16. Article 11--the "sanctions" article--has been more closely scrutinized and has been the subject of more criticism than any other article of the draft Protocol, and a hasty examination of it by some critics has led them to object that it goes beyond article 16 of the Covenant and imposes fresh obligations on the signatory States. In reply to such critics, it may be best to quote the words used by the British delegate in his speech to the Third Committee on the 22nd September:--
"It cannot be too strongly emphasized that everything in this article is already stated or implied in article 16 of the Covenant. We are remaining within the terms of the Covenant and we are undertaking no new obligations .......... Surely loyal and effective co-operation in support of the Covenant is what may confidently be expected from every Member of the League of {226} Nations .......... The extent of the co-operation must depend on the actual circ.u.mstances not only as regards the aggression but also as regards the geographical position and the resources of all kinds of individual States. It would be no use to bind oneself to do a variety of things which may not be required. We must and we can rely on the good faith of the Members of the League to decide themselves how their effective co-operation can best be given if and when the necessity arises."
17. In order to complete the fulfilment of the task a.s.signed to the committees by the a.s.sembly"s resolution of the 6th September, the Protocol finally provides (article 17) for the summoning in June next year of an International Conference for the reduction of armaments, to meet in Geneva and to include representatives of all states whether Members of the League or not. M. Herriot first, and other speakers after him, had emphasised the interdependence of the three great problems of arbitration, security and disarmament, and the framers of the Protocol, bearing this in mind, have been careful to preserve this interdependence in the doc.u.ment itself. Thus if sufficient ratifications of the Protocol have not been received by a certain date, the Conference on Disarmament is to be postponed. In any case, the Protocol does not come into force until that Conference shall have adopted a plan for the reduction of armaments. And if within a further period, that plan has not been carried out, the Protocol becomes null and void.
18. The above brief summary indicates how in the Protocol the committees of the a.s.sembly have sought to embody, in concrete form, the proposals made to the a.s.sembly itself by the British and French Prime Ministers. The Protocol is an attempt to complete the Covenant, to facilitate and develop the procedure of pacific settlement provided therein, and to define more clearly the obligations imposed by it on States Members of the League. The Protocol is based on the Covenant and keeps within its terms except in so far that it extends the Covenant procedure to give an alternative procedure by peaceful {227} settlement, even in those cases for which the framers of the Covenant in 1919 were unable to find a remedy. So far as it contains anything new, it is to be found in the definition of aggression which follows as a necessary corollary to the limitations inserted in the establishment of a universal system of peaceful settlement. But even here the principle is not new. Article 16 of the Covenant decreed that sanctions should be applied against any Member of the League that might "resort to war in disregard of its Covenants under articles 12, 13 or 15." Article 10 of the Protocol decrees sanctions against any State resorting to war without availing itself or in defiance of, the procedure of pacific settlement provided in the Covenant as amplified by the Protocol itself. The amplification of that procedure to cover all cases, so as to remove all excuse for resort to war, has enabled the framers of the Protocol to give a more exact definition of aggression, and to make that definition more certain and more automatic. The Protocol is thus free from the reproach that had been levelled against the Draft Treaty of Mutual a.s.sistance, which left a wide and dangerous discretion to the Council in determining which party to a dispute was the aggressor. It further discards the system proposed in the draft Treaty, whereby power was given to the Council to decide on and to direct the military sanctions required. The draft Treaty tended towards the realisation of the idea of the League as a "super-State": the Protocol respects the principle of national sovereignty. Every State retains its own liberty of action: it is still free to choose what it will do. The Protocol has stated in clearer terms what is expected of those who signed the Covenant in 1919, and it is to be hoped that this more explicit declaration may serve to deter those who would contemplate a violation of the spirit of the Covenant, whilst rea.s.suring those who have hitherto sought safety in their own armed strength, by giving them confidence in the solidarity of the civilised nations and in their determination to resist all unscrupulous attempts to plunge the world again into the disaster of war.
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19. It remains only to say a few words as to the actual procedure adopted by the a.s.sembly for putting into effect the scheme thus elaborated. It was generally agreed that mere resolutions of the a.s.sembly would not give sufficient a.s.surance of progress. The famous Resolution 14 of the Third a.s.sembly had been discussed and debated and had seemed to lead to an impa.s.se with the rejection of the Treaty of Mutual a.s.sistance. The Prime Minister, in his speech to the a.s.sembly, had said: "Let us see to it that even before we rise, before the a.s.sembly breaks up, some substantial progress shall be made in co-ordinating these ideas and in producing from their apparent diversities some measure of agreement and consent." It was therefore decided that the scheme should be embodied in the form of a Protocol, ready for signature, and that the a.s.sembly should pa.s.s a resolution endorsing the principles contained therein, recommending the Protocol to the Governments for their acceptance, and directing that it should be opened immediately for signature. The terms of this Resolution, which was carried unanimously, have already been published.
20. The Protocol itself was signed in Geneva by Delegates of the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Esthonia, France, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czechoslovakia. The Delegate of France at the same time signed on behalf of his Government the special Protocol opened for signature in virtue of article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, making the following declaration:--
"I hereby declare that, subject to ratification, the French Government gives its adhesion to the optional clause of article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, on the condition of reciprocity, for a period of fifteen years, with power of denunciation, should the Protocol of Arbitration, Security and the Reduction of Armaments, signed this day, lapse, and further, subject to the observations made at the First Committee of the Fifth a.s.sembly, according to the terms of which "one of the {229} parties to the dispute may bring the said dispute before the Council of the League of Nations for the purposes of the pacific settlement laid down in paragraph 3 of article 15 of the Covenant, and during such proceedings neither party may take proceedings against the other in the Court.""
21. Having briefly summarized the discussion which gave rise to the elaboration of the draft Protocol, and having examined in what way that instrument embodies the ideas expressed in that discussion, it may be of interest to review summarily the progress of the work of the two Committees of the a.s.sembly that were charged with the drafting of the scheme, and to show how the various articles were evolved.
22. It will be seen from the terms of the resolution of the 6th September that the scheme of "arbitration, security and disarmament,"
though forming one indivisible whole, would require the deliberation of two of the regular Committees of the a.s.sembly. The First Committee, dealing with the legal questions, would have to develop the principle of arbitration, while the Third Committee, dealing with the reduction of armaments, would have to consider the problems of security and disarmament.
23. It was realised that the work would overlap at many points, and the two Committees kept in constant touch throughout, the result of their labours being finally co-ordinated by a joint drafting sub-Committee.
24. During the whole period of discussion the British Delegation kept in close touch with the Dominion and Indian Delegations, who were consulted on all points of difficulty, and who were given every opportunity of expressing their views. This was done, not only by means of private consultation, but also at fourteen formal meetings of the Delegations.
25. In the following sections an attempt is made to trace the evolution of the Protocol through its various stages in the First and Third Committees.
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II.--WORK OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE.
26. The first plenary meeting of the First Committee was held on the 2nd September, when Sir Littleton Groom (Australia) was elected Chairman, and M. Limburg (Netherlands) Vice-Chairman. Sir C. Hurst represented the British Empire.
27. On the 9th September the Committee began its deliberations on the a.s.sembly resolution of the 6th September regarding arbitration, security and disarmament. The a.s.sembly, by this resolution, instructed the First Committee:--
"(_a_.) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement of disputes;
"(_b_.) To examine within what limits the terms of article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice might be rendered more precise, and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance of the clause;
"and thus strengthen the solidarity and security of the nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes which may arise between States."
28. The British Delegation commenced their labours by considering the second of these two tasks, as it was a British suggestion emanating from the Prime Minister himself. The question of the acceptance by His Majesty"s Government of the principle of compulsory arbitration for legal disputes, as provided in the optional clause referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice, had been examined in London before the meeting of the a.s.sembly. This examination had shown so clearly the difficulties which might arise in connection with disputes with neutral Powers arising out of British naval action in time of war, that the limitation of the acceptance by his Majesty"s Government of the optional clause by the exclusion of disputes arising out of British belligerent action at sea was suggested. To achieve this it was proposed that His Majesty"s Government {231} should make a reservation as to disputes arising out of action taken in conformity with the Covenant, or at the request, or with the approval, of the Council of the League.
29. The suggestion was accepted by the British Delegation. As however, the question was clearly one which affected the Empire as a whole, the Dominion and Indian Delegations were especially consulted in regard to it. The position as it appeared to the British Delegation was fully explained to them, and it was understood that they would telegraph to their respective Governments, making clear the nature of the reservation proposed.
30. The general discussion by the First Committee of the subject of the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice took place at the third plenary meeting on the 11th September. The British Delegate reminded the Committee that the views of His Majesty"s Government had already been explained in the a.s.sembly in regard to the optional clause. The Prime Minister had then stated that the British Government wished to sign a clause of this kind, subject to its being clearly drafted. The British Delegate proceeded to discuss the position of the British Empire supposing that it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and was then forced, in support of the Covenant, to go to war at sea. Sea warfare, he said, inevitably brought a belligerent into sharp conflict with the nationals of foreign Powers carrying on trade with the enemy State.
The British Empire might therefore find itself forced to support before the International Court the legality of action taken at the request of the League itself. The British Delegation therefore asked the Committee to consider whether it would be possible, either by amendment of article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court or by the admission of a reservation acceptable to other Members of the League, to exclude from the acceptance of that clause disputes which arose out of action taken, either in accordance with the Covenant, or at the request, or with the sanction, of the Council of the League.
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31. The French Delegation were content with the idea of such a reservation, and both the Belgian and Brazilian Delegations stated that they had no objection to it. The delegate of Brazil, however, said he would prefer to proceed by way of a reservation rather than by any modification of the text. Though the representatives of the Netherlands and of Sweden were slightly more critical, it became apparent that no real objection would be raised to the British reservation.
32. The Belgian Delegate suggested even going further still and excluding, when accepting the optional clause, the whole of sub-heading (_b_), which relates to questions of international law. The effect of this would be to exclude all questions of international law where that law has not yet been codified, as where it has been codified the dispute becomes one of the interpretation of a Treaty. This, the British Delegation thought, would be going too far. It would deprive the International Court of the power to build up a case law in the international field. It would, moreover, have gone further than the Delegation felt necessary, because it was only in the field of established international law, where there are two distinct schools of thought--the continental and the Anglo-Saxon--that the difficulties referred to by the British Delegate would arise.
33. As regards the question of amendments to the Covenant, the French representative did not, during the general discussion in a plenary meeting of the First Committee, specify the nature of the amendments suggested by the French Delegation. He contented himself with drawing attention to three points. The first was the last sentence of article 13 of the Covenant, which provides that in the event of any failure to carry out an arbitration award, the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken to give effect thereto. This the French Delegation regarded as inadequate. The second was the provision of article 15 by which, if the Council cannot reach a unanimous decision, the parties to a dispute which is submitted to the Council recover their liberty of action. Here, he said, was a gap in the {233} Covenant which must be filled. Was the position to be perpetuated, he asked, by which any one member of the Council could completely prevent a peaceful settlement of a dispute? The third was paragraph 8 of article 15, which provides that in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a State the Council can make no recommendation. The French Delegation asked the Committee to consider whether it would not be possible to discover a method of friendly conciliation over matters relating to domestic jurisdiction.
34. After the general discussion had been declared closed, the First Committee adjourned for a week and entrusted to a sub-committee, known as the Fifth Sub-Committee, the task of formulating concrete proposals.
The work done by this sub-committee was of such importance that it is considered desirable to indicate its composition, which was as follows:
Mr. Adatci (j.a.pan).
Count Albert Apponyi (Hungary).
M. Loucheur (France).
Mr. John O"Byrne (Irish Free State).
M. Erich (Finland).
M. Raul Fernandez (Brazil).
Sir Cecil Hurst (British Empire).
M. Nicolas Politis (Greece).
M. Rolin (Belgium).
M. Vittorio Scialoja (Italy).
M. Nicolas t.i.tulesco (Roumania).
M. Torriente (Cuba).
M. Limburg (Netherlands).
M. Unden (Sweden).
35. The discussion was taken up on the 12th September in the sub-committee on the lines of the general debate in the full Committee.
The meetings were not open to the public. As regards the proposed British reservation to the acceptance of the obligatory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, by signing the optional clause in the Statute of the Court, some opposition developed at first from two quarters. Subsequently, however, it waned and did not reappear.
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36. As regards the extension of the principle of arbitration by amendments to the Covenant, it at once became clear that there were many conflicting views as to the best system to adopt. The days were spent mainly in ascertaining, inside and outside the sub-committee, the extent and the nature of the different points of view.
37. The work on which the sub-committee was engaged was intimately related to the questions of security and disarmament with which the Third Committee was dealing. On the 16th September, Dr. Benes, chairman of the sub-committee of the Third Committee, who had been in close touch with the British and French Delegations, produced a draft Protocol covering the whole ground, in which he had attempted to reconcile opposing points of view and which was intended to serve as a basis for discussion. Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of this draft Protocol concerned the First Committee and were referred to the sub-committee.
They may be summarised as follows:--
38. _Article_ 1.--The signatories recognise the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice as compulsory, "subject to the following reserves":--
39. _Article_ 2.--The signatories undertake to submit all disputes, not covered by articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant, to the Council of the League, subject to an express reserve as to the right given exclusively to the a.s.sembly in article 19 of the Covenant, whereby the a.s.sembly alone is ent.i.tled to advise the reconsideration of existing treaties. The Council in such cases to act as an arbitration tribunal and to decide by a majority vote. Pending an examination of the dispute the Council may, by a majority, define measures to be taken by the parties to avert or put an end to armed conflict. Similarly, the Council may, in case of imminent danger, call upon the parties to discontinue any measure likely to cause the dispute to become more acute.
40. _Article_ 3.--The procedure laid down in article 2 to apply to the Permanent Court in cases concerning the competence of that Court.
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41. _Article_ 5.--Any signatory which does not submit its disputes to the methods of pacific settlement indicated above, or which does not comply with the provisional measures referred to in article 2, or which does not carry out an award of a duly qualified arbitral body, shall, if these acts of non-compliance are likely to disturb the peace of the world, be declared to be an aggressor and outlawed, the declaration to be made by the Permanent Court or by the Council acting, if need be, by a majority. When this declaration has been made, the Council is to call on Members of the League to put into operation the sanctions contained in article 7.
42. Consideration of these proposals and of those contained in two other schemes submitted led to long discussions in the Committee.
These discussions served mainly to bring into relief the different schools of thought. One favoured the widest possible extension of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court, even into the field of disputes of a political nature; the other held that the Court"s jurisdiction should be rigidly limited to disputes of a legal character, while a far-reaching system of arbitration should be established to deal with political disputes. Strong disinclination was shown towards any increase in the existing powers of the Council. On the other hand, it was made clear that no decrease of those powers would be tolerated. On one side it was urged that the Council, when acting as an arbitral body, should make its decisions by a majority vote; on the other, strong exception was taken to any departure from the unanimity rule.
As regards the application of sanctions, one group held that mere refusal to arbitrate or failure to carry out an award should justify their application. Another contended equally strongly that sanctions should only be applied when such refusal or failure was accompanied by a resort to war. The extent to which war was legitimate under the Covenant in cases relating to domestic jurisdiction was very fully discussed. The net result was a unanimous agreement to leave paragraph 8 of article 15 untouched.