Favre lodged in this house throughout all the negotiations for the surrender of Paris. So far as Favre knew, the owner of the house was a good Parisian and a resident of Versailles; in reality the place was the headquarters of the German secret-service system, and its owner was one of the fixed spies placed by Stieber before the war began, and thus ready to afford all information with regard to his own district to the German forces on their arrival. For the period of Favre"s stay, Stieber waited on him hand and foot, attending to his meals, to his bedroom and clothing, and performing all the duties of a valet. Under this pretext it was perfectly easy for Stieber to ransack all Favre"s clothing luggage, and personal equipment, and the arch-spy claims in his Memoirs that much of the information he obtained in this way was extremely useful to Bismarck during the negotiations on which the conclusion of peace was based.
Certain proposals made by the Minister of the Interior during this period in which Stieber was at the head of the secret police are worth quoting with regard to the establishment of spies throughout France, subsequent to the war of 1870, in order that strict watch might be kept on the conquered country. The proposals were as follows:
"All the fixed agents must hold not merely salaried positions (that is, in offices, workshops, etc), for they might at any time be dismissed from their posts, and in that case would no longer have any plausible reason for remaining at their points of observation. Such positions, too, possess considerable disadvantage for our agents, in that they restrict their actions and hamper their freedom of going and coming, and bring them too much under notice.
"For these reasons, it must be laid down as a condition of the employment of a spy that he shall be obliged to keep some kind of an establishment, which he may select so long as it is, at least externally, thoroughly in keeping with the commercial or other requirements of the country in which he is engaged. Whatever establishment it be, whether an office for the settlement of disputed claims, or a property register, or a business of a purely commercial land, such as groceries, cafes, restaurants, hotels, etc, it must be soundly established and possess a substantial good-will.
"It must be borne in mind that it is necessary for our agents to inspire confidence in circles where they have their centre of action, and to inspire that confidence by outward indications of a commonplace bourgeois existence; by tactful charity and by making themselves useful in societies, a.s.sociations, communities, and so forth; and by acquiring strong social positions, so that they may be well received and regarded in all quarters.
"While we must limit the expenditure which our agents are permitted to incur, it is necessary that we should give them absolute a.s.surance that any deficit of the undertaking which they carry on would be made good by the service under the head of general expenses."
Since the annual expenditure of Germany for work of this kind is admitted to amount to 780,000 pounds a year, it may be gathered that the espionage service is a complete one. The sum stated is admittedly spent; how much more is spent it is impossible to conjecture. The spies placed at fixed posts are given salaries varying between two and four pounds a week according to the importance of the post and the duties which the spy is expected to perform. To this is added any out-of-pocket expenses to which the spy may be put in the maintenance of his business or position. These spies at fixed posts are under the control of headquarters at Brussels, Lausanne, and Geneva, whence their salaries are paid monthly under the form of business remittances. There is also a system of inspectorship by means of which each fixed post is visited at regular intervals, either by women or by professed commercial travellers, who collect the written reports in order to avoid possible inspection of these reports by the French postal authorities. Further, this system admits of instructions being given verbally by the travelling inspector to the spy at each fixed post. At the outbreak of the present war the number of fixed spies known to exist in France was over 15,000.
The recruiting of this army of spies was begun by Stieber in 1870, when he requested that there should be sent, to the fourteen departments of France in which occupation was essential to the success of a German attack, about 4,000 farmers, agricultural labourers, and others who should be permanently employed in the several districts, together with an even larger number of women servants to be placed among the various cla.s.ses of the French population. These, however, were to receive pay from ordinary French commercial sources, and were to be under the control of the higher grade of spies established in businesses or otherwise independently employed at the fixed posts. The latter were specially chosen from among people of Teutonic origin, not only in Germany, but also in Switzerland and Belgium, whence they were sent to take up their posts after receiving the necessary preliminary training to fit them for their work. The occupant of a fixed post at the present time, whether in France or any other country, is nearly always a German, and has at his beck and call a host of other emigrants from Germany, who are legitimately employed in various capacities, have had no government training, and expect no fixed salary for their work. They are the small fry of the business, and do not come into contact with any higher officials than the fixed agent, who enables them to supplement their legitimate salaries by retailing bits of slander and gossip. The absence of one or more of them would make no difference to the system; as a matter of patriotism, they simply retail what they hear to a fellow-countryman, and, in this sense, every German in a foreign country may be reckoned as a spy, though for official purposes only a certain number of secret-service agents exist.
The recognised agent is placed at some point at which he is able to maintain espionage over a garrison, a military post, or something connected with the defensive or offensive organisation of the country concerned. His business at the outset is to be thoroughly agreeable and make himself well liked in the circle in which he moves. a.s.suming that he is located in a small garrison town, he sets up a business of some kind which will give him admittance to military circles, and, no matter how bad times may be, his business goes on. In the meantime he contributes unostentatiously to charities, attends all entertainments, and does his best to make himself and his business known in the community of which he is a member. Sooner or later, he makes friends out of one or two of his acquaintances; so far as can be seen he leads a benevolent, open, harmless sort of existence, and is a thoroughly good fellow, and eventually he gains close contact with some member of the garrison, either officer or non-commissioned officer. In the latter case, the spy will take care that the non-commissioned officer is in some position of trust where he is able to obtain useful information.
So far as his friends are concerned, the spy proves to be not entirely ignorant of matters military. He manifests a mild interest in drill, formation of troops, fortifications, guns, etc, but he is not in any way keen over these matters. Like any other inhabitant of the country in which he resides, he is willing to discuss the "shop" matters of his a.s.sociates, and will even indulge in mild arguments, making mistakes and submitting to correction from those more experienced. Gradually he gets more and more into the confidence of his friends, who, while they reveal nothing of importance, let fall a word here and a word there in his hearing, knowing him to be thoroughly trustworthy; out of these various words a fairly detailed report can be compiled. In the meantime, the small fry of the business are constantly bringing gossip. If a new gun is to be mounted, the spy hears about it; if the strength of the garrison is to be altered, the spy is cognisant of the fact; sooner or later, he gets to know domestic details with regard to the officers of the garrison. A certain lieutenant drinks too much, or a captain is very fond of a hand at cards; in the former case the spy is quite willing to drink level with the lieutenant, and in the latter he is willing to lose money to the captain, such money being put down to special expenses, and accounted for in his monthly statement.
It will be seen that in such simple ways these the fixed agent is able to obtain an immense amount of personal and other information by perfectly simple methods. It may be urged that the greater part of this information could be obtained in legitimate ways and with no expense to the German Government; but the system which Stieber inaugurated is above all things thorough, and there is a system at Berlin of tabulating and card-indexing all information received from fixed posts; of a.n.a.lysing, checking, and comparing, until absolute certainty is reached with regard to the accuracy of detail. For instance, a certain newspaper may announce that the armament of certain fortifications has been increased by a new four-inch gun. A fixed agent will add to this information the position of gun, weight of sh.e.l.l, rate of fire per minute, name of officer in control, and the fact that it is mounted on a disappearing platform--details which are noted and checked with a view to their possible usefulness in the future. The extent of this usefulness may be estimated when the fall of Namur or Maubeuge is recalled. The officers in control of the attacking German batteries knew exactly how many guns they had to silence, the position, bore, and rate of fire of these guns, and the points at which their own batteries could best be placed, with a view to fire effect and invisibility. In the case of Maubeuge they knew more: they knew where to find the necessary concrete platforms on which to place their own heavy artillery, in order to silence the French guns--and this must be attributed to the development of the system of fixed posts.
Not only does the Great German General Staff know details of fortifications and technical matters, but it is also kept posted up in the character and abilities of officers who come under the observation of the fixed agent. Reports sent in to headquarters are concerned with personal peculiarities and scandals to an extent undreamed of by the persons concerned. If any officer is open to bribery, the fact is ascertained; if any officer"s wife is open to blackmail, the blackmail is inst.i.tuted, and the price of silence in every case is information with regard to matters of which the husband is cognisant. Further, the topographical information supplied includes details of the nature and state of roads, telegraphs, bridges, depths of rivers and streams, positions of fords, nature and condition of every building and farm, supplies of forage and food, horses available, and every detail which is likely to be of service. The ordnance-maps supplied to German officers are marvels of map-making; every insignificant cottage, stile, clump of trees, and peculiarity of the landscape is indicated, and, by the use of maps of this kind, the march on Paris in 1870 was carried through without a hitch.
In like manner, all preparations for the Prussian advance through Belgium, and the projected victorious march on Paris, were made and completed years ago, with the a.s.sistance of the fixed agents. The German entry into Brussels, when 700,000 men marched through a strange city without the slightest confusion, has been described as a triumph of organisation. This it undoubtedly was; but the credit did not lie with the military commander, for the agents who had been busy through many months preparing the way of the army were responsible for that army"s successful advance. Officers had only to follow detailed instructions presented to them by headquarters.
With equal care the entry to Paris was planned: quarters were a.s.signed to each regiment of the invading army; each officer knew exactly the part that would be his in the spectacle, and every step of the entry to the French capital had been arranged in detail by German fixed agents, who had resided for many years in Northern France, and in Paris itself, as peaceful citizens. Reports of German occupation of French towns and even photographs from the theatre of war draw attention to various houses on which has been chalked--"Spare this house." In many cases, doubtless, this is intended as a return for unexpectedly hospitable reception, but in many other cases it indicates that the house in question was the residence of a fixed agent, to whom German officers came on their entry to the place in order to learn all that was possible with regard to resources of the town or village, and all that could be told of the movements of the enemy.
It has been urged, and with apparent reason, that the value of espionage ceases as soon as armies take the field, since the work of the spy can only concern preparations for hostilities, and, when war has begun, actual strength decides the issue. This, however, is not the case when German military espionage is in question; in many cases the fixed agents have been so long established at their posts that they rank in the eyes of normal inhabitants as a part of the life of the place, and, by maintaining their positions, they are able to ascertain for the benefit of their own commanders particulars of the dispositions of hostile forces. Elaborate systems of signalling are in use; carrier pigeons are used, but only to a limited extent; the ways of the Red Indians, who made the most perfect spies ever known, are copied in indicating events by the movement of stones, chipping of bark on trees, breaking branches, and other ways little likely to be detected, while the more civilised method of lamp-signalling is also practised. Altogether, the German military spy forms a very efficient and formidable part of the German military force, both before and after the opening of hostilities. His value decreases to a certain extent when action has been entered on, and, in a definite battle like those along the line of the Meuse and the line of the Aisne, he is practically useless, but in case of an advance on the part of the German forces he is invaluable, by reason of the information he can give with regard to the nature of the country and the dispositions of the retreating army.
CHAPTER FIVE.
NAVAL ESPIONAGE.
The routine of naval espionage is very similar in character to that followed by military spies. The naval spy, however, must be a rather more intelligent and highly trained man than his military confrere, and cases that have come to light prove that his position is one of more responsibility, and that he is entrusted with more funds for the carrying out of his work. It is an interesting fact that, for many years past, officers and men of the German naval service have been employed along the East coast of England in compiling extremely detailed plans of places and fortifications. The accuracy of these plans is ascertained by persistent redrawing done by new members of the naval espionage staff, and all changes in building, roadmaking, bridge-construction, and as far as possible the interior work of fortifications, are duly recorded on the Berlin maps. Not that this information is of definite working value at the present time, but the principle of secret-service headquarters is that no item is too trivial for record, and information is acquired without regard to its direct uses, but in view of the fact that it may possibly be of some use at a future date. The adoption of such a principle involves an immense amount of work in checking and sorting the ma.s.ses of information obtained, but beyond doubt the principle itself has gone far to a.s.sure such successes as German arms have obtained, either on land or at sea.
In addition to the work of fixed naval posts, stationed at dockyards and harbours, the work of spies at sea must not be overlooked, either in time of peace or in war. In the former case an innocent-looking trawler or private yacht is useful for taking soundings, ascertaining channels, and even locating naval mines used for purposes of harbour defence and fired by land contact. In time of war the services which may be performed by such vessels are even more valuable; the reports of the sinking of three British cruisers by German submarine attack are fairly unanimous with regard to the presence of a trawler in the vicinity of the spot at which the engagement took place. All that can be definitely learned with regard to this trawler is that she was not a British boat, and it is reasonable to a.s.sume that her business consisted in signalling to the submarines particulars which they may have been unable to obtain themselves, or in shielding them from sight during their approach towards the cruisers. Although there are no substantial proofs of this a.s.sumption, it is hardly likely that the vessel was a trawler engaged in usual and legitimate business.
The work of the naval spy in time of peace is best ill.u.s.trated by the record of cases which have actually come to light through actions taken in the courts. One noteworthy case is that of Sub-Lieutenant Ullmo, a gifted naval officer of the French service, serving in the Republican warship _Carabine_. Ullmo was an officer of undoubted ability, but he came under the influence of a female spy, known to him and his fellows as Lison, who persuaded him to set up an establishment for her and managed to secure his a.s.sent to a plan by which this establishment, maintained at his expense, was to be converted into an opium-den. So great an ascendancy did Lison gain over her victim that in a period of two years he had spent 3,000 pounds, which was all that was his in the way of capital and income apart from his pay. His position in the service rendered money a necessity, and, once his private fortune was gone, Lison pointed out to him that more money could be obtained. As soon as she spoke of the means by which he could obtain money he repudiated the suggestion, but, by working on his jealousy with regard to her acquaintance with a brother officer, she secured his consent to a bargain by which he was to give up the secret doc.u.ments kept in a safe on board his ship, in return for a price which was fixed at more than ten times his previous competence. The bargain was to be arranged by the medium of advertis.e.m.e.nts, and it was through the wording of these advertis.e.m.e.nts that the plot was detected by the French secret service.
Ullmo"s reward for his treachery was degradation from his rank and imprisonment for life, and Lison put in an appearance at his trial in order to watch the proceedings as an uninterested spectator.
The system of counter-espionage thus evidenced on the part of a foreign Government has its counterpart in the British service. Since Britain is the most powerful enemy Germany has to fear in a naval sense, it follows that German naval espionage is princ.i.p.ally directed against Britain, and that the establishment of naval spies is greater in this country than in any other. It is safe to say, however, that the majority of the fixed posts of the German naval service in Britain are known to the police, and that, as soon as information which, in the opinion of the British naval authorities, is of value, is in danger of being communicated to Germany, action is taken to prevent the transmission of the spies"
reports to headquarters. A case in point is that of Doctor Max Schulz, who, charged with espionage at Devon a.s.sizes, was sentenced to a year and nine months" imprisonment for acts attempted rather than acts committed.
According to his own account, Schulz became implicated in the work of the military branch of the German secret service in 1910, when he was engaged to obtain reports about British military and naval affairs for statistical purposes. Although no more was said, there can be no doubt that Schulz realised quite well the nature of the work he was undertaking, especially as, on the evidence of Sir Rufus Isaacs, who prosecuted at the trial, he was able to offer 500 pounds a year to a British subject for continuous information of a confidential character.
He began his career as a spy by ineffectual work in Ireland, following up this by a visit to Toulon, still in search of information. After various adventures, he returned in 1911 to Plymouth, and thence went for a trip up the River Yealm on a yacht called the _Egret_; here, according to the evidence of Crown witnesses for the prosecution, he was visited by a Mr Duff and a Mr Tarrant, to whom he made overtures with regard to the obtaining of information concerning naval matters.
The charges against Schulz, as outlined by the Attorney-General in opening the case, were four in number. The first charge was that, in the summer of 1911: "He, at the borough of Plymouth, having possession or control over knowledge which had been obtained by means of an act which const.i.tuted an offence against the Official Secrets Act, communicated or attempted to communicate the same to a person to whom the same ought not in the interest of the State to be communicated at the time." The second charge amplified the first in that Schulz was accused of having intended to communicate his illegally gained knowledge to the Government of a foreign State. The third and fourth counts against him were that he had "endeavoured to procure Samuel Hugh Duff and Edward Charles Tarrant respectively to communicate to him information relating to the naval affairs of His Majesty which ought not in the interests of the State to be communicated to any person."
Sir Rufus Isaacs stated, in his outline of the case for the prosecution, that Schulz had offered Duff a salary of 500 pounds a year, with a possibility of this sum being doubled, for confidential information.
Schulz alleged that the confidential information in question would be published in a German newspaper, but, at the time of Schulz"s arrest, there had been found in his possession a letter which proved the purpose for which the information was required. One pa.s.sage of the letter which was read in court is enlightening as regards the detailed information required of German naval spies. The pa.s.sage is as follows:
"How do matters stand with the commander and lieutenant respectively?
Can nothing at all be expected from them? Reserve officers are no use.
They do not procure any valuable secrets because they do not have access to them. Confidential books and reports are what is wanted, and what you must procure at all costs if our relations are to continue."
Sir Rufus Isaacs stated, and the evidence proved, that a man named Tobler, who did not visit England, kept Schulz supplied with money. A number of telegrams were produced, written in code, of which the prosecution had found the key. The deciphered telegrams read: "In greatest danger. Wire immediately 50 pounds."
"In greater trouble and danger. All prepared for departure. Wire immediately 50 pounds and date of meeting." Instructions from Tobler to Schulz included a list of questions which Schulz was to put to Mr Duff, and the list included the following:
I. Are officers or men granted leave, or have those on leave possibly been recalled?
II. Is there any sign of coals, stores, ammunition, etc, being acc.u.mulated?
III. What is the feeling in naval circles?
IV. How do officers and men discuss the situation?
V. Are crews being increased, are ships being prepared, or has commissioning of ships suddenly taken place?
These questions, the Attorney-General pointed out, were intended as tests for Mr Duff. Other questions, put apparently with more serious intent, included the following:
I. What is the opinion of officers of the British Navy as to the result of war between England and France, on the one hand, and Germany on the other, and the likelihood of the same over the Morocco question?
II. What ships of the Third Division were put out of service on July 23, or about the end of July, or have reduced their crews, and the reasons for so doing?
III. How many officers and men are still on board, and why was the programme altered after it was stated that the Third Division should be full up?
Before answering these questions Mr Duff communicated with the police, and it was stated in the initial proceedings against Schulz that, if British people usually acted in the way that Mr Duff and Mr Tarrant had done, and in the way that Detective-Sergeant Martin, whom they consulted, had acted, England would have nothing to fear from any system of espionage.
The evidence given by Mr Tarrant went to show that Schulz had offered him a salary of 50 pounds a month for acting as "Military and Naval Correspondent" to a German paper, for which Schulz was to act as agent and intermediary. The only defence set up was to the effect that Schulz was a _bona-fide_ journalist, and had no ulterior motive in attempting to obtain information. The Tobler correspondence was too strong evidence to the contrary, and the well-merited sentence of a year and nine months" imprisonment in the second division was imposed. It is characteristic of the German spy system that, after his release from jail, Schulz was disowned by his previous employers.
Later cases, like that of Ernst, to which reference will be made later, go to prove that both in England and France a system of counter-espionage has been organised, which goes far to neutralise such efforts as that detailed above. So persistent is the German thirst for information that one man who came into the British courts as defendant had actually received payment from German sources for information which he was virtually proved to have obtained from Whittaker"s almanac and like sources. This, however, only goes to show that the object of the German secret service is to check such information as it may receive, by means of duplicate and triplicate reports.
There is little likelihood of the system of German naval espionage having any definite effect in England until an invasion has been successfully accomplished, for there is a wide difference between learning the strength of a coast defence and overcoming that defence.
Both in naval and military matters, also, the plan has long since been adopted of changing orders at irregular intervals, so that, in case of active service requirements, the strength and dispositions of the forces vary from month to month and even from week to week. Signal and telegraphic codes are changed, routine is altered, and, altogether, such differences are effected in various ways that information supplied by spies one week may be quite valueless the next. Not that it is advisable to underrate the spy peril or the value of the German system, but at the same time it is equally unwise to overrate the possibilities of the system. Were another Stieber forthcoming, Germany might yet accomplish all that it set out to do with the a.s.sistance of its secret service; but, under present conditions, such success is extremely unlikely.
CHAPTER SIX.
DIPLOMATIC ESPIONAGE.
The way in which Stieber, as body-servant to Jules Favre, was able to a.s.sist in the negotiations for the surrender of Paris in 1870 has already been detailed, and this forms a fair sample of what can be done in the way of diplomatic espionage, as distinctly apart from the gaining of purely military information or details of a definite naval character.
But it is only one instance; the spy in the employ of the German Foreign Office is capable of making himself useful in many ways, and into this cla.s.s of work also the influence of women enters to a very large extent.
The woman spy of fiction, though not absolutely a myth, is very rare indeed. The siren of beauty and wit, mysterious as she is fascinating, makes a very pretty picture for a sensational melodrama; but it must be fairly obvious, on reflection, that she would defeat her own ends by the very mystery that is popularly supposed to surround her. Further, diplomats entrusted with confidential and delicate tasks are hard-headed men of the world, capable of seeing through the wiles of such dames of mystery as the fiction-writer would have us believe in, existing in the highest society and able to subjugate a man by a glance. A story has recently been told to the effect that one of these charming adventuresses was able to spoil the work of no less a person than a Russian Amba.s.sador, the said Amba.s.sador being a man of mature years and such judgment as one would expect in the holder of the power that he represented. The spy alleged that the lady in question was able by her charms to throw the Amba.s.sador entirely off his guard, so that his mission was spoiled and he incurred imperial displeasure and lost his post.
It is a pretty story, and would pa.s.s well as an effort of imagination; the only trouble is that the alleged confessions of the spy include this pretty story as truth, which it most distinctly is not. The affairs of nations are not conducted in such a manner as this, for there is sufficient wisdom in the various Courts of Europe to recognise the existence of all dangers, and to impose on their representatives such safeguards as shall neutralise the attempts that may be made at spoiling treaties and sowing discord by means of pretty women and susceptible men. The reason for the telling of such stories lies in their being extremely plausible, extremely attractive, and extremely saleable.
Real diplomatic spying is a much more sordid and much meaner business than the fiction-writer places before his or her readers. It consists in listening at doors, reading and replacing letters, and tricks of the kind which would be perfectly obvious if the person spying were not so thoroughly trustworthy--to outside appearance. The diplomatic spy may be a servant, a military attache, a courier in the ostensible service of a Government--he may be anything, but always he is a supremely trustworthy person, one who has no need to conceal the fact that he is highly intelligent and well fitted for his post, whatever that may be.