D.C.N.S. and I were much impressed with the so-called Actaeon net against torpedoes, on which the "Vernon" are keen. This net was introduced at the end of the late war. It is a skirt or petticoat which is only effective when the vessel is in motion. The "Vernon" declare that a vessel can steam eighteen knots with it on. The Laconia Laconia is to be tried out with one. The net is of thin wire and large mesh. It should be easy to make in large quant.i.ties very quickly. I suggest that this is a matter of the highest urgency and significance. It should be fitted on merchant ships, liners, and also, indeed, above all upon ships of war having solitary missions without destroyer protection. Could not a committee be formed before the week is out which would grip this idea, already so far advanced by the naval authorities, and see whether it cannot be brought into the forefront of our immediate war preparations? If it is right it would require a very large scale application. is to be tried out with one. The net is of thin wire and large mesh. It should be easy to make in large quant.i.ties very quickly. I suggest that this is a matter of the highest urgency and significance. It should be fitted on merchant ships, liners, and also, indeed, above all upon ships of war having solitary missions without destroyer protection. Could not a committee be formed before the week is out which would grip this idea, already so far advanced by the naval authorities, and see whether it cannot be brought into the forefront of our immediate war preparations? If it is right it would require a very large scale application.3
First Lord to First Sea Lord and others.
21.IX.39.
The importance of using all available guns capable of firing at aircraft whether on ships in harbour or in the dockyard to resist an air attack should be impressed upon Commanders-in-Chief of Home Ports as well as upon officers at lesser stations. The concerting of the fire of these guns with the regular defences should be arranged. If necessary, the high-angle guns of ships in dry dock should be furnished with crews from the depots, and special arrangements made to supply the electrical power, even though the ship is under heavy repair. There must be many contrivances by which a greater volume of fire could be brought to bear upon attacking aircraft. We must consider the moonlight period ahead of us as one requiring exceptional vigilance. Please consider whether some general exhortations cannot be given.
First Lord to Admiral Somerville and Controller.
23.IX.39.
Let me have at your earliest convenience the programme of installation of R.D.F. in H.M. ships, showing what has been done up to date, and a forecast of future installations, with dates. Thereafter, let me have a monthly return showing progress. The first monthly return can be November 1.
First Lord to First Sea Lord and others.
24.IX.39.
A lot of our destroyers and small craft are b.u.mping into one another under the present hard conditions of service. We must be very careful not to damp the ardour of officers in the flotillas by making heavy weather of occasional accidents. They should be encouraged to use their ships with war-time freedom, and should feel they will not be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct, it they have done their best, and something or other happens. I am sure this is already the spirit and your view, but am anxious it should be further inculcated by the Admiralty. There should be no general rule obliging a court martial in every case of damage. The Board should use their power to dispense with this, so long as no negligence or cra.s.s stupidity is shown. Errors towards the enemy, [i.e., to fight,] should be most leniently viewed, even if the consequences are not pleasant.
First Lord to First Sea Lord, D.C.N.S. and D.N.I. (For general guidance.) (Most secret.) 24.IX.39.
1. Mr. Dulanty is thoroughly friendly to England. He was an officer under me in the Ministry of Munitions in 1917/18, but he has no control or authority in Southern Ireland (so-called Eire). He acts as a general smoother, representing everything Irish in the most favourable light. Three-quarters of the people of Southern Ireland are with us, but the implacable, malignant minority can make so much trouble that De Valera dare not do anything to offend them. All this talk about part.i.tion and the bitterness that would be healed by a union of Northern and Southern Ireland will amount to nothing. They will not unite at the present time, and we cannot in any circ.u.mstances sell the loyalists of Northern Ireland. Will you kindly consider these observations as the basis upon which Admiralty dealings with Southern Ireland should proceed?2. There seems to be a good deal of evidence, or at any rate suspicion, that the U-boats are being succoured from West of Ireland ports by the malignant section with whom De Valera dare not interfere. And we are debarred from using Berehaven, etc. If the U-boat campaign became more dangerous we should coerce Southern Ireland both about coast watching and the use of Berehaven, etc. However, if it slackens off under our counter-attacks and protective measures, the Cabinet will not be inclined to face the serious issues which forcible measures would entail. It looks therefore as if the present bad situation will continue for the present. But the Admiralty should never cease to formulate through every channel its complaints about it, and I will from time to time bring our grievances before the Cabinet. On no account must we appear to acquiesce in, still less be contented with, the odious treatment we are receiving.
First Lord to First Sea Lord and D.C.N.S.
29.IX.39.
While anxious not to fetter in any way the discretion of C.-in-C., Home Fleet, I think it might be as well for you to point out that the sending of heavy ships far out into the North Sea will certainly entail bombing attacks from aircraft, and will not draw German warships from their harbours. Although there were no hits on the last occasion, there might easily have been losses disproportionate to the tactical objects in view. This opinion was expressed to me by several Cabinet colleagues.The first brush between the Fleet and the air has pa.s.sed off very well, and useful data have been obtained, but we do not want to run unnecessary risks with our important vessels until their A.A. has been worked up to the required standard against aircraft flying 250 miles an hour.4
First Lord to Secretary.
30.IX.39.
Surely the account you give of all these various disconnected Statistical Branches const.i.tutes the case for a central body which should grip together all Admiralty statistics, and present them to me in a form increasingly simplified and graphic.I want to know at the end of each week everything we have got, all the people we are employing, the progress of all vessels, works of construction, the progress of all munitions affecting us, the state of our merchant tonnage, together with losses, and numbers of every branch of the R.N. and R.M. The whole should be presented in a small book such as was kept for me by Sir Walter Layton when he was my statistical officer at the Ministry of Munitions in 1917 and 1918. Every week I had this book, which showed the past and the weekly progress, and also drew attention to what was lagging. In an hour or two I was able to cover the whole ground, as I knew exactly what to look for and where.How do you propose this want of mine should be met?OCTOBER, 1939
First Lord to Secretary.
9.X.39.
The First Lord"s Statistical Branch should consist of Professor Lindemann, who would do this besides his scientific activities, and a secretary who knows the Admiralty, a statistician, and a confidential typist who is also preferably an accountant. The duties of this branch will be:1. To present to the First Lord a weekly picture of the progress of all new construction, showing delays from contract dates, though without inquiring into the causes, upon which First Lord will make his own inquiries.2. To present return of all British or British-controlled merchant ships together with losses under various heads and new construction or acquisition also forecasts of new deliveries.(a) during the week,(b) since the war began;3. To record the consumption weekly and since war began of all ammunition, torpedoes, oil, etc., together with new deliveries, i.e., weekly and since the war began, monthly or weekly outputs and forecasts.4. To keep a complete continuous statistical survey of Fleet Air Arm, going not only into aircraft but pilots, guns and equipment of all kinds, and point out all apparent lag.5. To present a monthly survey of the losses of personnel of all kinds.6. To keep records of inquiries and any special papers relating to numbers and strength provided by First Lord.7. To make special inquiries, a.n.a.lysing for First Lord Cabinet Papers and papers from other Departments which have a statistical character, as requested by First Lord.As soon as the personnel of the department is settled after discussion with Professor Lindemann, who should also advise on any additions to the above list of duties, a Minute must be given to all departments to make the necessary returns to Statistical Branch (to be called "S") at the times required, and to afford any necessary a.s.sistance.Air SupplyOctober 16, 1939. 16, 1939.This most interesting paper is encouraging, but it does not touch the question on which the War Cabinet sought information namely, the disparity between the monthly output of new aircraft, and the number of squadrons composing the first-line air strength of the R.A.F. We were told in 1937 that there would be 1,750 first-line aircraft modernly equipped by April 1, 1938 (see Sir Thomas Inskip"s speeches). However, the House of Commons was content with the statement that this position had in fact been realised by April 1, 1939. We were throughout a.s.sured that reserves far above the German scale were the feature of the British system. We now have apparently only about 1,500 first-line aircraft with good reserves ready for action. On mobilisation the 125 squadrons of April 1, 1939, shrank to 96. It is necessary to know how many new squadrons will be fully formed during the months of November, December, January, and February. It is difficult to understand why, with a production of fighting machines which has averaged over seven hundred a month since May, and is now running even higher, only a handful of squadrons have been added to our first-line strength, and why that strength is below what we were a.s.sured was so reached in April of this year. One would have thought with outputs so large, and pilots so numerous, we should have been able to add ten or fifteen squadrons a month to our first-line air strength; and no explanation is furnished why this cannot happen. Then squadrons of sixteen each, with one hundred per cent reserves, would only amount to 320 a month, or much less than half the output from the factories. The Cabinet ought to be told what are the limiting factors. They should be told this in full detail. Is it pilots or mechanics or higher ground staff or guns or instruments of any kind? We ought not, surely, to continue in ignorance of the reasons which prevent the heavy outputs of the factories from being translated into a fighting-front of first-line aircraft organised in squadrons. It may be impossible to remedy this, but at any rate we ought to examine it without delay. It is not production that is lagging behind, but the formation of fighting units with their full reserve upon the approved scale.
D.S.R., Controller and Secretary.
16.X.39.
I am very much obliged to the Director of Scientific Research for his interesting memorandum [on the Admiralty Research Department], and I entirely agree with the principle that the first stage is the formulation of a felt want by the fighting Service. Once this is clearly defined in terms of simple reality it is nearly always possible for the scientific experts to find a solution. The Services should always be encouraged to explain what it is that hurts or hinders them in any particular branch of their work. For instance, a soldier advancing across No-Man"s-Land is. .h.i.t by a bullet which prevents his locomotion functioning further. It is no use telling him or his successor to be brave, because that condition has already been satisfied. It is clear however that if a steel plate or other obstacle had stood between the bullet and the soldier, the latter"s powers of locomotion would not have been deranged. The problem therefore becomes how to place a shield in front of the soldier. It then emerges that the shield is too heavy for him to carry, thus locomotion must be imparted to the shield; and how? Hence the tanks. This is of course a simple example.2. In your list of Branches and Departments very little seems to be allowed for physical investigation, the bulk being concentrated upon application and development. I am therefore very glad to know that the Clarendon Laboratory will be utilised for this purpose, and I shall be dealing with the paper on that subject later in the day.
First Lord to Controller and others.
18.X.39.
Requisitioning of TrawlersI have asked the Minister of Agriculture to bring Mr. Ernest Bevin and his deputation to the Admiralty at 4.15 o"clock tomorrow after they have explored the ground among themselves. Let all be notified and an official letter written to the Ministry of Agriculture inviting them here. I will preside myself.Meanwhile A.C.N.S., D.T.D. and Controller or Deputy-Controller should, together with Financial Secretary, meet together this evening to work out a plan, the object of which is the Utmost Fish, Utmost Fish, subject to naval necessity. The immediate loss arising from our requisition should be shared between ports, and the fact that a port has built the best kind of trawlers must not lead to its being the worst sufferer. Side by side with this equalisation process a type of trawler which can be built as quickly as possible, and will serve its purpose, should be given facilities in the shipyards. As soon as these trawlers flow in, they can either be added to the various ports or else be given to the ports from whom the chief requisition has been made, the equalising trawlers being restored after temporary use this is for local opinion to decide. It is vital to keep the fish trade going, and we must fight for this part of our food supply as hard as we do against the U-boats. subject to naval necessity. The immediate loss arising from our requisition should be shared between ports, and the fact that a port has built the best kind of trawlers must not lead to its being the worst sufferer. Side by side with this equalisation process a type of trawler which can be built as quickly as possible, and will serve its purpose, should be given facilities in the shipyards. As soon as these trawlers flow in, they can either be added to the various ports or else be given to the ports from whom the chief requisition has been made, the equalising trawlers being restored after temporary use this is for local opinion to decide. It is vital to keep the fish trade going, and we must fight for this part of our food supply as hard as we do against the U-boats.5
First Lord to First Sea Lord and D.C.N.S. (Most Secret) 19.10.39.
The Turkish situation has sharpened-up. Suppose Turkey wanted us to put a Fleet in the Black Sea sufficiently strong to prevent Russian military pressure upon the Bosphorus or other parts of the Turkish northern coast, and the Cabinet were satisfied that this might either keep Russia from going to war or, if she were at war, prevent her attacking Turkey, can the Force be found? What is the strength of the Russian Black Sea marine, and what would be sufficient to master them? Might this not be an area where British submarines with a few destroyers and a couple of protecting cruisers all based on Turkish ports would be able to give an immense measure of protection? Anyhow, the possibility should be studied in all its military bearings by the Naval Staff, and ways and means of finding and maintaining the Force worked out.Clearly, if Russia declares war upon us, we must hold the Black Sea.
First Lord to First Sea Lord and Controller.
23.X.39.
Before going further into your paper on the Northern Barrage, I should like to know what amounts of explosives are involved, and how these could be provided without hampering the main fire of the Armies. Perhaps the Controller could today discuss this point with Mr. Burgin or the head of his Chemical Department. I do not know what are the limiting factors in this field. I hear predictions that toluene may run short. I presume the output required for the barrage would be far outside the limits of the Admiralty cordite or explosive factories. I suggest that Controller has all this information collected informally, both from the Admiralty and the Ministry of Supply, and that we talk it over on our return.6
First Lord to First Sea Lord.
23.X.39.
I should be glad if you would arrange to discuss with the other Chiefs of Staff this morning the question of raid or invasion, having regard to the position of the Fleet and the long dark nights. I frequently combated these ideas in the late war, but now the circ.u.mstances do not seem to be altogether the same. I have of course no knowledge of the military arrangements, but it seems to me there ought to be a certain number of mobile columns or organised forces that could be thrown rapidly against any descent. Of course, it may be that the air service will be able to a.s.sume full responsibility.
First Lord to First Sea Lord and D.C.N.S.
27.X.39.
Pray consider this note which I wrote with the idea of circulating it to the Cabinet.
It is surely not our interest to oppose Russian claims for naval bases in the Baltic. These bases are only needed against Germany, and in the process of taking them a sharp antagonism of Russian and German interests becomes apparent. We should point out to the Finns that the preservation of their country from Russian invasion and conquest is the vital matter, and this will not be affected by Russian bases in the Gulf of Finland or the Gulf of Bothnia. Apart from Germany, Russian naval power in the Baltic could never be formidable to us. It is Germany alone that is the danger and the enemy there. There is, indeed, a common interest between Great Britain and Russia in forbidding as large a part of the Baltic as possible to Germany. It is quite natural that Russia should need to have bases which prevent German aggression in the Baltic Provinces or against Petrograd. If the above reasoning is right, we ought to let the Russians know what our outlook is, while trying to persuade the Finns to make concessions, and Russia to be content with strategic points.
First Lord to D.C.N.S. and Secretary.
29.X.39.
Arrange for a stand of arms to be placed in some convenient position in the bas.e.m.e.nt and let officers and able-bodied personnel employed in the Admiralty building have a rifle, a bayonet and ammunition a.s.signed to each. Fifty would be enough. Let this be done in forty-eight hours.
First Lord to General s.m.u.ts.
Personal and Private.
29.X.39.
Monitor Erebus Erebus is ready to sail for Capetown. As you know we have never considered fifteen-inch guns necessary for defence of Capetown, but to please Pirow agreed to lend is ready to sail for Capetown. As you know we have never considered fifteen-inch guns necessary for defence of Capetown, but to please Pirow agreed to lend Erebus Erebus until those defences were modernised in view of his fear of attack by j.a.pan. We realise the defences of Capetown remain weak, but the Germans have no battleships, and the only two battle-cruisers they possess, the until those defences were modernised in view of his fear of attack by j.a.pan. We realise the defences of Capetown remain weak, but the Germans have no battleships, and the only two battle-cruisers they possess, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, would be very unlikely to try to reach South African waters, or if they did so to risk damage far from a friendly dockyard from even weak defences. Should they break out, a major naval operation would ensue, and we shall pursue them wherever they go with our most powerful vessels until they are hunted down. Therefore, it seems to me you are unlikely to have need of this ship. On the other hand, she would be most useful for various purposes in the shallows of the Belgian coast, especially if Holland were attacked. She was indeed built by Fisher and me for this very purpose in 1914. The question is therefore mainly political. Rather than do anything to embarra.s.s you we would do without the ship. But if you let us have her either by re-loan or re-transfer Admiralty will be most grateful, and would, of course, reimburse Union. would be very unlikely to try to reach South African waters, or if they did so to risk damage far from a friendly dockyard from even weak defences. Should they break out, a major naval operation would ensue, and we shall pursue them wherever they go with our most powerful vessels until they are hunted down. Therefore, it seems to me you are unlikely to have need of this ship. On the other hand, she would be most useful for various purposes in the shallows of the Belgian coast, especially if Holland were attacked. She was indeed built by Fisher and me for this very purpose in 1914. The question is therefore mainly political. Rather than do anything to embarra.s.s you we would do without the ship. But if you let us have her either by re-loan or re-transfer Admiralty will be most grateful, and would, of course, reimburse Union.7All good wishes.NOVEMBER, 1939
First Lord to Secretary.
4.XI.39.
The French have a very complete installation in the country for all the business of their Admiralty, and have already moved there. Our policy is to stay in London until it becomes really impossible, but it follows from this that every effort must be made to bring our alternative installation up to a high level of efficiency.Pray let me know how it stands, and whether we could in fact shift at a moment"s notice without any break in control. Have the telephones, etc., been laid effectively? Are there underground wires as well as others? Do they connect with exchanges other than London, or are they dependent upon the main London exchange? If so, it is a great danger.
First Lord to First Sea Lord and others.
9.XI.39.
I am deeply concerned at the immense slowing-down of trade, both in imports and exports, which has resulted from our struggle during the first ten weeks of the war. Unless it can be grappled with and the restriction diminished to, say, twenty per cent of normal, very grave shortage will emerge. The complaints coming in from all the Civil Departments are serious. We shall have failed in our task if we merely subst.i.tute delays for sinkings. I frankly admit I had not appreciated this aspect, but in this war we must learn from day to day. We must secretly loosen-up the convoy system (while boasting about it publicly), especially on the outer routes. An intricate study must be made of the restrictions now imposed, and consequent lengthening of voyages, and a higher degree of risk must be accepted. This is possible now that so many of our ships are armed. They can go in smaller parties. Even across the Atlantic we may have to apply this principle to a certain degree. If we could only combine with it a large effective destroyer force, sweeping the Western Approaches as a matter of course instead of providing focal points on which convoys could be directed, we should have more freedom. This is no reversal or stultification of previous policy, which was absolutely necessary at the outset. It is a refinement and development of that policy so that its end shall not be defeated.
First Lord to D.C.N.S.
9.II.39.
It appears to me that St. Helena and Ascension must be made effectively secure against seizure by landing parties from, say, a Deutschland. Deutschland. We should look very foolish if we found them in possession of the two 6-inch guns with a supply ship in the harbour. I don"t feel the garrisons there are strong enough. We should look very foolish if we found them in possession of the two 6-inch guns with a supply ship in the harbour. I don"t feel the garrisons there are strong enough.
First Lord to First Sea Lord.
15.XI.39.
Pray let me have details of the proposed first Canadian convoy. How many ships, which ships, how many men in each ship, what speed will convoy take, escort both A-S and anti-raider? Place of a.s.sembly and date of departure should be mentioned verbally.
First Lord to Secretary and A.C.N.S.