In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I (Sir Edward Grey) remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circ.u.mstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, _but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a doc.u.ment of so formidable a character_.
Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke. Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia"s part.
I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying a time limit could have been introduced later; _but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation_.
Unfortunately both Russia and England"s requests for time were refused, on the plea that they had reached the Austrian Foreign Minister too late, although it has never yet been explained why, even if Count Berchtold were unable to take up the requests before the expiration of the ultimatum, the matter might not have been reopened for a few days by a corresponding extension of the time limit.
In the absence of some explanation, which as yet remains to be made, the absence of the Austrian Premier from Vienna at the time intervening between the issuance of the _ultimatum_ and the expiration of the time limit seems like an extraordinarily petty piece of diplomatic finesse. He had without any warning to the great Powers of Europe, launched a thunderbolt, and if there ever was a time when a pacific foreign minister should have been at his post and open to suggestions of peace, it was in those two critical days. And yet, after issuing the ultimatum, he immediately takes himself beyond reach of personal parleys by going to Ischl, and this was taken by the German Foreign Office as a convenient excuse for an antic.i.p.ated failure to extend this courtesy to Russia and England. Upon this we have the testimony of the English Amba.s.sador at Berlin, who in his report to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, says:
[The German] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at ten o"clock this morning from German Amba.s.sador at London, he immediately instructed German Amba.s.sador at Vienna to pa.s.s on to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion, for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from the press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circ.u.mstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, _but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands...._
A like excuse is found in a conversation with the Russian Charge at Berlin, in which Bethmann-Hollweg expressed the fear "that in consequence of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl, and seeing the lack of time, his (Bethmann-Hollweg"s telegrams suggesting delay) will remain without result."[17]
[Footnote 17: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 14.]
These conversations are most illuminating. They refer to instructions to the German Amba.s.sador in Vienna, _which are not found in the German White Paper_, although they would have thrown a searchlight upon the sincerity with which Germany "pa.s.sed on" the most important request of England and Russia for a little time to save the peace of Europe, and it strongly suggests the possibility that Count Berchtold"s most inopportune absence in Ischl was to be the excuse for the gross discourtesy of refusing to give any extension of time.
Kudachef, the Russian Charge at Vienna, did not content himself with submitting the request to the Acting Foreign Minister (Baron Macchio) but to deprive Austria of the flimsy excuse of Berchtold"s absence at Ischl, the Russian Charge went over the head of the Austrian Acting Foreign Minister and telegraphed the request for time to Count Berchtold at Ischl. Let the record tell for itself how this most reasonable request was made and refused.
The Russian Charge sent on July 25th the two following telegrams to the Russian Foreign Minister:
Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed him our proposal to extend the delay of the ultimatum, and I have repeated it verbally to Baron Macchio. This latter promised me to communicate it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, _but added that he could predict with a.s.surance a categorical refusal_.[18]
[Footnote 18: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 11.]
Sequel to my telegram of to-day. Have just received from Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government to our proposal to prolong the delay of the note.[19]
[Footnote 19: Russian _Orange Paper_, No. 12.]
It is evident from the Russian _Orange Paper_ that that country had no illusions as to the possibility of a peaceful outcome. Germany has contended that on July the 24th, before Count Berchtold made his inopportune visit to Ischl, he sent for the Russian Charge at Vienna and a.s.sured him that the punitive measures which Austria had determined to take against Servia at all costs would not involve any territorial acquisitions.
Of this interview the chief evidence comes indirectly from two sources, which are not entirely in accord.
In a telegram from the German Amba.s.sador at Vienna to the German Chancellor, dated July 24th, it is said:
Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Charge d"Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia.
After going over the historical developments of the last few years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy did not wish to appear against Servia in the role of a conqueror. He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly behavior of Servia toward the monarchy; that he had no intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans. The Charge d"Affaires, who as yet had no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations of the Minister _ad referendum_ adding that he would immediately transmit them to Sazonof.[20]
[Footnote 20: German _White Paper_, No. 3.]
In a report of the same interview from the English Amba.s.sador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, it is said:
Russian Charge d"Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any power.[21]
[Footnote 21: English _White Papers_, No. 7.]
It will be noted that in the report of the English Amba.s.sador there is no suggestion of any disclaimer of an intention to take Servian territory.
In the Russian _Orange Paper_, we find no report from its representative at Vienna of any such interview and Austria has never produced any doc.u.ment or memorandum either of such an interview or of such a concession to Russia. It is probable that such a concession was made, as Germany contends, and if so, Russian diplomacy was far too keen to be led upon a false trail by this empty promise and as the evidences multiplied that Austria would not consider either an extension of time or any modification of its terms and that Germany was acting in complete accord and cooperated with her Ally, the probability of war was unmistakable.
Sazonof at once sent for the English and French Amba.s.sadors, and the substance of the conference is embodied in the telegram from the British Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 24th, which throws a strong light upon the double effort of Russia and France to preserve the peace and also as an obvious necessity to prepare for the more probable issue of war:
Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria"s conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that his Majesty"s Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.
The French Amba.s.sador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.
I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty"s Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty"s Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M.
Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.
In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria?
M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to....
Had England then followed the sagacious suggestion of Sazonof, would war have been averted?
Possibly, perhaps probably. Germany"s princ.i.p.al fear was the intervention of England. In view of its supremacy on the seas this was natural. It was England"s intimation in the Moroccan crisis of 1911, made in Lloyd George"s Mansion House speech, which at that time induced Germany to reverse the engines. Might not the same intimation in 1914 have had a like effect upon the mad counsels of Potsdam? The answer can only be a matter of conjecture. It depends largely upon how deep-seated the purpose of Germany may have been to provoke a European war at a time when Russia, France, or England were not fully prepared.
It does not follow that if Sazonof was right, Sir Edward Grey was necessarily wrong in declining to align England definitely with Russia and France at that stage. He was the servant of a democratic nation and could not ignore the public opinion of his country as freely as the Russian Foreign Minister. To take such a course, it would have been necessary for Grey to submit the matter to Parliament, and while with a large liberal majority his policy might have been endorsed, yet it would have been after such an acrimonious discussion and such vehement protests that England would have stood before the world "as a house divided against itself."
Both Sazonof and Sir Edward Grey from their respective standpoints were right. Neither made a single false step in the great controversy.
As a result of this interview, Russia, England, and France, after the request for time had been abruptly refused, next proceeded in the interests of peace to persuade Servia to make as conciliatory a reply to the impossible ultimatum as was possible without a fatal compromise of her political independence.
While the lack of time prevented France and Russia from making any formal communication to Servia on the question, yet Sazonof had a conference with the Servian Minister and discussed the wisdom of avoiding an attack on Belgrade by having the Servian forces withdrawn to the interior and then appealing to the Powers, and Russia thereupon made the broad and magnanimous suggestion that if Servia should appeal to the Powers, _Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy_.
This interview, as reported by the British Amba.s.sador at St.
Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, is as follows:
I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris, and this afternoon, I discussed with him the communication which the French Amba.s.sador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade....
The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.
_If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration._
Pursuant to this policy of conciliation Sir Edward Grey in direct communication with the Servian Minister at London, Mr. Crackenthorpe, the British Amba.s.sador at Belgrade, in direct communication with the Servian Foreign Ministry, and Sazonof in interviews with the Servian Minister at St. Petersburg, all brought direct influence upon Servia to make a conciliatory reply.
Thus Sir Edward Grey instructed Crackenthorpe:
Servia ought to promise that if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests.
It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favorably to as many points as the time limit allows....
I have urged upon the German Amba.s.sador that Austria should not precipitate military action.[22]
[Footnote 22: English _White Paper_, No. 12.]
In response to these suggestions, Mr. Crackenthorpe communicated Sir Edward Grey"s pacific suggestions to the Servian Minister and received the following reply, as reported in Crackenthorpe"s report to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th.
The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible....