Faith draws from divine revelation; profane sciences, as such, do not draw from divine revelation, but only from experience and reason. Philosophy would cease to be philosophy and become theology did it demonstrate the immortality of the soul by revelation. The anthropologist would cease to be an anthropologist and become a theologian if he would attempt to prove the common origin of mankind by Holy Scripture.
In other words, the profane sciences are distinguished from faith and theology by their formal object, by the end they have in view, by the scientific method with which they handle their subject. Theology, of course, uses revelation extensively; and in this it differs from the other sciences. Hence faith cannot command the anthropologist to defend also in profane science the common origin of the human race from Adam and Eve, because it is held to be a revealed truth. He must say: I believe as a Christian that this is true, established by divine revelation, and no science will ever prove the contrary; but whether I can positively defend this fact as resulting from anthropology, depends on my ability to corroborate it by the methods of this science, that is by the testimony of profane history. And just as little could the historian be required to obtain historical results of which he cannot produce the evidence according to his method.
Therefore faith can only tell the profane scientist that he must not a.s.sert anything which is held by faith to be erroneous; that it is false to say there is nothing but force and matter, that the human soul ends in death, or that the various families of the human race have not a common origin. As soon as the scientist knows by faith that a thing is false, he is bound to refrain from a.s.serting it: bound in the first place by the duty to believe, but also by the principles of his own science, which is to find not error, but truth, which forbids to a.s.sert what has been proved to be erroneous. Perhaps his own means will not enable him to prove the truth independently of revelation; then from the standpoint of his science he must say, _Non liquet._
The position of the Catholic Church agrees with these principles.
She knows, and emphasizes that science has its own method, and hence a natural right and freedom to proceed in its own field according to its method. The Church rejects but one kind of freedom, viz., the freedom to propound a doctrine proved by faith to be erroneous. "The Church by no means forbids these disciplines to use in their own field their own principles and method,"
declares the Vatican Council. "But, while acknowledging this lawful freedom, the Church takes care to prevent them from taking up errors in opposition to divine teaching, or from creating confusion by transgressing their limits and invading the realm of faith" (Vat. sess. III, ch. 4. Cf. also the letter of _Pius IX_., "Gravissimas," of Dec. 11, 1862, to the Archbishop of Munich, Denz. n. 1666, _seq._)
These few remarks show the lack of intelligence in the charge that "Catholic philosophy starts from dogmas and revelation," or that the Church would dictate to scientists everything they should teach; that, according to its principles it could claim the right "to impose upon a physicist of _Zeppelin"s_ era the task of proving the Ascension of Christ or the a.s.sumption of Mary by aerostatic rules." This is simply gross ignorance or misrepresentation.
3. Restraint Only in the Province of Revelation.
In what matters may faith and the Church be a guide to research in this negative sense? In all fields, or only some? Evidently only in their own sphere. But to the sphere of faith belongs only what is contained in divine revelation, viz., the truths of _religion and morality_, as laid down in Scripture and tradition, the truths of G.o.d and His work of salvation, of man and his way to his eternal destiny, of the means of grace, and of the Church. Whatever lies outside of that sphere does not belong to the province of faith. This is true also of the teaching authority of the Church. The purpose of the Church is to guard faithfully the treasure of divine revelation and to transmit it in an authoritative manner to mankind: hence her authority in teaching is confined to what is contained in revelation, and what is necessary for an efficient custody and transmission of it to mankind. Hence she may declare certain truths as revealed, she may reject opposing errors, she may condemn books offensive to faith, she may approve or reject systems of ethics. But she cannot set up wholly new religious truths or revelations. _Depositum custodi_-this is the purpose of the Church. Still less are matters of an entirely profane nature subject to the teaching authority of the Church. Profane sciences can therefore receive direction from faith only in those matters which at the same time belong to the province of faith.
What follows from this? It follows that _almost all the profane sciences are incapable of being instructed or restricted by faith_, because their province lies outside that of faith, and does not come in touch with it: they are left to themselves to correct their errors. When the astronomer in his observatory watches the movements of the planets, and bases thereon his mathematical calculations, when the physicist or chemist in his laboratory observes the laws of nature or makes new discoveries, when the pathologist studies the symptoms of diseases in organisms, no warning voice interrupts their work of study. Of course when they deny the creation, the possibility of miracles, then they conflict with faith; but then they have ceased to be naturalists, they have become philosophers.
When the botanist or zoologist in his laboratory is studying plants and animals and collecting his specimens, when the palaeontologist is excavating and examining his fossils, they enjoy perfect freedom: all this has nothing directly to do with faith. And there is no warning sign set up for the geographer or geologist when settling the orographical or hydrographical conditions of countries or measuring geological strata; no danger signal disturbs the linguist in establishing the grammar of unknown languages, nor the archaeologist or the historian, when they discover new doc.u.ments or decipher inscriptions. Nor does anybody interrupt the mathematician in his calculations.
What unnecessary worry, then, for the representatives of mathematics, geology, palaeontology, and chemistry to write burning protests against the fetters of dogma in the interest of their scientific activity! And it is superfluous worry for professors of the technical arts to get excited by imagining that electricity and steam must be treated according to ecclesiastical precepts. Nor is there need of emphasizing the statement that there cannot be a Catholic chemistry, geography, or mathematics-it is self-evident.
Hence almost the entire province of the profane sciences, which are the pride of our age and occupy the foremost position in our universities, with their laboratories, inst.i.tutes and observatories and meteorological stations, are free and perfectly undisturbed by faith. If accordingly any one should be of the opinion that the Christian-minded scientist were hindered in his scientific research, he would have to consider him an unhampered investigator at least in this vast field.
Most in touch with faith comes _philosophy_. Not in the vast field of logic, of empirical psychology, in questions concerning the essence of bodies and their forces, in matters of mere history of philosophy; but in questions of views of the world and life, in metaphysics and ethics, it does. These, the highest questions, bearing on the direction and pursuit of human life, matters that most occupy the human mind, are at the same time subjects of revelation; G.o.d Himself has deigned to teach the truth in these matters, to make them safe for all time against the error of the mind of man. Here philosophers encounter danger-signals. They hear, what their reason even tells them, that it is erroneous to think there is no world of spirits, no G.o.d above nature, no immortality, no life hereafter, no providence. Nor could one say that philosophy is the loser by being kept from error which endangers human life. Nowhere are errors so apt to occur as in questions which are outside the sphere of immediate experience; nowhere are self-deceptions more common than there, where disposition and character continually influence the mind.
A modern representative of philosophy, _E. Ad.i.c.kes_, writes as follows: "In the course of this history (of metaphysics) there have been given long since all the princ.i.p.al answers that are at all possible to all metaphysical questions. The building up of metaphysical systems can and will proceed, nevertheless, and their multiplicity will remain.... Of course, progress will not be gained thereby: results will not gain in certainty, contradictions and mysteries do not diminish."
"If the greatest of the ancient Greek natural scientists, physicians, and geographers should rise again they would be amazed at the progress made in their sciences; like beginners they would sit at the feet of teachers of our day, they would lack the most elementary ideas; they would first have to learn what every grammar-school boy knows, and much of what they once considered achievements would be disclosed to them as deception or mere hypothesis. On the other hand a _Plato_, an _Aristotle_, a _Zeno_ or _Epicurus_, might readily take part in our discussions about G.o.d and the soul, about virtue and immortality. And they could safely use their old weapons, the keenness of which has suffered but little from the rust of time and the attacks of opponents.
They would be astonished at the little progress made, so that now, after two thousand years, the same answers are given to the same questions." (Charakter und Weltanschauung, 1905, p. 24).
A science which must make such a confession has no reason to reject with haughty self-confidence the intimations of a divine revelation.
The _science of history_ again has not the duty of praising everything that has happened within the Catholic Church or else to repress it; no, only the truth is desired. But it must not start out with the a.s.sumption that G.o.d"s influence in the world, a divine revelation, miracles, and a supernatural guidance of the Church, are impossible; nor must it attempt to construe history according to that a.s.sumption. Hence it must not undertake to explain the religion of the Jewish nation, or the origin of Christianity, by unconditionally ignoring everything supernatural, and attempting to eliminate it by prejudiced research and by means of natural factors, whether they be called Babylonic myths or Greek philosophy or anything else; it must not impugn the credibility of the Gospel, claiming that reports of miracles must be false; it must not write the history of the Church and deliberately ignore its supernatural character, as if it were the violent struggle of a federation of priests for universal rule.
a.s.sured results undoubtedly are arrived at in history less frequently than in other sciences; it offers full play to suppositions, hypotheses, constructive fancy, the influence of ideas inculcated by education and personal views of the world, especially when summing up facts. Hence here more than anywhere else must moral character and unselfish love of the truth stand higher than the desire for freedom.
The _history of religion_ and _anthropology_ must be forbidden to a.s.sume that the human mind is but a product of animal evolution, that therefore religion and morality, family and state life, reason and language, and the entire intellectual and social life have necessarily evolved from the first stages of animal life. If we add that _jurisprudence_ in its highest principles comes in touch with faith, and that it also must not dispute the divine right of the Church, we have mentioned the most important sciences and instances in which the investigator must take faith into consideration.
We now understand in what sense we may rightly speak of a "_Christian philosophy and science_" or of a "_Catholic science of history_." Surely not in this sense that philosophy and history have to draw their results from Holy Scripture or from the dogmatical decisions of the Church; nor in the sense that they have to make positive defence for everything that the Church finds it necessary to prescribe. The sense is merely this: they guide themselves by faith, as we said above, by refraining from propositions and presumptions proved by faith to be false. In a large measure this is also the meaning of the often-misrepresented term, _Catholic University_. In the reverse sense we may speak of a liberal science. It is that science which in the field of philosophy and religion guides itself by the principles of liberalism and the principle of liberal freedom and the rejection of faith. But to speak of a Catholic, Protestant, Liberal chemistry or mathematics, has no sense at all, because these disciplines, like most other profane sciences, have no direct connection with Catholicism, Protestantism, or Liberalism.
That we have stated correctly the _att.i.tude of the Catholic Church_ is evidenced by more than one official doc.u.ment. In the decree of the Holy Office of July 3, 1907, the so-called Syllabus of _Pius X._, the following (5.) proposition is condemned: "Inasmuch as the treasure of faith contains only revealed truths, it does not behoove the Church under any consideration to pa.s.s judgment on the a.s.sertions made by human sciences." Similarly was the proposition (14), likewise condemned in the Syllabus of _Pius IX._: "Philosophy must be pursued without any regard to supernatural revelation."
These condemnations stirred up anger: "Now," it was said, "the Church wants to subject the whole of human knowledge to her judgment: this is unbearable insolence." But what follows from these condemnations? The opposite truth a.s.serted in them is this: the Church in one respect must pa.s.s judgment on the a.s.sertions made by human science, namely, in so far as they come in conflict with the doctrines of faith. The only freedom rejected by the Council is the freedom to contradict revealed truth: it must not be held "that human science may be pursued with freedom, that its a.s.sertions can be considered true and must not be rejected by the Church even if they contradict a revealed doctrine." (sess. III, ch. 4, can. 2). The Church does not want to judge on matters of profane science; but she claims the right, due to her as guardian appointed for the preservation of the pure faith, to raise her warning voice when, for instance, natural science transgresses its limits and trespa.s.ses on the province of religion by denying the creation of the world. It is but self-defence against an attack upon her inviolable domain. But she does not claim the authority to sit in judgment upon the results of astro-physics, upon the atom-hypothesis, or its opposite; or on the acceptance of a theory about ions or earthquakes.
Another question may be touched upon: Is the _Catholic historian_ free to proceed steadily in the search after historic truth, even where he discovers facts which do not reflect honour on his Church? And where it is a question of uncertain, private revelation, of doubtfulness of relics and other sacred objects exposed for public worship, may he proceed undisturbed with his critical research, or is he restrained by ecclesiastical authority?
Should the Catholic meet with dark pa.s.sages in the history of his Church, then every well-meaning observer will demand that he display in the treatment of such matters a pious forbearance for his Church. His respect for her will dictate this. Unsparing criticism and hunting for blemishes and shadows must be excluded. But he cannot on this account be bound to pa.s.s by the unpleasant facts he may meet in his researches, or to cloak or deny them against his better knowledge. He knows that the divinity of his Church shows itself to best advantage just because, notwithstanding many weaknesses and faults, past and present, she pa.s.ses unvanquished and imperishable through all storms,-a token of the supernatural origin of her strength and power of endurance.
It was this very thought that moved _Leo XIII._ to open the Vatican Archives for freest research to friend and enemy,-the clearest proof that could possibly be given that the Church does not fear historical truth. In his letter of admonition, of August 18, 1883, urging the fostering of historiography, the same Pope gives the following rules for the Catholic scientist: "The first law of history is that it must not say anything false; the second, that it must not be afraid of saying the truth, lest a suspicion of partiality and unfairness arise." An excellent example of the application of these rules is found in _L. v. Pastor"s_ "History of the Popes," especially in what he says about _Alexander VI._ and _Leo X._
In his historical investigation of private revelations, such as those of _St. Gertrude_, _St. Mechtild_, _Bl. Juliana of Liege_, or of relics and objects of veneration, the historian is likewise not restricted by Church-direction. Having merely the task of preserving the treasure of the faith received from Christ and the Apostles, the Church in her function as Teacher never vouches for the divine origin of new, private revelations, nor for the accuracy of pious traditions of another kind. True, she decides authoritatively whether private revelations contain anything against faith and morals, but she decides nothing more. If she accepts such revelations or traditions as genuine, she claims for the facts in question only that human faith which corresponds to their historical proof.
This is clearly stated by the recent encyclical _Pascendi_: "In judging of pious traditions, the following must be kept in mind: the Church employs such prudence in treating of these matters that she does not allow such traditions to be written about except with great precaution and only after making the declarations required by _Urban VIII._; and even then, after this has been properly done, the Church by no means a.s.serts the truth of the private revelation or of the tradition, but merely permits them to be believed, provided there be sufficient human reasons. It was in this sense that the Sacred Congregation of Rites declared thirty-one years ago: "These apparitions are neither approved nor condemned by the Holy See; it merely permits them to be believed in a natural way, provided the tradition on which they rest be corroborated by credible testimonies and doc.u.ments." Whoever follows this maxim is safe. The veneration of such things is always conditional, it is only relative, and on the condition that the tradition be true. In so far only is the veneration absolute as it relates to the Saint to whom the veneration is paid. The same applies to the veneration of relics." (_Benedict XIV._ says of private revelations: "Praedictis revelationibus etsi _approbatis_, non debere nec posse a n.o.bis adhiberi a.s.sensum fidei catholicae, sed tantum fidei humanae juxta regulas prudentiae, juxta quas praedictae revelationes sunt probabiles et pie credibiles." De Serv. Dei beatificatione, III, c. ult. n. 15).
Hence the historian is free to investigate such traditions critically, provided, of course, that he does not violate the reverence due to sacred things.
4. Infallible and Non-Infallible Teachings.
Now to consider a last point. Does it not rest entirely with the pleasure of ecclesiastical authority, as would seem from what has been said above, to suppress at any time the results, or at least the hypotheses, of scientific research by pointing to putative truths of faith presumed to be in opposition? Then, of course, the scientist would be at the mercy of a zealous ecclesiastical authority. Or will it perhaps be said that this authority is infallible in its every decision? Think of _Galileo_, of the interdict against the Copernican view of the world, and you will be able fully to appreciate the danger alluded to!
We shall later on return to the famous case of _Galileo_. For the present we only call attention to a distinction which must not be overlooked, the distinction between infallible teachings and those that are not infallible.(3)
According to Catholic teaching, the universal teaching body of the Church, when declaring unanimously to be an object of faith something relating to faith and morals, is endowed with _infallibility_, and also when in its daily practice of the faith it unanimously professes a doctrine to be a truth of faith. This infallibility is also possessed by the Pope alone when, acting in his capacity as Supreme Teacher of the Church in matters of faith and morals, he intends to give a permanent decision for the whole Church (ex cathedra).
Besides these infallible teachings there are also _non-infallible_ teachings, and they are the more frequent. Such are, first of all, the ordinary doctrinal utterances of the Pope himself in his regular supervision of the teaching of doctrine: these instructions and declarations are of a lower kind than those peremptory ones that are p.r.o.nounced ex cathedra: he is infallible only in the utterance of these ultimate, supreme decisions, the chief bulwark, as it were, erected against the floods of error. Decisions ex cathedra are very rare.
Encyclical letters, too, are, as a rule, not infallible. It is self-evident that the theological opinions and statements of the Pope as a private person, not as Supreme Head of the Church, do not belong here at all. They have no official character and are in no way binding.
Among decisions that are not infallible are further included, in various degrees, the doctrinal utterances of Bishops, of particular synods, and especially those of the Roman Congregations. The latter are bodies of Cardinals, delegated by the Head of the Church, as highest Papal boards, to co-operate with him in the various offices of administration. Of these, the Congregation of the Holy Office and that of the Index may also render decisions on doctrinal questions. Although the Congregations act by virtue of their delegation from the Pope, and publish their decrees with his consent, the decisions are not decisions of the Pope himself, but remain decisions of the Cardinals. Much less can the infallibility of the Pope pa.s.s over to them: it is his personal prerogative, the aid of the Holy Ghost is promised to him, and protects his judgments under certain conditions against error.
But the Catholic owes submission also to the non-infallible teachings; and not only an outer submission, a reverent silence, that offends not either verbally or in writing against the decision rendered, but he owes also his inner a.s.sent. But it cannot be that unconditional inner a.s.sent which he owes to the infallible decision, for this he holds to be irrevocably certain; nor is his a.s.sent to non-infallible decisions a real act of faith. He is not given any unconditional guarantee of the truth. An error is, of course, most unlikely, but not absolutely impossible. Hence the faithful Catholic should always be ready to accept such decisions in as far as they are warranted by recognized truth. This applies to all kinds of doctrinal teaching, but of course in different ways, corresponding to the degree of authority,-for instance, Papal decisions are of higher authority than those of the Congregations,-yet it applies also to the doctrinal decisions of the Congregations, because they are the ordinary teaching organs of the Church.
When the Congregation of the Index, 1857, had forbidden the works of _Guenther_ and many thought they could evade the decision, _Pius IX._ wrote, June 15, to the Archbishop of Cologne: "The decree is so far-reaching that n.o.body may think himself free not to hold what we have confirmed." Similar was what the Pope had written to the Archbishop of Mecheln after the condemnation of the ontological errors of _Ubagh_. The Motu proprio of _Pius X._ of November 8, 1907, speaks similarly of the obligation of submission to the decisions of the Papal Biblical Commission relating to doctrines, and to the decrees of Congregations when approved by the Pope. (Cf. also the Syllabus of Pius IX., sent. 22.)
Theologians agree that this requisite internal a.s.sent is not the same as irrevocable a.s.sent. This was also declared by _Pius IX._ in his letter to the Archbishop of Munich-Freising, saying that this inner submission is by no means faith; and no theologian will ascribe infallibility to a mere congregational decree. (See on this point: _e.g._ _Grisar_, Galileistudien, 1882, 171 _seq._ Cr.
_Pesch_, Theol. Zeitfragen, Erste Folge, 1900, III. _Egger_, Streiflichter ueber die freiere Bibelforschung, 1889.)
It would be erroneous to think that only in recent times, after the embarra.s.sment caused by the regrettable _Galileo_ decision the subtle distinction had been invented that congregational decisions are not binding on Catholics with absolute force. This was taught by theologians long before the _Galileo_ case caused any excitement. In this sense the celebrated writer on Moral Theology, _Lacroix_, said: "The declarations of none of these Congregations are infallible.... No infallibility is promised to the Congregation in so far as it is viewed as separate from the Pope"
(Theologia Moralis, 1729, I, n. 215). _Raccioli_, soon after the _Galileo_ trial, wrote: "The Holy Congregation of Cardinals as separate from the Pope cannot give to any proposition the proper authority of faith." And he adds: "There being extant no decision of the Pope, or of a Council directed and confirmed by him, the proposition of the sun moving and the earth standing still cannot on the strength of a congregational decree be considered a truth that must be believed" (Almagestum novum, 1651, I, 52).
The obligation to give interior a.s.sent also to an authority not infallible, cannot seem strange if this authority offers a guarantee for the truth commensurate to the a.s.sent demanded. We certainly ask of a child to receive the instruction from his parent and teacher with internal a.s.sent, so far as the latter does not run counter to its instinct for the truth, else the education of the child and the needful influence over its intellectual life would be impossible. Upon the Church has been bestowed by her divine Founder the task of guiding the faithful authoritatively in the educational matters committed to the Church, and not only in their youth but throughout their lives. This guidance in religion and morality would be impossible if the faithful could constantly deny their internal a.s.sent to the instruction of the Church, which is given generally in a form that is not infallible. The full power of the Church to teach with authority implies a corresponding duty of the faithful to a.s.sent to her teachings as far as this is possible. Does not the scientific specialist think himself obliged to accept a proposition on the strength of a certain authority, even if the latter"s infallibility is not established? He reads in his scientific periodical and finds in it the report of special researches made by a colleague. He cannot examine them over again, yet he accepts them because of the reliability of his colleague, in which he sees the guarantee of truth. Likewise, only more so, does the Catholic owe it to his sense of truth to impose upon himself an a.s.sent even where the representatives of the teaching authority of the Church are not endowed in their decision with the gift of infallibility. For he knows that even in such teachings the Church is commonly under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, who will seldom tolerate error. He is promised to the teaching Church for the safe guidance of the faithful; these declarations are, however, the ordinary doctrinal utterances of that ecclesiastical office.
And the Holy Ghost cannot permit that the teaching authority should by a wrong decision forfeit the confidence it enjoys.
Moreover, this authority ranks very high even when looked at from a purely human standpoint. Those who are invested with it are mostly men of great learning, competent to give such doctrinal decisions by virtue of their experience and position, and learned advisers are at their side. They are guided by the tradition and wisdom of a universal Church, which measures its history by thousands of years: the decisions, too, are for the most part but the application or repet.i.tion of previous doctrinal utterances.
Besides, there is the hesitating caution which advances to a decision only after long deliberations, and in undemonstrated matters usually refrains from decision; a caution which has increased still more in recent times, since so many subtle questions have arisen on the boundaries of science and faith. It is also known that many inquisitive eyes are constantly turned on Rome, and a single wrong decision might entail most disagreeable consequences for friend and foe. The pressure must be very great before a much-disputed question is taken up at all.