PART IV
NATURE
CHAPTER IX
HYPOTHESES IN PHYSICS
THE RoLE OF EXPERIMENT AND GENERALIZATION.--Experiment is the sole source of truth. It alone can teach us anything new; it alone can give us certainty. These are two points that can not be questioned.
But then, if experiment is everything, what place will remain for mathematical physics? What has experimental physics to do with such an aid, one which seems useless and perhaps even dangerous?
And yet mathematical physics exists, and has done unquestionable service. We have here a fact that must be explained.
The explanation is that merely to observe is not enough. We must use our observations, and to do that we must generalize. This is what men always have done; only as the memory of past errors has made them more and more careful, they have observed more and more, and generalized less and less.
Every age has ridiculed the one before it, and accused it of having generalized too quickly and too navely. Descartes pitied the Ionians; Descartes, in his turn, makes us smile. No doubt our children will some day laugh at us.
But can we not then pa.s.s over immediately to the goal? Is not this the means of escaping the ridicule that we foresee? Can we not be content with just the bare experiment?
No, that is impossible; it would be to mistake utterly the true nature of science. The scientist must set in order. Science is built up with facts, as a house is with stones. But a collection of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones is a house.
And above all the scientist must foresee. Carlyle has somewhere said something like this: "Nothing but facts are of importance. John Lackland pa.s.sed by here. Here is something that is admirable. Here is a reality for which I would give all the theories in the world." Carlyle was a fellow countryman of Bacon; but Bacon would not have said that. That is the language of the historian. The physicist would say rather: "John Lackland pa.s.sed by here; that makes no difference to me, for he never will pa.s.s this way again."
We all know that there are good experiments and poor ones. The latter will acc.u.mulate in vain; though one may have made a hundred or a thousand, a single piece of work by a true master, by a Pasteur, for example, will suffice to tumble them into oblivion. Bacon would have well understood this; it is he who invented the phrase _Experimentum crucis_. But Carlyle would not have understood it. A fact is a fact. A pupil has read a certain number on his thermometer; he has taken no precaution; no matter, he has read it, and if it is only the fact that counts, here is a reality of the same rank as the peregrinations of King John Lackland. Why is the fact that this pupil has made this reading of no interest, while the fact that a skilled physicist had made another reading might be on the contrary very important? It is because from the first reading we could not infer anything. What then is a good experiment? It is that which informs us of something besides an isolated fact; it is that which enables us to foresee, that is, that which enables us to generalize.
For without generalization foreknowledge is impossible. The circ.u.mstances under which one has worked will never reproduce themselves all at once. The observed action then will never recur; the only thing that can be affirmed is that under a.n.a.logous circ.u.mstances an a.n.a.logous action will be produced. In order to foresee, then, it is necessary to invoke at least a.n.a.logy, that is to say, already then to generalize.
No matter how timid one may be, still it is necessary to interpolate.
Experiment gives us only a certain number of isolated points. We must unite these by a continuous line. This is a veritable generalization.
But we do more; the curve that we shall trace will pa.s.s between the observed points and near these points; it will not pa.s.s through these points themselves. Thus one does not restrict himself to generalizing the experiments, but corrects them; and the physicist who should try to abstain from these corrections and really be content with the bare experiment, would be forced to enunciate some very strange laws.
The bare facts, then, would not be enough for us; and that is why we must have science ordered, or rather organized.
It is often said experiments must be made without a preconceived idea.
That is impossible. Not only would it make all experiment barren, but that would be attempted which could not be done. Every one carries in his mind his own conception of the world, of which he can not so easily rid himself. We must, for instance, use language; and our language is made up only of preconceived ideas and can not be otherwise. Only these are unconscious preconceived ideas, a thousand times more dangerous than the others.
Shall we say that if we introduce others, of which we are fully conscious, we shall only aggravate the evil? I think not. I believe rather that they will serve as counterbalances to each other--I was going to say as antidotes; they will in general accord ill with one another--they will come into conflict with one another, and thereby force us to regard things under different aspects. This is enough to emanc.i.p.ate us. He is no longer a slave who can choose his master.
Thus, thanks to generalization, each fact observed enables us to foresee a great many others; only we must not forget that the first alone is certain, that all others are merely probable. No matter how solidly founded a prediction may appear to us, we are never _absolutely_ sure that experiment will not contradict it, if we undertake to verify it.
The probability, however, is often so great that practically we may be content with it. It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to foresee at all.
One must, then, never disdain to make a verification when opportunity offers. But all experiment is long and difficult; the workers are few; and the number of facts that we need to foresee is immense. Compared with this ma.s.s the number of direct verifications that we can make will never be anything but a negligible quant.i.ty.
Of this few that we can directly attain, we must make the best use; it is very necessary to get from every experiment the greatest possible number of predictions, and with the highest possible degree of probability. The problem is, so to speak, to increase the yield of the scientific machine.
Let us compare science to a library that ought to grow continually. The librarian has at his disposal for his purchases only insufficient funds.
He ought to make an effort not to waste them.
It is experimental physics that is entrusted with the purchases. It alone, then, can enrich the library.
As for mathematical physics, its task will be to make out the catalogue.
If the catalogue is well made, the library will not be any richer, but the reader will be helped to use its riches.
And even by showing the librarian the gaps in his collections, it will enable him to make a judicious use of his funds; which is all the more important because these funds are entirely inadequate.
Such, then, is the role of mathematical physics. It must direct generalization in such a manner as to increase what I just now called the yield of science. By what means it can arrive at this, and how it can do it without danger, is what remains for us to investigate.
THE UNITY OF NATURE.--Let us notice, first of all, that every generalization implies in some measure the belief in the unity and simplicity of nature. As to the unity there can be no difficulty. If the different parts of the universe were not like the members of one body, they would not act on one another, they would know nothing of one another; and we in particular would know only one of these parts. We do not ask, then, if nature is one, but how it is one.
As for the second point, that is not such an easy matter. It is not certain that nature is simple. Can we without danger act as if it were?
There was a time when the simplicity of Mariotte"s law was an argument invoked in favor of its accuracy; when Fresnel himself, after having said in a conversation with Laplace that nature was not concerned about a.n.a.lytical difficulties, felt himself obliged to make explanations, in order not to strike too hard at prevailing opinion.
To-day ideas have greatly changed; and yet, those who do not believe that natural laws have to be simple, are still often obliged to act as if they did. They could not entirely avoid this necessity without making impossible all generalization, and consequently all science.
It is clear that any fact can be generalized in an infinity of ways, and it is a question of choice. The choice can be guided only by considerations of simplicity. Let us take the most commonplace case, that of interpolation. We pa.s.s a continuous line, as regular as possible, between the points given by observation. Why do we avoid points making angles and too abrupt turns? Why do we not make our curve describe the most capricious zig-zags? It is because we know beforehand, or believe we know, that the law to be expressed can not be so complicated as all that.
We may calculate the ma.s.s of Jupiter from either the movements of its satellites, or the perturbations of the major planets, or those of the minor planets. If we take the averages of the determinations obtained by these three methods, we find three numbers very close together, but different. We might interpret this result by supposing that the coefficient of gravitation is not the same in the three cases. The observations would certainly be much better represented. Why do we reject this interpretation? Not because it is absurd, but because it is needlessly complicated. We shall only accept it when we are forced to, and that is not yet.
To sum up, ordinarily every law is held to be simple till the contrary is proved.
This custom is imposed upon physicists by the causes that I have just explained. But how shall we justify it in the presence of discoveries that show us every day new details that are richer and more complex? How shall we even reconcile it with the belief in the unity of nature? For if everything depends on everything, relationships where so many diverse factors enter can no longer be simple.
If we study the history of science, we see happen two inverse phenomena, so to speak. Sometimes simplicity hides under complex appearances; sometimes it is the simplicity which is apparent, and which disguises extremely complicated realities.
What is more complicated than the confused movements of the planets?
What simpler than Newton"s law? Here nature, making sport, as Fresnel said, of a.n.a.lytical difficulties, employs only simple means, and by combining them produces I know not what inextricable tangle. Here it is the hidden simplicity which must be discovered.
Examples of the opposite abound. In the kinetic theory of gases, one deals with molecules moving with great velocities, whose paths, altered by incessant collisions, have the most capricious forms and traverse s.p.a.ce in every direction. The observable result is Mariotte"s simple law. Every individual fact was complicated. The law of great numbers has reestablished simplicity in the average. Here the simplicity is merely apparent, and only the coa.r.s.eness of our senses prevents our perceiving the complexity.
Many phenomena obey a law of proportionality. But why? Because in these phenomena there is something very small. The simple law observed, then, is only a result of the general a.n.a.lytical rule that the infinitely small increment of a function is proportional to the increment of the variable. As in reality our increments are not infinitely small, but very small, the law of proportionality is only approximate, and the simplicity is only apparent. What I have just said applies to the rule of the superposition of small motions, the use of which is so fruitful, and which is the basis of optics.
And Newton"s law itself? Its simplicity, so long undetected, is perhaps only apparent. Who knows whether it is not due to some complicated mechanism, to the impact of some subtile matter animated by irregular movements, and whether it has not become simple only through the action of averages and of great numbers? In any case, it is difficult not to suppose that the true law contains complementary terms, which would become sensible at small distances. If in astronomy they are negligible as modifying Newton"s law, and if the law thus regains its simplicity, it would be only because of the immensity of celestial distances.
No doubt, if our means of investigation should become more and more penetrating, we should discover the simple under the complex, then the complex under the simple, then again the simple under the complex, and so on, without our being able to foresee what will be the last term.
We must stop somewhere, and that science may be possible we must stop when we have found simplicity. This is the only ground on which we can rear the edifice of our generalizations. But this simplicity being only apparent, will the ground be firm enough? This is what must be investigated.
For that purpose, let us see what part is played in our generalizations by the belief in simplicity. We have verified a simple law in a good many particular cases; we refuse to admit that this agreement, so often repeated, is simply the result of chance, and conclude that the law must be true in the general case.
Kepler notices that a planet"s positions, as observed by Tycho, are all on one ellipse. Never for a moment does he have the thought that by a strange play of chance Tycho never observed the heavens except at a moment when the real orbit of the planet happened to cut this ellipse.