishes to remain in power, a prince who does not want to choose the good course must choose the course of evil. Men, however, usually take a middle course that is most destructive, because they do not know how to be entirely good or entirely bad, as I will discuss in the following chapter.
90. Machiavelli quotes the Bible, Luke 1:53, in Latin: Machiavelli quotes the Bible, Luke 1:53, in Latin: Esurientes implevit bonis et divites dimisit inanes Esurientes implevit bonis et divites dimisit inanes.91. In In Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus, Justin writes (Book VIII, chapter 5): "Just as shepherds drive their flocks at times into winter pastures, at times into summer pastures, so he transplanted people and cities from one place to another."
CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN.
ON THE RARITY OF MAN BEING ENTIRELY GOOD OR ENTIRELY BAD.
When Pope Julius II went to Bologna in 1505 in order to drive out the Bentivogli,92 who had been princes in that city for a hundred years, he also wanted to remove Giampaolo Baglioni from Perugia, of which he was tyrant, as the pope conspired against all the tyrants who were occupying the lands of the Church. Arriving before Perugia with that spirit and intent known to all, he did not wait to enter the city with his army that would have protected him, but entered unarmed, even though Giampaolo was inside with the many men he had gathered to defend him. Thus the pope, escorted only by his personal entourage, and driven by the rage with which he conducted all his affairs, put himself in the hands of his enemy Giampaolo, who then meekly followed him out of the city, leaving behind a governor who would do justice in the name of the Church. The prudent men who attended the pope commented on the pope"s recklessness and Giampaolo"s cowardice, who had been princes in that city for a hundred years, he also wanted to remove Giampaolo Baglioni from Perugia, of which he was tyrant, as the pope conspired against all the tyrants who were occupying the lands of the Church. Arriving before Perugia with that spirit and intent known to all, he did not wait to enter the city with his army that would have protected him, but entered unarmed, even though Giampaolo was inside with the many men he had gathered to defend him. Thus the pope, escorted only by his personal entourage, and driven by the rage with which he conducted all his affairs, put himself in the hands of his enemy Giampaolo, who then meekly followed him out of the city, leaving behind a governor who would do justice in the name of the Church. The prudent men who attended the pope commented on the pope"s recklessness and Giampaolo"s cowardice,93 nor could they understand why Giampaolo had not, to his everlasting fame, crushed his enemy the pope and enriched himself with plunder, since all the cardinals in the pope"s entourage carried much wealth with them. Nor could they believe that he had refrained out of goodness or conscience: There could hardly have been any pious respect in the heart of a ruthless man who kept his sister as mistress and who had killed his cousins and nephews in order to rule. nor could they understand why Giampaolo had not, to his everlasting fame, crushed his enemy the pope and enriched himself with plunder, since all the cardinals in the pope"s entourage carried much wealth with them. Nor could they believe that he had refrained out of goodness or conscience: There could hardly have been any pious respect in the heart of a ruthless man who kept his sister as mistress and who had killed his cousins and nephews in order to rule.94 So the consensus was that men often do not know how to be perfectly good or honorably evil, and when an evil deed has grandeur or is in some part generous, a man will often not know how to carry it off. So the consensus was that men often do not know how to be perfectly good or honorably evil, and when an evil deed has grandeur or is in some part generous, a man will often not know how to carry it off.
Thus Giampaolo, who was unconcerned about committing incest and ostentatiously murdering his family, did not know how, or to put it better, did not dare, when the perfect opportunity presented itself, to pull off a feat for which everyone would have admired him, making a name for himself to all eternity for being the first to show the prelates how little those who live and rule as they do should be esteemed. The greatness of this feat would have surpa.s.sed any infamy or danger that could have sprung from it.
92. Giovanni Bentivoglio (14431508) had been Gonfalonier of Bologna until Pope Paul II made him chief senator for life in 1466. Pope Julius II, however, excommunicated and ousted him from Bologna in 1506. Giovanni Bentivoglio (14431508) had been Gonfalonier of Bologna until Pope Paul II made him chief senator for life in 1466. Pope Julius II, however, excommunicated and ousted him from Bologna in 1506.93. Machiavelli was in Pope Julius II"s retinue at Perugia. Machiavelli was in Pope Julius II"s retinue at Perugia.94. Giampaolo Baglioni (c. 14701520). In 1500, when his uncle Guido Baglioni was ruler of Perugia, Giampaolo"s cousins Carlo and Grifonetto attempted to seize power by a.s.sa.s.sinating all the other members of the family. Giampaolo violently suppressed their attempt and seized power himself. Giampaolo Baglioni (c. 14701520). In 1500, when his uncle Guido Baglioni was ruler of Perugia, Giampaolo"s cousins Carlo and Grifonetto attempted to seize power by a.s.sa.s.sinating all the other members of the family. Giampaolo violently suppressed their attempt and seized power himself.
CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE.
ON WHO IS MORE UNGRATEFUL, A POPULACE OR A PRINCE.
It seems to me relevant to our subject to examine who has shown greater instances of ingrat.i.tude, a populace or a prince. So that we can weigh this question more effectively, I would like to suggest that the vice of ingrat.i.tude is sparked by either avarice or suspicion. If a populace or a prince has sent a general on an important campaign through which he will attain much glory if he is victorious, the prince or populace must reward the general when he returns. But if instead, when the general returns, he is dishonored or harmed and not given the reward he deserves out of parsimony or greed, then this is an unforgivable error that carries with it everlasting infamy. Yet many princes have committed this error, and Tacitus gives us the reason in the line: "Man is much more inclined to requite wrongs than reward any benefit done to him, because grat.i.tude is burdensome, while revenge seems to offer gain."95 But when the reason that a prince or populace does not reward the victorious general but harms him is not parsimony, but suspicion, the prince or the populace can be excused. One reads much about this kind of ingrat.i.tude. It happens because the general, who with exceptional skill and prowess has acquired an empire for his prince-conquering his enemies, and covering himself with glory and his soldiers with riches-will unavoidably gain so much standing with his soldiers, his enemies, and even the prince"s citizens that the general"s victory cannot augur well for the prince who sent him. Because man"s nature is ruthless and suspicious, and will not set limits to its aspirations, it is inevitable that the suspicion immediately sparked in a prince after his general"s victory will be triggered by some arrogant action or remark of the general. Consequently, the prince cannot think of anything but how to secure himself against the general, and to do this will consider killing him or taking away the standing and reputation he has gained with the army or populace, demonstrating that this victory was the result not of the general"s skill and courage but of Fortune, the cowardice of the enemy, or the judicious tactics of the other commanders involved in the battle. But when the reason that a prince or populace does not reward the victorious general but harms him is not parsimony, but suspicion, the prince or the populace can be excused. One reads much about this kind of ingrat.i.tude. It happens because the general, who with exceptional skill and prowess has acquired an empire for his prince-conquering his enemies, and covering himself with glory and his soldiers with riches-will unavoidably gain so much standing with his soldiers, his enemies, and even the prince"s citizens that the general"s victory cannot augur well for the prince who sent him. Because man"s nature is ruthless and suspicious, and will not set limits to its aspirations, it is inevitable that the suspicion immediately sparked in a prince after his general"s victory will be triggered by some arrogant action or remark of the general. Consequently, the prince cannot think of anything but how to secure himself against the general, and to do this will consider killing him or taking away the standing and reputation he has gained with the army or populace, demonstrating that this victory was the result not of the general"s skill and courage but of Fortune, the cowardice of the enemy, or the judicious tactics of the other commanders involved in the battle.
When Vespasian was in Judea his troops declared him emperor.96 Antonius Primus, who was leading another army in Illyria, Antonius Primus, who was leading another army in Illyria,97 formed an allegiance with him and marched on Italy against the Emperor Vitellus, who was reigning in Rome. With great skill Antonius Primus destroyed two of Vitellus"s armies and occupied Rome, so that when Mucia.n.u.s, who had been sent by Vespasian, arrived in Rome, he found that Antonius had skillfully seen to everything and that every difficulty had been overcome. Yet Antonius"s reward was that Mucia.n.u.s immediately stripped him of command of the army, and little by little took away any authority he had in Rome. Antonius turned to Vespasian, who was still in Asia, but he stripped Antonius of all military rank, and Antonius later died in quite desperate circ.u.mstances. The histories are filled with such examples. In our own times we all know with what skill and application Gonsalvo Ferrante fought in the Kingdom of Naples for King Ferdinand of Aragon against the French. Gonsalvo Ferrante was victorious over the French and conquered Naples, but the reward for his victory was that King Ferdinand immediately came to Naples, stripped him of his command, took from him his fortresses, and then brought him back to Spain, where he soon died in obscurity. formed an allegiance with him and marched on Italy against the Emperor Vitellus, who was reigning in Rome. With great skill Antonius Primus destroyed two of Vitellus"s armies and occupied Rome, so that when Mucia.n.u.s, who had been sent by Vespasian, arrived in Rome, he found that Antonius had skillfully seen to everything and that every difficulty had been overcome. Yet Antonius"s reward was that Mucia.n.u.s immediately stripped him of command of the army, and little by little took away any authority he had in Rome. Antonius turned to Vespasian, who was still in Asia, but he stripped Antonius of all military rank, and Antonius later died in quite desperate circ.u.mstances. The histories are filled with such examples. In our own times we all know with what skill and application Gonsalvo Ferrante fought in the Kingdom of Naples for King Ferdinand of Aragon against the French. Gonsalvo Ferrante was victorious over the French and conquered Naples, but the reward for his victory was that King Ferdinand immediately came to Naples, stripped him of his command, took from him his fortresses, and then brought him back to Spain, where he soon died in obscurity.
This suspicion in princes is so natural that they cannot avoid it, which makes it impossible for them to show grat.i.tude to a general who has been victorious and has made great acquisitions under their flags. If a prince cannot avoid this, it is no miracle that a populace cannot either, because if a state living in freedom has two goals-one to acquire territory, the other to remain free-it stands to reason that it will err from excessive zeal in achieving either of these goals. Regarding the errors that a state makes in its attempts to acquire territory, I shall discuss those at an appropriate point.98 As for the errors it makes to secure its freedom, there are, among others, harming the citizens it ought to reward, and suspecting those it should trust. In a republic that has become corrupted, these methods are a cause of great evil, and many times such a republic is quick to turn into a tyranny, as happened in Rome with Caesar, who seized by force what ingrat.i.tude had denied him. Nevertheless, in a republic that is not corrupted, these methods are the cause of much good: They ensure that the republic stays free, since men, out of fear of punishment, tend to remain good and less ambitious for power. It is true that, for the reasons I have discussed above, Rome proved the least ungrateful among all the peoples who ever had an empire. It can be said that the only example of Rome"s ingrat.i.tude was that to Scipio, because Coriola.n.u.s and Camillus were exiled on account of their offenses against the plebeians. As for the errors it makes to secure its freedom, there are, among others, harming the citizens it ought to reward, and suspecting those it should trust. In a republic that has become corrupted, these methods are a cause of great evil, and many times such a republic is quick to turn into a tyranny, as happened in Rome with Caesar, who seized by force what ingrat.i.tude had denied him. Nevertheless, in a republic that is not corrupted, these methods are the cause of much good: They ensure that the republic stays free, since men, out of fear of punishment, tend to remain good and less ambitious for power. It is true that, for the reasons I have discussed above, Rome proved the least ungrateful among all the peoples who ever had an empire. It can be said that the only example of Rome"s ingrat.i.tude was that to Scipio, because Coriola.n.u.s and Camillus were exiled on account of their offenses against the plebeians.99 Coriola.n.u.s was never forgiven, because he had always been hostile toward the populace, while Camillus was not only called back from exile, but subsequently venerated for the rest of his life as if he were a prince. The ingrat.i.tude shown Scipio, however, arose from suspicion that the citizens began to have of him such as they had never had of others. This was because of the greatness of the enemy whom Scipio had defeated, Coriola.n.u.s was never forgiven, because he had always been hostile toward the populace, while Camillus was not only called back from exile, but subsequently venerated for the rest of his life as if he were a prince. The ingrat.i.tude shown Scipio, however, arose from suspicion that the citizens began to have of him such as they had never had of others. This was because of the greatness of the enemy whom Scipio had defeated,100 the standing that a victory after such a long and perilous war had secured him, the speed of this victory, and the favors that his youth, prudence, and other memorable qualities had acquired for him. These were so many factors that even the Roman magistrates were afraid of his power, which displeased wise men as a thing unheard of in Rome. Scipio"s position seemed so extraordinary that Cato the Elder, who was known for his saintly temperament, was the first to attack him, maintaining that a state could not call itself free if one of its citizens was feared by the magistrates. Had the people of Rome followed Cato"s opinion in this case, they would have deserved the excuse that I offered above for those princes and populaces that are ungrateful out of suspicion. Concluding this discourse, I would like to emphasize once more that the vice of ingrat.i.tude occurs either from parsimony or suspicion. But we will find that a populace never shows ingrat.i.tude out of parsimony, and they are less inclined than are princes to show ingrat.i.tude out of suspicion, since a populace has less reason to be suspicious, as I will discuss below. the standing that a victory after such a long and perilous war had secured him, the speed of this victory, and the favors that his youth, prudence, and other memorable qualities had acquired for him. These were so many factors that even the Roman magistrates were afraid of his power, which displeased wise men as a thing unheard of in Rome. Scipio"s position seemed so extraordinary that Cato the Elder, who was known for his saintly temperament, was the first to attack him, maintaining that a state could not call itself free if one of its citizens was feared by the magistrates. Had the people of Rome followed Cato"s opinion in this case, they would have deserved the excuse that I offered above for those princes and populaces that are ungrateful out of suspicion. Concluding this discourse, I would like to emphasize once more that the vice of ingrat.i.tude occurs either from parsimony or suspicion. But we will find that a populace never shows ingrat.i.tude out of parsimony, and they are less inclined than are princes to show ingrat.i.tude out of suspicion, since a populace has less reason to be suspicious, as I will discuss below.
95. Machiavelli quotes Tacitus, Machiavelli quotes Tacitus, Histories Histories, Book IV, chapter 3, in Latin: Tanto proclivius est iniuriae quam beneficio vicem exolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio in quaestu habetur Tanto proclivius est iniuriae quam beneficio vicem exolvere, quia gratia oneri, ultio in quaestu habetur.96. Vespasian was Roman emperor from 69 to 79 CE. Tacitus, in Vespasian was Roman emperor from 69 to 79 CE. Tacitus, in Histories Histories, Book II, describes his rise from humble origins to the throne.97. According to Tacitus (Book II, chapter 86), Antonius was not in Illyria, but in Pannonia. According to Tacitus (Book II, chapter 86), Antonius was not in Illyria, but in Pannonia.98. In the following chapter. In the following chapter.99. For Coriola.n.u.s, see chapter 7 above; for Camillus, chapter 8 above. For Coriola.n.u.s, see chapter 7 above; for Camillus, chapter 8 above.100. The enemy was Hannibal. The enemy was Hannibal.
CHAPTER THIRTY.
ON THE MEANS A PRINCE OR REPUBLIC MUST EMPLOY TO AVOID THE VICE OF INGRAt.i.tUDE, AND ON WHAT A GENERAL OR CITIZEN MUST DO NOT TO FALL VICTIM TO IT.
To escape the need of living in constant suspicion or being ungrateful, a prince must himself go out on military expeditions, as the Roman emperors initially did and as the Turk does in our times.101 This is what skillful princes have done and still do, because when the prince is victorious, the glory and the conquest is entirely his. But if he is not there the glory belongs to another, and the prince feels he cannot profit from the conquest if he does not extinguish the general"s glory, a glory which the prince did not know how to gain for himself. Such princes become ungrateful and unjust, and without doubt they lose more than they gain. If through negligence or lack of prudence the prince remains idly at home and sends a general to war, the only course of action I could suggest to the prince is the one he would be following anyway. But as the general will not be able to escape the sting of the prince"s ingrat.i.tude, I would advise the general to do one of two things: Either leave the army immediately after his victory and put himself in the hands of his prince, being careful not to commit any insolent or ambitious act, so that the prince has no reason to suspect him and every reason to reward him, or at least not harm him; or, if this does not seem the prudent thing to do, energetically take the opposite course, and consider all the means by which he can make what he acquired in battle his own, and not his prince"s. He must secure the goodwill of soldier and subject, forge new alliances with neighbors, occupy the fortresses with his men, bribe the commanders of his army, and take measures against those he cannot bribe. By these means he must punish his prince for the ingrat.i.tude the prince would otherwise show him. There are no other alternatives, but, as I have mentioned previously, men do not know how to be entirely evil or entirely good. This is what skillful princes have done and still do, because when the prince is victorious, the glory and the conquest is entirely his. But if he is not there the glory belongs to another, and the prince feels he cannot profit from the conquest if he does not extinguish the general"s glory, a glory which the prince did not know how to gain for himself. Such princes become ungrateful and unjust, and without doubt they lose more than they gain. If through negligence or lack of prudence the prince remains idly at home and sends a general to war, the only course of action I could suggest to the prince is the one he would be following anyway. But as the general will not be able to escape the sting of the prince"s ingrat.i.tude, I would advise the general to do one of two things: Either leave the army immediately after his victory and put himself in the hands of his prince, being careful not to commit any insolent or ambitious act, so that the prince has no reason to suspect him and every reason to reward him, or at least not harm him; or, if this does not seem the prudent thing to do, energetically take the opposite course, and consider all the means by which he can make what he acquired in battle his own, and not his prince"s. He must secure the goodwill of soldier and subject, forge new alliances with neighbors, occupy the fortresses with his men, bribe the commanders of his army, and take measures against those he cannot bribe. By these means he must punish his prince for the ingrat.i.tude the prince would otherwise show him. There are no other alternatives, but, as I have mentioned previously, men do not know how to be entirely evil or entirely good.102 And it is always the case that immediately after a victory, generals do not want to leave their armies, cannot show modesty, and do not know how to adopt means that are violent and create respect. Indecisive at this cruci