If then for any two elements _A_ and _B_ of the continuum _C_, it is always the first case which presents itself, we shall say that _C_ remains all in one piece despite the cuts.
Thus, if we choose the cuts in a certain way, otherwise arbitrary, it may happen either that the continuum remains all in one piece or that it does not remain all in one piece; in this latter hypothesis we shall then say that it is _divided_ by the cuts.
It will be noticed that all these definitions are constructed in setting out solely from this very simple fact, that two manifolds of impressions sometimes can be discriminated, sometimes can not be. That postulated, if, to _divide_ a continuum, it suffices to consider as cuts a certain number of elements all distinguishable from one another, we say that this continuum _is of one dimension_; if, on the contrary, to divide a continuum, it is necessary to consider as cuts a system of elements themselves forming one or several continua, we shall say that this continuum is _of several dimensions_.
If to divide a continuum _C_, cuts forming one or several continua of one dimension suffice, we shall say that _C_ is a continuum _of two dimensions_; if cuts suffice which form one or several continua of two dimensions at most, we shall say that _C_ is a continuum _of three dimensions_; and so on.
To justify this definition it is proper to see whether it is in this way that geometers introduce the notion of three dimensions at the beginning of their works. Now, what do we see? Usually they begin by defining surfaces as the boundaries of solids or pieces of s.p.a.ce, lines as the boundaries of surfaces, points as the boundaries of lines, and they affirm that the same procedure can not be pushed further.
This is just the idea given above: to divide s.p.a.ce, cuts that are called surfaces are necessary; to divide surfaces, cuts that are called lines are necessary; to divide lines, cuts that are called points are necessary; we can go no further, the point can not be divided, so the point is not a continuum. Then lines which can be divided by cuts which are not continua will be continua of one dimension; surfaces which can be divided by continuous cuts of one dimension will be continua of two dimensions; finally, s.p.a.ce which can be divided by continuous cuts of two dimensions will be a continuum of three dimensions.
Thus the definition I have just given does not differ essentially from the usual definitions; I have only endeavored to give it a form applicable not to the mathematical continuum, but to the physical continuum, which alone is susceptible of representation, and yet to retain all its precision. Moreover, we see that this definition applies not alone to s.p.a.ce; that in all which falls under our senses we find the characteristics of the physical continuum, which would allow of the same cla.s.sification; that it would be easy to find there examples of continua of four, of five, dimensions, in the sense of the preceding definition; such examples occur of themselves to the mind.
I should explain finally, if I had the time, that this science, of which I spoke above and to which Riemann gave the name of a.n.a.lysis situs, teaches us to make distinctions among continua of the same number of dimensions and that the cla.s.sification of these continua rests also on the consideration of cuts.
From this notion has arisen that of the mathematical continuum of several dimensions in the same way that the physical continuum of one dimension engendered the mathematical continuum of one dimension. The formula
_A_ > _C_, _A_ = _B_, _B_ = _C_,
which summed up the data of crude experience, implied an intolerable contradiction. To get free from it, it was necessary to introduce a new notion while still respecting the essential characteristics of the physical continuum of several dimensions. The mathematical continuum of one dimension admitted of a scale whose divisions, infinite in number, corresponded to the different values, commensurable or not, of one same magnitude. To have the mathematical continuum of _n_ dimensions, it will suffice to take _n_ like scales whose divisions correspond to different values of _n_ independent magnitudes called coordinates. We thus shall have an image of the physical continuum of _n_ dimensions, and this image will be as faithful as it can be after the determination not to allow the contradiction of which I spoke above.
4. _The Notion of Point_
It seems now that the question we put to ourselves at the start is answered. When we say that s.p.a.ce has three dimensions, it will be said, we mean that the manifold of points of s.p.a.ce satisfies the definition we have just given of the physical continuum of three dimensions. To be content with that would be to suppose that we know what is the manifold of points of s.p.a.ce, or even one point of s.p.a.ce.
Now that is not as simple as one might think. Every one believes he knows what a point is, and it is just because we know it too well that we think there is no need of defining it. Surely we can not be required to know how to define it, because in going back from definition to definition a time must come when we must stop. But at what moment should we stop?
We shall stop first when we reach an object which falls under our senses or that we can represent to ourselves; definition then will become useless; we do not define the sheep to a child; we say to him: _See_ the sheep.
So, then, we should ask ourselves if it is possible to represent to ourselves a point of s.p.a.ce. Those who answer yes do not reflect that they represent to themselves in reality a white spot made with the chalk on a blackboard or a black spot made with a pen on white paper, and that they can represent to themselves only an object or rather the impressions that this object made on their senses.
When they try to represent to themselves a point, they represent the impressions that very little objects made them feel. It is needless to add that two different objects, though both very little, may produce extremely different impressions, but I shall not dwell on this difficulty, which would still require some discussion.
But it is not a question of that; it does not suffice to represent _one_ point, it is necessary to represent _a certain_ point and to have the means of distinguishing it from an _other_ point. And in fact, that we may be able to apply to a continuum the rule I have above expounded and by which one may recognize the number of its dimensions, we must rely upon the fact that two elements of this continuum sometimes can and sometimes can not be distinguished. It is necessary therefore that we should in certain cases know how to represent to ourselves _a specific_ element and to distinguish it from an _other_ element.
The question is to know whether the point that I represented to myself an hour ago is the same as this that I now represent to myself, or whether it is a different point. In other words, how do we know whether the point occupied by the object _A_ at the instant [alpha] is the same as the point occupied by the object _B_ at the instant [beta], or still better, what this means?
I am seated in my room; an object is placed on my table; during a second I do not move, no one touches the object. I am tempted to say that the point _A_ which this object occupied at the beginning of this second is identical with the point _B_ which it occupies at its end. Not at all; from the point _A_ to the point _B_ is 30 kilometers, because the object has been carried along in the motion of the earth. We can not know whether an object, be it large or small, has not changed its absolute position in s.p.a.ce, and not only can we not affirm it, but this affirmation has no meaning and in any case can not correspond to any representation.
But then we may ask ourselves if the relative position of an object with regard to other objects has changed or not, and first whether the relative position of this object with regard to our body has changed. If the impressions this object makes upon us have not changed, we shall be inclined to judge that neither has this relative position changed; if they have changed, we shall judge that this object has changed either in state or in relative position. It remains to decide which of the _two_.
I have explained in "Science and Hypothesis" how we have been led to distinguish the changes of position. Moreover, I shall return to that further on. We come to know, therefore, whether the relative position of an object with regard to our body has or has not remained the same.
If now we see that two objects have retained their relative position with regard to our body, we conclude that the relative position of these two objects with regard to one another has not changed; but we reach this conclusion only by indirect reasoning. The only thing that we know directly is the relative position of the objects with regard to our body. _A fortiori_ it is only by indirect reasoning that we think we know (and, moreover, this belief is delusive) whether the absolute position of the object has changed.
In a word, the system of coordinate axes to which we naturally refer all exterior objects is a system of axes invariably bound to our body, and carried around with us.
It is impossible to represent to oneself absolute s.p.a.ce; when I try to represent to myself simultaneously objects and myself in motion in absolute s.p.a.ce, in reality I represent to myself my own self motionless and seeing move around me different objects and a man that is exterior to me, but that I convene to call me.
Will the difficulty be solved if we agree to refer everything to these axes bound to our body? Shall we know then what is a point thus defined by its relative position with regard to ourselves? Many persons will answer yes and will say that they "localize" exterior objects.
What does this mean? To localize an object simply means to represent to oneself the movements that would be necessary to reach it. I will explain myself. It is not a question of representing the movements themselves in s.p.a.ce, but solely of representing to oneself the muscular sensations which accompany these movements and which do not presuppose the preexistence of the notion of s.p.a.ce.
If we suppose two different objects which successively occupy the same relative position with regard to ourselves, the impressions that these two objects make upon us will be very different; if we localize them at the same point, this is simply because it is necessary to make the same movements to reach them; apart from that, one can not just see what they could have in common.
But, given an object, we can conceive many different series of movements which equally enable us to reach it. If then we represent to ourselves a point by representing to ourselves the series of muscular sensations which accompany the movements which enable us to reach this point, there will be many ways entirely different of representing to oneself the same point. If one is not satisfied with this solution, but wishes, for instance, to bring in the visual sensations along with the muscular sensations, there will be one or two more ways of representing to oneself this same point and the difficulty will only be increased. In any case the following question comes up: Why do we think that all these representations so different from one another still represent the same point?
Another remark: I have just said that it is to our own body that we naturally refer exterior objects; that we carry about everywhere with us a system of axes to which we refer all the points of s.p.a.ce and that this system of axes seems to be invariably bound to our body. It should be noticed that rigorously we could not speak of axes invariably bound to the body unless the different parts of this body were themselves invariably bound to one another. As this is not the case, we ought, before referring exterior objects to these fict.i.tious axes, to suppose our body brought back to the initial att.i.tude.
5. _The Notion of Displacement_
I have shown in "Science and Hypothesis" the preponderant role played by the movements of our body in the genesis of the notion of s.p.a.ce. For a being completely immovable there would be neither s.p.a.ce nor geometry; in vain would exterior objects be displaced about him, the variations which these displacements would make in his impressions would not be attributed by this being to changes of position, but to simple changes of state; this being would have no means of distinguishing these two sorts of changes, and this distinction, fundamental for us, would have no meaning for him.
The movements that we impress upon our members have as effect the varying of the impressions produced on our senses by external objects; other causes may likewise make them vary; but we are led to distinguish the changes produced by our own motions and we easily discriminate them for two reasons: (1) because they are voluntary; (2) because they are accompanied by muscular sensations.
So we naturally divide the changes that our impressions may undergo into two categories to which perhaps I have given an inappropriate designation: (1) the internal changes, which are voluntary and accompanied by muscular sensations; (2) the external changes, having the opposite characteristics.
We then observe that among the external changes are some which can be corrected, thanks to an internal change which brings everything back to the primitive state; others can not be corrected in this way (it is thus that, when an exterior object is displaced, we may then by changing our own position replace ourselves as regards this object in the same relative position as before, so as to reestablish the original aggregate of impressions; if this object was not displaced, but changed its state, that is impossible). Thence comes a new distinction among external changes: those which may be so corrected we call changes of position; and the others, changes of state.
Think, for example, of a sphere with one hemisphere blue and the other red; it first presents to us the blue hemisphere, then it so revolves as to present the red hemisphere. Now think of a spherical vase containing a blue liquid which becomes red in consequence of a chemical reaction.
In both cases the sensation of red has replaced that of blue; our senses have experienced the same impressions which have succeeded each other in the same order, and yet these two changes are regarded by us as very different; the first is a displacement, the second a change of state.
Why? Because in the first case it is sufficient for me to go around the sphere to place myself opposite the blue hemisphere and reestablish the original blue sensation.
Still more; if the two hemispheres, in place of being red and blue, had been yellow and green, how should I have interpreted the revolution of the sphere? Before, the red succeeded the blue, now the green succeeds the yellow; and yet I say that the two spheres have undergone the same revolution, that each has turned about its axis; yet I can not say that the green is to yellow as the red is to blue; how then am I led to decide that the two spheres have undergone the _same_ displacement?
Evidently because, in one case as in the other, I am able to reestablish the original sensation by going around the sphere, by making the same movements, and I know that I have made the same movements because I have felt the same muscular sensations; to know it, I do not need, therefore, to know geometry in advance and to represent to myself the movements of my body in geometric s.p.a.ce.
Another example: An object is displaced before my eye; its image was first formed at the center of the retina; then it is formed at the border; the old sensation was carried to me by a nerve fiber ending at the center of the retina; the new sensation is carried to me by _another_ nerve fiber starting from the border of the retina; these two sensations are qualitatively different; otherwise, how could I distinguish them?
Why then am I led to decide that these two sensations, qualitatively different, represent the same image, which has been displaced? It is because I _can follow the object with the eye_ and by a displacement of the eye, voluntary and accompanied by muscular sensations, bring back the image to the center of the retina and reestablish the primitive sensation.
I suppose that the image of a red object has gone from the center _A_ to the border _B_ of the retina, then that the image of a blue object goes in its turn from the center _A_ to the border _B_ of the retina; I shall decide that these two objects have undergone the _same_ displacement.
Why? Because in both cases I shall have been able to reestablish the primitive sensation, and that to do it I shall have had to execute the _same_ movement of the eye, and I shall know that my eye has executed the same movement because I shall have felt the _same_ muscular sensations.
If I could not move my eye, should I have any reason to suppose that the sensation of red at the center of the retina is to the sensation of red at the border of the retina as that of blue at the center is to that of blue at the border? I should only have four sensations qualitatively different, and if I were asked if they are connected by the proportion I have just stated, the question would seem to me ridiculous, just as if I were asked if there is an a.n.a.logous proportion between an auditory sensation, a tactile sensation and an olfactory sensation.
Let us now consider the internal changes, that is, those which are produced by the voluntary movements of our body and which are accompanied by muscular changes. They give rise to the two following observations, a.n.a.logous to those we have just made on the subject of external changes.
1. I may suppose that my body has moved from one point to another, but that the same _att.i.tude_ is retained; all the parts of the body have therefore retained or resumed the same _relative_ situation, although their absolute situation in s.p.a.ce may have varied. I may suppose that not only has the position of my body changed, but that its att.i.tude is no longer the same, that, for instance, my arms which before were folded are now stretched out.
I should therefore distinguish the simple changes of position without change of att.i.tude, and the changes of att.i.tude. Both would appear to me under form of muscular sensations. How then am I led to distinguish them? It is that the first may serve to correct an external change, and that the others can not, or at least can only give an imperfect correction.
This fact I proceed to explain as I would explain it to some one who already knew geometry, but it need not thence be concluded that it is necessary already to know geometry to make this distinction; before knowing geometry I ascertain the fact (experimentally, so to speak), without being able to explain it. But merely to make the distinction between the two kinds of change, I do not need to _explain_ the fact, it suffices me _to ascertain_ it.
However that may be, the explanation is easy. Suppose that an exterior object is displaced; if we wish the different parts of our body to resume with regard to this object their initial relative position, it is necessary that these different parts should have resumed likewise their initial relative position with regard to one another. Only the internal changes which satisfy this latter condition will be capable of correcting the external change produced by the displacement of that object. If, therefore, the relative position of my eye with regard to my finger has changed, I shall still be able to replace the eye in its initial relative situation with regard to the object and reestablish thus the primitive visual sensations, but then the relative position of the finger with regard to the object will have changed and the tactile sensations will not be reestablished.
2. We ascertain likewise that the same external change may be corrected by two internal changes corresponding to different muscular sensations.
Here again I can ascertain this without knowing geometry; and I have no need of anything else; but I proceed to give the explanation of the fact, employing geometrical language. To go from the position _A_ to the position _B_ I may take several routes. To the first of these routes will correspond a series _S_ of muscular sensations; to a second route will correspond another series _S"_, of muscular sensations which generally will be completely different, since other muscles will be used.