PART II.--THE PARTY SYSTEM
CHAPTER XXIV
PARTY AND THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
[Sidenote: Lack of a Psychology of Political Parties.]
The last generation has made great strides in the study of psychology.
The workings of the individual mind, and its reaction to every stimulus or impression, especially under morbid conditions, have been examined with far more care than ever before. Social psychology has also come into view, and attempts have been made to explain the psychology of national traits, and of abnormal or unhealthy popular movements, notably mobs. But the normal forces that govern the ordinary conduct of men in their public relations have scarcely received any scientific treatment at all. In short, we are almost wholly lacking in a psychology of political parties, the few scattered remarks in Maine"s "Popular Government" being, perhaps, still the nearest approach to such a thing that we possess.[435:1]
[Sidenote: Although Parties are Universal.]
The absence of treatises on the subject is all the more remarkable because the phenomena to be studied are almost universal in modern governments that contain a popular element. Experience has, indeed, shown that democracy in a great country, where the number of voters is necessarily large, involves the permanent existence of political parties; and it would not be hard to demonstrate that this must in the nature of things be the case. That parties exist, and are likely to continue to do so, has provoked general attention. By all statesmen they are recognised as a factor to be reckoned with in public life; and, indeed, efforts have been made in various places to deal with them by law. In the United States, for example, the local caucuses, or conventions of the parties, and their methods of nominating candidates, have of late years been regulated by statute; while in Switzerland and Belgium, elaborate schemes of proportional representation have been put into operation to insure a fair share of seats to the groups in the minority.
[Sidenote: Modern View of Parties.]
But if political parties have become well-nigh universal at the present time, they are comparatively new in their modern form. No one in the eighteenth century foresaw party government as it exists to-day, enfolding the whole surface of public life in its constant ebb and flow.
An occasional man like Burke could speak of party without condemnation;[436:1] but with most writers on political philosophy parties were commonly called factions, and were a.s.sumed to be subversive of good order and the public welfare. Men looked at the history with which they were familiar; the struggles for supremacy at Athens and at Rome; the Guelphs and Ghibelines exiling one another in the Italian republics; the riots in the Netherlands; the civil war and the political strife of the seventeenth century in England. It was not unnatural that with such examples before their eyes they should have regarded parties as fatal to the prosperity of the state. To them the idea of a party opposed to the government was a.s.sociated with a band of selfish intriguers, or a movement that endangered the public peace and the security of political inst.i.tutions.
Foreign observers, indeed, point out that for nearly three hundred years political parties have existed in England, as they have not in continental countries; and that the procedure of the House of Commons has consistently protected the Opposition in its attacks upon the government.[437:1] This is true, and there is no doubt that even in the seventeenth century party struggles were carried on both in Parliament and by pamphlets and public speeches, with a freedom unknown in most other nations; but still they were a very different thing from what they are now. They were never far removed from violence. When the Opposition of those days did not actually lead to bloodshed, it was perilously near to plots and insurrection; and the fallen minister, who was driven from power by popular feeling or the hostility of Parliament, pa.s.sed under the shadow at least of the scaffold. Danby was impeached, and Shaftesbury, his rival, died a refugee in Holland. With the accession of the House of Hanover, and the vanishing of the old issues, political violence subsided. The parties degenerated into personal factions among the ruling cla.s.s; and true parties were evolved slowly by the new problems of a later generation.
[Sidenote: "His Majesty"s Opposition."]
The expression, "His Majesty"s Opposition," said to have been coined by John Cam Hobhouse before the Reform Bill,[437:2] would not have been understood at an earlier period; and it embodies the greatest contribution of the nineteenth century to the art of government--that of a party out of power which is recognised as perfectly loyal to the inst.i.tutions of the state, and ready at any moment to come into office without a shock to the political traditions of the nation. In countries where popular control of public affairs has endured long enough to be firmly established, an Opposition is not regarded as in its nature unpatriotic. On the contrary, the party in power has no desire to see the Opposition disappear. It wants to remain in power itself, and for that reason it wants to keep a majority of the people on its side; but it knows well that if the Opposition were to become so enfeebled as to be no longer formidable, rifts would soon appear in its own ranks. In the newer democracies, such as France and Italy, there are large bodies of men whose aims are revolutionary, whose object is to change the existing form of government, although not necessarily by violent means.
These men are termed "irreconcilables," and so long as they maintain that att.i.tude, quiet political life with a peaceful alternation of parties in power is an impossibility.
[Sidenote: Conditions of Good Party Government.]
The recognition of the Opposition as a legitimate body, ent.i.tled to attain to power by persuasion, is a primary condition of the success of the party system, and therefore of popular government on a large scale.
Other conditions of success follow from this.
[Sidenote: Opposition must not be Revolutionary.]
If the Opposition is not to be regarded as revolutionary, its objects must not be of that character, either in the eyes of its own adherents, or in those of other people. As Professor Dicey has put it, parties must be divided upon real differences, which are important, but not fundamental. There is, of course, no self-evident line to mark off those things that are revolutionary or fundamental; and herein lies an incidental advantage of a written const.i.tution restricting the competence of the legislature, for it draws just such a line, and goes far to confine the immediate energies of the parties to questions that are admitted not to be revolutionary.[438:1] In the absence of a const.i.tution of that kind, party activity must be limited to a conventional field, which is regarded by the public opinion of the day as fairly within the range of practical politics. Clearly the issues must not involve vital matters, such as life or confiscation. When, during the progress of the French Revolution, an orator argued in favour of the responsibility of the ministers, and added "By responsibility we mean death," he advocated a principle inconsistent with the peaceful alternation of parties in power.
[Sidenote: Lines of Cleavage must not be Social.]
For the same reason there is grave danger when the lines of cleavage of the parties coincide with those between the different social cla.s.ses in the community, because one side is likely to believe that the other is shaking the foundations of society, and pa.s.sions are kindled like those that blaze in civil war. This is true whenever the parties are separated by any of the deeper feelings that divide mankind sharply into groups; and especially when two or three such feelings follow the same channel.
The chief difficulty with Irish Nationalism, as a factor in English politics, lies in the fact that to a great extent the line of cleavage is at once racial, religious, social, and economic.
[Sidenote: Issues must be Based on Public Matters.]
In order that the warfare of parties may be not only safe, but healthy, it must be based upon a real difference of opinion about the needs of the community as a whole. In so far as it is waged, not for public objects, but for the private gain, whether of individuals, or of cla.s.ses, or of collective interests, rich or poor, to that extent politics will degenerate into a scramble of self-seekers.
[Sidenote: Relation of Parties to Political Inst.i.tutions.]
Before inquiring how far these conditions have been fulfilled in England we must consider the form that party has a.s.sumed there, and the inst.i.tutions to which it has given birth. England is, in fact, the only large country in which the political inst.i.tutions and the party system are thoroughly in harmony.
[Sidenote: In America.]
The framers of the Const.i.tution of the United States did not foresee the role that party was to play in popular government,[439:1] and they made no provision for it in their plan; yet they established a system in which parties were a necessity. It was from the first inevitable, and soon became clear, that the real selection of the President would not be left to the judgment of the electoral college--a result made the more certain, first, by providing that the members should a.s.semble by States, and hence should not meet together as a whole for deliberation; and second, by excluding from the college all congressmen and holders of federal offices, that is, all the leading men in national public life.[440:1] If the electoral college was not really to select the President, it must become a mere machine for registering the results of a popular vote throughout the nation, and the candidates for the presidency must be designated beforehand in some way.
In a small district where the voters are few, and an interchange of opinions naturally takes place by informal conference, public officers may be elected by popular vote without the existence of any machinery for nomination; but in a large const.i.tuency, where the voters are not personally acquainted with each other, men who have the same objects in view must get together, agree upon a candidate, and recommend him to the public. Otherwise votes will be thrown away by scattering them, and it will be mere chance whether the result corresponds with the real wishes of the voters or not. In short, there must be some process for nominating candidates; that is, some party organisation; and the larger the electorate the more imperative the need of it. Now the electorate that practically chooses the President of the United States is by far the largest single const.i.tuency that has ever existed in the world. It is, in fact, noteworthy that democracy throughout Europe adheres to the custom of dividing the country for political purposes into comparatively small electorates; while in the United States it is the habit to make whole communities single const.i.tuencies for the choice of their chief magistrates--state governors or national president--a condition of things that involves elaborate party machinery for nomination, and hence the creation of huge party organisations on a popular basis.
The form of government in the United States has thus made parties inevitable; and yet they were furnished with no opportunity for the exercise of their functions by the regular organs of the state. There were no means provided whereby a party could formulate and carry through its policy, select its candidates for high office, or insure that they should be treated as the real leaders of the party and able to control its action.[441:1] The machinery of party, therefore, from the national convention to the legislative caucus, has perforce been created outside the framework of the government, and cannot be nicely adjusted thereto.
[Sidenote: In Continental Europe.]
The European countries, on the other hand, that have adopted the English parliamentary system, have usually copied those features, like the responsibility of the ministers, which were most readily perceived, without acquiring at the same time the substructure on which the system rests, the procedure which prevents friction, or the national traditions which supply the motive power. The result has been that a form of government well fitted to the great English parties has proved very imperfectly suited to the numerous political groups that exist in most of the continental legislatures.[441:2] In France the conditions have indeed changed much in the last few years, the procedure has been gradually better adapted to the parliamentary system, and the ministries have gained in stability; but as yet the difficulties are by no means overcome. In some of the smaller countries, such as Belgium and Switzerland, the organs of government and the system of parties are less inconsistent; in Belgium because she followed British precedents more faithfully; in Switzerland because she was enabled by her small size, coupled with a federal structure, to create a novel polity of her own, in which parties are given no const.i.tutional sphere of action, and play an unusually subordinate part. In none of these countries, however, is the form of government so fully consonant with the party system as it is in Great Britain.
[Sidenote: English Parliamentary System Grew out of Parties.]
In England the party system is no more in accord with the strictly legal inst.i.tutions, with King, Lords and Commons, than it is elsewhere; but it is in absolute harmony with those conventions, which, although quite unknown to the law, make up the actual working const.i.tution of the state. It is in harmony with them because they were created by the warfare of parties, were evolved out of party life. Government by a responsible ministry was not the inevitable consequence of the long struggle between the House of Commons and the Crown. Some other means might very well have been devised for taking the executive power out of the personal control of the King. It was rather the result of the condition of the House itself; for it is inconceivable that this form of government should have appeared if Parliament had not been divided into Whigs and Tories. In fact the whole plan would be senseless if parties did not exist. The reason for the resignation of a ministry upon the rejection of a measure it has proposed is that the defeat indicates a general loss of confidence in the policy of the party in power, and the preference for another body of leaders with a different policy. If this were not so, the Swiss practice of remaining in office, but yielding on the point at issue, would be far more sensible. The parliamentary system is thus a rational expression of the division of the ruling chamber into two parties.
[Sidenote: It has Made Parties Stronger.]
Neither the parliamentary system nor the party system, neither the responsibility of ministers to the House of Commons nor the permanent division into two parties, grew up in a day. Throughout the eighteenth century the principle of cabinet responsibility was but dimly recognised; while parties at times disintegrated, and the wheels of government were kept going by means of corruption, which has served in all ages as a lubricant for ill-adjusted political machinery. But little by little, with halting steps, the rivalry of parties built up the responsibility of ministers, and this in turn helped to perpetuate the party divisions; for the parliamentary system, like every rational form of government, reacts upon and strengthens the conditions of its own existence. It is based upon party, and by the law of its nature tends to accentuate party. Ministers perceived that their security depended upon standing together, presenting a united front, and prevailing upon their friends to do the same. The leaders of the Opposition learned also that their chance of attaining to power was improved by pursuing a similar course. In this way two parties are arrayed against one another continually, while every member of Parliament finds himself powerfully drawn to enlist under one banner or the other, and follow it on all occasions. He cannot consider measures simply on their merits, but must take into account the ultimate effect of his vote. As soon as men recognise that the defeat of a government bill means a change of ministry, the pressure is great to sacrifice personal opinions on that bill to the greater principles for which the party stands; and the more fully the system develops, the clearer becomes the incompatibility between voting as the member of Parliament pleases on particular measures, and maintaining in power the party he approves. In short, the action of the House of Commons has tended to become more and more party action, with the ministers, as we have already seen, gradually drawing the initiative in legislation, and the control over procedure, more and more into their own hands.
[Sidenote: It is Government by Party.]
The English government is builded as a city that is in unity with itself, and party is an integral part of the fabric. Party works, therefore, inside, instead of outside, the regular political inst.i.tutions. In fact, so far as Parliament is concerned, the machinery of party and of government are not merely in accord; they are one and the same thing. The party cabal has become the Treasury Bench. The ministers are the party chiefs, selected not artificially but by natural prominence, and the majority in the House of Commons, which legislates, appropriates money, supervises and controls the administration, and sustains or discards ministers, is the party itself acting under the guidance of those chiefs. The parliamentary system, as it has grown up spontaneously in England, is in its origin and nature government by party, sanctioned and refined by custom. In that respect it differs, not only from national political systems elsewhere, but also from British local government. This last is not an outgrowth of party, but, like most of the existing popular inst.i.tutions in other countries, was designed, not evolved. In it, as we shall see hereafter, party has no organic connection with the ruling bodies, and has not the same controlling authority as in national affairs.
[Sidenote: It can Thrive only with Two Parties.]
If the existence of a responsible ministry normally involves government by party, it also requires as a condition of success that there shall be only two parties. The ills that have flowed from the subdivision of the French, the Italian and other parliaments, into a number of groups are now an oft-told tale. The consequences there are very different from those that occur where the executive is not responsible to the legislature. In this last case the presence of several groups may result in the election of a president, a council or an a.s.sembly, representing a minority of the voters, and if so the popular will may not be truly expressed. Yet the government will go on unshaken until the next periodic election. But with similar conditions under the parliamentary system the administration itself will be weak, its position unstable, its tenure of office dependent upon the pleasure of a group that may be ready to sacrifice everything else for a single object. Parnell was quite right in his reckoning that if he could keep the Home Rulers together until they held the balance of power in the House, one or other of the great parties must make terms with them, or parliamentary government would be unworkable.
[Sidenote: Opposition not Entirely Genuine.]
In the English system the initiative in most matters of importance has come into the hands of the cabinet ministers, as the representatives and leaders of the predominant party. It is their business to propose, and it is the business of the Opposition to oppose. But the att.i.tude of the latter is not quite spontaneous. On rare occasions it congratulates the government upon some action, which it supports heartily. More commonly it seeks to criticise everything, to find all imaginable faults.
Impotent to legislate, it tries to prevent the majority from doing so; not content with expressing its views and registering a protest, it raises the same objections at every stage in the pa.s.sage of a bill; and sometimes strives to delay and even to destroy measures which it would itself enact if in power. Its immediate object is, in fact, to discredit the cabinet. Now this sounds mischievous, and would be so were Parliament the ultimate political authority. But the parties are really in the position of barristers arguing a case before a jury, that jury being the national electorate; and experience has shown, contrary to the prepossessions of non-professional legal reformers in all ages, that the best method of attaining justice is to have a strong advocate argue on each side before an impartial umpire. Unfortunately the jurymen in this case are not impartial, and the arguments are largely addressed to their interests, but that is a difficulty inseparable from democracy, or, indeed, from any form of government.
[Sidenote: Waste of Capacity.]
Another result of party government that is constantly decried is the waste of capacity it involves. Why, it is asked, should an excellent administrator leave his post, because some measure quite unconnected with his department--a measure, it may be, that he has himself opposed in the cabinet--is rejected by the House of Commons? Such a system interferes with that continuity of policy which is often essential to success both in foreign and internal affairs, and this is, no doubt, an evil; but owing to the presence of a highly trained body of permanent officials, who carry on the traditions and largely control the policy of the departments, it is not so important in England as one might suppose.
The system also debars one half of the talent in public life from the service of the state; but this misfortune is one that, for one reason or another, has existed to some extent in all countries at all times. The idea of a state where all the ablest men in the land join, without regard to political opinions, to devote the best of their talents to the public service, is enchanting, but it has never been permanently realised anywhere.
[Sidenote: Issues not Decided solely on their Merits.]
Another criticism levelled at party government in England arises from the impossibility of supporting the party in power on one issue and opposing it on another. A voter at the last election who objected strongly to any change in fiscal policy, and equally strongly to any concessions on the subject of Home Rule, found himself on the horns of a dilemma. He was compelled to make up his mind which issue he thought most important, and trust to Providence about the other. In a party government, where the cabinet must resign if any of its vital measures are rejected, those measures cannot be considered by individuals on their merits. The policy of one party or the other must be supported as a whole. This is certainly a limitation on personal freedom of action, and it acts as a restraint just to the extent that the government is conducted strictly on party lines. The party system certainly involves compromise of opinion; but then there is some compromise required for the enactment of every public measure, whether parties exist or not, for it never happens that the legislators who vote for any bill are all perfectly satisfied with every one of its clauses.
Government by party is not an ideal regimen. Like everything else it contains both good and evil. A political organisation, indeed, that avoided all strife and all waste would certainly be impossible, and would probably, by relaxing effort and sapping the springs of human nature, prove undesirable. As yet it is too early to strike a final balance between the merits and the defects of the party system in England, and it would be hopeless to attempt it here. Both good and evil will appear more fully as we proceed.
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