2 The straight line is the shortest path from one point to another;
3 Through a given point there is not more than one parallel to a given straight.
Although generally a proof of the second of these axioms is omitted, it would be possible to deduce it from the other two and from those, much more numerous, which are implicitly admitted without enunciating them, as I shall explain further on.
It was long sought in vain to demonstrate likewise the third axiom, known as _Euclid"s Postulate_. What vast effort has been wasted in this chimeric hope is truly unimaginable. Finally, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and almost at the same time, a Hungarian and a Russian, Bolyai and Lobachevski, established irrefutably that this demonstration is impossible; they have almost rid us of inventors of geometries "sans postulatum"; since then the Academie des Sciences receives only about one or two new demonstrations a year.
The question was not exhausted; it soon made a great stride by the publication of Riemann"s celebrated memoir ent.i.tled: _Ueber die Hypothesen welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen_. This paper has inspired most of the recent works of which I shall speak further on, and among which it is proper to cite those of Beltrami and of Helmholtz.
THE BOLYAI-LOBACHEVSKI GEOMETRY.--If it were possible to deduce Euclid"s postulate from the other axioms, it is evident that in denying the postulate and admitting the other axioms, we should be led to contradictory consequences; it would therefore be impossible to base on such premises a coherent geometry.
Now this is precisely what Lobachevski did.
He a.s.sumes at the start that: _Through a given point can be drawn two parallels to a given straight_.
And he retains besides all Euclid"s other axioms. From these hypotheses he deduces a series of theorems among which it is impossible to find any contradiction, and he constructs a geometry whose faultless logic is inferior in nothing to that of the Euclidean geometry.
The theorems are, of course, very different from those to which we are accustomed, and they can not fail to be at first a little disconcerting.
Thus the sum of the angles of a triangle is always less than two right angles, and the difference between this sum and two right angles is proportional to the surface of the triangle.
It is impossible to construct a figure similar to a given figure but of different dimensions.
If we divide a circ.u.mference into _n_ equal parts, and draw tangents at the points of division, these _n_ tangents will form a polygon if the radius of the circle is small enough; but if this radius is sufficiently great they will not meet.
It is useless to multiply these examples; Lobachevski"s propositions have no relation to those of Euclid, but they are not less logically bound one to another.
RIEMANN"S GEOMETRY.--Imagine a world uniquely peopled by beings of no thickness (height); and suppose these "infinitely flat" animals are all in the same plane and can not get out. Admit besides that this world is sufficiently far from others to be free from their influence. While we are making hypotheses, it costs us no more to endow these beings with reason and believe them capable of creating a geometry. In that case, they will certainly attribute to s.p.a.ce only two dimensions.
But suppose now that these imaginary animals, while remaining without thickness, have the form of a spherical, and not of a plane, figure, and are all on the same sphere without power to get off. What geometry will they construct? First it is clear they will attribute to s.p.a.ce only two dimensions; what will play for them the role of the straight line will be the shortest path from one point to another on the sphere, that is to say, an arc of a great circle; in a word, their geometry will be the spherical geometry.
What they will call s.p.a.ce will be this sphere on which they must stay, and on which happen all the phenomena they can know. Their s.p.a.ce will therefore be _unbounded_ since on a sphere one can always go forward without ever being stopped, and yet it will be _finite_; one can never find the end of it, but one can make a tour of it.
Well, Riemann"s geometry is spherical geometry extended to three dimensions. To construct it, the German mathematician had to throw overboard, not only Euclid"s postulate, but also the first axiom: _Only one straight can pa.s.s through two points_.
On a sphere, through two given points we can draw _in general_ only one great circle (which, as we have just seen, would play the role of the straight for our imaginary beings); but there is an exception: if the two given points are diametrically opposite, an infinity of great circles can be drawn through them.
In the same way, in Riemann"s geometry (at least in one of its forms), through two points will pa.s.s in general only a single straight; but there are exceptional cases where through two points an infinity of straights can pa.s.s.
There is a sort of opposition between Riemann"s geometry and that of Lobachevski.
Thus the sum of the angles of a triangle is:
Equal to two right angles in Euclid"s geometry;
Less than two right angles in that of Lobachevski;
Greater than two right angles in that of Riemann.
The number of straights through a given point that can be drawn coplanar to a given straight, but nowhere meeting it, is equal:
To one in Euclid"s geometry;
To zero in that of Riemann;
To infinity in that of Lobachevski.
Add that Riemann"s s.p.a.ce is finite, although unbounded, in the sense given above to these two words.
THE SURFACES OF CONSTANT CURVATURE.--One objection still remained possible. The theorems of Lobachevski and of Riemann present no contradiction; but however numerous the consequences these two geometers have drawn from their hypotheses, they must have stopped before exhausting them, since their number would be infinite; who can say then that if they had pushed their deductions farther they would not have eventually reached some contradiction?
This difficulty does not exist for Riemann"s geometry, provided it is limited to two dimensions; in fact, as we have seen, two-dimensional Riemannian geometry does not differ from spherical geometry, which is only a branch of ordinary geometry, and consequently is beyond all discussion.
Beltrami, in correlating likewise Lobachevski"s two-dimensional geometry with a branch of ordinary geometry, has equally refuted the objection so far as it is concerned.
Here is how he accomplished it. Consider any figure on a surface.
Imagine this figure traced on a flexible and inextensible canvas applied over this surface in such a way that when the canvas is displaced and deformed, the various lines of this figure can change their form without changing their length. In general, this flexible and inextensible figure can not be displaced without leaving the surface; but there are certain particular surfaces for which such a movement would be possible; these are the surfaces of constant curvature.
If we resume the comparison made above and imagine beings without thickness living on one of these surfaces, they will regard as possible the motion of a figure all of whose lines remain constant in length. On the contrary, such a movement would appear absurd to animals without thickness living on a surface of variable curvature.
These surfaces of constant curvature are of two sorts: Some are of _positive curvature_, and can be deformed so as to be applied over a sphere. The geometry of these surfaces reduces itself therefore to the spherical geometry, which is that of Riemann.
The others are of _negative curvature_. Beltrami has shown that the geometry of these surfaces is none other than that of Lobachevski. The two-dimensional geometries of Riemann and Lobachevski are thus correlated to the Euclidean geometry.
INTERPRETATION OF NON-EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRIES.--So vanishes the objection so far as two-dimensional geometries are concerned.
It would be easy to extend Beltrami"s reasoning to three-dimensional geometries. The minds that s.p.a.ce of four dimensions does not repel will see no difficulty in it, but they are few. I prefer therefore to proceed otherwise.
Consider a certain plane, which I shall call the fundamental plane, and construct a sort of dictionary, by making correspond each to each a double series of terms written in two columns, just as correspond in the ordinary dictionaries the words of two languages whose significance is the same:
_s.p.a.ce_: Portion of s.p.a.ce situated above the fundamental plane.
_Plane_: Sphere cutting the fundamental plane orthogonally.
_Straight_: Circle cutting the fundamental plane orthogonally.
_Sphere_: Sphere.
_Circle_: Circle.
_Angle_: Angle.
_Distance between two points_: Logarithm of the cross ratio of these two points and the intersections of the fundamental plane with a circle pa.s.sing through these two points and cutting it orthogonally. Etc., Etc.
Now take Lobachevski"s theorems and translate them with the aid of this dictionary as we translate a German text with the aid of a German-English dictionary. _We shall thus obtain theorems of the ordinary geometry._ For example, that theorem of Lobachevski: "the sum of the angles of a triangle is less than two right angles" is translated thus: "If a curvilinear triangle has for sides circle-arcs which prolonged would cut orthogonally the fundamental plane, the sum of the angles of this curvilinear triangle will be less than two right angles."
Thus, however far the consequences of Lobachevski"s hypotheses are pushed, they will never lead to a contradiction. In fact, if two of Lobachevski"s theorems were contradictory, it would be the same with the translations of these two theorems, made by the aid of our dictionary, but these translations are theorems of ordinary geometry and no one doubts that the ordinary geometry is free from contradiction. Whence comes this certainty and is it justified? That is a question I can not treat here because it would require to be enlarged upon, but which is very interesting and I think not insoluble.
Nothing remains then of the objection above formulated. This is not all.
Lobachevski"s geometry, susceptible of a concrete interpretation, ceases to be a vain logical exercise and is capable of applications; I have not the time to speak here of these applications, nor of the aid that Klein and I have gotten from them for the integration of linear differential equations.