The twelve hours elapsed and Russia, standing upon its dignity as a sovereign nation of equal standing with Germany, declined to answer this unreasonable and most arrogant demand, which under the circ.u.mstances was equivalent to a declaration of war.
Simultaneously a like telegram was sent to the Amba.s.sador at Paris, requiring the French Government to state in eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German war.
The reasons given for this double ultimatum are as disingenuous as the whole course of German diplomacy in this matter. The statement that Germany had pursued any mediatory negotiations was as untrue as its statement that it had taken no measures for mobilization. Equally disingenuous was the statement with respect to the _Kriegsgefahr_ (state of martial law), for when that was declared on July 31st, the railroad, telegraph, and other similar public utilities were immediately taken over by Germany and the movement of troops to the frontier began.
After the fateful ultimatum had thus been given by Germany to Russia, the British Amba.s.sador, pursuant to the instructions of his home office, saw the German Secretary of State on July 31st, and urged him
most earnestly to accept your [Sir Edward Grey"s] proposal and make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe of a European war.
He [von Jagow] expressed himself very sympathetically toward your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace _but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day_; this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilization against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilize at once.
I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept _by asking them to demobilize in the south as well_. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying that all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.[80]
[Footnote 80: English _White Paper_, No. 121.]
The German Secretary of State also stated to Sir E. Goschen that both the Emperor William and the German Foreign Office
had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions, and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature, but Russia"s mobilization had spoiled everything.
Here again it must be noted that the telegraphic communications from Vienna have not yet been published by the Austrian Government, nor by the German Foreign Office in its official defense.
Sir Edward Grey"s last attempt to preserve peace was on August 1st, when he telegraphed to Sir E. Goschen:
I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war.
The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.
Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that the German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above in order to avoid tension.
His Majesty"s Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.[81]
[Footnote 81: English _White Paper_, No. 131.]
At that time the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia had already expired, but the British Amba.s.sador saw the German Secretary of State on August 1st, and, after submitting to him the substance of Sir Edward Grey"s telegram last quoted,
spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria"s ally. _If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement._ Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria"s readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany"s demand that she should demobilize, had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. _This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up ma.s.ses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions _. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had, therefore, ordered mobilization, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.[82]
[Footnote 82: English _White Paper_, No. 138.]
It will thus be seen that although Germany was urged to the very last to await the result of the conferences, which had just commenced with some slight promise of success between Austria and Russia, it nevertheless elected to declare war against Russia and thus blast beyond possible recall any possibility of peace. Its justification for this course, as stated in the interview with the German Secretary of State last quoted, was that it did not propose to forego its advantage of speed as against the advantage of Russia"s numerical superiority.
For this there might be some justification, if Russia had shown an unyielding and bellicose att.i.tude, but apart from the fact that Russia had consistently worked in the interests of peace, Germany had the express a.s.surance of the Czar that no provocative action would be taken while peace conferences continued. To disregard these a.s.surances and thus destroy the pacific efforts of other nations, in order not to lose a tactical advantage, was the clearest disloyalty to civilization. In any aspect, Germany could have fully kept its advantage of speed by inducing its ally to suspend its aggressive operations against Servia, for in that event Russia had expressly obligated itself to suspend all military preparations.
As the final doc.u.ment in this shameful chapter of diplomacy, there need only be added the telegram, sent by the German Chancellor to his Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg on August 1, 1914, in which war was declared by Germany against Russia on the ground that while Germany and Austria should be left free to pursue their aggressive military preparations, Russia should, on the peremptory demand of another nation, cease the mobilization of its armies even for self-defense. It reads:
The Imperial Government has endeavored from the opening of the crisis to lead it to a pacific solution. In accordance with a desire which had been expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany in accord with England had applied himself to filling a mediatory role with the Cabinets of Vienna and St.
Petersburg, when Russia, without awaiting the result of this, proceeded to the complete mobilization of her forces on land and sea. As a consequence of this threatening measure, motived by no military "_presage_" on the part of Germany, the German Empire found itself in face of a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial Government had failed to safeguard herself against this peril it would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany.
Consequently the German Government saw itself forced to address to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, an insistence on the cessation of the said military acts. Russia, having refused to accede to (not having thought it should reply to), this demand, and having manifested by this refusal (this att.i.tude) that its action was directed against Germany, I have the honor to make known to your Excellency the following:
His Majesty the Emperor, My August Sovereign, in the name of the Empire, taking up the challenge, considers himself in a state of war with Russia.
The feverish haste with which this fatal step was taken, is shown by the fact that the German Amba.s.sador could not even wait to state whether Russia had refused to answer or answered negatively. This war--thus begun in such mad haste--is likely to be repented of at leisure.
A few hours before this rash and most iniquitous declaration was made the Czar made his last appeal for peace. With equal solemnity and pathos he telegraphed the Kaiser:
_I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of G.o.d it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply._
This touching and magnanimous message does infinite credit to the Czar. Had the Kaiser been as pacific, had he been inspired by the same enlightened spirit in the interests of peace, had he been as truly mindful of the G.o.d of nations, whom the Czar thus invoked, it would have been possible to prevent the "shedding of blood," which has now swept away after only three months of war the very flower of the youth of Europe.
To this the Kaiser replied:
I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your Government the way through which _alone_ war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Amba.s.sador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the _sole_ way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circ.u.mstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers.
In this is no spirit of compromise; only the repeated insistence of the unreasonable and in its consequences iniquitous demand that Russia should by demobilizing make itself "naked to its enemies," while Germany and Austria, without making any real concession in the direction of peace, should be permitted to arm both for offense and defense.
There were practical reasons which made the Kaiser"s demand unreasonable. Mobilization is a highly developed and complicated piece of governmental machinery, and even where transportation facilities are of the best, as in Germany and France, the mobilization ordinarily takes about two weeks to complete. In Russia, with limited means of transportation, it was impossible to recall immediately a mobilization order that had gone forward to the remotest corners of the great Empire. The record shows that the Kaiser himself recognized this fact, for in a telegram which he sent on August 1st to King George, with respect to the possible neutralization of England, the Kaiser said:
I just received the communication from Your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. Added to this offer was the inquiry whether under these conditions Germany would refrain from attacking France. _On technical grounds My mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed against two fronts east and west as prepared; this cannot be countermanded because, I am sorry, Your telegram came so late._ But if France offers Me neutrality which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall of course refrain from attacking France and employ My troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on My frontier are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France.[83]
[Footnote 83: No such offer had been made. The Kaiser"s error was due to a misunderstanding, which had arisen quite honestly between Sir Edward Grey and the German Amba.s.sador in London. King George promptly corrected this misapprehension of the Kaiser.
See also Addendum, p. 192.]
If it were impossible for the Kaiser, with all the exceptional facilities of the German Empire, to arrest his mobilization for "technical" reasons, it was infinitely more difficult for the Czar to arrest immediately his military preparations. The demand of Germany was not that Russia should simply cancel the mobilization order. It was that Russia should "cease within twelve hours all warlike measures," and it demanded a physical impossibility.
In any event, mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation, as the Czar had so clearly pointed out to the Kaiser in the telegram already quoted. It is the right of a sovereign State and by no code of ethics a _casus belli_. Germany"s demand that Russia should not arm to defend itself, when its prestige as a great European power was at stake and when Austria was pushing her aggressive preparations, treated Russia as an inferior, almost a va.s.sal, State. Its rejection must have been recognized by the Kaiser and his advisers as inevitable, and, on the theory that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts, it must be a.s.sumed that the Kaiser in this mad demand at that time desired and intended war, however pacific his purposes may have been when he first took the helm.
Such will be his awful responsibility "to the last syllable of recorded time."
How well prepared Germany was, the sequel developed only too surely.
_On the following day_--August 2d--its troops invaded Luxemburg and an abrupt demand was made upon Belgium for permission to cross its territory.
Upon the declaration of war, the Czar telegraphed to King George of England as follows:
"In this solemn hour, I wish to a.s.sure you once more I have done all in my power to avert war."
_Such will be the verdict of history._
ADDENDUM
I
THE SUPPRESSED TELEGRAM FROM THE CZAR
It is a curious and suggestive fact that the German Foreign Office in publishing the correspondence between the Kaiser and the Czar omitted one of the most important telegrams.
The Russian Government on January 31, 1915, therefore, made public the following telegram which the Czar sent to the Kaiser on July 29, 1914:
"Thanks for your conciliatory and friendly telegram.