The Gathering Storm

Chapter 15

At first the reception of my case was favourable. All my colleagues were deeply impressed with the evil; but strict respect for the neutrality of small states was a principle of conduct to which we all adhered.

First Lord to First Sea Lord and others.

19.IX.39.

I brought to the notice of the Cabinet this morning the importance of stopping the Norwegian transportation of Swedish iron ore from Narvik, which will begin as soon as the ice forms in the Gulf of Bothnia. I pointed out that we had laid a minefield across the three-mile limit in Norwegian territorial waters in 1918, with the approval and co-operation of the United States. I suggested that we should repeat this process very shortly. [This, as is explained above, was not an accurate statement, and I was soon apprised of the fact.] The Cabinet, including the Foreign Secretary, appeared strongly favourable to this action.It is therefore necessary to take all steps to prepare it.1. The negotiations with the Norwegians for the chartering of their tonnage must be got out of the way first.2. The Board of Trade would have to make arrangements with Sweden to buy the ore in question, as it is far from our wish to quarrel with the Swedes.3. The Foreign Office should be made acquainted with our proposals, and the whole story of Anglo-American action in 1918 must be carefully set forth, together with a reasoned case.4. The operation itself should be studied by the Admiralty Staff concerned. The Economic Warfare Department should be informed as and when necessary.Pray let me be continually informed of the progress of this plan, which is of the highest importance in crippling the enemy"s war industry.A further Cabinet decision will be necessary when all is in readiness.

On the twenty-ninth, at the invitation of my colleagues, and after the whole subject had been minutely examined at the Admiralty, I drafted a paper for the Cabinet upon this subject and on the chartering of neutral tonnage which was linked with it.



Norway and SwedenMemorandum by the First Lord of the AdmiraltySeptember 29, 1939. 29, 1939.Chartering Norwegian Tonnage.The Norwegian Delegation is approaching, and in a few days the President of the Board of Trade hopes to make a bargain with them by which he charters all their spare tonnage, the bulk of which consists of tankers.The Admiralty consider the chartering of this tonnage most important, and Lord Chatfield has written strongly urging it upon them.

German Supplies of Iron Ore from Narvik.2. At the end of November the Gulf of Bothnia normally freezes, so that Swedish iron ore can be sent to Germany only through Oxelosund in the Baltic, or from Narvik at the north of Norway. Oxelosund can export only about one-fifth of the weight of ore Germany requires from Sweden. In winter normally the main trade is from Narvik, whence ships can pa.s.s down the west coast of Norway, and make the whole voyage to Germany without leaving territorial waters until inside the Skagerrak.It must be understood that an adequate supply of Swedish iron ore is vital to Germany, and the interception or prevention of these Narvik supplies during the winter months, i.e., from October to the end of April, will greatly reduce her power of resistance. For the first three weeks of the war no iron-ore ships left Narvik owing to the reluctance of crews to sail and other causes outside our control. Should this satisfactory state of affairs continue, no special action would be demanded from the Admiralty. Furthermore, negotiations are proceeding with the Swedish Government which in themselves may effectively reduce the supplies of Scandinavian ore to Germany.Should, however, the supplies from Narvik to Germany start moving again, more drastic action will be needed.Relations with Sweden.3. Our relations with Sweden require careful consideration. Germany acts upon Sweden by threats. Our sea power gives us also powerful weapons, which, if need be, we must use to ration Sweden. Nevertheless, it should be proposed, as part of the policy outlined in paragraph 2, to a.s.sist the Swedes so far as possible to dispose of their ore in exchange for our coal; and, should this not suffice, to indemnify them, partly at least, by other means. This is the next step.

Charter and Insurance of All Available Neutral Tonnage.4. The above considerations lead to a wider proposal. Ought we not to secure the control, by charter or otherwise, of all the free neutral shipping we can obtain, as well as the Norwegian, and thus give the Allies power to regulate the greater part of the sea transport of the world and recharter it, profitably, to those who act as we wish?And ought we not to extend neutral shipping not under our direct control the benefit of our convoy system?The results so far achieved by the Royal Navy against the U-boat attack seem, in the opinion of the Admiralty, to justify the adoption of this latter course. This would mean that we should offer safe convoy to all vessels of all countries traversing our sea routes, provided they conform to our rules of contraband, and pay the necessary premiums in foreign devisen. They would, therefore, be able to contract themselves out of the war risk, and with the success of our anti-U-boat campaign we may well hope to make a profit to offset its heavy expense. Thus, not only vessels owned by us or controlled by us, but independent neutral ships, would all come to enjoy the British protection on the high seas, or be indemnified in case of accidents. It is not believed at the Admiralty that this is beyond our strength. Had some such scheme for the chartering and insurance of neutral shipping been in force from the early days of the last war, there is little doubt that it would have proved a highly profitable speculation. In this war it might well prove to be the foundation of a League of Free Maritime Nations to which it was profitable to belong.

5. It is therefore asked that the Cabinet, if they approve in principle of these four main objectives, should remit the question to the various departments concerned in order that detailed plans may be made for prompt action.

Before circulating this paper to the Cabinet and raising the issue there, I called upon the Admiralty Staff for a thorough recheck of the whole position.

First Lord to the a.s.sistant Chief of the Naval Staff.

29.IX.39.

Please reconvene the meeting on iron ore we held on Thursday tomorrow morning, while Cabinet is sitting, in order to consider the draft print which I have made. It is no use my asking the Cabinet to take the drastic action suggested against a neutral country unless the results are in the first order of importance.I am told that there are hardly any German or Swedish ships trying to take ore south from Narvik. Also that the Germans have been acc.u.mulating ore by sea at Oxelosund against the freezing-up, and so will be able to bring good supplies down the Baltic via the Kiel Ca.n.a.l to the Ruhr during the winter months. Are these statements true? It would be very unpleasant if I went into action on mining the Norwegian territorial waters and was answered that it would not do the trick.2. At the same time, a.s.suming that the west coast traffic of Norway in ore is a really important factor worth making an exertion to stop, at what point would you stop it?Pray explore in detail the coast and let me know the point. Clearly it should be north at any rate of Bergen, thus leaving the southern part of the west Norwegian coast open for any traffic that may come from Norway or out of the Baltic in the Norwegian convoy across to us. All this has to be more explored before I can present my case to the Cabinet. I shall not attempt to do so until Monday or Tuesday.

When all was agreed and settled at the Admiralty, I brought the matter a second time before the Cabinet. Again there was general agreement upon the need; but I was unable to obtain a.s.sent to action. The Foreign Office arguments about neutrality were weighty, and I could not prevail. I continued, as will be seen, to press my point by every means and on all occasions. It was not, however, until April, 1940, that the decision that I asked for in September, 1939, was taken. By that time it was too late.

Almost at this very moment (as we now know), German eyes were turned in the same direction. On October 3, Admiral Raeder, Chief of the Naval Staff, submitted a proposal to Hitler headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway." He asked, "That the Fuehrer be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval War Staff on the possibilities of extending the operational base to the North. It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving our strategic and operational position." He framed, therefore, a series of notes which he placed before Hitler on October 10.

In these notes [he wrote] I stressed the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by the British would have for us: the control of the approaches to the Baltic, the outflanking of our naval operations and of our air attacks on Britain, the end of our pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast: outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine barrier, as in the year 1917/18.... The Fuehrer saw at once the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the question himself.

Rosenberg, the Foreign Affairs expert of the n.a.z.i Party, and in charge of a special bureau to deal with propaganda activities in foreign countries, shared the Admiral"s views. He dreamed of "converting Scandinavia to the idea of a Nordic community embracing the northern peoples under the natural leadership of Germany." Early in 1939, he thought he had discovered an instrument in the extreme Nationalist Party in Norway, which was led by a former Norwegian Minister of War named Vidkun Quisling. Contacts were established, and Quisling"s activity was linked with the plans of the German Naval Staff through the Rosenberg organisation and the German Naval Attache in Oslo.

Quisling and his a.s.sistant, Hagelin, came to Berlin on December 14, and were taken by Raeder to Hitler, to discuss a political stroke in Norway. Quisling arrived with a detailed plan. Hitler, careful of secrecy, affected reluctance to increase his commitments, and said he would prefer a neutral Scandinavia. Nevertheless, according to Raeder, it was on this very day that he gave the order to the Supreme Command to prepare for a Norwegian operation.

Of all this we, of course, knew nothing. The two Admiralties thought with precision along the same lines in correct strategy, and one had obtained decisions from its Government.

Meanwhile, the Scandinavian peninsula became the scene of an unexpected conflict which aroused strong feeling in Britain and France, and powerfully affected the discussions about Norway. As soon as Germany was involved in war with Great Britain and France, Soviet Russia in the spirit of her pact with Germany proceeded to block the lines of entry into the Soviet Union from the west. One pa.s.sage led from East Prussia through the Baltic States; another led across the waters of the Gulf of Finland; the third route was through Finland itself and across the Karelian Isthmus to a point where the Finnish frontier was only twenty miles from the suburbs of Leningrad. The Soviet had not forgotten the dangers which Leningrad had faced in 1919. Even the White Russian Government of Kolchak had informed the Peace Conference in Paris that bases in the Baltic States and Finland were a necessary protection for the Russian capital. Stalin had used the same language to the British and French Missions in the summer of 1939; and we have seen in earlier chapters how the natural fears of these small states had been an obstacle to an Anglo-French Alliance with Russia, and had paved the way for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement.

Stalin had wasted no time; on September 24, the Esthonian Foreign Minister had been called to Moscow, and four days later his Government signed a Pact of Mutual a.s.sistance which gave the Russians the right to garrison key bases in Esthonia. By October 21, the Red Army and air force were installed. The same procedure was used simultaneously in Latvia, and Soviet garrisons also appeared in Lithuania. Thus, the southern road to Leningrad and half the Gulf of Finland had been swiftly barred against potential German ambitions by the armed forces of the Soviet. There remained only the approach through Finland.

Early in October, Mr. Paasikivi, one of the Finnish statesmen who had signed the Peace of 1921 with the Soviet Union, went to Moscow. The Soviet demands were sweeping; the Finnish frontier on the Karelian Isthmus must be moved back a considerable distance so as to remove Leningrad from the range of hostile artillery. The cession of certain Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland; the lease of the Rybathy Peninsula together with Finland"s only ice-free port in the Arctic Sea, Petsamo; and above all, the leasing of the port of Hango at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland as a Russian naval and air base, completed the Soviet requirements. The Finns were prepared to make concessions on every point except the last. With the keys of the Gulf in Russian hands the strategic and national security of Finland seemed to them to vanish. The negotiations broke down on November 13, and the Finnish Government began to mobilise and strengthen their troops on the Karelian frontier. On November 28, Molotov denounced the Non-Aggression Pact between Finland and Russia; two days later, the Russians attacked at eight points along Finland"s thousand-mile frontier, and on the same morning the capital, Helsingfors, was bombed by the Red air force.

The brunt of the Russian attack fell at first upon the frontier defences of the Finns in the Karelian Isthmus. These comprised a fortified zone about twenty miles in depth running north and south through forest country deep in snow. This was called the "Mannerheim Line," after the Finnish Commander-in-Chief and saviour of Finland from Bolshevik subjugation in 1917. The indignation excited in Britain, France, and even more vehemently in the United States, at the unprovoked attack by the enormous Soviet Power upon a small, spirited, and highly civilised nation, was soon followed by astonishment and relief. The early weeks of fighting brought no success to the Soviet forces, which in the first instance were drawn almost entirely from the Leningrad garrison. The Finnish Army, whose total fighting strength was only about two hundred thousand men, gave a good account of themselves. The Russian tanks were encountered with audacity and a new type of hand-grenade, soon nicknamed "The Molotov c.o.c.ktail."

[image]

It is probable that the Soviet Government had counted on a walk-over. Their early air raids on Helsingfors and elsewhere, though not on a heavy scale, were expected to strike terror. The troops they used at first, though numerically much stronger, were inferior in quality and ill-trained. The effect of the air raids and of the invasion of their land roused the Finns, who rallied to a man against the aggressor and fought with absolute determination and the utmost skill. It is true that the Russian division which carried out the attack on Petsamo had little difficulty in throwing back the seven hundred Finns in that area. But the attack on the "Waist" of Finland proved disastrous to the invaders. The country here is almost entirely pine forests, gently undulating and at the time covered with a foot of hard snow. The cold was intense. The Finns were well equipped with skis and warm clothing, of which the Russians had neither. Moreover, the Finns proved themselves aggressive individual fighters, highly trained in reconnaissance and forest warfare. The Russians relied in vain on numbers and heavier weapons. All along this front the Finnish frontier posts withdrew slowly down the roads, followed by the Russian columns. After these had penetrated about thirty miles, they were set upon by the Finns. Held in front at Finnish defence lines constructed in the forests, violently attacked in flank by day and night, their communications severed behind them, the columns were cut to pieces, or, if lucky, got back after heavy loss whence they came. By the end of December, the whole Russian plan for driving in across the "Waist" had broken down.

Meanwhile, the attacks against the Mannerheim Line in the Karelian Peninsula fared no better. North of Lake Ladoga a turning movement attempted by about two Soviet divisions met the same fate as the operations farther north. Against the Line itself a series of ma.s.s attacks by nearly twelve divisions was launched in early December and continued throughout the month. The Russian artillery bombardments were inadequate; their tanks were mostly light, and a succession of frontal attacks were repulsed with heavy losses and no gains. By the end of the year, failure all along the front convinced the Soviet Government that they had to deal with a very different enemy from what they had expected. They determined upon a major effort. Realising that in the forest warfare of the north they could not overcome by mere weight of numbers the superior tactics and training of the Finns, they decided to concentrate on piercing the Mannerheim Line by methods of siege warfare in which the power of ma.s.sed heavy artillery and heavy tanks could be brought into full play. This required preparation on a large scale, and from the end of the year fighting died down all along the Finnish Front, leaving the Finns so far victorious over their mighty a.s.sailant. This surprising event was received with equal satisfaction in all countries, belligerent or neutral, throughout the world. It was a pretty bad advertis.e.m.e.nt for the Soviet Army. In British circles many people congratulated themselves that we had not gone out of our way to bring the Soviets in on our side, and preened themselves on their foresight. The conclusion was drawn too hastily that the Russian Army had been ruined by the purge, and that the inherent rottenness and degradation of their system of government and society was now proved. It was not only in England that this view was taken. There is no doubt that Hitler and all his generals meditated profoundly upon the Finnish exposure, and that it played a potent part in influencing the Fuehrer"s thought.

[image]

All the resentment felt against the Soviet Government for the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was fanned into flame by this latest exhibition of brutal bullying and aggression. With this was also mingled scorn for the inefficiency displayed by the Soviet troops and enthusiasm for the gallant Finns. In spite of the Great War which had been declared, there was a keen desire to help the Finns by aircraft and other precious war material and by volunteers from Britain, from the United States, and still more from France. Alike for the munition supplies and the volunteers, there was only one possible route to Finland. The iron-ore port of Narvik with its railroad over the mountains to the Swedish iron mines acquired a new senti mental if not strategic significance. Its use as a line of supply for the Finnish armies affected the neutrality both of Norway and Sweden. These two states, in equal fear of Germany and Russia, had no aim but to keep out of the wars by which they were encircled and might be engulfed. For them this seemed the only chance of survival. But whereas the British Government were naturally reluctant to commit even a technical infringement of Norwegian territorial waters by laying mines in the Leads for their own advantage against Germany, they moved upon a generous emotion, only indirectly connected with our war problem, towards a far more serious demand upon both Norway and Sweden for the free pa.s.sage of men and supplies to Finland.

I sympathised ardently with the Finns and supported all proposals for their aid; and I welcomed this new and favourable breeze as a means of achieving the major strategic advantage of cutting off the vital iron-ore supplies of Germany. If Narvik was to become a kind of Allied base to supply the Finns, it would certainly be easy to prevent the German ships loading ore at the port and sailing safely down the Leads to Germany. Once Norwegian and Swedish protestations were overborne for whatever reason, the greater measures would include the less. The Admiralty eyes were also fixed at this time upon the movements of a large and powerful Russian ice-breaker which was to be sent from Murmansk to Germany, ostensibly for repairs, but much more probably to open the now-frozen Baltic port of Lulea for the German ore ships. I, therefore, renewed my efforts to win consent to the simple and bloodless operation of mining the Leads, for which a certain precedent of the previous war existed. As the question raises moral issues, I feel it right to set the case in its final form as I made it after prolonged reflection and debate.

Norway - Iron-Ore TrafficNote by the First Lord of the Admiralty16.XII.39.The effectual stoppage of the Norwegian ore supplies to Germany ranks as a major offensive operation of war. No other measure is open to us for many months to come which gives so good a chance of abridging the waste and destruction of the conflict, or of perhaps preventing the vast slaughters which will attend the grapple of the main armies.2. If the advantage is held to outweigh the obvious and serious objections, the whole process of stoppage must be enforced. The ore from Lulea [in the Baltic] is already stopped by the winter ice, which must not be [allowed to be] broken by the Soviet ice-breaker, should the attempt be made. The ore from Narvik must be stopped by laying successively a series of small minefields in Norwegian territorial waters at the two or three suitable points on the coast, which will force the ships carrying ore to Germany to quit territorial waters and come onto the high seas, where, if German, they will be taken as prize, or, if neutral, subjected to our contraband control. The ore from Oxelosund, the main ice-free port in the Baltic, must also be prevented from leaving by methods which will be neither diplomatic nor military. All these three ports must be dealt with in various appropriate ways as soon as possible.3. Thus, it is not a question of denying Germany a mere million tons between now and May, but of cutting off her whole winter supply except the negligible amounts that can be got from Gavle, or other minor ice-free Baltic ports. Germany would, therefore, undergo a severe deprivation, tending to crisis before the summer. But when the ice melts in the Gulf of Bothnia the abundant supply from Lulea would again be open, and Germany is no doubt planning, not only to get as much as she can during the winter, but to make up the whole nine and a half million tons which she needs, or even more, between May 1 and December 15, 1940. After this she might hope to organise Russian supplies and be able to wage a very long war.4. It may well be that, should we reach the month of May with Germany starving for ore for her industries and her munitions, the prevention of the reopening of Lulea may become [for us] a princ.i.p.al naval objective. The laying of a declared minefield, including magnetic mines, off Lulea by British submarines would be one way. There are others. If Germany can be cut from all Swedish ore supplies from now onwards till the end of 1940, a blow will have been struck at her war-making capacity equal to a first-cla.s.s victory in the field or from the air, and without any serious sacrifice of life. It might indeed be immediately decisive.5. To every blow struck in war there is a counter. If you fire at the enemy he will fire back. It is most necessary, therefore, to face squarely the counter-measures which may be taken by Germany, or constrained by her from Norway or Sweden. As to Norway, there are three pairs of events which are linked together. First, the Germans, conducting war in a cruel and lawless manner, have violated the territorial waters of Norway, sinking without warning or succour a number of British and neutral vessels. To that our response is to lay the minefields mentioned above. It is suggested that Norway, by way of protest, may cancel the valuable agreement we have made with her for chartering her tankers and other ship ping. But then she would lose the extremely profitable bargain she has made with us, and this shipping would become valueless to her in view of our contraband control. Her ships would be idle, and her owners impoverished. It would not be in Norwegian interests for her Government to take this step; and interest is a powerful factor. Thirdly, Norway could retaliate by refusing to export to us the aluminium and other war materials which are important to the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply. But here again her interests would suffer. Not only would she not receive the valuable gains which this trade brings her, but Great Britain, by denying her bauxite and other indispensable raw materials, could bring the whole industry of Norway, centring upon Oslo and Bergen, to a complete standstill. In short, Norway, by retaliating against us, would be involved in economic and industrial ruin.6. Norwegian sympathies are on our side, and her future independence from German overlordship hangs upon the victory of the Allies. It is not reasonable to suppose that she will take either of the counter-measures mentioned above (although she may threaten them), unless she is compelled to do so by German brute force.7. This will certainly be applied to her anyway, and whatever we do, if Germany thinks it her interest to dominate forcibly the Scandinavian peninsula. In that case the war would spread to Norway and Sweden, and with our command of the seas there is no reason why French and British troops should not meet German invaders on Scandinavian soil. At any rate, we can certainly take and hold whatever islands or suitable points on the Norwegian coast we choose. Our northern blockade of Germany would then become absolute. We could, for instance, occupy Narvik and Bergen, and keep them open for our own trade while closing them completely to Germany. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that British control of the Norwegian coast-line is a strategic objective of first-cla.s.s importance. It is not, therefore, seen how, even if retaliation by Germany were to run its full course, we should be worse off for the action now proposed. On the contrary, we have more to gain than lose by a German attack upon Norway or Sweden. This point is capable of more elaboration than is necessary here.There is no reason why we should not manage to secure a large and long-continued supply of iron ore from Sweden through Narvik while at the same time diverting all supplies of ore from Germany. This must be our aim.

I concluded as follows: 8. The effect of our action against Norway upon world opinion and upon our own reputation must be considered. We have taken up arms in accordance with the principles of the Covenant of the League in order to aid the victims of German aggression. No technical infringement of international law, so long as it is unaccompanied by inhumanity of any kind, can deprive us of the good wishes of neutral countries. No evil effect will be produced upon the greatest of all neutrals, the United States. We have reason to believe that they will handle the matter in the way most calculated to help us. And they are very resourceful.9. The final tribunal is our own conscience. We are fighting to re-establish the reign of law and to protect the liberties of small countries. Our defeat would mean an age of barbaric violence, and would be fatal, not only to ourselves, but to the independent life of every small country in Europe. Acting in the name of the Covenant, and as virtual mandatories of the League and all it stands for, we have a right, and indeed are bound in duty, to abrogate for a s.p.a.ce some of the conventions of the very laws we seek to consolidate and reaffirm. Small nations must not tie our hands when we are fighting for their rights and freedom. The letter of the law must not in supreme emergency obstruct those who are charged with its protection and enforcement. It would not be right or rational that the aggressor Power should gain one set of advantages by tearing up all laws, and another set by sheltering behind the innate respect for law of its opponents. Humanity, rather than legality, must be our guide.Of all this history must be the judge. We now face events.My memorandum was considered by the Cabinet on December 22, and I pleaded the case to the best of my ability. I could not obtain any decision for action. Diplomatic protest might be made to Norway about the misuse of her territorial waters by Germany, and the Chiefs of the Staff were instructed to consider the military implications of any possible future commitments on Scandinavian soil. They were authorised to plan for landing a force at Narvik for the sake of Finland, and also to consider the military consequences of a German occupation of Southern Norway. But no executive orders could be issued to the Admiralty. In a paper which I circulated on December 24, I summarised the Intelligence reports which showed the possibilities of a Russian design upon Norway. The Soviets were said to have three divisions concentrated at Murmansk preparing for a seaborne expedition. "It may be," I concluded, "that this theatre will become the scene of early activities." This proved only too true: but from a different quarter.

10.

A Dark New Year

The Trance Continues - - Catherine: The Final Phase - Tension with Russia Catherine: The Final Phase - Tension with Russia - - Mussolini"s Misgivings Mussolini"s Misgivings - - Mr. h.o.r.e-Belisha Leaves the War Office Mr. h.o.r.e-Belisha Leaves the War Office - - Impediments to Action Impediments to Action - - A Twilight Mood in the Factories A Twilight Mood in the Factories - - The Results in May The Results in May - - Capture of the German Plans Against Belgium Capture of the German Plans Against Belgium - - Work and Growth of the British Expeditionary Force Work and Growth of the British Expeditionary Force - - No Armoured Division - Deterioration of the French Army - Communist Intrigues No Armoured Division - Deterioration of the French Army - Communist Intrigues - - German Plans for the Invasion of Norway German Plans for the Invasion of Norway - - The Supreme War Council of February The Supreme War Council of February 5 5 - My First Attendance - My First Attendance - - The "Altmark" Incident - The "Altmark" Incident - Captain Philip Vian - Rescue of the British Prisoners Captain Philip Vian - Rescue of the British Prisoners - Mr. - Mr. Chamberlain"s Effective Defence Chamberlain"s Effective Defence - - Hitler Appoints General von Falkenhorst to Command Against Norway Hitler Appoints General von Falkenhorst to Command Against Norway - - Norway Before France Norway Before France - - German Air Attack on Our East Coast Shipping German Air Attack on Our East Coast Shipping - - Counter-Measures - Counter-Measures - Satisfactory Results of the First Six Months" Sea War Satisfactory Results of the First Six Months" Sea War - - Navy Esiimates Speech, February Navy Esiimates Speech, February 27 27, 1940 1940.

THE END OF THE YEAR 1939 left the war still in its sinister trance. An occasional cannon-shot or reconnoitring patrol alone broke the silence of the Western Front. The armies gaped at each other from behind their rising fortifications across an undisputed "No-Man"s-Land." 1939 left the war still in its sinister trance. An occasional cannon-shot or reconnoitring patrol alone broke the silence of the Western Front. The armies gaped at each other from behind their rising fortifications across an undisputed "No-Man"s-Land."

There is a certain similarity [I wrote to Pound on Christmas Day] between the position now, and at the end of the year 1914. The transition from peace to war has been accomplished. The outer seas, for the moment at any rate, arc clear from enemy surface craft. The lines in France are static. But in addition on the sea we have repelled the first U-boat attack, which previously did not begin till February, 1915, and we can see our way through the magnetic-mine novelty. Moreover, in France the lines run along the frontiers instead of six or seven of the French provinces and Belgium being in the enemy"s hands. Thus I feel we may compare the position now very favourably with that of 1914. And also I have the feeling (which may be corrected at any moment) that the Kaiser"s Germany was a much tougher customer than n.a.z.i Germany.This is the best I can do for a Christmas card in these hard times.

I was by now increasingly convinced that there could be no "Operation Catherine" in 1940.

The sending of a superior surface fleet into the Baltic [I wrote to Pound, January 6], though eminently desirable, is not essential to the seizure and retention of the iron-fields. While therefore every preparation to send the Fleet in should continue, and strong efforts should be made, it would be wrong to try it unless we can see our way to maintaining it under air attack, and still more wrong to make the seizure of the iron-fields dependent upon the sending of a surface fleet. Let us advance with confidence and see how the naval side develops as events unfold.

And again a week later:

Mr. Churchill to First Sea Lord.

15.I.40.

I have carefully considered all the papers you have been good enough to send me in reply to my various minutes about "Catherine." I have come reluctantly but quite definitely to the conclusion that the operation we outlined in the autumn will not be practicable this year. We have not yet obtained sufficient mastery over U-boats, mines, and raiders to enable us to fit for their special duties the many smaller vessels required. The problem of making our ships comparatively secure against air attack has not been solved. The dive-bomber remains a formidable menace. The rockets [called for secrecy "the U.P. weapon," i.e., unrotated projectile], though progressing rapidly towards the production stage, will not be available in sufficient quant.i.ties, even if all goes well, for many months to come. We have not been able so far to give the additional armour protection to our larger ships. The political situation in the Baltic is as baffling as ever. On the other hand, the arrival of the Bismarck Bismarck in September adds greatly to the scale of the surface resistance to be encountered. in September adds greatly to the scale of the surface resistance to be encountered.2. But the war may well be raging in 1941, and no one can tell what opportunities may present themselves then. I wish, therefore, that all the preparations of various ships and auxiliaries outlined in your table and marked as "beneficial" should continue as opportunity offers; that when ships come into the dockyards for repair or refit, everything should be done to them which will not delay their return to service. And it would surely be only common prudence, in view of the att.i.tude of Russia, to go on warning our destroyers for service in winter seas. I am glad to feel that we are agreed in this.

So far no ally had espoused our cause. The United States was cooler than in any other period. I persevered in my correspondence with the President, but with little response. The Chancellor of the Exchequer groaned about our dwindling dollar resources. We had already signed a pact of mutual a.s.sistance with Turkey, and were considering what aid we could give her from our narrow margins. The stresses created by the Finnish War had worsened our relations, already bad, with the Soviets. Any action we might undertake to help the Finns might lead to war with Russia. The fundamental antagonisms between the Soviet Government and n.a.z.i Germany did not prevent the Kremlin actively aiding by supplies and facilities the development of Hitler"s power. Communists in France and any that existed in Britain denounced the "imperialist-capitalist" war, and did what they could to hamper work in the munition factories. They certainly exercised a depressing and subversive influence within the French Army, already wearied by inaction. We continued to court Italy by civilities and favourable contracts, but we could feel no security, or progress towards friendship. Count Ciano was polite to our Amba.s.sador. Mussolini stood aloof.

The Italian Dictator was not, however, without his own misgivings. On January 3, he wrote a revealing letter to Hitler expressing his distaste for the German agreement with Russia: No one knows better than I with forty years" political experience that policy particularly a revolutionary policy has its tactical requirements. I recognised the Soviets in 1924. In 1934, I signed with them a treaty of commerce and friendship. I, therefore, understood that, especially as Ribbentrop"s forecast about the non-intervention of Britain and France has not come off, especially as Ribbentrop"s forecast about the non-intervention of Britain and France has not come off, you are obliged to avoid the second front. You have had to pay for this in that Russia has, without striking a blow, been the great profiteer of the war in Poland and the Baltic. you are obliged to avoid the second front. You have had to pay for this in that Russia has, without striking a blow, been the great profiteer of the war in Poland and the Baltic.But I, who was born a revolutionary and have not modified my revolutionary mentality, tell you that you cannot permanently sacrifice the principles of your your revolution to the tactical requirements of a given moment.... I have also the definite duty to add that a further step in the relations with Moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in Italy, where the unanimity of anti-Bolshevik feeling is absolute, granite-hard, and unbreakable. Permit me to think that this will not happen. The solution of your revolution to the tactical requirements of a given moment.... I have also the definite duty to add that a further step in the relations with Moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in Italy, where the unanimity of anti-Bolshevik feeling is absolute, granite-hard, and unbreakable. Permit me to think that this will not happen. The solution of your Lebensraum Lebensraum is in Russia, and nowhere else.... The day when we shall have demolished Bolshevism we shall have kept faith with both our revolutions. Then it will be the turn of the great democracies, who will not be able to survive the cancer which gnaws them.... is in Russia, and nowhere else.... The day when we shall have demolished Bolshevism we shall have kept faith with both our revolutions. Then it will be the turn of the great democracies, who will not be able to survive the cancer which gnaws them....

On January 6, I again visited France to explain my two mechanical projects, Cultivator Number 61 and the Fluvial Mine ("Operation Royal Marine"), to the French High Command. In the morning, before I left, the Prime Minister sent for me and told me he had decided to make a change at the War Office, and that Mr. h.o.r.e-Belisha would give place to Mr. Oliver Stanley. Late that night, Mr. h.o.r.e-Belisha called me on the telephone at our Emba.s.sy in Paris and told me what I knew already. I pressed him, but without success, to take one of the other offices which were open to him. The Government was itself in low water at this time, and almost the whole press of the country declared that a most energetic and live figure had been dismissed from the Government. He quitted the War Office amid a chorus of newspaper tributes. Parliament does not take its opinion from the newspapers; indeed, it often. reacts in the opposite sense. When the House of Commons met a week later, he had few champions, and refrained from making any statement. I wrote to him, January 10, as follows: and the Fluvial Mine ("Operation Royal Marine"), to the French High Command. In the morning, before I left, the Prime Minister sent for me and told me he had decided to make a change at the War Office, and that Mr. h.o.r.e-Belisha would give place to Mr. Oliver Stanley. Late that night, Mr. h.o.r.e-Belisha called me on the telephone at our Emba.s.sy in Paris and told me what I knew already. I pressed him, but without success, to take one of the other offices which were open to him. The Government was itself in low water at this time, and almost the whole press of the country declared that a most energetic and live figure had been dismissed from the Government. He quitted the War Office amid a chorus of newspaper tributes. Parliament does not take its opinion from the newspapers; indeed, it often. reacts in the opposite sense. When the House of Commons met a week later, he had few champions, and refrained from making any statement. I wrote to him, January 10, as follows: I much regret that our brief a.s.sociation as colleagues has ended. In the last war I went through the same experience as you have suffered, and I know how bitter and painful it is to anyone with his heart in the job. I was not consulted in the changes that were proposed. I was only informed after they had been decided. At the same time, I should fail in candour if I did not let you know that I. thought it would have been better if you went to the Board of Trade or the Ministry of Information, and I am very sorry that you did not see your way to accept the first of these important offices.The outstanding achievement of your tenure of the War Office was the pa.s.sage of conscription in time of peace. You may rest with confidence upon this, and I hope that it will not be long before we are colleagues again, and that this temporary set-back will prove no serious obstacle to your opportunities of serving the country.

It was not possible for me to realise my hope until, after the break-up of the National Coalition, I formed the so-called "Caretaker Government" in May, 1945. Belisha then became Minister of National Insurance. In the interval he had been one of our severe critics; but I was very glad to be able to bring so able a man back into the Administration.

All January the Finns stood firm, and at the end of the month the growing Russian armies were still held in their positions. The Red air force continued to bomb Helsingfors and Viipuri, and the cry from the Finnish Government for aircraft and war materials grew louder. As the Arctic nights shortened, the Soviet air offensive would increase, not only upon the towns of Finland, but upon the communications of their armies. Only a trickle of war material and only a few thousand volunteers from the Scandinavian countries had reached Finland so far. A bureau for recruiting was opened in London in January, and several scores of British aircraft were sent to Finland, some direct by air. Nothing in fact of any use was done.

The delays about Narvik continued interminably. Although the Cabinet were prepared to contemplate pressure upon Norway and Sweden to allow aid to pa.s.s to Finland, they remained opposed to the much smaller operation of mining the Leads. The first was n.o.ble; the second merely tactical. Besides, everyone could see that Norway and Sweden would refuse facilities for aid; so nothing would come of the project anyway.

In my vexation after one of our Cabinets I wrote to a colleague:

January 15, 1940. 15, 1940.My disquiet was due mainly to the awful difficulties which our machinery of war conduct presents to positive action. I see such immense walls of prevention, all built and building, that I wonder whether any plan will have a chance of climbing over them. Just look at the arguments which have had to be surmounted in the seven weeks we have discussed this Narvik operation. First, the objections of the economic departments, Supply, Board of Trade, etc. Secondly, the Joint Planning Committee. Thirdly, the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Fourthly, the insidious argument, "Don"t spoil the big plan for the sake of the small," when there is really very little chance of the big plan being resolutely attempted. Fifthly, the juridical and moral objections, all gradually worn down. Sixthly, the att.i.tude of neutrals, and above all, the United States. But see how well the United States have responded to our demarche! demarche! Seventhly, the Cabinet itself, with its many angles of criticism. Eighthly, when all this has been smoothed out, the French have to be consulted. Finally, the Dominions and their consciences have to be squared, they not having gone through the process by which opinion has advanced at home. All this makes me feel that under the present arrangements we shall be reduced to waiting upon the terrible attacks of the enemy, against which it is impossible to prepare in every quarter simultaneously without fatal dissipation of strength. Seventhly, the Cabinet itself, with its many angles of criticism. Eighthly, when all this has been smoothed out, the French have to be consulted. Finally, the Dominions and their consciences have to be squared, they not having gone through the process by which opinion has advanced at home. All this makes me feel that under the present arrangements we shall be reduced to waiting upon the terrible attacks of the enemy, against which it is impossible to prepare in every quarter simultaneously without fatal dissipation of strength.I have two or three projects moving forward, but all I fear will succ.u.mb before the tremendous array of negative arguments and forces. Pardon me, therefore, if I showed distress. One thing is absolutely certain, namely, that victory will never be found by taking the line of least resistance.However, all this Narvik story is for the moment put on one side by the threat to the Low Countries. If this materialises, the position will have to be studied in the light of entirely new events.... Should a great battle engage in the Low Countries, the effects upon Norway and Sweden may well be decisive. Even if the battle ends only in a stalemate, they may feel far more free, and to us a diversion may become even more needful.

There were other causes for uneasiness. The progress of converting our industries to war production was not up to the pace required. In a speech at Manchester on January 27, I urged the immense importance of expanding our labour supply and of bringing great numbers of women into industry to replace the men taken for the armed forces and to augment our strength: We have to make a huge expansion, especially of those capable of performing skilled or semi-skilled operations. Here we must specially count for aid and guidance upon our Labour colleagues and trade-union leaders. I can speak with some knowledge about this, having presided over the former Ministry of Munitions in its culminating phase. Millions of new workers will be needed, and more than a million women must come boldly forward into our war industries into the sh.e.l.l plants, the munition works, and into the aircraft factories. Without this expansion of labour and without allowing the women of Britain to enter the struggle as they desire to do, we should fail utterly to bear our fair share of the burden which France and Britain have jointly a.s.sumed.

Little was, however, done, and the sense of extreme emergency seemed lacking. There was a "twilight" mood in the ranks of Labour and of those who directed production as well as in the military operations. It was not till the beginning of May that a survey of employment in the engineering, motor, and aircraft group of industries which was presented to the Cabinet revealed the facts in an indisputable form. This paper was searchingly examined by my statistical department under Professor Lindemann. In spite of the distractions and excitements of the Norwegian hurly-burly then in progress, I found time to address the following note to my colleagues:

Note by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

May 4, 1940.

This Report suggests that in this fundamental group, at any rate, we have hardly begun to organise man-power for the production of munitions.In [previous papers] it was estimated that a very large expansion, amounting to 71.5 per cent of the number engaged in the metal industry, would be needed in the first year of war. Actually the engineering, motor, and aircraft group, which covers three-fifths of the metal industry and which is discussed in this survey, has only expanded by 11.1 per cent (122,000) between June, 1939, and April, 1940. This is less than one-sixth of the expansion stated to be required. Without any Government intervention, by the mere improvement of trade, the number increased as quickly as this in the year 1936/37.Although 350,000 boys leave school each year, there is an increase of only 25,000 in the number of males under twenty-one employed in this group. Moreover, the proportion of women and young persons has only increased from 26.6 per cent to 27.6 per cent. In the engineering, motor, and aircraft group, we now have only one woman for every twelve men. During the last war the ratio of women to men in the metal industries increased from one woman for every ten men to one woman for every three men. In the first year of the last war, July, 1914, to July, 1915, the new workers drafted into the metal industries amounted to 20 per cent of those already there. In the group under survey which may fairly be taken as typical of the whole metal industry, only 11 per cent have been added in the last ten months.Admiralty establishments, in which employment has been increased by nearly 27 per cent, have not been considered here, as no figures of the different types of labour are given.

On January 19, anxieties about the Western Front received confirmation. A German staff-major of the 7th Air Division had been ordered to take some doc.u.ments to Headquarters in Cologne. Wishing to save time for private indulgences, he decided to fly across the intervening Belgian territory. His machine made a forced landing; the Belgian police arrested him and impounded his papers, which he tried desperately to destroy. These contained the entire and actual scheme for the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and France on which Hitler had resolved. The French and British Governments were given copies of these doc.u.ments, and the German major was released to explain matters to his superiors. I was told about all this at the time, and it seemed to me incredible that the Belgians would not make a plan to invite us in. But they did nothing about it. It was argued in all three countries concerned that probably it was a plant. But this could not be true. There could be no sense in the Germans trying to make the Belgians believe that they were going to attack them in the near future. This might make them do the very last thing the Germans wanted, namely, make a plan with the French and British Armies to come forward privily and quickly one fine night. I, therefore, believed in the impending attack. But such questionings found no place in the thought of the Belgian King, and he and his Army Staff merely waited, hoping that all would turn out well. In spite of all the German major"s papers, no fresh action of any kind was taken by the Allies or the threatened states. Hitler, on the other hand, as we now know, summoned Goering to his presence, and on being told that the captured papers were in fact the complete plans for invasion, ordered, after venting his anger, new variants to be prepared.

It was thus clear at the beginning of 1940 that Hitler had a detailed plan involving both Belgium and Holland for the invasion of France. Should this begin at any moment, General Gamelin"s Plan "D" would be put in operation, including the movement of the Seventh French Army and the British Army. Plan "D" 2 2 had been worked out in exact detail and required only one single word to set it in motion. This course, though deprecated at the outset of the war by the British Chiefs of Staff, had been definitely and formally confirmed in Paris on November 17, 1939. On this basis the Allies awaited the impending shock, and Hitler the campaigning season, for which the weather might well be favourable from April onwards. had been worked out in exact detail and required only one single word to set it in motion. This course, though deprecated at the outset of the war by the British Chiefs of Staff, had been definitely and formally confirmed in Paris on November 17, 1939. On this basis the Allies awaited the impending shock, and Hitler the campaigning season, for which the weather might well be favourable from April onwards.

During the winter and spring, the B.E.F. were extremely busy setting themselves to rights, fortifying their line and preparing for war, whether offensive or defensive. From the highest rank to the lowest, all were hard at it, and the good showing that they eventually made was due largely to the full use made of the opportunities provided during the winter. The British was a far better army at the end of the "Twilight War." It was also larger. The 42d and 44th Divisions arrived in March and went on to the frontier line in the latter half of April, 1940. In that month there also arrived the 12th, 23d, and 46th Divisions. These were sent to complete their training in France and to augment the labour force for all the work in hand. They were short even of the ordinary unit weapons and equipment, and had no artillery. Nevertheless, they were inevitably drawn into the fighting when it began, and acquitted themselves well.

The awful gap, reflecting on our pre-war arrangements, was the absence of even one armoured division in the British Expeditionary Force. the absence of even one armoured division in the British Expeditionary Force. Britain, the cradle of the tank in all its variants, had between the wars so far neglected the development of this weapon, soon to dominate the battlefields, that eight months after the declaration of war our small but good army had only with it, when the hour of trial arrived, the First Army Tank Brigade, comprising seventeen light tanks and one hundred "infantry" tanks. Only twenty-three of the latter carried even the two-pounder gun; the rest machine-guns only. There were also seven cavalry and yeomanry regiments equipped with carriers and light tanks which were in process of being formed into two light armoured brigades. Apart from the lack of armour the progress in the efficiency of the B.E.F. was marked. Britain, the cradle of the tank in all its variants, had between the wars so far neglected the development of this weapon, soon to dominate the battlefields, that eight months after the declaration of war our small but good army had only with it, when the hour of trial arrived, the First Army Tank Brigade, comprising seventeen light tanks and one hundred "infantry" tanks. Only twenty-three of the latter carried even the two-pounder gun; the rest machine-guns only. There were also seven cavalry and yeomanry regiments equipped with carriers and light tanks which were in process of being formed into two light armoured brigades. Apart from the lack of armour the progress in the efficiency of the B.E.F. was marked.

Developments on the French Front were less satisfactory. In a great national conscript force the mood of the people is closely reflected in its army, the more so when that army is quartered in the homeland and contacts are close. It cannot be said that France in 1939/40 viewed the war with uprising spirit or even with much confidence. The restless internal politics of the past decade had bred disunity and discontents. Important elements, in reaction to growing Communism, had swung towards Fascism, lending a ready ear to Goebbels" skilful propaganda and pa.s.sing it on in gossip and rumour. So also in the Army the disintegrating influences of both Communism and Fascism were at work; the long winter months of waiting gave time and opportunity for the poisons to be established.

Very many factors go to the building-up of sound morale in an army, but one of the greatest is that the men be fully employed at useful and interesting work. Idleness is a dangerous breeding-ground. Throughout the winter there were many tasks that needed doing; training demanded continuous attention; defences were far from satisfactory or complete, even the Maginot Line lacked many supplementary field works; physical fitness demands exercise. Yet visitors to the French Front were often struck by the prevailing atmosphere of calm aloofness, by the seemingly poor quality of the work in hand, by the lack of visible activity of any kind. The emptiness of the roads behind the line was in great contrast to the continual coming and going which extended for miles behind the British sector.

There can be no doubt that the quality of the French Army was allowed to deteriorate during the winter, and that they would have fought better in the autumn than in the spring. Soon they were to be stunned by the swiftness and violence of the German a.s.sault. It was not until the last phases of that brief campaign that the true fighting qualities of the French soldier rose uppermost in defence of his country against the age-long enemy. But then it was too late.

Meanwhile, the German plans for a direct a.s.sault on Norway and a lightning occupation of Denmark also were advancing. Field-Marshal Keitel drew up a memorandum on this subject on January 27, 1940: The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes that Study "N" should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.

The detailed planning for this operation proceeded through the normal channels.

In early February, when the Prime Minister was going to the Supreme War Council in Paris, he invited me for the first time to go with him. Mr. Chamberlain asked me to meet him at Downing Street after dinner.

The main subject of discussion on February 5 was "Aid to Finland," and plans were approved to send three or four divisions into Norway, in order to persuade Sweden to let us send supplies and reinforcements to the Finns, and incidentally to get control of the Gullivare ore-field. As might be expected, the Swedes did not agree to this and, though extensive preparations were made, the whole project fell to the ground. Mr. Chamberlain conducted the proceedings himself on our behalf, and only minor interventions were made by the various British Ministers attending. I am not recorded as having said a word.

The next day, when we came to recross the Channel, an amusing incident occurred. We sighted a floating mine. So I said to the Captain: "Let"s blow it up by gun-fire." It burst with a good bang, and a large piece of wreckage sailed over towards us and seemed for an instant as if it were going to settle on the bridge, where all the politicians and some of the other swells were cl.u.s.tered. However, it landed on the forecastle, which was happily bare, and no one was hurt. Thus everything pa.s.sed off pleasantly. From this time onwards I was invited by the Prime Minister to accompany him, with others, to the meetings of the Supreme War Council. But I could not provide an equal entertainment each time.

The Council decided that it was of first importance that Finland should be saved; that she could not hold out after the spring without reinforcements of thirty to forty thousand trained men; that the present stream of heterogeneous volunteers was not sufficient; and that the destruction of Finland would be a major defeat for the Allies. It was, therefore, necessary to send Allied troops either through Petsamo or through Narvik and/or other Norwegian ports. The operation through Narvik was preferred, as it would enable the Allies "to kill two birds with one stone" [i.e., help Finland cut off the iron ore]. Two British divisions due to start for France in February should be retained in England and prepared for fighting in Norway. Meanwhile, every effort should be made to procure the a.s.sent and if possible the co-operation of the Norwegians and Swedes. The issue of what to do if Norway and Sweden refused, as seemed probable, was never faced.

A vivid episode now sharpened everything in Scandinavia. The reader will remember my concern to capture the Altmark, Altmark, the auxiliary of the the auxiliary of the Spee. Spee. This vessel was also a floating prison for the crews of our sunk merchant ships. British captives released by Captain Langsdorff according to international law in Montevideo Harbour told us that nearly three hundred British merchant seamen were on board the This vessel was also a floating prison for the crews of our sunk merchant ships. British captives released by Captain Langsdorff according to international law in Montevideo Harbour told us that nearly three hundred British merchant seamen were on board the Altmark. Altmark. This vessel hid in the South Atlantic for nearly two months, and then, hoping that the search had died down, her captain made a bid to return to Germany. Luck and the weather favoured her, and not until February 14, after pa.s.sing between Iceland and the Faroes, was she sighted by our aircraft in Norwegian territorial waters. This vessel hid in the South Atlantic for nearly two months, and then, hoping that the search had died down, her captain made a bid to return to Germany. Luck and the weather favoured her, and not until February 14, after pa.s.sing between Iceland and the Faroes, was she sighted by our aircraft in Norwegian territorial waters.

First Lord to First Sea Lord.

16.2.40.

On the position as reported to me this morning, it would seem that the cruiser and destroyers should sweep northward during the day up the coast of Norway, not hesitating to arrest Altmark Altmark in territorial waters should she be found. This ship is violating neutrality in carrying British prisoners of war to Germany. Surely another cruiser or two should be sent to rummage the Skagerrak tonight? The in territorial waters should she be found. This ship is violating neutrality in carrying British prisoners of war to Germany. Surely another cruiser or two should be sent to rummage the Skagerrak tonight? The Altmark Altmark must be regarded as an invaluable trophy. must be regarded as an invaluable trophy.

In the words of an Admiralty communique, "certain of His Majesty"s ships which were conveniently disposed were set in motion." A destroyer flotilla, under the command of Captain Philip Vian, of H.M.S. Cossack, Cossack, intercepted the intercepted the Altmark, Altmark, but did not immediately molest her. She took refuge in Josing Fiord, a narrow inlet about half a mile long surrounded by high snow-clad cliffs. Two British destroyers were told to board her for examination. At the entrance to the fiord they were met by two Norwegian gunboats, who informed them that the ship was unarmed, had been examined the previous day, and had received permission to proceed to Germany, making use of Norwegian territorial waters. Our destroyers thereupon withdrew. but did not immediately molest her. She took refuge in Josing Fiord, a narrow inlet about half a mile long surrounded by high snow-clad cliffs. Two British destroyers were told to board her for examination. At the entrance to the fiord they were met by two Norwegian gunboats, who informed them that the ship was unarmed, had been examined the previous day, and had received permission to proceed to Germany, making use of Norwegian territorial waters. Our destroyers thereupon withdrew.

When this information reached the Admiralty, I intervened, and with the concurrence of the Foreign Secretary, ordered our ships to enter the fiord. I did not often act so directly; but I now sent Captain Vian the following order:

February 16, 1940, 5.25 16, 1940, 5.25 P.M. P.M.Unless Norwegian torpedo-boat undertakes to convoy Altmark Altmark to Bergen with a joint Anglo-Norwegian guard on board, and a joint escort, you should board to Bergen with a joint Anglo-Norwegian guard on board, and a joint escort, you should board Altmark, Altmark, liberate the prisoners, and take possession of the ship pending further instructions. If Norwegian torpedo-boat interferes, you should warn her to stand off. If she fires upon you, you should not reply unless attack is serious, in which case you should defend yourself, using no more force than is necessary, and ceasing fire when she desists. liberate the prisoners, and take possession of the ship pending further instructions. If Norwegian torpedo-boat interferes, you should warn her to stand off. If she fires upon you, you should not reply unless attack is serious, in which case you shoul

© 2024 www.topnovel.cc