It will be noted that on this occasion, when above all other occasions it was not only the duty, but to the highest interests of Germany, to give to the world any substantial reason for violating the neutrality of Belgium, the defense of Germany is rested upon the ground of self-interest,--euphemistically called "necessity,"--_and upon none other_.
While von Bethmann-Hollweg"s statement does state that "France held herself in readiness to invade Belgium," there was no intimation that France had done so, or had any immediate intention of doing so. On the contrary, it was added, "_France could wait, we (Germany) could not._"
If Belgium had forfeited its rights by undue favors to France or England, _why did the Chancellor characterize its protest as "just"?_
How Germany fulfilled the promise of its Chancellor, to "make good"
the admitted wrong which it did Belgium, subsequent events have shown.
It may be questioned whether, since the Thirty Years" War, any country has been subjected to such general devastating horrors. So little effort has been taken by the conqueror to lessen the inevitable suffering, that fines have been levied upon this impoverished people, which would be oppressive even in a period of prosperity. It is announced from Holland, as this book goes to press, that Germany has imposed upon this war-desolated country a fine of $7,000,000 per month and an especial fine of $75,000,000, for its "violation of neutrality."
Were this episode not a tragedy, the sardonic humor, which caused the German General Staff to impose this monstrous fine upon Belgium for its "violation of neutrality," would have the tragi-comical aspects of Bedlam. It recalls the fable of the wolf who complained that the lamb was muddying the stream and when the lamb politely called the wolf"s attention to the fact that it stood lower down on the river side than the wolf, the latter announced its intention to devour the lamb in any event. Such is probably the intention of Prussia. If it prevail Belgium as an independent State will cease to exist and it will be mourned as Poland is. Like Poland, it may have a resurrection.
The war having thus commenced between Germany and Belgium, the brave ruler of the latter country--"every inch a King"--addressed to the King of England the following appeal:
Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty"s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly att.i.tude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty"s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.[92]
[Footnote 92: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 25.]
In reply to that appeal, which no chivalrous nation could have disregarded, Sir Edward Grey immediately, on August 4th, advised the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin as follows:
We hear that Germany has addressed a note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.
We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.
In these circ.u.mstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same a.s.surance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o"clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your pa.s.sports, and to say that his Majesty"s Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.[93]
[Footnote 93: English _White Paper_. No. 159.]
Thereupon Sir Edward Goschen, the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin, called upon the Secretary of State and stated in the name of His Majesty"s Government that unless the Imperial Government
could give the a.s.surance by 12 o"clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my pa.s.sports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty"s Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o"clock as the time when His Majesty"s Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my pa.s.sports. This interview took place at about 7 o"clock....
I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty"s Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded--_just for a sc.r.a.p of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her._ All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two a.s.sailants.
He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter"s neutrality, _so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium"s neutrality if attacked_. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason, that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument....[94]
[Footnote 94: British _White Paper_, No. 160.]
Here again it is most significant, in view of the subsequent clumsily framed defense by German apologists, to note that the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow, and his superior, the German Chancellor, did not pretend to suggest that the invasion of Belgium was due to any overt act of France.
With even greater frankness von Jagow stated the real purpose, which was, "to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way," and to "avoid the more Southern route," which, "in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses," would have entailed "great loss of time."
The d.a.m.ning conclusion as to the guilt of Germany, which irresistibly follows from these admitted facts, is sought to be overborne by a pamphlet ent.i.tled "_The Truth about Germany_," and subscribed to by a number of distinguished Germans, who are in turn vouched for in America by Professor John W. Burgess of Columbia College. He tells us that they are the "salt of the earth," and "among the greatest thinkers, moralists, and philanthropists of the age." To overbear the doubter with the weight of such authority we are told that this defense has the support of the great theologian, Harnack, the sound and accomplished political scientist and economist, von Schmoller, the distinguished philologian, von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian, Lamprecht, the profound statesman, von Posadowsky, the brilliant diplomatist, von Bulow, the great financier, von Gwinner, the great promoter of trade and commerce, Ballin, the great inventor, Siemens, the brilliant preacher of the Gospel, Dryander, and the indispensable Director in the Ministry of Education, Schmidt. (The adjectives are those of Professor Burgess.)
The average American, as indeed the average citizen of any country, when his natural pa.s.sions are not unduly aroused, is apt to take a very prosaic and dispa.s.sionate view of such matters, and when he has reached his conclusion based upon everyday, commonplace morality, he is not apt to be shaken even by an imposing array of names, fortified by an enthusiastic excess of grandiloquent adjectives. The aristocracy of brains has no monopoly of truth, which is often best grasped by the democracy of common sense.
The defense of these notable representatives of German thought seems to be based upon the wholly unsupported a.s.sertion that "England and France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium."
They say:
It would have been a crime against the German people if the German General Staff had not antic.i.p.ated this intention. The inalienable right of self-defense gives the individual, whose very existence is at stake, the moral liberty to resort to weapons which would be forbidden except in times of peril. As Belgium would, nevertheless, not acquiesce in a friendly neutrality, which would permit the un.o.bstructed pa.s.sage of German troops through small portions of her territory, although her integrity was guaranteed, the German General Staff was obliged to force the pa.s.sage in order to avoid the necessity of meeting the enemy on the most unfavorable ground.
In other words, it seemed preferable to the German General Staff that it should fight in France rather than in Germany, and for this reason Belgium must be ruined.
Notwithstanding this and similar propositions, which are so abhorrent in their political immorality, it is yet gravely suggested by Dr.
Dernberg and others that Bernhardi"s philosophy does not reflect the true thought of the Prussian ruling cla.s.ses. Here are representative theologians, economists, historians, statesmen, diplomatists, financiers, inventors, and educators, who, in invoking the support of the educated cla.s.ses in the United States, deliberately subscribe to a proposition at which even Machiavelli might have gagged.
We are further told that "the German troops, with their iron discipline will respect the personal property and liberty of the individual in Belgium just as they did in France in 1870," and these scientists, philosophers, and doctors of divinity add that "Belgium would have been wise, if it had permitted the pa.s.sage of the German troops," for the Belgian people "_would have fared well from the business point of view, for the army would have proved a good customer and paid well._"
To this defense we are led in the last a.n.a.lysis, that Belgium should have preferred cash to her honor, just as the German General Staff preferred dishonor to the sacrifice of an immediate military advantage.
The possibilities of moral casuistry have been severely tested in the attempt of these apologists for Germany to defend the forcible invasion of Belgium.
The ethical question has been made quite unnecessarily to pivot upon the express contractual obligations of England, Germany, and France with respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The indictment of Germany has been placed upon the sound but too narrow ground that by the Treaty of 1839, and The Hague Convention of 1907, Germany had obligated itself by a solemn pledge to respect the neutrality both of Luxemburg and Belgium.
If, however, there had been no Hague Convention and no Treaty of 1839, and if Germany, England, and France had never entered into reciprocal obligations in the event of war to respect Belgium"s neutrality, nevertheless upon the broadest considerations of international law the invasion without its consent would be without any justification whatever.
It is a fundamental axiom of international law that each nation is the sole and exclusive judge of the conditions under which it will permit an alien to cross its frontiers. Its territory is _sacrosanct_. No nation may invade the territory of another without its consent. To do so by compulsion is an act of war. Each nation"s land is its castle of asylum and defense. This fundamental right of Belgium should not be confused or obscured by balancing the subordinate equities between France, Germany, and England with respect to their formal treaty obligations.
Belgium"s case has thus been weakened in the forum of public opinion by too insistent reference to the special treaties. The right of Belgium and of its citizens as individuals, to be secure in their possessions rests upon the sure foundation of inalienable right and is guarded by the immutable principle of moral law, "Thou shalt not steal." It was well said by Alexander Hamilton:
The sacred rights of man are not to be searched for in old parchments and musty records; they are written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of Divinity itself and can never be erased by mortal power.
This truth can be ill.u.s.trated by an imaginary instance. Let us suppose that the armies of the Kaiser had made the progress which they so confidently antic.i.p.ated, and had not simply captured Paris, but had also invaded England, and that, in an attempt to crush the British Empire, the German General Staff planned an invasion of Canada. Let us further suppose that Germany thereupon served upon the United States such an arrogant demand as it made upon Belgium, requiring the United States to permit it to land an army in New York, with the accompanying a.s.surance that neither its territory nor independence would be injured, and that Germany would generously reimburse it for any damage.
Let us further suppose--and it is not a very fanciful supposition--that the United States would reply to the German demand that under no circ.u.mstances should a German force be landed in New York or its territory be used as a base of hostile operations against Canada. To carry out the a.n.a.logy in all its details, let us then suppose that the German fleet should land an army in the city of New York, arrest its Mayor, and check the first attempt of its outraged inhabitants to defend the city by demolishing the Cathedral, the Metropolitan Art Gallery, the City Hall and other structures, and shooting down remorselessly large numbers of citizens, because a few non-combatants had not accepted the invasion with due humility.
Although Germany had not entered into any treaty to respect the territory of the United States, no one would seriously contend that Germany would be justified in such an invasion.
The alleged invalidation of the treaty of 1839 being thus unimportant, Dr. Dernberg and Professor von Mach fall back upon the only remaining defense, that France had already violated the neutrality of Belgium with the latter"s consent. _Of this there is no evidence whatever._ We have, on the contrary, the express a.s.surance, which France gave on the eve of the German invasion both to Belgium and England, that it would not violate the rights of Belgium, and in addition we have the significant fact that when Belgium was invaded, and it was vitally necessary that the French Army should go with all possible speed to its relief and thus stop the invasion and save France itself from invasion, it was ten days before France could send any adequate support. Unhappily it was then too late.
If it were true that France intended to invade Belgium, then of all the blunders that the German Foreign Office has made, the greatest was that it did not permit France to carry out this step, for it would have palliated the action of Germany in meeting such violation by a similar invasion, and it would thus have been an immeasurable gain for Germany and a greater injury to France.
Germany"s greatest weakness to-day is its moral isolation. It stands condemned by the judgment of the civilized world. No physical power it can exercise can compensate for this loss of moral power. Even success will be too dearly bought at such a price. There are things which succeed better than success. Truth is one of them.
Under the plea of necessity, which means Germany"s desire to minimize its losses of life, Germany has turned Belgium into a shambles, trampled a peaceful nation under foot and almost crushed its soul beneath the iron tread of its mighty armies.
Almost wounded unto death, and for a time prostrate under the heel of the conqueror, the honor of Belgium shines unsullied by any selfish interests, personal dishonor, or lack of courage.
It is claimed that there were officers of the French Army in Liege and Namur before the war broke out. Neither names nor dates have been given, and the allegation might be fairly dismissed because of the very vagueness of the charge. But even if it were true, international law does not forbid the officers of one nation serving with the armies of another. German officers have for many years been thus employed in Turkey and engaged in training and developing the Turkish Army, but no one has ever contended that the employment by that country of German military officers was a violation of neutrality, or gave rise to a _casus belli_.
It is wholly probable that there were some German officers in Belgium before the war commenced, and if not, there were certainly hundreds of spies, of whose pernicious activities the Belgian people were to learn later to their infinite sorrow, but because Germany employed an elaborate system of espionage in Belgium, it could not justify France in invading its territory without its permission.
To a lawyer, who has had experience in the judicial ascertainment of truth, there is one consideration that justifies him in disposing of all these vague allegations with respect to French activities in Belgium on the eve of the war, and that is that Germany has not only failed to give any testimony in support of the charges, _but it never suggested this defense until the judgment of the civilized world had branded it with an ineffaceable stain_.
Professor von Mach, a former educator of Harvard University and an apologist for Germany, feels this poverty of evidence and has rather navely suggested an adjournment of the case. He says:
Did French officers remain in Liege or in any other Belgian fortress after hostilities had begun, and did France plan to go through Belgium? Germany has officially made both claims.