"Just as the electric incandescent light and the tallow-candle may exist side by side, and as each of them may serve its purpose in its proper place, so there exist also side by side various physical and metaphysical ideas and fundamental notions: the scientist and the philosopher and the old grandmother in her cottage on the remote mountain-side, cannot think of the world in the same way" (Ethik II, 240-244). But the argument, if it should prove anything, must be formulated thus: "As the incandescent light can at the same time be a tallow-candle, just so can two different and opposite views about one and the same thing be at the same time both right."
Thus, thanks to the science of modern subjectivism, every fixed and unchangeable truth, especially in the sphere of philosophy and religion, is removed, and with it also every barrier to freedom of thought in science as well as elsewhere. The human intellect in its autonomous self-consciousness may not only reject those truths which are proposed by revelation or the Church; it may not only experience its views of religion and the world by giving free activity to its feelings, it also knows that to be no longer satisfied with the old truths means to be progressive.
Above we have sketched the deeper-lying thoughts on which the liberal freedom of science is based; it is the humanitarian view of the world with its emanc.i.p.ation of man, and autonomous scepticism in thought, joined to that sceptical disregard of truth which once the representative of expiring pagan antiquity comprised in the words: _Quid est veritas?_ Now we also understand better the liberal science which often claims the privilege of being "the" science, and which only too often likes to put down as unwarranted and inferior every other science that does not pursue its investigations in the same way. We understand its methods of thought in philosophy and religion, for which it claims an exclusive privilege; we can also form a judgment of its claim to be the leader of humanity in place of faith.
No doubt there are many who are flirting with this freedom without accepting its principles entirely. They do not reason out the thing to the end, they argue against the invasion of the Church into the field of science, and point to _Galileo_; they denounce Index and Syllabus, and then believe they have therewith exhausted the meaning of freedom of science. That the real matter in question is a view of the world diametrically opposed to the Christian view, that a changed theory of cognition is underlying it, is by many but insufficiently realized.
This freedom is not acceptable to one who professes the Christian view of the world. He will not offer any feeble apology to the eulogist of this freedom, as, for instance: Indeed you are quite right about your freedom, but please remember that I, too, as a faithful Christian am ent.i.tled to profess freedom. No; the answer can only be: Freedom, yes; but _this_ freedom, no. A wholly different view of the world separates me from it. I see in it not freedom but rebellion, not the rights of man but upheaval, not a real boon of mankind but real danger.
The principle of liberalism has in the field of social economy already done enough to wreck man"s welfare. It has here proved its incompetence as a factor of civilization. That in science also, where it is active in the field of philosophy and religion, liberalism is the principle of overthrowing true science, without any appreciation for truth and human nature, that it is a principle of intellectual pauperism and decay, that it despoils man of his greatest treasures, inherited from better centuries-this we shall prove conclusively.
It is difficult to say how long the high tide of liberalism will sweep over the fields of modern intellectual life before it subsides. One thing, however, is certain, that just so long it will remain a danger to Christian civilization, and to the intellectual life of mankind.
SECOND SECTION. FREEDOM OF RESEARCH AND FAITH.
Chapter I. Research And Faith In General.
Introduction.
When the youth growing to maturity begins to feel the development of his own strength, it may happen that he finds his dependence on home unbearably trying. Perhaps he will say, "Father, give me the portion of substance that falleth to me," and then depart into a strange country.
The men of Europe have for centuries lived in the Christian religion as in their fathers" house, and have fared well. But to many children of our time the old homestead has become too confining. Modern man, we are told, has at last come to his senses. He wants to develop his personality, thoughts, and sentiments freely, independently of every authority. He turns his back on his father"s house. His parting words are the accusation: The old Church "opposes the modern principles of free individuality, the right to drain the cup of one"s own reason and personal life, and it sets itself against the whole of modern feeling, investigation, and activity" (_Th. Ziegler_, Gesch. der Ethik, II, 2d ed., 1892, p. 589).
We are already acquainted with this freedom. We approach now the main question: What is the true relation of the freedom, which man may rightly claim for his scientific activity and reason, to external laws and regulations? Is man really justified to reject them all on the plea that they degrade his intellect and are an obstacle to his development, or does this rejection but manifest an error into which his desire of freedom has decoyed him? This is the question, it will be remembered, that we reached soon in the beginning of our investigation. We have already found the categorical answer-an emphatic rejection of such justification; we also traced the hypotheses on which the answer rests. We now return to the question to discuss it in principle. We begin with the freedom of scientific _research_, in order to take up afterwards the freedom in _teaching_.
What are those external powers that may interrupt or caution the scientist in his investigations and problems? Here we do not yet consider the scientist as a teacher, communicating to the public the result of his investigation, his ideas and views, from the university chair to his scientific audience, or to a wider circle of hearers by means of publications; we here regard him in his private study only, in the pursuit of which he perhaps encounters new questions, and new solutions suggest themselves to him. What freedom can he and must he enjoy here? This private freedom must evidently be judged from a point of view other than that from which the freedom in teaching should be judged. With the latter, the interests of his contemporaries must be taken into account, and the question must be considered, whether they suffer by such teaching. The freedom of the scientist is greater than that of the teacher. Moreover, research is the princ.i.p.al and most important activity of science: nothing, surely, is taught that has not been previously investigated. If, therefore, research is in any way restricted, so also is teaching; but not _vice versa_. Are there, then, exterior authorities that may restrain research and reasoning, and what are they?
One who lives in the Christian world knows at once of what authority to think. It is not the state. The state cannot directly influence the private work of the student: if it may exert its influence directly upon anything, it is only upon freedom in teaching. No, the authority to think of is the authority of the faith, revealed religion and its guardian, the Church.
Of course, this is not the only authority. Even if a revelation from heaven had not been given us, yet those _general convictions of mankind_, common to all nations and times, of the immutability of the laws of thought and morality, of the existence of a supramundane G.o.d, of the retribution for moral conduct to be made in the world to come, of the sanct.i.ty of state-authority, of the necessity of private property, and others, would ever remain most revered utterances of truth. No one would be allowed to contradict this avowal of all mankind, relying on his own reasoning, which he calls science, and give the lie to the reasoning of all other men, in order to make his own reason the sole measure of truth.
But for the present let us pa.s.s over the natural authority of mankind, of its convictions and traditions. It is surpa.s.sed and replaced by the _authority of faith_ which belongs to _our Christian religion_. The latter comes to us claiming to possess the only true view of the world, and laying upon us the obligation of accepting it. It has even the courage to put its anathema upon propositions which the scientist may call science; it dares write out a list of the propositions which it condemns as untenable. Against this authority the protest is raised: Where is freedom of research, if one cannot even indulge in his own ideas, if the intellect is to be cropped and fettered? What is to become of frank, unprejudiced investigation, if I am from the outset bound to certain propositions, if from the outset the result at which I must arrive is already determined?
It is intellectual bondage that the man of faith is languishing in. Thus reads the indictment; thus sounds the battle-cry. Is the indictment justified? Can and shall science take faith as a guide in many instances without detriment to its own innate freedom? And where, and when?
First, the more general question: Is freedom of research compatible with the duty to believe, or do they exclude each other in principle?
What Faith is Not.
What, then, is faith, and what does the duty to believe demand of us?
Here we meet at once with a false proposition which the opponents of the Christian faith will not abandon. To them faith is always a blind a.s.sent, in giving which one does not ask, nor dare ask, whether the proposition be true-_a belief without personal conviction_. According to them the believer holds himself "captive to the teaching of his Church. He cannot reflect personally, but follows blindly the lead of authority and force of habit." Thus "Catholicism is the religion of bondage" (_W. Wundt_, Ethik, 3d ed., 1903, II, 255, 254). To them it is but an "uncritical submission to the existing authority, uninfluenced either by the testimony of the senses or the reflection of the intellect" (_K. Menger_, Neue Freie Presse, 24 Nov., 1907). The campaign for liberal science is denouncing those who "even to-day dare to demand blind faith," "without proof or criticism," faith in the "word of the Popes and men pretending to be interpreters and emissaries of G.o.d, men who have proved their incompetence and inability by the physical and religious coercion to which they have subjected mankind" (_T. G. Masaryk_, V boji o nabozenstvi, The Battle for Religion, 1904, p. 10, 23).
To be sure, if the Christian faith were such, it would be intellectual slavery. If I am compelled to believe something of which I cannot know the truth, this is coercion, and conflicts with the nature of the intellect and its right to truth. Infidelity would then be liberation. But faith is _not_ that.
As a rule this view is based on a presumption, which has already been extensively discussed, viz., that faith and religion have nothing at all to do with intellectual activity, but are merely the _product of the heart_, a sentimental, freely acting notion; for, of metaphysical objects no human intellect can form a certain conviction. It is subjectivism that leads to this view. According to it the subject creates its own world of thought, free in action and feeling, not indeed everywhere,-in the sphere of sense-experience the evidence of the concrete is too great,-but at least in the sphere of metaphysical truth.
Such modes of expression find their way also into Catholic literature and language; even here we meet with the a.s.sertion that religion is a matter of the heart, and for that very reason has nothing to do with science. On the whole it is a remarkable fact that among believing men many expressions are current that have been coined in the mint of modern philosophy, and have there received a special significance. They are used without real knowledge of their origin and purposed meaning; but the words do not fail to colour their ideas, and to create imperceptibly a strange train of thought.
One who is of the opinion that religion and views of the world are but sentiment and feeling, which change with one"s personality and individuality, can, of course, no longer understand a dogmatic Christianity and the obligation to hold fast to clearly defined dogmas as unchangeable truth. I can hold dogmas and doctrinal decisions to be unquestionably true only when I can _convince myself of their credibility_ by the judgment of my reason. If I cannot do that, and am still bound to believe them, without the least doubt, then such obedience is compulsory repression of the reason. Then it would indeed be necessary for the Church, as _Kant_ says, "to instil into its flock a pious dread of the least deviation from certain articles of faith based on history, and a dread of all investigation, to such a degree that they dare not let a doubt rise, even in thought, against the articles proposed for their belief, because this would be tantamount to lending an ear to the evil spirit" (Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 3. Stueck, 2. Abtlg.). Fixed dogmas may then at the very most, according to the great master of modern thought, be of pedagogic value to a minor, until he be grown to maturity. But to more advanced minds must be unconditionally conceded the freedom to construct dogmas as they think best, viz., as symbols and images for the subjective thought they underlie. This also, as is well known, is an article of Modernism, which here again follows in the steps of _Kant_.
"Ecclesiastical faith," says _Kant_, "may be useful as a vehicle to minors who can grasp a purely rational religion only through symbols, until in the course of time, owing to the general enlightenment, they can with the consent of everybody exchange the form of degrading means of coercion for an ecclesiastical form suitable to the dignity of a moral religion-that of free faith."
"The membranes," he says in another place, "in which the embryo first shaped itself into man must be cast off, if he is to see the light of day. The ap.r.o.n-strings of sacred tradition with its appendages, viz., the statutes and observances which at one time did good service, can gradually be dispensed with; they may even become a harmful hindrance when one is growing to manhood."
Of course, to him who takes the position of _Kant"s_ _dualism of belief and rational judgment_, freedom from every authority in matters of faith, and in this sense tolerance, will appear to be self-evident. Whatever has nothing to do with knowledge, but is merely the personal result of an inner, subjective experience, cannot be offered by external authority as matter for instruction. The sole standard for this belief is the autonomous subject and its own needs. In this sense _Harnack_ tells us: "The kernel of one"s being is to be grasped in its own depths and the soul is merely to recognize its own needs and the road traced out for their gratification. This can only be done with the fullest freedom. Any restraint here is tantamount to the destruction of the problem; any submission to the teaching of others ... is treason to one"s own religion"
(Religioeser Glaube und freie Forschung. Neue Freie Presse, 7. Juni, 1908). To have one"s religion determined by any authority, even a divine one, would be treason to the sovereignty of man!
Viewed from this standpoint, the _reconciliation between faith and science_ is no longer a problem. And they congratulate themselves on the solution of this vexing question. Now, they say, deliverance from an oppressive misery has been found, now the peace sought for so long is restored. A fair division has been made: two worlds, the world of the senses, and the world above sense experience. One belongs to science, where it now rules supreme; the other belongs to faith, where it can move freely, undisturbed by, and even unapproachable to science. Just as the stars in the sky are inaccessible to the custodian of civil order,-he can neither support them nor hinder them, nor pull them down,-just so the realm of faith is inaccessible to science: peace reigns everywhere.
Cheered on by this treaty of peace, _Paulsen_ writes: "Thus critical philosophy has solved the old problem of the relation of knowledge to faith. _Kant_ is convinced that by properly setting the limits he has succeeded in laying the foundation for real and enduring peace between them. In fact, upon this in the first place will rest the importance and vitality of his philosophy. It gives to knowledge, on the one hand, what belongs to it for unlimited research, the whole world of phenomena; on the other hand it gives to faith its eternal right, the interpretation of life and the world from the view-point of values. There can be no doubt that herein lies the cause of the great impression made by _Kant_ upon his time; he appeared as the liberator from unbearable suspense"
(Immanuel Kant, 1898, 6).
To a critical observer, such peace-making is utterly incomprehensible.
They probably did not consider that in this way _religion and faith_ were not liberated, but _dispossessed_; not brought to a place of safety, but transferred from the realm of reality into the realm of fancy. Similarly an aggressive ruler might address a neighbouring prince thus: We cannot agree any longer, let us make peace: you retain all your t.i.tles, and I shall see to your decent support, but you will have to lay down your crown and sovereignty and leave the country-in this way we can have peace.
Religion, once the greatest power in the life of man, for the sake of which man made sacrifices and even laid down his life, has now become a matter of sterile devotion; it may, moreover, no longer claim power and importance; it is now reduced to a poetic feeling, with which one can fill up intellectual vacancies. No longer is man here for religion"s sake; religion is here for man"s sake. A b.u.t.tonhole flower, a poetic perfume to sprinkle over his person. For he does not want to give up religion entirely. "We are the less inclined to give up religion forthwith, since we are p.r.o.ne to consider a religious disposition as a prerogative of human nature, even as its n.o.blest t.i.tle." Thus _D. F. Strauss_, when he asked of those who sympathized with his opinions, Have we still religion? (Der alte u. neue Glaube, II, n. 33). Of course religion has now become something quite different; it has been _consigned to deep degradation_.
To be sure, feeling is of great importance in religion. Dissatisfaction with the things of this earth, man"s longing for something higher, for the Infinite, his craving for immortality, for aid and consolation-are all naturally seeking for religious truths. If these are known, they in turn arouse fear and hope, love and grat.i.tude; they become a source of happiness and inspiration. But these feelings have no meaning unless we are certain that there exists something corresponding to them; much less could they of themselves be a conviction, just as little as hunger could convince us that we have food and drink. If one cannot perceive that there is a G.o.d, a Providence, a life beyond, then religion sinks to the level of a hazy feeling, without reason and truth, which must appear foolish to men who think,-as "the great phantasmagoria of the human mind, which we call religion" (_Jodl_, Gedanken uber Reform Katholizismus, 1902, 12),-which departs from the sphere of rational intellectual life, and which many have even begun to contemplate from the view-point of psychopathology. It is only due to the after-effect of a more religious past that religion is suffered to lead still a life of pretence: moral support in struggles it can give no more, nor comfort in dark hours, much less may it presume to guide man"s thought. It stands far below science.
Despair of the possibility of knowing higher truths is confronting us, the disease of deteriorating times and intellectually decaying nations. But just as Christianity, once in youthful vigour, went to the rescue of an old World dying of scepticism, just as the Catholic Church has ever upheld the rights of reason, especially against Protestantism, which from its beginning has torn asunder faith and knowledge: so the Catholic Church stands to this day unaffected by the doubting tendency of our times, upholding the rights of reason. It also upholds faith. But its faith has nothing to do with modern agnosticism.
What Faith Is.
What, then, according to Catholic doctrine, is faith and the duty to believe?
Let us briefly recall to mind the _fundamental tenets_ of the _Christian religion_. It tells us that even in the Old Testament, but more especially in the New, through His Incarnate Son, G.o.d has revealed to man all those religious and moral truths which are necessary and sufficient for the attainment of his supernatural end. Some of them are truths which reason by itself could not discover; others it could discover, but only by great labour. And this divine revelation demands belief. Belief is natural to man. The child believes its parents, the judge believes the witnesses, the ruler believes his counsellors. G.o.d wished to meet man in this way, and to give him certainty in regard to the highest truths.