The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is [Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?
he is then [Greek: euboulos]--is he pa.s.sing under review the suggestions of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]--is he judging of the acts of others?
he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness--is he applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek: nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]--while in each and all he is [Greek: phronimos]?
P. 144, 1. 7. See note, on p. 140.
P 144 1.19. There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the province of [Greek: nous], _i.e._ he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.
P. 144, 1. 25. _i.e._ of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
P 144,1 27. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss (_i.e._ by [Greek: ethismos]).
All that is pleasant is to be done, This is pleasant, This is to be done
By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, _i.e._ on the suggestions of [Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss.
Aristotle says of the man dest.i.tute of all self-control that he is firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification of his bodily appet.i.tes, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein aytas]. And his a.n.a.lysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress towards this utter abandonment to pa.s.sion) shows that each case of previous good resolution succ.u.mbing to temptation is attributable to [Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the right one. Book VII. 8 and 5. P. 145, l. 4. The _consequentia_ is this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous]. What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e. Experience, and _therefore_, etc.
P. 145, l. 22. This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika], he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics, I. xiii. 10,
{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiaetikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]
{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon], { [Greek: to de saemantikon].
Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
P. 146, l. 11. Healthiness is the formal cause of health.
Medicine is the efficient.
See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hae hygieia kai ho iatros h.o.m.oios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
P. 146, l. 17. [Greek: phronaesis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.
P. 146, l. 19. This is another case of an observation being thrown in _obiter_, not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
P. 146, l. 22. See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
P. 147, l. 6. The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. "Up to anything" is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
P. 147, l. 13. See the note on [Greek: Archae] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
"This particular action is------."
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein--ti gar dei prattein hae mae, to telos autaes estin] i.e. [Greek: taes phronaeseos].--(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
P. 147, l. 19. "Look asquint on the face of truth." Sir T. Browne, Religio Medici.
P. 147, l. 26. The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.
P. 147, l. 30. Compare the pa.s.sage at the commencement of Book X.
[Greek: nun de phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek taes aretaes].
P. 148, l. 10. It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronaesis] is used throughout this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of it. P. 152, 1. 1. The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men _may be_ than what they _are_. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.
P. 152, 1. 17. This ill.u.s.trates the expression, "_Deceits_ of the Flesh."
P. 156, 1. 12. Another reading omits the [Greek:----]; the meaning of the whole pa.s.sage would be exactly the same--it would then run, "if he had been convinced of the rightness of what he does, _i.e._ if he were now acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of conviction."
P. 158, 1. 4. Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:----]
[Greek----]
P. 158, 1. 8. Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.
P 158, 1. 31. As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott"s "Red Gauntlet."
P. 159, 1. 23. That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise, it is true, that "all that is sweet is pleasant," it is true also, that "this is sweet," what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in this minor to the major _i.e._ the universal maxim, forbidding to taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his mind "All excess is to be avoided," at a certain time his [Greek:----] tells him "This gla.s.s is excess." As a matter of mere reasoning, he cannot help receiving the conclusion "This gla.s.s is to be avoided," and supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But [Greek:----], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in place of the minor premise "This is excess," its own premise "This is sweet," this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle ("[Greek:----]), "All that is sweet is to be tasted," and so, by strict logical sequence, proves "This gla.s.s is to be tasted."
The solution then of the phaenomenon of [Greek:----] is this that [Greek:----], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the suggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:----] i.e. [Greek:----]
easily defeats [Greek:----]. The [Greek:----], an hour before he is in temptation, would never deliberately prefer the maxim "All that is sweet is to be tasted" to "All excess is to be avoided." The [Greek:----]
would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):
Quae virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo Discite, _non inter lances mensasque nitentes_ Verum hic _impransi_ mec.u.m disquirite
Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. "Look not thou upon the wine when it is red," etc. P. 160, l. 2. [Greek: oron]. Aristotle"s own account of this word (Prior a.n.a.lyt ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself is really indicated by it.
P. 161, l. 16. The Greek would give "avoids excessive pain," but this is not true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for translating as in the text, is the pa.s.sage occurring just below [Greek: diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
P. 162, l. 11. Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, a.n.a.logy, Part I chap v sect. iv.
P. 162, l. 35. That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
P. 165, l. 4 Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek: orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler"s Sermon on Resentment.
P. 166, l. 7. The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concis.e.m.e.nt of expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
Actions of l.u.s.t are wrong actions done with pleasure, Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,
[Footnote: [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust, Actions of l.u.s.t are more unjust