Meanwhile, the Hunter Hunter had been sunk, and the had been sunk, and the Hotspur Hotspur and the and the Hostile, Hostile, which were both damaged, with the which were both damaged, with the Havock Havock made for the open sea. The enemy who had barred their pa.s.sage was by now in no condition to stop them. Half an hour later, they encountered a large ship coming in from the sea, which proved to be the made for the open sea. The enemy who had barred their pa.s.sage was by now in no condition to stop them. Half an hour later, they encountered a large ship coming in from the sea, which proved to be the Rauenfels Rauenfels carrying the German reserve ammunition. She was fired upon by the carrying the German reserve ammunition. She was fired upon by the Havock, Havock, and soon blew up. The survivors of the and soon blew up. The survivors of the Hardy Hardy struggled ash.o.r.e with the body of their Commander, who was awarded posthumously the Victoria Cross. He and they had left their mark on the enemy and in oar naval records. struggled ash.o.r.e with the body of their Commander, who was awarded posthumously the Victoria Cross. He and they had left their mark on the enemy and in oar naval records.
On the ninth, MM. Reynaud and Daladier, with Admiral Darlan, flew over to London, and in the afternoon a Supreme War Council meeting was held to deal with what they called "the German action in consequence of the laying of mines within Norwegian territorial waters." Mr. Chamberlain at once pointed out that the enemy"s measures had certainly been planned in advance and quite independently of ours. Even at that date this was obvious. M. Reynaud informed us that the French War Committee, presided over by the President, had that morning decided in principle on moving forward into Belgium should the Germans attack. The addition, he said, of eighteen to twenty Belgian divisions, besides the shortening of the front, would to all intents and purposes wipe out the German preponderance in the West. The French would be prepared to connect such an operation with the laying of the fluvial mines in the Rhine. He added that his reports from Belgium and Holland indicated the imminence of a German attack on the Low Countries; some said days, some said hours.
On the question of the military expedition to Norway, the Secretary of State for War reminded the Council that the two British divisions originally a.s.sembled for a.s.sistance to Finland had since been sent to France. There were only eleven battalions available in the United Kingdom. Two of these were sailing that night. The rest, for various reasons, would not be ready to sail for three or four days or more.
The Council agreed that strong forces should be sent where possible to ports on the Norwegian seaboard, and joint plans were made. A French Alpine division was ordered to embark within two or three days. We were able to provide two British battalions that night, a further five battalions within three days, and four more within fourteen days eleven in all. Any additional British forces for Scandinavia would have to be withdrawn from France. Suitable measures were to be taken to occupy the Faroe Islands, and a.s.surances of protection would be given to Iceland. Naval arrangements were concerted in the Mediterranean in the event of Italian intervention. It was also decided that urgent representations should be made to the Belgian Government to invite the Allied armies to move forward into Belgium. Finally, it was confirmed that if Germany made an attack in the West or entered Belgium, "Royal Marine" should be carried out.
I was far from content with what had happened so far in Norway. I wrote to Admiral Pound: 10.IV.40.The Germans have succeeded in occupying all the ports on the Norwegian coast, including Narvik, and large-scale operations will be required to turn them out of any of them. Norwegian neutrality and our respect for it have made it impossible to prevent this ruthless coup. coup. It is now necessary to take a new view. We must put up with the disadvantage of closer air attack on our northern bases. We must seal up Bergen with a watched minefield, and concentrate on Narvik, for which long and severe fighting will be required. It is now necessary to take a new view. We must put up with the disadvantage of closer air attack on our northern bases. We must seal up Bergen with a watched minefield, and concentrate on Narvik, for which long and severe fighting will be required.It is immediately necessary to obtain one or two fuelling-bases on the Norwegian coast, and a wide choice presents itself. This is being studied by the Staff. The advantage of our having a base, even improvised, on the Norwegian coast is very great, and now that the enemy have bases there, we cannot carry on without it. The Naval Staff are selecting various alternatives which are suitable anchorages capable of defence, and without communications with the interior. Unless we have this quite soon we cannot compete with the Germans in their new position.We must also take our advantages in the Faroes.Narvik must be fought for. Although we have been completely outwitted, there is no reason to suppose that prolonged and serious fighting in this area will not impose a greater drain on the enemy than on ourselves.
For three days we were deluged with reports and rumours from neutral countries and triumphant claims by Germany of the losses they had inflicted on the British Navy, and of their master-stroke in seizing Norway in the teeth of our superior naval power. It was obvious that Britain had been forestalled, surprised, and as I had written to the First Sea Lord, outwitted. Anger swept the country, and the brunt fell upon the Admiralty. On Thursday the eleventh, I had to face a disturbed and indignant House of Commons. I followed the method I have always found most effective on such occasions, of giving a calm, unhurried factual narrative of events in their sequence, laying full emphasis upon ugly truths. I explained for the first time in public the disadvantage we had suffered since the beginning of the war by Germany"s abuse of the Norwegian corridor, or "covered way," and how we had at last overcome the scruple which "caused us injury at the same time that it did us honour."
It is not the slightest use blaming the Allies for not being able to give substantial help and protection to neutral countries if we are held at arm"s length until these neutrals are actually attacked on a scientifically prepared plan by Germany. The strict observance of neutrality by Norway has been a contributory cause to the sufferings to which she is now exposed and to the limits of the aid which we can give her. I trust this fact will be meditated upon by other countries who may tomorrow, or a week hence, or a month hence, or a month hence, find themselves the victims of an equally elaborately worked-out staff plan for their destruction and enslavement. find themselves the victims of an equally elaborately worked-out staff plan for their destruction and enslavement.
I described the recent reoccupation by our Fleet of Scapa Flow, and the instant movement we had made to intercept the German forces in the North, and how the enemy were in fact caught between two superior forces.
However, they got away.... You may look at the map and see flags stuck in at different points and consider that the results will be certain, but when you get out on the sea with its vast distances, its storms and mists, and with night coming on, and all the uncertainties which exist, you cannot possibly expect that the kind of conditions which would be appropriate to the movements of armies have any application to the haphazard conditions of war at sea.... When we speak of the command of the seas, it does not mean command of every part of the sea at the same moment, or at every moment. It only means that we can make our will prevail ultimately in any part of the seas which may be selected for operations, and thus indirectly make our will prevail in every part of the sea. Anything more foolish than to suppose that the life and strength of the Royal Navy should have been expended in ceaselessly patrolling up and down the Norwegian and Danish coasts, as a target for the U-boats, on the chance that Hitler would launch a blow like this, cannot be imagined.
The House listened with growing acceptance to the account, of which the news had just reached me, of Tuesday"s brush between the Renown Renown and the enemy, of the air attack on the British Fleet off Bergen, and especially Warburton-Lee"s incursion and action at Narvik. At the end I said: and the enemy, of the air attack on the British Fleet off Bergen, and especially Warburton-Lee"s incursion and action at Narvik. At the end I said: Everyone must recognise the extraordinary and reckless gambling which has flung the whole German Fleet out upon the savage seas of war, as if it were a mere counter to be cast away for a particular operation.... This very recklessness makes me feel that these costly operations may be only the prelude to far larger events which impend on land. We have probably arrived now at the first main clinch of the war.
After an hour and a half the House seemed to be very much less estranged. A little later there would have been more to tell.
By the morning of April 10, the Warspite Warspite had joined the Commander-in-Chief, who was proceeding towards Narvik. On learning about Captain Warburton-Lee"s attack at dawn, we resolved to try again. The cruiser had joined the Commander-in-Chief, who was proceeding towards Narvik. On learning about Captain Warburton-Lee"s attack at dawn, we resolved to try again. The cruiser Penelope Penelope with destroyer support was ordered to attack "if in the light of experience this morning you consider it a justifiable operation." But while the signals were pa.s.sing, with destroyer support was ordered to attack "if in the light of experience this morning you consider it a justifiable operation." But while the signals were pa.s.sing, Penelope, Penelope, in searching for enemy transports reported off Bodo, ran ash.o.r.e. The next day (twelfth) a dive-bombing attack on enemy ships in Narvik Harbour was made from the in searching for enemy transports reported off Bodo, ran ash.o.r.e. The next day (twelfth) a dive-bombing attack on enemy ships in Narvik Harbour was made from the Furious. Furious. The attack was pressed home in terrible weather and low visibility, and four hits on destroyers were claimed for the loss of two aircraft. This was not enough. We wanted Narvik very much and were determined at least to clear it of the German Navy. The climax was now at hand. The attack was pressed home in terrible weather and low visibility, and four hits on destroyers were claimed for the loss of two aircraft. This was not enough. We wanted Narvik very much and were determined at least to clear it of the German Navy. The climax was now at hand.
The precious Renown Renown was kept out of it. Admiral Whitworth shifted his flag to the was kept out of it. Admiral Whitworth shifted his flag to the Warspite Warspite at sea, and at noon on the thirteenth he entered the fiord escorted by nine destroyers and by dive-bombers from the at sea, and at noon on the thirteenth he entered the fiord escorted by nine destroyers and by dive-bombers from the Furious. Furious. There were no minefields; but a U-boat was driven off by the destroyers and a second sunk by the There were no minefields; but a U-boat was driven off by the destroyers and a second sunk by the Warspite"s Warspite"s own own Swordfish Swordfish aircraft, which also detected a German destroyer lurking in an inlet to launch her torpedoes on the battleship from this ambush. The hostile destroyer was quickly overwhelmed. At 1.30 aircraft, which also detected a German destroyer lurking in an inlet to launch her torpedoes on the battleship from this ambush. The hostile destroyer was quickly overwhelmed. At 1.30 P.M P.M., when our ships were through the Narrows and a dozen miles from Narvik, five enemy destroyers appeared ahead in the haze. At once a fierce fight began with all ships on both sides firing and manoeuvring rapidly. The Warspite Warspite found no sh.o.r.e batteries to attack, and intervened in deadly fashion in the destroyer fight. The thunder of her fifteen-inch guns reverberated among the surrounding mountains like the voice of doom. The enemy, heavily overmatched, retreated, and the action broke up into separate combats. Some of our ships went into Narvik Harbour to complete the task of destruction there; others, led by the found no sh.o.r.e batteries to attack, and intervened in deadly fashion in the destroyer fight. The thunder of her fifteen-inch guns reverberated among the surrounding mountains like the voice of doom. The enemy, heavily overmatched, retreated, and the action broke up into separate combats. Some of our ships went into Narvik Harbour to complete the task of destruction there; others, led by the Eskimo, Eskimo, pursued three Germans who sought refuge in the head waters of Rombaks Fiord and annihilated them there. The bows of the pursued three Germans who sought refuge in the head waters of Rombaks Fiord and annihilated them there. The bows of the Eskimo Eskimo were blown off by a torpedo; but in this second sea-fight off Narvik, the eight enemy destroyers which had survived Warburton-Lee"s attack were all sunk or wrecked without the loss of a single British ship. were blown off by a torpedo; but in this second sea-fight off Narvik, the eight enemy destroyers which had survived Warburton-Lee"s attack were all sunk or wrecked without the loss of a single British ship.
When the action was over, Admiral Whitworth thought of throwing a landing party of seamen and marines ash.o.r.e to occupy the town, where there seemed for the moment to be no opposition. Unless the fire of the Warspite Warspite could dominate the scene, an inevitable counter-attack by a greatly superior number of German soldiers must be expected. With the risk from the air and by U-boats, he did not feel justified in exposing this fine ship so long. His decision was endorsed when a dozen German aircraft appeared at 6 could dominate the scene, an inevitable counter-attack by a greatly superior number of German soldiers must be expected. With the risk from the air and by U-boats, he did not feel justified in exposing this fine ship so long. His decision was endorsed when a dozen German aircraft appeared at 6 P.M P.M. Accordingly, he withdrew early next morning after embarking the wounded from the destroyers. "My impression," he said, "is that the enemy forces in Narvik were thoroughly frightened as a result of today"s action, I recommend that the town be occupied without delay by the main landing-force." Two destroyers were left off the port to watch events, and one of these rescued the survivors of the Hardy, Hardy, who had meanwhile maintained themselves on sh.o.r.e. who had meanwhile maintained themselves on sh.o.r.e.
His Majesty, whose naval instincts were powerfully stirred by this clash of the British and German Navies in Northern waters, wrote me the following encouraging letter:
BUCKINGHAM P PALACE.
April 12, 1940 12, 1940My dear Mr. Churchill,I have been wanting to have a talk with you about the recent striking events in the North Sea, which, as a sailor, I have naturally followed with the keenest interest, but I have purposely refrained from taking up any of your time, as I know what a great strain has been placed upon you by your increased responsibilities as Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee. I shall, however, ask you to come and see me as soon as there is a lull. In the meantime I would like to congratulate you on the splendid way in which, under your direction, the Navy is countering the German move against Scandinavia. I also beg of you to take care of yourself and get as much rest as you possibly can in these critical days.Believe me,Yours very sincerely,GEORGE R.I. R.I.
13.
Narvik
Hitler"s Outrage on Norway - Long-Prepared Treachery - - Norwegian Resistance - Appeal to the Allies - The Position of Sweden - The Narvik Expedition - Instructions to General Mackesy - And to Lord Cork - Question of a Direct a.s.sault - General Mackesy Adverse - My Desire to Concentrate on Narvik and to Attempt to Storm It - War Cabinet Conclusions of April Norwegian Resistance - Appeal to the Allies - The Position of Sweden - The Narvik Expedition - Instructions to General Mackesy - And to Lord Cork - Question of a Direct a.s.sault - General Mackesy Adverse - My Desire to Concentrate on Narvik and to Attempt to Storm It - War Cabinet Conclusions of April 13 - 13 - The Trondheim Project Mooted - Disappointing News from Narvik - My Note to the Military Co-ordination Committee of April The Trondheim Project Mooted - Disappointing News from Narvik - My Note to the Military Co-ordination Committee of April 17 - 17 - Our Telegram to the Naval and Military Commanders - Deadlock at Narvik. Our Telegram to the Naval and Military Commanders - Deadlock at Narvik.
FOR MANY GENERATIONS, Norway, with its homely, rugged population engaged in trade, shipping, fishing, and agriculture, had stood outside the turmoil of world politics. Far off were the days when the Vikings had sallied forth to conquer or ravage a large part of the then-known world. The Hundred Years" War, the Thirty Years" War, the wars of William III and Marlborough, the Napoleonic convulsion, and later conflicts, had left Norway unmoved and unscathed. A large proportion of the people had hitherto thought of neutrality and neutrality alone. A tiny army and a population with no desires except to live peaceably in their own mountainous and semi-Arctic country now fell victims to the new German aggression.
It had been the policy of Germany for many years to profess cordial sympathy and friendship for Norway. After the previous war some thousands of German children had found food and shelter with the Norwegians. These had now grown up in Germany, and many of them were ardent n.a.z.is. There was also a Major Quisling, who with a handful of young men had aped and reproduced in Norway on an insignificant scale the Fascist Movement. For some years past, Nordic meetings had been arranged in Germany to which large numbers of Norwegians had been invited. German lecturers, actors, singers, and men of science had visited Norway in the promotion of a common culture. All this had been woven into the texture of the Hitlerite military plan, and a widely scattered internal pro-German conspiracy set on foot. In this every member of the German diplomatic or consular service, every German purchasing agency, played its part under directions from the German Legation in Oslo. The deed of infamy and treachery now performed may take its place with the Sicilian Vespers and the ma.s.sacre of St. Bartholomew. The President of the Norwegian Parliament, Carl Hambro, has written: In the case of Poland and later in those of Holland and Belgium, notes had been exchanged, ultimata had been presented. In the case of Norway, the Germans under the mask of friendship tried to extinguish the nation in one dark night, silently, murderously, without any declaration of war, without any warning given. What stupefied the Norwegians more than the act of aggression itself was the national realisation that a Great Power, for years professing its friendship, suddenly appeared a deadly enemy; and that men and women with whom one had had intimate business or professional relations, who had been cordially welcomed in one"s home, were spies and agents of destruction. More than by the violation of treaties and every international obligation, the people of Norway were dazed to find that for years their German friends had been elaborating the most detailed plans for the invasion and subsequent enslaving of their country.
The King, the Government, the Army, and the people, as soon as they realised what was happening, flamed into furious anger. But it was all too late. German infiltration and propaganda had hitherto clouded their vision and now sapped their powers of resistance. Major Quisling presented himself at the radio, now in German hands, as the pro-German ruler of the conquered land. Almost all Norwegian officials refused to serve him. The Army was mobilised and at once began under General Ruge to fight the invaders pressing northwards from Oslo. Patriots who could find arms took to the mountains and the forests. The King, the Ministry, and the Parliament withdrew first to Hamar, a hundred miles from Oslo. They were hotly pursued by German armoured cars, and ferocious attempts were made to exterminate them by bombing and machine-gunning from the air. They continued, however, to issue proclamations to the whole country urging the most strenuous resistance. The rest of the population was overpowered and terrorised by b.l.o.o.d.y examples into stupefied or sullen submission. The peninsula of Norway is nearly a thousand miles long. It is spa.r.s.ely inhabited, and roads and railways are few, especially to the northward. The rapidity with which Hitler effected the domination of Norway was a remarkable feat of war and policy, and an enduring example of German thoroughness, wickedness, and brutality.
The Norwegian Government, hitherto in their fear of Germany so frigid to us, now made vehement appeals for succour. It was from the beginning obviously impossible for us to rescue Southern Norway. Almost all our trained troops, and many only half-trained, were in France. Our modest but growing air force was fully a.s.signed to supporting the British Expeditionary Force, to home defence, and vigorous training. All our anti-aircraft guns were demanded ten times over for vulnerable points of the highest importance. Still, we felt bound to do our utmost to go to their aid, even at violent derangement of our own preparations and interests. Narvik, it seemed, could certainly be seized and defended with benefit to the whole Allied cause. Here the King of Norway might fly his flag unconquered. Trondheim might be fought for, at any rate as a means of delaying the northward advance of the invaders until Narvik could be regained and made the base of an army. This it seemed could be maintained from the sea at a strength superior to anything which could be brought against it by land through five hundred miles of mountain territory. The Cabinet heartily approved all possible measures for the rescue and defence of Narvik and Trondheim. The troops which had been released from the Finnish project, and a nucleus kept in hand for Narvik, could soon be ready. They lacked aircraft, antiaircraft guns, anti-tank guns, tanks, transport, and training. The whole of Northern Norway was covered with snow to depths which none of our soldiers had ever seen, felt, or imagined. There were neither snowshoes nor skis still less skiers. We must do our best. Thus began this ramshackle campaign.
There was every reason to believe that Sweden would be the next victim of Germany or Russia, or perhaps even both. If Sweden came to the aid of her agonised neighbour, the military situation would be for the time being transformed. The Swedes had a good army. They could enter Norway easily. They could be at Trondheim in force before the Germans. We could join them there. But what would be the fate of Sweden in the months that followed? Hitler"s vengeance would lay them low, and the Bear would maul them from the east. On the other hand, the Swedes could purchase neutrality by supplying the Germans with all the iron ore they wanted throughout the approaching summer. For Sweden the choice was a profitable neutrality or subjugation. She could not be blamed because she did not view the issue from the standpoint of our unready but now eager island.
After the Cabinet on the morning of April 11, I wrote the following minute, which the sacrifices we were making for the rights of small states and the Law of Nations may justify:
Prime Minister.Foreign Secretary.I am not entirely satisfied with the result of the discussion this morning, or with my contribution to it. What we want is that Sweden should not remain neutral, but declare war on Germany. What we do not want is to provide either the three divisions which we dangled to procure the Finland project, or to keep her fully supplied with food as long as the war lasts, or to bomb Berlin, etc., if Stockholm is bombed. These stakes are more than it is worth while paying at the present time. On the other hand, we should do everything to encourage her into the war by general a.s.surances that we will give all the help we can, that our troops will be active in the Scandinavian Peninsula, that we will make common cause with her as good allies, and will not make peace without her, or till she is righted. Have we given this impulse to the Anglo-French Mission? If not, there is still time to do it. Moreover, our diplomacy should be active at Stockholm.It must be remembered that Sweden will say, "Thank you for nothing," about any offers on our part to defend the Gullivare iron field. She can easily do this herself. Her trouble is to the south, where we can do but little. Still, it will be something to a.s.sure her that we intend to open the Narvik route to Sweden from the Atlantic by main force as soon as possible, and also that we propose to clean up the German lodgments on the Norwegian coast seriatim, seriatim, thus opening other channels. thus opening other channels.If the great battle opens in Flanders, the Germans will not have much to spare for Scandinavia, and if, on the other hand, the Germans do not attack in the West, we can afford to send troops to Scandinavia in proportion as German divisions are withdrawn from the Western Front. It seems to me we must not throw cold water on the French idea of trying to induce the Swedes to enter the war. It would be disastrous if they remained neutral and bought Germany off with ore from Gullivare down the Gulf of Bothnia.I must apologise for not having sufficiently gripped this issue in my mind this morning, but I only came in after the discussion had begun, and did not address myself properly to it.
There was justice in the Foreign Secretary"s reply, by which I was convinced. He said that the Prime Minister and he agreed with my general view, but doubted the method I favoured of approaching Sweden.
April 11, 1940. 11, 1940.From all the information that we have from Swedish sources that are friendly to the Allies, it appears that any representations that can be readily translated in their mind into an attempt by us to drag them into the war will be likely to have an effect opposite to that which we want. Their immediate reaction would be that we were endeavouring to get them to do what, until we have established a position in one or more of the Norwegian ports, we were unable or unwilling to do ourselves. And accordingly the result would do us more harm than good.
It was easy to regather at short notice the small forces for a Narvik expedition which had been dispersed a few days earlier. One British brigade and its ancillary troops began to embark immediately, and the first convoy sailed for Narvik on April 12. This was to be followed in a week or two by three battalions of Cha.s.seurs Alpins and other French troops. There were also Norwegian forces north of Narvik which would help our landings. Major-General Mackesy had been selected on April 5 to command any expedition which might be sent to Narvik. His instructions were couched in a form appropriate to the case of a friendly neutral power from whom some facilities are required. They contained among their appendices the following references to bombardment: It is clearly illegal to bombard a populated area in the hope of hitting a legitimate target which is known to be in the area, but which cannot be precisely located and identified.
In the face of the German onslaught, new and stiffer instructions were issued to the General on the tenth. They gave him more lat.i.tude, but did not cancel this particular injunction. Their substance was as follows: His Majesty"s Government and the Government of the French Republic have decided to send a field force to initiate operations against Germany in Northern Norway. The object of the force will be to eject the Germans from the Narvik area and establish control of Narvik itself.... Your initial task will be to establish your force at Harstad, ensure the co-operation of Norwegian forces that may be there, and obtain the information necessary to enable you to plan your further operations. It is not intended that you should land in the face of opposition. You may, however, be faced with opposition owing to mistaken ident.i.ty; you will, therefore, take such steps as are suitable to establish the nationality of your force before abandoning the attempt. The decision whether to land or not will be taken by the senior naval officer in consultation with you. If landing is impossible at Harstad, some other suitable locality should be tried. A landing must be carried out when you have sufficient troops.
At the same time a personal letter from General Ironside, the C.I.G.S., was given to General Mackesy, which included the remark: "You may have a chance of taking advantage of naval action and should do so if you can. Boldness is required." This struck a somewhat different note from the formal instructions.
My contacts with Lord Cork and Orrery had become intimate in the long months during which the active discussions of Baltic strategy had proceeded. In spite of some differences of view about "Catherine," his relations with the First Sea Lord were good. I was fully conscious from long and hard experience of the difference between pushing things audaciously on paper so as to get them explored and tested the processes of mental reconnaissance-in-force and actually doing them or getting them done. Admiral Pound and I were both agreed from slightly different angles that Lord Cork should command the naval forces in this amphibious adventure in the North. We both urged him not to hesitate to run risks but to strike hard to seize Narvik. As we were all agreed and could talk things over together, we left him exceptional discretion, and did not give him any written orders. He knew exactly what we wanted. In his dispatch he says, "My impression on leaving London was quite clear that it was desired by His Majesty"s Government to turn the enemy out of Narvik at the earliest possible moment, and that I was to act with all prompt.i.tude in order to attain this result."
Our staff work at this time had not been tempered by war experience, nor was the action of the service departments concerted except by the meetings of the Military Co-ordination Committee, over which I had just begun to preside. Neither I, as Chairman of the Committee, nor the Admiralty were made acquainted with the War Office instructions to General Mackesy, and as the Admiralty directions had been given orally to Lord Cork, there was no written text to communicate to the War Office. The instructions of the two departments, although animated by the same purpose, were somewhat different in tone and emphasis; and this may have helped to cause the divergences which presently developed between the military and naval commanders.
Lord Cork sailed from Rosyth at high speed in the Aurora Aurora on the night of April 12. He had intended to meet General Mackesy at Harstad, a small port on the island of Hinney in Vaags Fiord which, although one hundred and twenty miles from Narvik, had been selected as the military base. However, on the fourteenth he received a signal from Admiral Whitworth in the on the night of April 12. He had intended to meet General Mackesy at Harstad, a small port on the island of Hinney in Vaags Fiord which, although one hundred and twenty miles from Narvik, had been selected as the military base. However, on the fourteenth he received a signal from Admiral Whitworth in the Warspite, Warspite, who had exterminated all the German destroyers and supply ships the day before, saying: "I am convinced that Narvik can be taken by direct a.s.sault now without fear of meeting serious opposition on landing. I consider that the main landing-force need only be small...." Lord Cork, therefore, diverted the who had exterminated all the German destroyers and supply ships the day before, saying: "I am convinced that Narvik can be taken by direct a.s.sault now without fear of meeting serious opposition on landing. I consider that the main landing-force need only be small...." Lord Cork, therefore, diverted the Aurora Aurora to Skjel Fiord in the Lofoten Islands, flanking the approach to Narvik, and sent a message ordering the to Skjel Fiord in the Lofoten Islands, flanking the approach to Narvik, and sent a message ordering the Southampton Southampton to join him there. His intention was to organise a force for an immediate a.s.sault consisting of two companies of the Scots Guards, who had been embarked in the to join him there. His intention was to organise a force for an immediate a.s.sault consisting of two companies of the Scots Guards, who had been embarked in the Southampton, Southampton, and a force of seamen and marines from the and a force of seamen and marines from the Warspite Warspite and other ships already in Skjel Fiord. He could not, however, get in touch with the and other ships already in Skjel Fiord. He could not, however, get in touch with the Southampton Southampton except after some delay through the Admiralty, whose reply contained the following sentence: "We think it imperative that you and the General should be together and act together and that no attack should be made except in concert." He therefore left Skjel Fiord for Harstad and led the convoy, carrying the 24th Brigade, into harbour there on the morning of the fifteenth. His escorting destroyers sank except after some delay through the Admiralty, whose reply contained the following sentence: "We think it imperative that you and the General should be together and act together and that no attack should be made except in concert." He therefore left Skjel Fiord for Harstad and led the convoy, carrying the 24th Brigade, into harbour there on the morning of the fifteenth. His escorting destroyers sank U-49 U-49 which was prowling near-by. which was prowling near-by.
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Lord Cork now urged General Mackesy to take advantage of the destruction of all the German naval force and to make a direct attack on Narvik as soon as possible, but the General replied that the harbour was strongly held by the enemy with machine-gun posts. He also pointed out that his transports had not been loaded for an a.s.sault, but only for an unopposed landing. He opened his headquarters at the hotel in Harstad, and his troops began to land thereabouts. The next day he stated that on the information available landing at Narvik was not possible, nor would naval bombardment make it so. Lord Cork considered that with the help of overwhelming gun-fire troops could be landed in Narvik with little loss; but the General did not agree, and could find some cover in his instructions. From the Admiralty we urged an immediate a.s.sault. A deadlock arose between the military and naval chiefs.
At this time the weather greatly worsened, and dense falls of snow seemed to paralyse all movements by our troops, unequipped and untrained for such conditions. Meanwhile, the Germans in Narvik held our ever-growing forces at bay with their machine-guns. Here was a serious and unexpected check.
Most of the business of our improvised campaign pa.s.sed through my hands, and I prefer to record it as far as possible in my own words at the time. The Prime Minister had a strong desire, shared by the War Cabinet, to occupy Trondheim as well as Narvik. This operation, "Maurice," as it was called, promised to be a big undertaking. According to the records of our Military Co-ordination Committee of April 13: [I was] very apprehensive of any proposals which might tend to weaken our intention to seize Narvik. Nothing must be allowed to deflect us from making the capture of this place as certain as possible. Our plans against Narvik had been very carefully laid, and there seemed every chance that they would be successful if they were allowed to proceed without being tampered with. Trondheim was, on the other hand, a much more speculative affair, and I deprecated any suggestion which might lead to the diversion of the Cha.s.seurs Alpins until we had definitely established ourselves at Narvik. Otherwise we might find ourselves committed to a number of ineffectual operations along the Norwegian coast, none of which would succeed.At the same time consideration had already been given to the Trondheim area, and plans were being made to secure landing-points in case a larger-scale action should be needed. A small landing of naval forces would take place at Namsos that afternoon. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff had collected a force of five battalions, two of which would be ready to land on the Norwegian coast on April 16, and three more on April 21 if desired. The actual points at which landings were to be made would be decided that night.General Mackesy"s original orders had been that, after landing at Narvik, he should push rapidly on to Gullivare ore-field. He has now been told to go no farther than the Swedish frontier, since, if Sweden were friendly, there need be no fear for the ore-fields, and if hostile, the difficulties of occupying them would be too great.
I also said that: It might be necessary to proceed to invest the German forces in Narvik. But we should not allow the operation to degenerate into an investment except after a very determined battle. On this understanding I was willing to send a telegram to the French saying that we hoped and thought that we should be successful in seizing Narvik by a coup-de-main. coup-de-main. We should explain that this had been made easier by a change in the orders which did not now require the expedition to go beyond the Swedish frontier. We should explain that this had been made easier by a change in the orders which did not now require the expedition to go beyond the Swedish frontier.
It was decided by the War Cabinet to attempt both the Narvik and Trondheim operations. The Secretary of State for War with foresight warned us that reinforcements for Norway might soon be required from our army in France, and suggested that we should address the French on the point at a very early date. I agreed with this, but thought it premature to approach the French for a day or two. This was accepted. The War Cabinet approved a proposal to inform the Swedish and Norwegian Governments that we intended to recapture both Trondheim and Narvik; that we recognised the supreme importance of Trondheim as a strategic centre, but that it was important to secure Narvik as a naval base. We added that we had no intention that our forces should proceed over the Swedish frontier. We were at the same time to invite the French Government to give us liberty to use the Cha.s.seurs Alpins for operations elsewhere than at Narvik, telling them what we were saying to the Swedish and Norwegian Governments. Neither I nor Mr. Stanley liked the dispersion of our forces. We were still inclined to concentrate all on Narvik, except for diversions elsewhere. But we deferred to the general view, for which there was no lack of good reasons.
On the night of the sixteenth-seventeenth disappointing news arrived from Narvik. General Mackesy had, it appeared, no intention of trying to seize the town by an immediate a.s.sault protected by the close-range bombardment of the Fleet; and Lord Cork could not move him. I stated the position to my Committee as it then appeared.
April 17. 17.1. Lord Cork"s telegram shows that General Mackesy proposes to take two unoccupied positions on the approaches to Narvik and to hold on there until the snow melts, perhaps at the end of the month. The General expects that the first demi-brigade of Cha.s.seurs Alpins will be sent to him, which it certainly will not be. This policy means that we shall be held up in front of Narvik for several weeks. Meanwhile, the Germans will proclaim that we are brought to a standstill and that Narvik is still in their possession. The effects of this will be damaging both upon Norwegians and neutrals. Moreover, the German fortification of Narvik will continue, requiring a greater effort when the time comes. This information is at once unexpected and disagreeable. One of the best regular brigades in the Army will be wasting away, losing men by sickness, and playing no part. It is for consideration whether a telegram on the following lines should not be sent to Lord Cork and General Mackesy:Your proposals involve damaging deadlock at Narvik and the neutralisation of one of our best brigades. We cannot send you the Cha.s.seurs Alpins. The Warspite Warspite will be needed elsewhere, in two or three days. Full consideration should, therefore, be given by you to an a.s.sault upon Narvik covered by the will be needed elsewhere, in two or three days. Full consideration should, therefore, be given by you to an a.s.sault upon Narvik covered by the Warspite Warspite and the destroyers, which might also operate at Rombaks Fiord. The capture of the port and town would be an important success. We should like to receive from you the reasons why this is not possible, and your estimate of the degree of resistance to be expected on the waterfront. Matter most urgent. and the destroyers, which might also operate at Rombaks Fiord. The capture of the port and town would be an important success. We should like to receive from you the reasons why this is not possible, and your estimate of the degree of resistance to be expected on the waterfront. Matter most urgent.2. The second point which requires decision is whether the Cha.s.seurs Alpins shall go straight on to join General Carton de Wiart at or beyond Namsos, or whether, as is easy, they should be held back at Scapa and used for the Trondheim operation on the twenty-second or twenty-third, together with other troops available for this main attack.3. Two battalions of the 146th Brigade will, it is hoped, have been landed before dawn today at Namsos and Bandsund. The 3d Battalion in the Chobry Chobry will make a dangerous voyage tomorrow to Namsos, arriving if all is well about dusk, and landing. The anchorage of Lillejonas was bombed all the afternoon without the two transports being hit, and the large 18,000-tonner is now returning empty to Scapa Flow. If the leading Cha.s.seurs Alpins are to be used at Namsos, they must go there direct instead of making rendezvous at Lillejonas. will make a dangerous voyage tomorrow to Namsos, arriving if all is well about dusk, and landing. The anchorage of Lillejonas was bombed all the afternoon without the two transports being hit, and the large 18,000-tonner is now returning empty to Scapa Flow. If the leading Cha.s.seurs Alpins are to be used at Namsos, they must go there direct instead of making rendezvous at Lillejonas.4. The question of whether the forces now available for the main attack on Trondheim are adequate must also be decided today. The two Guards battalions that were to be mobilised, i.e., equipped, cannot be ready in time. The two French Foreign Legion battalions cannot arrive in time. A regular brigade from France can, however, be ready to sail from Rosyth on the twentieth. The first and second demi-brigades of the Cha.s.seurs Alpins can also be in time. A thousand Canadians have been made available. There is also a brigade of Territorials. Is this enough to prevail over the Germans in Trondheim? The dangers of delay are very great and need not be restated.5. Admiral Holland leaves tonight to meet the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, on his return to Scapa on the eighteenth, and he must carry with him full and clear decisions. It may be taken as certain that the Navy will cheerfully undertake to carry troops to Trondheim.6. It is probable that fighting will take place tonight and tomorrow morning for the possession of Andalsnes. We hope to have landed an advance party from the cruiser Calcutta, Calcutta, and are moving sufficient cruisers to meet a possible attack by five enemy destroyers at dawn. and are moving sufficient cruisers to meet a possible attack by five enemy destroyers at dawn.7. The naval bombardment of Stavanger aerodrome will begin at dawn today.
The Committee agreed to the telegram, which was accordingly sent. It produced no effect. It must remain a matter of opinion whether such an a.s.sault would have succeeded. It involved no marches through the snow, but on the other hand, landings from open boats both in Narvik Harbour and in Rombaks Fiord, under machine-gun fire. I counted upon the effect of close-range bombardment by the tremendous ship batteries which would blast the waterfronts and cover with smoke and clouds of snow and earth the whole of the German machine-gun posts. Suitable high-explosive sh.e.l.ls had been provided by the Admiralty both for the battleship and the destroyers. Certainly Lord Cork, on the spot and able to measure the character of the bombardment, was strongly in favour of making the attempt. We had over four thousand of our best regular troops, including the Guards brigade and marines, who, once they set foot on sh.o.r.e, would become intermingled at close quarters with the German defenders, whose regular troops, apart from the crews rescued from the sunken destroyers, we estimated, correctly as we now know, at no more than half their number. This would have been considered a fair proposition on the Western Front in the previous war, and no new factors were at work here. Later on in this war, scores of such a.s.saults were made and often succeeded. Moreover, the orders sent to the commanders were of such a clear and imperative character, and so evidently contemplated heavy losses, that they should have been obeyed. The responsibility for a b.l.o.o.d.y repulse would fall exclusively on the home authorities, and very directly upon me. I was content that this should be so; but nothing I or my colleagues or Cork could do or say produced the slightest effect on the General. He was resolved to wait till the snow melted. As for the bombardment, he could point to the paragraph in his instructions against endangering the civil population. When we contrast this spirit with the absolutely reckless gambling in lives and ships and the almost frenzied vigour, based upon long and profound calculations, which had gained the Germans their brilliant success, the disadvantages under which we lay in waging this campaign are obvious.
14.
Trondheim
A Key Objective - The Obvious Plan - "Operation Hammer" - Att.i.tude of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet - Choice of Generals - A Chapter of Accidents - Situation on April 14 14 - - Situation on April Situation on April 17 - 17 - Second Thoughts of the Staffs - Power of Unopposed Air Force - The Change of Plan - Sir Roger Keyes" Desires and Credentials - My Report to the Co-ordination Committee of April Second Thoughts of the Staffs - Power of Unopposed Air Force - The Change of Plan - Sir Roger Keyes" Desires and Credentials - My Report to the Co-ordination Committee of April 19 - 19 - The War Cabinet Accept the Abandonment of "Hammer" - Urgency of Narvik, April The War Cabinet Accept the Abandonment of "Hammer" - Urgency of Narvik, April 20 - 20 - General Ismay"s Summary. General Ismay"s Summary.
TRONDHFIM, if it were within our strength, was of course the key to any considerable operations in Central Norway. To gain it meant a safe harbour with quays and docks upon which an army of fifty thousand men or more could be built up and based. Near-by was an airfield from which several fighter squadrons could work. The possession of Trondheim would open direct railway contact with Sweden, and greatly improve the chances of Swedish intervention or the degree of mutual aid possible if Sweden were herself attacked. From Trondheim alone the northward advance of the German invasion from Oslo could be securely barred. On the broadest grounds of policy and strategy it would be good for the Allies to fight Hitler on the largest possible scale in Central Norway, if that was where he wanted to go. Narvik, far away to the north, could be stormed or reduced at leisure and would all the while be protected. We had the effective command of the sea. As to the air, if we could establish ourselves firmly on Norwegian airfields, we should not hesitate to fight the German air force there to any extent which the severely limiting conditions allowed to either side.
All these reasons had simultaneously convinced the French War Council, the British War Cabinet, and most of their advisers. The British and French Prime Ministers were at one. General Gamelin was willing to withdraw French or release British divisions from France for Norway to the same extent that the Germans diverted their forces thither. He evidently welcomed a prolonged battle on a large scale south of Trondheim, where the ground was almost everywhere favourable to defence. It seemed that we could certainly bring forces and supplies to the scene across the open sea through Trondheim far quicker than the Germans could fight their way up the single road and railway line from Oslo, both of which might be cut behind them by bombs or parties dropped from the air. The only question was, Could we take Trondheim in time? Could we get there before the main enemy army arrived from the south, and for this purpose, could we obtain even a pa.s.sing relief from their present unchallenged air domination?
There was a surge of opinion in favour of Trondheim which extended far beyond Cabinet circles. The advantages were so obvious that all could see them. The public, the clubs, the newspapers and their military correspondents had, for some days past, been discussing such a policy freely. My great friend, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Roger Keyes, champion of forcing the Dardanelles, hero and victor of Zeebrugge, pa.s.sionately longed to lead the Fleet or any portion of it past the batteries into the Trondheim Fiord and storm the town by landings from the sea. The appointment of Lord Cork, also an Admiral of the Fleet, to command the naval operations at Narvik, although he was senior to the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Forbes, seemed to remove the difficulties of rank. Admirals of the Fleet are always on the active list, and Keyes had many contacts at the Admiralty. He spoke and wrote to me repeatedly with vehemence, reminding me of the Dardanelles and how easily the Straits could have been forced if we had not been stopped by timid obstructionists. I also pondered a good deal upon the lessons of the Dardanelles. Certainly the Trondheim batteries and any minefields that might have been laid were trivial compared to those we had then had to face. On the other hand, there was the airplane, capable of dropping its bombs on the unprotected decks of the very few great ships which now const.i.tuted the naval power of Britain on the oceans.
At the Admiralty the First Sea Lord and the Naval Staff generally did not shrink from the venture. On April 13 the Admiralty had officially informed the Commander-in-Chief of the Supreme Council"s decision to allot troops for the capture of Trondheim, and had raised the question with him in a positive manner whether the Home Fleet should not force the pa.s.sage.
Do you consider [the message ran] that the sh.o.r.e batteries could be either destroyed or dominated to such an extent as to permit transports to enter? If so, how many ships and what type would you propose?
On this Admiral Forbes asked for details about the Trondheim defences. He agreed that the sh.o.r.e batteries might be destroyed or dominated in daylight by battleships provided with suitable ammunition. None was carried at that moment in Home Fleet ships. The first and most important task, he said, was to protect troopships from heavy air attack over the thirty miles approach through narrow waters, and the next to carry out an opposed landing of which ample warning had been given. In the circ.u.mstances he did not consider the operation feasible.
The Naval Staff persisted in their view, and the Admiralty with my earnest agreement replied on April 15 as follows: We still think that the operation described should be further studied. It could not take place for seven days, which would be devoted to careful preparation. Danger from air not appreciably less wherever these large troopships are brought into the danger zone. Our idea would be that in addition to R.A.F. bombing of Stavanger aerodrome, Suffolk Suffolk should bombard with high-explosive at dawn, hoping thereby to put the aerodrome out of business. The aerodrome at Trondheim could be dealt with by Fleet air-arm bombers and subsequently by bombardment. High-explosive sh.e.l.ls for fifteen-inch guns have been ordered to Rosyth. should bombard with high-explosive at dawn, hoping thereby to put the aerodrome out of business. The aerodrome at Trondheim could be dealt with by Fleet air-arm bombers and subsequently by bombardment. High-explosive sh.e.l.ls for fifteen-inch guns have been ordered to Rosyth. Furious Furious and First Cruiser Squadron would be required for this operation. Pray, therefore, consider this important project further. and First Cruiser Squadron would be required for this operation. Pray, therefore, consider this important project further.
Admiral Forbes, although not fully convinced of its soundness, therefore addressed himself to the project in a more favourable mood. In a further reply he said that he did not antic.i.p.ate great difficulty from the naval side, except that he could not provide air defence for the transports while carrying out the landing. The naval force required would be the Valiant Valiant and and Renown Renown to give air defence to the to give air defence to the Glorious, Glorious, the the Warspite Warspite to bombard, at least four A.A. cruisers and about twenty destroyers. to bombard, at least four A.A. cruisers and about twenty destroyers.
While plans for the frontal attack on Trondheim from the sea were being advanced with all speed, two subsidiary landings were already in progress designed to envelop the town from the landward side. Of these the first was a hundred miles to the north, at Namsos, where Major-General Carton de Wiart, V.C., had been chosen to command the troops with orders "to secure the Trondheim area." He was informed that the Navy were making a preliminary lodgment with a party about three hundred strong in order to take and hold points for his disembarkation. The idea was that two infantry brigades and a light division of Cha.s.seurs Alpins should land hereabouts in conjunction with the main attack by the Navy upon Trondheim, "Operation Hammer." For this purpose the 146th Brigade and the Cha.s.seurs Alpins were being diverted from Narvik. Carton de Wiart started forthwith in a flying-boat, and reached Namsos under heavy air attack on the evening of the fifteenth. His staff officer was wounded, but he took effective charge on the spot. The second landing was at Andalsnes, about a hundred and fifty miles by road to the southwest of Trondheim. Here also the Navy had made a lodgment, and on April 18 Brigadier Morgan with a military force arrived and took command. Lieutenant-General Ma.s.sy was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the forces operating in Central Norway. This officer had to exercise his command from the War Office because there was as yet no place for his Headquarters on the other side.
On the fifteenth, I reported that all these plans were being developed, but the difficulties were serious. Namsos was under four feet of snow and offered no concealment from the air. The enemy enjoyed complete air mastery, and we had neither antiaircraft guns nor any airfield from which protecting squadrons might operate. Admiral Forbes had not, I said, at first been very keen on forcing his way into Trondheim because of the risk of air attack. It was, of course, of first importance that the Royal Air Force should continue to hara.s.s the Stavanger airfield, by which the enemy airplanes were pa.s.sing northward. The Suffolk Suffolk would bombard this airfield with her eight-inch guns on April 17. This was approved, and the bombardment took place as planned. Some damage was done to the airfield, but during her withdrawal the would bombard this airfield with her eight-inch guns on April 17. This was approved, and the bombardment took place as planned. Some damage was done to the airfield, but during her withdrawal the Suffolk Suffolk was continuously bombed for seven hours. She was heavily hit and reached Scapa Flow the following day with her quarterdeck awash. was continuously bombed for seven hours. She was heavily hit and reached Scapa Flow the following day with her quarterdeck awash.
The Secretary of State for War had now to nominate a military commander for the Trondheim operation. Colonel Stanley"s first choice fell upon Major-General Hotblack, who was highly reputed, and on April 17 he was briefed for his task at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff held in the Admiralty, That night at 12.30 A.M. A.M. he had a fit on the Duke of York"s Steps, and was picked up unconscious some time later. He had luckily left all his papers with his staff, who were working on them. The next morning Brigadier Berney-Ficklin was appointed to succeed Hotblack. He too was briefed, and started by train for Edinburgh. On April 19, he and his staff left by air for Scapa. They crashed on the airfield at Kirkwall. The pilot and one of the crew were killed, the rest were seriously injured. Every day counted. he had a fit on the Duke of York"s Steps, and was picked up unconscious some time later. He had luckily left all his papers with his staff, who were working on them. The next morning Brigadier Berney-Ficklin was appointed to succeed Hotblack. He too was briefed, and started by train for Edinburgh. On April 19, he and his staff left by air for Scapa. They crashed on the airfield at Kirkwall. The pilot and one of the crew were killed, the rest were seriously injured. Every day counted.
On April 17, I explained in outline to the War Cabinet the plan which the staffs were making for the main landing at Trondheim. The forces immediately available were one regular brigade from France (twenty-five hundred strong), one thousand Canadians, and about one thousand men of a Territorial brigade as a reserve. The Military Co-ordination Committee had been advised that the forces available were adequate and that the risks, although very considerable, were justified. The operation would be supported by the full strength of the Fleet, and two carriers would be available with a total of about one hundred aircraft, including forty-five fighters. The provisional date for the landing was April 22. The second demibrigade of Cha.s.seurs Alpins would not reach Trondheim until April 25, when it was hoped they would be able to disembark at the quays in Trondheim.
Asked whether the Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the plans as outlined, the Chief of the Air Staff said on their behalf and in their presence that they were. The operation was, of course, attended by considerable risks, but these were worth running. The Prime Minister agreed with this view, and emphasised the importance of air co-operation. The War Cabinet gave cordial approval to the enterprise. I did my best to have it carried out.
Up to this point all the staffs and their chiefs had seemed resolved upon the central thrust at Trondheim. Admiral Forbes was actively preparing to strike, and there seemed no reason why the date of the twenty-second should not be kept. Although Narvik was my pet, I threw myself with increasing confidence into this daring adventure, and was willing that the Fleet should risk the weak batteries at the entrance to the fiord, the possible minefields, and, most serious, the air. The ships carried what was in those days very powerful anti-aircraft armament. A group of ships had a combined overhead fire power which few aircraft would care to encounter at a height where bombing would be accurate. I must here explain that the power of an air force is terrific when there is nothing to oppose it. The pilots can fly as low as they please and are often safer fifty feet off the ground than high up. They can cast their bombs with precision and use their machine-guns on troops with only the risk of a chance rifle bullet. These hard conditions had to be faced by our small expeditions at Namsos and Andalsnes, but the Fleet, with its ack-ack batteries and a hundred seaborne airplanes, might well be superior during the actual operation to any air power the enemy could bring. If Trondheim were taken, the neighbouring airfield of Vaernes would be in our hands, and in a few days we could have not only a considerable garrison in the town, but also several fighter squadrons of the R.A.F. in action. Left to myself, I might have stuck to my first love, Narvik; but serving as I did a respected chief and friendly Cabinet, I now looked forward to this exciting enterprise to which so many staid and cautious Ministers had given their strong adherence, and which seemed to find much favour with the Naval Staff and indeed among all our experts. Such was the position on the seventeenth.
Meanwhile, I felt that we should do our utmost to keep the King of Norway and his advisers informed of our plans by sending him an officer who understood the Norwegian scene and could speak with authority. Admiral Sir Edward Evans was well suited to this task, and was sent to Norway by air through Stockholm to make contact with the King at his headquarters. There he was to do everything possible to encourage the Norwegian Government in their resistance and explain the measures which the British Government were taking to a.s.sist them. From April 22 he was for some days in consultation with the King and the princ.i.p.al Norwegian authorities, helping them to understand both our plans and our difficulties.
During the eighteenth, a vehement and decisive change in the opinions of the Chiefs of Staff and of the Admiralty occurred. This change was brought about, first, by increasing realisation of the magnitude of the naval stake in hazarding so many of our finest capital ships, and also by War Office arguments that even if the Fleet got in and got out again, the opposed landing of the troops in the face of the German air power would be perilous. On the other hand, the landings which were already being successfully carried out both north and south of Trondheim seemed to all these authorities to offer a far less dangerous solution. The Chiefs of Staff drew up a long paper opposing "Operation Hammer."
This began with a reminder that a combined operation involving an opposed landing was one of the most difficult and hazardous operations of war, requiring the most careful and detailed preparations. The Chiefs of Staff had always realised that this particular operation would involve very serious risks; for, owing to the urgency of the situation, there had not been time for the detailed and meticulous preparation which should have been given to an operation of this character and, as there had been no reconnaissance or air photographs, the plan had been worked out from maps and charts. The plan had the further disadvantage that it would involve concentrating almost the whole of the Home Fleet in an area where it could be subjected to heavy attack from the air. There were also new factors in the situation which should be taken into account. We had seized the landing places at Namsos and Andalsnes and established forces ash.o.r.e there; there were reliable reports that the Germans were improving the defences at Trondheim; and reports of our intention to make a direct landing at Trondheim had appeared in the press. On reconsidering the original project in the light of these new factors, the Chiefs of Staff unanimously recommended a change of plan.
They still thought it essential that we should seize Trondheim and use it as a base for subsequent operation in Scandinavia; but they urged that, instead of the direct frontal a.s.sault, we should take advantage of our unexpected success in landing forces at Namsos and Andalsnes and develop a pincer movement on Trondheim from north and south. By this means, they declared, we could turn a venture which was attended by grave hazards into one which could achieve the same result with much less risk. By this change of plan the press reports of our intentions could also be turned to our advantage; for by judicious leakages we could hope to leave the enemy under the impression that we still intended to persist in our original plan. The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommended that we should push in the maximum forces possible at Namsos and An