To close a chapter dealing so largely with the destructive efforts of the middle-cla.s.s a.s.sembly against the prerogatives of the King and of the two privileged orders, it may be noted that on the 19th of June, 1790, on the proposal of members of the n.o.bility, all t.i.tles were abolished. Hereafter Mirabeau is Honore Riquetti, the _ci-devant_ Comte de Mirabeau; and Camille Desmoulins, prompt, picturesque and impertinent, logically applies the process to the King himself and rechristens Louis, _Mr. Capet l"aine_.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE FLIGHT TO VARENNES
On the 14th of July 1790 was held the first great festival of the Revolution, the federation of the national guards at the Champ de Mars in Paris. Federation was the name that had been given all through France the previous year to district or departmental gatherings or reviews, at which the newly raised national guards had paraded and, with great ceremony, sworn patriotic oaths. This was now repeated on a grander and more centralized scale, to commemorate the fall of the Bastille twelve months before. On the military exercise ground just outside Paris, 14,000 national guards a.s.sembled. An altar was erected, at which Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun and deputy, officiated. La Fayette led the military procession. Louis was made to play an almost subordinate role. The national guards took an oath of fidelity to La Fayette, the Law, and Louis XVI; the gradation was intended and significant.
{106} The festival was, in a sense, merely an echo of the policy which the a.s.sembly was pursuing in regard to the army. The army was a great factor in the situation; sooner or later, as in most revolutions, it was likely to prove the decisive one. From the first the pressure of the armed force on Paris had acted as a powerful irritant; and in reducing the power of the King nothing seemed more important than to detach the army from its allegiance. The mutiny and desertion of July 1789 gave the a.s.sembly a good starting point; in the spring of 1790 the troops were placed under oath to obey the law and the King, and not to act against the citizens. This, however, was not decisive, for on the northeastern frontier, far from Paris, among the fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, a considerable part of the army was a.s.sembled. There French and foreign regiments were well mixed, esprit de corps was maintained, staunch loyalists were in command, and it was conceivable that the troops would respond to Louis" appeal if the King summoned them to his help.
So thought Marat, and many others. The author of the _Ami du peuple_ voiced the popular fear, that the army on the north-eastern frontier would destroy the national {107} cause. Everything in Marat"s career tended to make him the accredited prophet of the reign of suspicion now fast becoming established. He had during many years studied science and philosophy, and had acquired the knack of writing while unsuccessfully knocking at the doors of the academies. The outbreak of the Revolution found him soured, and ready to turn a venomous pen against all detainers of power. A morbid streak fast developed into a mania of persecution and suspicion, and it was by giving free rein to his imagination in that respect that he came into line with the frenzy of starving women and declaiming demagogues ready to believe every accusation, and to rend every _accapareur_.
Marat"s violence had become so great shortly after the taking of the Bastille that he had been proceeded against by the new munic.i.p.ality of Paris. He then began a life of hiding, flitting obscurely from point to point, dwelling in cellars, even at one time concealing himself in a drain. For a few weeks he fled to London. But in the spring of 1790 he was back in Paris, and at the crisis of the midsummer he published a violent pamphlet, _C"en est fait de nous_, "it"s all up with us," in which he hysterically demanded the ma.s.sacre {108} of all traitors and conspirators as the only means of preserving Paris from the vengeance of the King and the operations of his army.
The a.s.sembly denounced the pamphlet, and steps were taken for the prosecution of its author. Marat had chosen the moment for his denunciations badly, for within a few days of the publication of his pamphlet the army had broken out in open mutiny against its generals.
Bouille, a staunch royalist and experienced soldier, was in command.
His men were being gradually demoralized by democratic propaganda. At last, on the 31st of August, several regiments in garrison at Nancy broke out in mutiny.
Bouille displayed great vigour in dealing with a difficult and dangerous crisis. He forced his way into Nancy after severe fighting, and dealt summarily with the offenders when once he had regained control. One French regiment he disbanded. The Swiss regiment of Chateauvieux he handed over to a court-martial of its officers, who ordered a great number of their men to be shot, or to be sent to the galleys.
These events caused great excitement. The a.s.sembly, now alarmed at the result of its own work of disintegration, pa.s.sed a formal vote {109} of thanks to Bouille. The democratic party, however, took the opposite side, strongly led by the Cordeliers, a popular sectional club. Noisy demonstrations followed in favour of the defeated soldiers, and license and indiscipline were extolled as the virtues of free men. This more than anything else broke down the old royal army, and from this moment the cavalry and infantry officers began to throw up their commissions and emigrate. And, incidentally, another fragment of the old regime disappeared in the same storm; Necker, still a royal minister, unimportant and discredited, was mobbed on the 2d of September, and as a result resigned and ingloriously left France for his native Switzerland.
Until the winter of 1790 the Revolution had not shown signs of becoming anti-monarchical, but at the turn of the year republicanism at last raised its head. In the att.i.tude of the French towards this question one must bear in mind the historical precedents before them. French opinion was strongly impregnated with the apparent lessons of the great revolution that had occurred in England a little more than one hundred years before. There a republic, founded in revolt from incompetent {110} monarchy, had failed, and had made way for a military dictatorship, which also had failed, to be replaced by the restored monarchy. And, last of all, eventual success had come from a bargain or compromise between the upper and middle cla.s.s on the one hand and the King on the other. This was the historic precedent best known and generally uppermost in the minds of the men of the national a.s.sembly.
But there was another precedent, that of the American revolution, and it tended in the opposite direction. Few, indeed, perceived that Washington had succeeded where Cromwell had failed; and the event was too near in time, too distant in s.p.a.ce, too remote in surroundings, to have as much bearing as it should. Yet the impression made was considerable. Benjamin Franklin"s picturesque and worthy republicanism was not forgotten: his plain clothes and robust sense, his cheerful refrain of _ca ira_,--it"s all right,--so soon to be the song of the French republicans themselves. The men of Rochambeau"s army too, had caught the infection, had seen republicanism in war, the brave and capable commanding whatever their station in life; and in that army were many rankers, held down by the Bourbon regime, who were soon to become the {111} victorious generals of the French Republic. Again the const.i.tutional doc.u.ments of the Americans had been consulted, studied,--declarations of right, State const.i.tutions. And all this tended towards republicanism.
Yet even the American example did not mean republicanism in the democratic sense. And the movement that became so marked about December 1790 was distinctly towards a democratic republic. Many prominent journalists were of that way of thought. Desmoulins had been even in 1789. The franchise restrictions which the a.s.sembly was drafting into the Const.i.tution gave the papers a good text. It was pointed out that whereat all Frenchmen had been admitted to vote for the States-General, under the proposed const.i.tution there would be but two million voters. Why should not the poor man have a vote? Why should not even women have a vote? Should there not be equality of rights and no invidious distinctions?
Pamphlets began to appear in favour of a republic. Popular societies were formed, and became the vogue, with a programme of universal suffrage, and fraternization as a social characteristic. Women, occasionally children, were admitted; the members called one {112} another brother and sister, having discarded more formal modes of address; popular banquets were held. The influence of woman, of which something has already been said, was widened by the action of these societies; that influence a little later tended to give the Revolution the hysterical turn which it took.
The professional politicians showed little inclination to follow the lead of the _Societes populaires_. The a.s.sembly remained rigidly middle cla.s.s in its att.i.tude. The Jacobin Club maintained the same position, though a few of its members were now inclining towards democracy, and one of them, Robespierre, not quite so isolated as a few months earlier, came forward as its official mouthpiece. In April 1791 he issued a speech, printed in pamphlet form, in which he ably argued the case for democratic suffrage. He was hailed as the champion and friend of the poor man, the apostle of fraternity.
Since he had been compelled to accept the civil const.i.tution of the clergy the King"s revolt had become more marked. He declared to his friends that he would sooner be king of Metz than king of France under such terms. The rise of the democratic movement in the winter had not tended to allay his fears, and by the {113} spring of 1791 he was decided, so far as it was in his nature ever to be decided, to remove from Paris and find some way out of his difficulties. His hopes of escape centred on the northeastern frontier. There, at Metz, 200 miles from Paris, were the headquarters of the energetic Bouille; and beyond Metz was the Rhine, where the Emperor Leopold, his brother-in-law, was already a.s.sembling troops that might prove a further support.
With such an outlook, it was natural that the Court, and in this case the Court meant the Queen, should attempt to concert measures with Vienna; the phantom of the Austrian alliance, so detested at the time of the Seven Years" War, was reappearing. Marie Antoinette held numerous conferences with the foreign amba.s.sadors on the subject and wrote frequent letters to her brother invoking his aid; all of which was more or less suspected or known by the public outside the palace walls.
Paris was, indeed, guarding her king very jealously. Marat constantly preached suspicion. Zealous sections formed watch committees that kept the palace under keen observation. If the King attempted to leave Paris violence must be used to keep him there. Royalists offered their protection to the King; {114} and in February a bad brawl took place within the palace walls, between the two factions.
Incidents kept occurring. In March the a.s.sembly voted that the King was the first public functionary, and therefore, like other functionaries, responsible for carrying out certain duties. One of these was declared to be that he must reside within 20 leagues of the a.s.sembly. This measure was in one sense restrictive; in another it seemed slightly to loosen the King"s fetters. To test whether he could not take advantage of this decree to enlarge his radius of movement, it was decided that Louis should attempt an afternoon"s excursion as far as St. Cloud.
In all this matter Mirabeau had been consulted. His advice had been constant and correct. If the King would make his departure from Paris coincide with taking the lead in a real reform he might get most support and rouse least opposition by going to Rouen, the capital of Normandy, a very accessible point; to go to Metz was to touch the self-same chord that had whipped Paris into open revolt in July 1789.
But although Mirabeau"s advice was asked, what he said was only half listened to. No one could trust him now, no one could believe {115} him--and besides, he was dying. Battling in the a.s.sembly for measures of constructive statesmanship, spending his life outside with profuse extravagance, his vitality was now gone, and a fever carried him off on the 2d of April. His death caused a great sensation, though few would say a word of praise for the great orator. He realized that his death removed the last possible hope for the monarchy, and Louis himself, when Marie Antoinette showed her satisfaction at the news, rebuked her and declared that he had lost a friend.
Friendless, what could Louis do now? The obscure Robespierre, tortuous, fanatical and tenacious, had risen to importance; hitherto the giant Mirabeau had held down the smaller man and his little group by his breadth, his vigour and his crushing apostrophes:--_Silence aux trente voix_! But now that Mirabeau was gone, Robespierre suddenly appeared almost the first figure of the a.s.sembly; and Robespierre stood for the rising tide of democracy. What could Louis do? To escape from Paris seemed the only course.
The King had occasionally been to St. Cloud in the year 1790, and the recent edict of the a.s.sembly formally a.s.sured his freedom of movement for a much greater distance; it only {116} remained to test whether the people of Paris would attempt to restrain him from acting in a manner that was customary and within his const.i.tutional rights.
The test proved conclusive. A large mob, including a number of national guards, a.s.sembled at the palace on Easter Sunday. It had been announced that on this day the King would visit St. Cloud to hear ma.s.s performed by priests who had not accepted the civil const.i.tution. He was not allowed to proceed. After sitting in his carriage several hours awaiting the moment when the mob would give him pa.s.sage, he returned to his apartments defeated.
Louis was a prisoner. Not only was he a prisoner, but he was compelled by the a.s.sembly to have within the palace only priests whom he considered schismatic, and compelled to appear in the a.s.sembly and there declare solemnly that he was a free agent and enjoyed entire liberty of action. This drove him to a definite purpose, and preparations were now secretly begun for the flight to Metz.
On the 20th of June the attempt was made. The King"s brother, the Comte de Provence, who afterwards became Louis XVIII, managed his escape well, and was driven over the {117} frontier into the Netherlands,--an experience he was to repeat in 1815. The King"s arrangements had been placed in the hands of a Swedish n.o.bleman attached to the Queen, Count Fersen. False pa.s.sports were obtained.
The royal family was smuggled out of the palace in disguise. Several bodyguards dressed as couriers acted as escort. A large travelling carriage was ready. A start was successfully made on the great northeastern road.
All went prosperously until the fugitives reached Varennes, a village in the frontier district not more than 15 miles from Verdun, where Bouille had a strong garrison. At this point the scheme broke down.
Bouille should have been able to place a large cavalry escort about the King"s carriage at Varennes, but his arrangements were defective and went wrong. This was not altogether his fault, for Louis had wasted much precious time on the way, and had shown no sense of the resolution required by the circ.u.mstances. And lastly the patriots had discovered who the traveller was; the postmaster of Ste Menehould had recognised the King, had ridden on ahead, had roused the national guard of Varennes--and now the game was up.
{118} After a slight skirmish between a detachment of Bouille"s cavalry and the national guard of Varennes, Louis was started back for Paris, surrounded by armed contingents from all the near-by villages. The whole course of the Revolution had for an instant wavered, hesitating whether to turn this way or that. Now it had turned in a direction that could not be mistaken. Louis himself speaking to one of the officials of Varennes said to him: "If we return to Paris, we shall die."
It was early on the morning of the 21st of June that Paris learnt that the King had left the capital; intense excitement resulted. No doubt could be felt as to the significance of the event; the King himself had taken care that there should be none by leaving behind a lengthy proclamation of which the upshot was that all the decrees he had signed were null and void because of compulsion. The people answered this in the way that might be expected; every emblem of royalty was torn down through the city.
The a.s.sembly was in a state of the greatest uncertainty. It had two dangers to face, one from the King, immediate, another from the people, less immediate yet calling for much prudence. In this moment of crisis and doubt, {119} numerous solutions of the political problem were put forward, of which several demand notice.
Marat, in _l"Ami du peuple_, declared that a military dictator was the only remedy for the situation; a curiously logical perception of what was to be the outcome of the Revolution. This opinion did not obtain any success.
The duc d"Orleans proposed another solution. This personage was the head of the branch of the French Bourbons that stood next to that holding the throne. He had long been on bad terms with the Court and had a.s.siduously cultivated popularity among the Parisians. During the winter of 1788-89 he had spent much money and effort in charity and the relief of distress, and had his reward on the a.s.sembly of the States-General at which, while the Queen was received in stony silence, he had met with an ovation. He did his best to create an Orleans party, to push for the throne, and devoted to the purpose the large sums of money which his great fortune placed at his disposal. At every crisis in the Revolution small groups, mostly subsidized, attempted to provoke demonstrations in his favour. And now, on the 21st of June, with the throne derelict, he thought his opportunity had come, and ostentatiously paraded through {120} the central quarters of the city in hopes of a popular movement. But the popular movement would not come. The duke was too well understood; his vices were too well known; his treachery to his cousin aroused no enthusiasm; the people wanted a more complete solution.
That more complete solution was voiced by the Club of the Cordeliers and by its formidable spokesman Danton. Like Mirabeau, Danton was of large physique and stentorian voice, an orator by nature, a man whose unusual if far from handsome features fascinated the crowd. But, unlike his great predecessor, he could hold the affection of the people, indeed, he proved one of the few conspicuous leaders against whom the people did not turn on the day of going to the guillotine. A lawyer, and of a lawyer"s family, he was in lucrative practice when the Revolution broke out, a fine advocate, not overscrupulous in method, flexible, but large in view, generous in heart, irresistible in courage, strong in political instincts, a man of the greatest possibilities. He espoused the popular cause, and the popular cause in the democratic sense. He stood for the sections against the central Commune; he defended Marat and the liberty of the press; he opposed the bourgeois regime and La Fayette {121} at every step; he led the battalion of the Cordeliers section to the Tuileries to prevent Louis"
visit to St. Cloud in April 1791. Such was the man who now headed a deputation of the Cordeliers Club to the a.s.sembly and presented a pet.i.tion demanding the deposition of Louis XVI.
The demand of the Cordeliers for the deposition of the King was not the thing to please the a.s.sembly. The situation was doubly difficult, for apart from the uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the King and the possibility of civil war, there was a difficulty in regard to the Const.i.tution. For two years past the a.s.sembly had been labouring hard to complete the work it had sworn to accomplish by the oath of the _Jeu de Paume_. That work was now nearly completed, but was almost as unpopular with the ma.s.ses as it was hateful to the King. It had not even been elaborated in a spirit of compromise between the extreme claims of autocracy on the one hand and of democracy on the other, but was frankly middle-cla.s.s legislation. But the King was an essential part of the const.i.tutional mechanism and his flight had occurred just in time to wreck the Const.i.tution as it was coming into port--that was the prevailing sentiment of the {122} members of the a.s.sembly. When on the 24th it was known that Louis had been stopped and was returning to Paris, the relief of the deputies was great,--their long-laboured Const.i.tution was safe after all.
It was not till the next day that the royal family reached the capital; and before their arrival more than one exciting scene occurred. The duc d"Orleans was admitted a member of the Jacobin Club. Danton, apparently not unfriendly for the moment to d"Orleans, harangued the Jacobins in favour of the appointment of a regency. But the a.s.sembly maintained a negative att.i.tude. It seized control of the administration by ordering the ministers, now little more than chief clerks of departments, to report to it for orders, and for the rest awaited the return of the King.
On the 25th Louis and his family reached Paris. The whole population turned out to watch his return, but it gave him no greeting. The crowd, obeying a common instinct, received the King in dead silence.
Not a voice was heard, not a hat was raised, as Louis once more pa.s.sed into his palace of the Tuileries.
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CHAPTER IX
WAR BREAKS OUT
From the 25th of June to the 17th of July the conflict between the middle cla.s.s and the democratic party continued with great intensity.
Louis was, in reality, less the object than the pretext of their quarrel. The Cordeliers urged that France, and not the a.s.sembly, should p.r.o.nounce the King"s fate, and to effect that it would be necessary to proceed to a referendum, to demand a popular vote. But this was precisely what the Const.i.tution refused to permit, and hence the demand was in reality an attack on the Const.i.tution. Day after day the agitation grew, changing slightly in form. Finally the democrats decided on a monster pet.i.tion to be signed at the altar of the Champ de Mars on the 17th of July.
Danton himself stood at one of the corners of the platform that day to help on the signing of the protest of the Parisian democracy. But Bailly, La Fayette, and the ma.s.s of the a.s.sembly had decided on a policy of repression. {124} The national guards arrived in strong force. Confusion followed. Volleys were fired. The mob, after losing many dead, fled for safety. Danton, escaping, left Paris and proceeded to London, where he remained until the storm had blown over. By this stroke the a.s.sembly for the moment retained control. But the situation was profoundly changed. If Danton and the popular insurrectional force were for the moment defeated, Robespierre and intellectual democracy were making rapid headway; the centre of gravity of revolutionary opinion was shifting in his direction. Just before the crisis the Jacobins had been invaded by a Palais Royal mob who had hooted down the const.i.tutionalist speakers, and imposed their opinion on the club.
This led to disruption. The moderate Jacobins left, and, at the neighbouring _Feuillants_, founded a new society that was gradually to become more and more retrograde. The few advanced Jacobins retained possession of the old club, with its great affiliation of country clubs, infused a radical element into its membership, and soon, making of Robespierre its mouthpiece and its prophet, advanced in the direction of imposing his doctrine of political salvation on France.
Meanwhile the a.s.sembly, with its const.i.tutional {125} keystone securely locked up in the Tuileries, was hastening to profit by its victory.