On his return the diplomatic negotiations, which had commenced with an _allegro con brio_, for a time changed under the baton of the Imperial Conductor into a more peaceful _andante_, until the Kaiser made one of his characteristically sudden changes of purpose and precipitated the war by an arrogant ultimatum to Russia, which that country could not possibly accept without a fatal sacrifice of its self-respect and prestige as a nation.
If it be true--and the future may demonstrate it--that this war was planned by Germany at least as far back as the Moroccan crisis, then the Kaiser"s responsibility for the commencement of the quarrel cannot be doubted. It is inconceivable that the German Foreign Office could pursue for three years the policy of precipitating a European war without the knowledge and consent of the "Over War Lord."
When full data are accessible as to the importations by Germany in advance of the war, as to its withdrawal of foreign credits and placing of foreign loans, its sales of stocks by influential investors, and its importations on the eve of the war of horses and foodstuffs, a strong circ.u.mstantial case may be developed of a deliberate purpose to retrieve the Moroccan fias...o...b.. an audacious _coup_ which would determine the mastery of Europe. The levy in 1913 of an extraordinary tax upon capital, which virtually confiscated the earnings of the German people for military purposes, adds much support to this contention. According to Giolitti, the former Italian Premier, Austria sounded Italy in August, 1913, as to its willingness to partic.i.p.ate in a war against Servia.[59]
[Footnote 59: Giolitti Speech, Italian Chamber, Dec. 5, 1914.]
The inferences to be drawn from the Kaiser"s personality are somewhat conflicting. Like all self-centered and highly neurotic personalities, his nature is essentially a dual one. This does not mean that he is in any sense a hypocrite, for one of the engaging features of his attractive personality has been the candor and sincerity which have marked nearly all his public acts. He has shown himself to be a man of opposite moods, and conflicting purposes, having almost as many public poses as he has costumes, and a strong desire to play as many varied _roles_ as possible on the stage of the world. Like Bottom in the _Midsummer Night"s Dream_, he would play all parts from the "roaring lion" to the shrinking Thisbe.
The ruler who sent a sympathetic message to Kruger as an insult to England is he who shortly thereafter gratuitously submitted to Queen Victoria military plans for the subjugation of the Boers.
The ruler, who sent the _Panther_ to Agadir, later restrained his country from declaring war against England, when Lloyd George threw down the gauntlet in his Mansion House speech in the Moroccan crisis.
As preacher, the Kaiser exalted within sight of the Mount of Olives the precepts of Christian humility, and yet advised his soldiers, on their departure to China, to "take no prisoners and give no quarter."
The most affable and democratic monarch on occasion will in another mood a.s.sume the outworn toggery of mediaeval absolutism. A democratic business monarch, and as such the advance agent of German prosperity, he yet shocks the common sense and awakens the ridicule of the world by posing as a combination of Caesar and Mahomet.
The avowed champion of Christianity, who has preached with the fervor of Peter the Hermit against the Yellow Race, he has nevertheless, since this war began, instigated the Sultan of Turkey to proclaim in the Moslem world a "holy war" against his Christian enemies.
Pacific and bellicose by turns the monarch, who throughout his whole reign has. .h.i.therto kept the peace of the world, has yet on slight pretext given utterance to the most warlike and incendiary statements.
How is it possible to draw any inference from such a personality, of whom it could be said, as Sydney Smith once said of Lord John Russell, that
there is nothing he would not undertake. I believe he would perform an operation for stone, build St. Peter"s, a.s.sume (with or without ten minutes" notice) the command of the Channel Fleet, and no one would discover from his manner that the patient had died, that St. Peter"s had tumbled down, and that the Channel Fleet had been knocked to atoms.
We should therefore dismiss all inferences suggested by his complex personality and should judge him by what he did from the time that he suddenly arrived in Berlin on July 26th, until the issuance by his direct order of the fatal ultimatum to Russia.
Before proceeding to a.n.a.lyze the very interesting and dramatic correspondence, which pa.s.sed between the rulers of Germany, England, and Russia--doubly interesting because of the family relationship and the unusual personal and cousinly intimacy of these dispatches--it is well to inquire what the Kaiser could have done that would have immediately avoided the crisis and saved the situation. So far as the published record goes, he did not send a single telegram in the interests of peace to his ill.u.s.trious ally, the Emperor Francis Joseph.
Let us suppose that he had sent the following:
I have just returned to Berlin and find Europe on the verge of war. I sympathize entirely with you and your country in its demands upon Servia. I agree with you that the Servian reply is not satisfactory. In accordance with the obligations of our alliance, I shall in any event support with the full power of the German sword the cause of Austria. Servia has by its reply admitted its responsibility for the murder of the Archduke and has unreservedly accepted certain of your demands, and as to others has agreed to submit them either to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, or to a concert of Powers. You will decide whether Austria is satisfied to accept either of these suggestions, but as England, France, and Russia have asked that time be granted to consider a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the difficulty, and as the questions reserved by Servia can be used as the basis for further discussion without prejudice to the rights of Austria, and as it is to the interest of every country and the entire world that its peace should not be broken unnecessarily, I shall be gratified if you can agree that a reasonable time shall be granted as a matter of courtesy to Russia, England, and France, in order that it may be determined upon due consideration whether it is not possible to preserve peace without sacrificing in any respect the legitimate demands of Austria, which have my full sympathy and support.
WILHELM.
Would the Austrian Emperor, himself a n.o.ble-minded and peace-loving monarch, have refused this reasonable request? A little time, a little patience and some forbearance for the rights of other States and the youth of Europe need not have perished. Again, "the pity of it."
In its place the following correspondence took place between the Kaiser on the one hand and the Czar and King George on the other. It is so dramatic that it justifies quotation _in extenso_.
On the night of July 28th, the Kaiser sent the following dispatch to the Czar:
I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.
On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.[60]
[Footnote 60: German _White Paper_, No. 20. The Capitals to the p.r.o.nouns follow the original correspondence.]
This telegram rings true, and fairly suggests a pacific att.i.tude on the part of the Kaiser when he first took the helm on his return from Norway. Its weakness lies in the fact that the record, as presented by the German Government, does not disclose any communication which he sent to his Austrian ally in the interests of peace. We have the frequent a.s.surances of the Kaiser to the Czar that he was exerting all his influence to induce his ally to come to a satisfactory understanding with Russia, _but neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor over that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace_.
The Czar did not fail to appreciate this, and his reply to the Kaiser rings quite as true and suggests the crux of the whole problem. It reads:
I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power _to restrain Your ally from going too far_.[61]
[Footnote 61: German _White Paper_, No. 21.]
Who can deny the force of the sentence thus italicized? It was Austria which was the provocative factor. It was then bombarding Belgrade and endeavoring to cross the Danube into Servia. It had declared war, and brusquely refused even to discuss the question with Russia. It was mobilizing its army, and making every effort to make a speedy subjugation of Servia. If peace was to be preserved, the pressure must begin with Austria. If any question remained for peace parleys, the _status quo_ must be preserved. Russia could not permit Austria to destroy Servia first and then discuss its justice.
Thereupon the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar as follows:
I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However I cannot--as I told You in my first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.
According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort.
Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.[62]
[Footnote 62: German _White Paper_, No. 22. See note, _post._, p.
189.]
The Kaiser"s fatal error lies in the concluding paragraph of this telegram, in claiming that Russia should not take any military measures pending the Kaiser"s mediation, _although Austria should be left free not merely to make such preparations against Russia, but to pursue its aggressive war then already commenced against Servia_. If the belligerents were expected to desist from military preparations, should not the obligation be reciprocal?
Later that night the Kaiser again telegraphed the Czar:
My Amba.s.sador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram.
Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator, with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.[63]
[Footnote 63: German _White Paper_, No. 23.]
To which the Czar replied as follows:
I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. _We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us._[64]
[Footnote 64: German _White Paper_, No. 23 A.]
Later the Czar again telegraphed the Kaiser:
I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war. _As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon._ I confide with all my faith in the grace of G.o.d, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.
What more could the Kaiser reasonably ask? Here was an a.s.surance from the ruler of a great nation, and his royal cousin, that on his "solemn word" no provocative action would be taken by Russia "as long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue" and this notwithstanding the fact that Austria had flouted and ignored Russia, had declared war against Servia and was then endeavoring to subjugate it quickly by bombarding its capital and invading its territory with superior forces.
It is true that the Czar did not order demobilization, and apart from his unquestioned right to prepare for eventualities in the event of the failure of the peace parleys, the Kaiser himself recognized in a later telegram that in the case of Germany when mobilization had once been started it could not be immediately arrested.
Simultaneously King George had telegraphed the Kaiser through Prince Henry as follows:
Thanks for Your telegram; so pleased to hear of William"s efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a European war should be averted. My Government is doing its utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations if Austria will consent to be satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands; other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Pray a.s.sure William I am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power to preserve peace of Europe.[65]
[Footnote 65: Second German _White Paper_.]
The fairness of this proposal can hardly be disputed. It conceded to Austria the right to occupy the capital of Servia and hold it as a hostage for a satisfactory adjustment of her demands and even to continue her military preparations, while all other nations, including Russia, were to suspend their military preparations. As the Kaiser precipitated the war because Russia would not cease its preparations for eventualities, King George"s proposal, upon which neither the Kaiser nor his government ever acted, fully met his demands.
To this the Kaiser replied on July 31st: