10. China shall first consult with and obtain the consent of j.a.pan before she can enter into an agreement with another Power for making loans, the leasing of territory, or the cession of the same.
From the date of the signing of this Defensive Alliance, j.a.pan and China shall work together hand-in-hand. j.a.pan will a.s.sume the responsibility of safeguarding Chinese territory and maintaining the peace and order in China. This will relieve China of all future anxieties and enable her to proceed energetically with her reforms, and, with a sense of territorial security, she may wait for her national development and regeneration. Even after the present European War is over and peace is restored China will absolutely have nothing to fear in the future of having pressure brought against her by the foreign powers. It is only thus that permanent peace can be secured in the Far East.
But before concluding this Defensive Alliance, two points must first be ascertained and settled, (1) Its bearing on the Chinese Government. (2) Its bearing on those Powers having intimate relations with and great interests in China.
In considering its effect on the Chinese Government, j.a.pan must try to foresee whether the position of China"s present ruler Yuan Shih-kai shall be permanent or not; whether the present Government"s policy will enjoy the confidence of a large section of the Chinese people; whether Yuan Shih-kai will readily agree to the j.a.panese Government"s proposal to enter into a treaty of alliance with us.
These are points to which we are bound to give a thorough consideration. Judging by the att.i.tude hitherto adopted by Yuan Shih-kai we know he has always resorted to the policy of expediency in his diplomatic dealings, and although he may now outwardly show friendliness towards us, he will in fact rely upon the influence of the different Powers as the easiest check against us and refuse to accede to our demands. Take for a single instance, his conduct towards us since the Imperial Government declared war against Germany and his action will then be clear to all. Whether we can rely upon the ordinary friendly methods of diplomacy to gain our object or not it does not require much wisdom to decide. After the gigantic struggle in Europe is over, leaving aside America which will not press for advantage, China will not be able to obtain any loans from the other Powers. With a depleted treasury, without means to pay the officials and the army, with local bandits inciting the poverty-stricken populace to trouble, with the revolutionists waiting for opportunities to rise, should an insurrection actually occur while no outside a.s.sistance can be rendered to quell it we are certain it will be impossible for Yuan Shih-kai, single-handed, to restore order and consolidate the country. The result will be that the nation will be cut up into many parts beyond all hope of remedy.
That this state of affairs will come is not difficult to foresee.
When this occurs, shall we uphold Yuan"s Government and a.s.sist him to suppress the internal insurrection with the certain a.s.surance that we could influence him to agree to our demands, or shall we help the revolutionists to achieve a success and realize our object through them? This question must be definitely decided upon this very moment so that we may put it into practical execution. If we do not look into the future fate of China but go blindly to uphold Yuan"s Government, to enter into a Defensive Alliance with China, hoping thus to secure a complete realization of our object by a.s.sisting him to suppress the revolutionists, it is obviously a wrong policy. Why? Because the majority of the Chinese people have lost all faith in the tottering Yuan Shih-kai who is discredited and attacked by the whole nation for having sold his country. If j.a.pan gives Yuan the support, his Government, though in a very precarious state, may possibly avoid destruction. Yuan Shih-kai belongs to that school of politicians who are fond of employing craftiness and cunning. He may be friendly to us for a time, but he will certainly abandon us and again befriend the other Powers when the European war is at an end. Judging by his past we have no doubt as to what he will do in the future. For j.a.pan to ignore the general sentiment of the Chinese people and support Yuan Shih-kai with the hope that we can settle with him the Chinese Question is a blunder indeed.
Therefore in order to secure the permanent peace of the Far East, instead of supporting a Chinese Government which can neither be long continued in power nor a.s.sist in the attainment of our object, we should rather support the 400,000,000 Chinese people to renovate their corrupt Government, to change its present form, to maintain peace and order in the land and to usher into China a new era of prosperity so that China and j.a.pan may in fact as well as in name be brought into the most intimate and vital relations with each other.
China"s era of prosperity is based on the China-j.a.panese Alliance and this Alliance is the foundational power for the repelling of the foreign aggression that is to be directed against the Far East at the conclusion of the European war. This alliance is also the foundation-stone of the peace of the world. j.a.pan therefore should take this as the last warning and immediately solve this question.
Since the Imperial j.a.panese Government has considered it imperative to support the Chinese people, we should induce the Chinese revolutionists, the Imperialists and other Chinese malcontents to create trouble all over China. The whole country will be thrown into disorder and Yuan"s Government will consequently be overthrown. We shall then select a man from amongst the most influential and most noted of the 400,000,000 of Chinese and help him to organize a new form of Government and to consolidate the whole country. In the meantime our army must a.s.sist in the restoration of peace and order in the country, and in the protection of the lives and properties of the people, so that they may gladly tender their allegiance to the new Government which will then naturally confide in and rely upon j.a.pan. It is after the accomplishment of only these things that we shall without difficulty gain our object by the conclusion of a Defensive Alliance with China.
For us to incite the Chinese revolutionists and malcontents to rise in China we consider the present to be the most opportune moment.
The reason why these men cannot now carry on an active campaign is because they are insufficiently provided with funds. If the Imperial Government can take advantage of this fact to make them a loan and instruct them to rise simultaneously, great commotion and disorder will surely prevail all over China. We can intervene and easily adjust matters.
The progress of the European War warns j.a.pan with greater urgency of the imperative necessity of solving this most vital of questions.
The Imperial Government cannot be considered as embarking on a rash project. This opportunity will not repeat itself for our benefit. We must avail ourselves of this chance and under no circ.u.mstances hesitate. Why should we wait for the spontaneous uprising of the revolutionists and malcontents? Why should we not think out and lay down a plan beforehand? When we examine into the form of Government in China, we must ask whether the existing Republic is well suited to the national temperament and well adapted to the thoughts and aspirations of the Chinese people. From the time the Republic of China was established up to the present moment, if what it has pa.s.sed through is to be compared to what it ought to be in the matter of administration and unification, we find disappointment everywhere. Even the revolutionists themselves, the very ones who first advocated the Republican form of government, acknowledge that they have made a mistake. The retention of the Republican form of Government in China will be a great future obstacle in the way of a Chino-j.a.panese Alliance. And why must it be so? Because, in a Republic the fundamental principles of government as well as the social and moral aims of the people are distinctly different from that of a Const.i.tutional Monarchy. Their laws and administration also conflict. If j.a.pan act as a guide to China and China models herself after j.a.pan, it will only then be possible for the two nations to solve by mutual effort the Far East Question without differences and disagreements. Therefore to start from the foundation for the purpose of reconstructing the Chinese Government, of establishing a Chino-j.a.panese Alliance, of maintaining the permanent peace of the Far East and of realizing the consummation of j.a.pan"s Imperial policy, we must take advantage of the present opportunity to alter China"s Republican form of Government into a Const.i.tutional Monarchy which shall necessarily be identical, in all its details, to the Const.i.tutional Monarchy of j.a.pan, and to no other. This is really the key and first principle to be firmly held for the actual reconstruction of the form of Government in China. If China changes her Republican form of Government to that of a Const.i.tutional Monarchy, shall we, in the selection of a new ruler, restore the Emperor Hsuan T"ung to his throne or choose the most capable man from the Monarchists or select the most worthy member from among the revolutionists? We think, however, that it is advisable at present to leave this question to the exigency of the future when the matter is brought up for decision. But we must not lose sight of the fact that to actually put into execution this policy of a Chino-j.a.panese Alliance and the transformation of the Republic of China into a Const.i.tutional Monarchy, is, in reality, the fundamental principle to be adopted for the reconstruction of China.
We shall now consider the bearing of this Defensive Alliance on the other Powers. Needless to say, j.a.pan and China will in no way impair the rights and interests already acquired by the Powers. At this moment it is of paramount importance for j.a.pan to come to a special understanding with Russia to define our respective spheres in Manchuria and Mongolia so that the two countries may co-operate with each other in the future. This means that j.a.pan after the acquisition of sovereign rights in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia will work together with Russia after her acquisition of sovereign rights in North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia to maintain the status quo, and endeavour by every effort to protect the peace of the Far East. Russia, since the outbreak of the European War, has not only laid aside all ill-feelings against j.a.pan, but has adopted the same att.i.tude as her Allies and shown warm friendship for us. No matter how we regard the Manchurian and Mongolian Questions in the future she is anxious that we find some way of settlement. Therefore we need not doubt but that Russia, in her att.i.tude towards this Chinese Question, will be able to come to an understanding with us for mutual co-operation.
The British sphere of influence and interest in China is centred in Tibet and the Yangtsze Valley. Therefore if j.a.pan can come to some satisfactory arrangement with China in regard to Tibet and also give certain privileges to Great Britain in the Yangtsze Valley, with an a.s.surance to protect those privileges, no matter how powerful Great Britain might be, she will surely not oppose j.a.pan"s policy in regard to this Chinese Question. While this present European War is going on Great Britain has never asked j.a.pan to render her a.s.sistance. That her strength will certainly not enable her to oppose us in the future need not be doubted in the least.
Since Great Britain and Russia will not oppose j.a.pan"s policy towards China, it can readily be seen what att.i.tude France will adopt in regard to the subject. What j.a.pan must now somewhat reckon with is America. But America in her att.i.tude towards us regarding our policy towards China has already declared the principle of maintaining China"s territorial integrity and equal opportunity and will be satisfied, if we, do not impair America"s already acquired rights and privileges. We think America will also have no cause for complaint. Nevertheless America has in the East a naval force which can be fairly relied upon, though not sufficiently strong to be feared. Therefore in j.a.pan"s att.i.tude towards America there is nothing really for us to be afraid of.
Since China"s condition is such on the one hand and the Powers"
relation towards China is such on the other hand, j.a.pan should avail herself in the meantime of the European War to definitely decide upon a policy towards China, the most important move being the transformation of the Chinese Government to be followed up by preparing for the conclusion of the Defensive Alliance. The precipitate action on the part of our present Cabinet in acceding to the request of Great Britain to declare war against Germany without having definitely settled our policy towards China has no real connection with our future negotiations with China or affect the political condition in the Far East. Consequently all intelligent j.a.panese, of every walk of life throughout the land, are very deeply concerned about the matter.
Our Imperial Government should now definitely change our dependent foreign policy which is being directed by others into an independent foreign policy which shall direct others, proclaiming the same with solemn sincerity to the world and carrying it out with determination. If we do so, even the G.o.ds and spirits will give way.
These are important points in our policy towards China and the result depends on how we carry them out. Can our authorities firmly make up their mind to solve this Chinese Question by the actual carrying out of this fundamental principle? If they show irresolution while we have this heaven-conferred chance and merely depend on the good will of the other Powers, we shall eventually have greater pressure to be brought against the Far East after the European War is over, when the present equilibrium will be destroyed. That day will then be too late for us to repent of our folly. We are therefore impelled by force of circ.u.mstances to urge our authorities to a quicker sense of the situation and to come to a determination.
The first point which leaps out of this extraordinarily frank disquisition is that the origin of the Twenty-one Demands is at last disclosed. A perusal of the ten articles forming the basis of the Defensive alliance proposed by the Black Dragon Society, allows us to understand everything that occurred in Peking in the spring of 1915. As far back as November, 1914, it was generally rumoured in Peking that j.a.pan had a surprise of an extraordinary nature in her diplomatic archives, and that it would be merely a matter of weeks before it was sprung. Comparing this elaborate memorandum of the Black Dragon Society with the original text of the Twenty-one Demands it is plain that the proposed plan, having been handed to Viscount Kato, had to be pa.s.sed through the diplomatic filters again and again until all gritty matter had been removed, and an appearance of innocuousness given to it. It is for this reason that the defensive alliance finally emerges as five compact little "groups" of demands, with the vital things directly affecting Chinese sovereignty labelled _desiderata_, so that j.a.panese amba.s.sadors abroad could leave very warm a.s.surances at every Foreign Office that there was nothing in what j.a.pan desired which in any way conflicted with the Treaty rights of the Powers in China. The air of mystery which surrounded the whole business from the 18th January to the 7th May--the day of the ultimatum--was due to the fact that j.a.pan attempted to translate the conspiracy into terms of ordinary intercourse, only to find that in spite of the "filtering" the atmosphere of plotting could not be shaken off or the political threat adequately hidden. There is an arresting piece of psychology in this.
The conviction expressed in the first portion of the Memorandum that bankruptcy was the rock on which the Peking administration must sooner or later split, and that the moment which j.a.pan must seize is the outbreak of insurrections, is also highly instructive in view of what happened later. Still more subtle is the manner in which the ultimate solution is left open: it is consistently admitted throughout the ma.s.s of reasoning that there is no means of knowing whether suasion or force will ultimately be necessary. Force, however, always beckons to j.a.pan because that is the simplest formula. And since j.a.pan is the self-appointed defender of the dumb four hundred millions, her influence will be thrown on the side of the populace in order "to usher into China a new era of prosperity" so that China and j.a.pan may in fact as well as in name be brought into the most intimate and vital relations with each other.
The object of the subsidized insurrections is also clearly stated; it is to alter China"s republican form of government into a Const.i.tutional Monarchy which shall necessarily be identical in all its details to the Const.i.tutional Monarchy of j.a.pan and to no other. Who the new Emperor is to be is a point left in suspense, although we may here again recall that in 1912 in the midst of the revolution j.a.pan privately sounded England regarding the advisability of lending the Manchus armed a.s.sistance, a proposal which was immediately vetoed. But there are other things: nothing is forgotten in the Memorandum. Russia is to be specially placated, England to be specially negotiated with, thus incidentally explaining j.a.pan"s recent att.i.tude regarding the Yangtsze Railways. j.a.pan, released from her dependent foreign policy, that is from a policy which is bound by conventions and treaties which others respect, can then carry out her own plans without fear of molestation.
And this brings us to the two last doc.u.ments of the dossier--the method of subsidizing and arranging insurrections in China when and wherever necessary.
The first doc.u.ment is a detailed agreement between the Revolutionary Party and various j.a.panese merchants. Trained leaders are to be used in the provinces South of the Yellow River, and the matter of result is so systematized that the agreement specifies the amount of compensation to be paid for every j.a.panese killed on active service; it declares that the j.a.panese will deliver arms and ammunition in the districts of Jihchow in Shantung and Haichow in Kiangsu; and it ends by stating that the first instalment of cash, Yen 400,000, had been paid over in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The second doc.u.ment is an additional loan agreement between the interested parties creating a special "trading" corporation, perhaps satirically named "The Europe and Asia Trading Company," which in a consideration of a loan of half a million yen gives j.a.panese prior rights over all the mines of China.
ALLEGED SECRET AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN SUN WEN (SUN YAT SEN) AND THE j.a.pANESE
In order to preserve the peace in the Far East, it is necessary for China and j.a.pan to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance whereby in case of war with any other nation or nations j.a.pan shall supply the military force while China shall be responsible for the finances. It is impossible for the present Chinese Government to work hand in hand with the j.a.panese Government nor does the j.a.panese Government desire to co-operate with the former. Consequently j.a.panese politicians and merchants who have the peace of the Far East at heart are anxious to a.s.sist China in her reconstruction. For this object the following Agreement is entered into by the two parties:
1. Before an uprising is started, Terao, Okura, Tseji Karoku and their a.s.sociates shall provide the necessary funds, weapons and military force, but the funds so provided must not exceed 1,500,000 yen and rifles not to exceed 100,000 pieces.
2. Before the uprising takes place the loan shall be temporarily secured by 10,000,000 yen worth of bonds to be issued by Sun Wen (Sun Yat Sen). It shall however, be secured afterwards by all the movable properties of the occupied territory. (See Article 14 of this Agreement.)
3. The funds from the present loan and military force to be provided are for operations in the provinces South of the Yellow River, viz.: Yunnan, Kweichow, Hunan, Hupeh, Szechuan, Kiangsi, Anhuei, Kiangsu Chekiang, f.u.kien, Kw.a.n.gsi and Kw.a.n.gtung. If it is intended to invade the Northern provinces North of the Yellow River, Tseji Karoku and his a.s.sociates shall partic.i.p.ate with the revolutionists in all deliberations connected with such operations.
4. The j.a.panese volunteer force shall be allowed from the date of their enrolment active service pay in accordance with the regulations of the j.a.panese army. After the occupation of a place, the two parties will settle the mode of rewarding the meritorious and compensating the family of the killed, adopting the most generous practice in vogue in China and j.a.pan. In the case of the killed, compensation for each soldier shall, at the least, be more than 1,000 yen.
5. Wherever the revolutionary army might be located the j.a.panese military officers accompanying these expeditions shall have the right to advise a continuation or cessation of operations.
6. After the revolutionary army has occupied a region and strengthened its defences, all industrial undertakings and railway construction and the like, not mentioned in the Treaties with other foreign Powers, shall be worked with joint capital together with the j.a.panese.
7. On the establishment of a new Government in China, all j.a.pan"s demands on China shall be recognized by the new Government as settled and binding.
8. All j.a.panese Military Officers holding the rank of Captain or higher ranks engaged by the Chinese revolutionary army shall have the privilege of being continued in their employment with a limit as to date and shall have the right to ask to be thus employed.
9. The loan shall be paid over in three instalments. The first instalment will be 400,000 yen, the second instalment ... yen and the third instalment ... yen. After the first instalment is paid over, Okura who advances the loan shall have the right to appoint men to supervise the expenditure of the money.
10. The j.a.panese shall undertake to deliver all arms and ammunition in the Districts of Jih Chao and Haichow (in Shantung and Kiangsu, South of Kiaochow).
11. The payment of the first instalment of the loan shall be made not later than three days after the signing of this Agreement.
12. All the employed j.a.panese Military officers and j.a.panese volunteers are in duty bound to obey the orders of the Commander of the revolutionary army.
13. The Commander of the revolutionary army shall have the right to send back to j.a.pan those j.a.panese military officers and j.a.panese volunteers who disobey his orders and their pa.s.sage money shall not be paid if such decision meets with the approval of three or more of the j.a.panese who accompany the revolutionary force.
14. All the commissariat departments in the occupied territory must employ j.a.panese experts to co-operate in their management.
15. This Agreement takes effect immediately it is signed by the two parties.
The foregoing fifteen articles have been discussed several times between the two parties and signed by them in February. The first instalment of 400,000 yen has been paid according to the terms of this Agreement.
LOAN AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY REPRESENTED BY CHANG YAO-CHING AND HIS a.s.sOCIATES OF THE FIRST PART AND KAWASAKI KULANOSKE OF THE SECOND PART
1. The Europe and Asia Trading Company undertakes to raise a loan of 500,000 yen. After the Agreement is signed and sealed by the contracting parties the j.a.panese Central Bank shall hand over 3/10 of the loan as the first instalment. When Chang Yao-Ching and his a.s.sociates arrive at their proper destination the sum of 150,000 yen shall be paid over as the second instalment. When final arrangements are made the third and last instalment of 200,000 yen shall be paid.
2. When money is to be paid out, the Europe and Asia Trading Company shall appoint supervisors. Responsible individuals of the contracting parties shall jointly affix their seals (to the cheques) before money is drawn for expenditure.
3. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall secure a volunteer force of 150 men, only retired officers of the j.a.panese army to be eligible.
4. On leaving j.a.pan the travelling expenses and personal effects of the volunteers shall be borne by themselves. After reaching China, Chang Yao-Ching and his a.s.sociates shall give the volunteers the pay of officers of the subordinate grade according to the established regulations of the j.a.panese army.
5. If a volunteer is wounded while on duty Chang Yao-Ching and his a.s.sociates shall pay him a provisional compensation of not exceeding 1,000 yen. When wounded seriously a provisional compensation of 5,000 yen shall be paid as well as a life pension in accordance with the rules of the j.a.panese army. If a volunteer meets with an accident, thus losing his life, an indemnity of 50,000 yen shall be paid to his family.
6. If a volunteer is not qualified for duty Chang Yao-Ching and his a.s.sociates shall have the power to dismiss him. All volunteers are subject to the orders of Chang Yao-Ching and his a.s.sociates and to their command in the battlefields.
7. When volunteers are required to attack a certain selected place it shall be their duty to do so. But the necessary expenses for the undertaking shall be determined beforehand by both parties after investigating into existing conditions.
8. The volunteer force shall be organized after the model of the j.a.panese army. Two j.a.panese officers recommended by the Europe and Asia Trading Company shall be employed.
9. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the power to dispose of the public properties in the places occupied by the volunteer force.
10. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the first preference for working the mines in places occupied and protected by the volunteer force.