Pickett"s charge ranks among the famous in modern history, and was one of the most striking incidents of the war. The double column which marched across that fire-swept field numbered 5,000 of the flower of the Confederate army. Thirty-five hundred were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Of the three brigade commanders, one was killed, the second mortally wounded, and the third badly hurt. One only of the fourteen field officers returned, and out of the twenty-four regimental officers, only two were unhurt. The ferocity of the charge resulted in many deaths among the Unionists, and General Hanc.o.c.k was painfully wounded, but refused to leave the field until the struggle was over.
And all this valor had gone for naught. The Southerners had attempted an impossible thing, and the penalty was fearful. Unspeakably depressed, General Lee saw the return of the staggering, bleeding survivors, and, riding among them, he did all he could to cheer the mute sufferers by his sympathetic words. He insisted that the failure was wholly his own fault, and that not a word of censure should be visited upon anyone else.
The expectation of the Confederates was that the Federals would follow up this repulse with an immediate advance, and preparations were hurriedly made to repel it; but the ammunition was low on Cemetery Ridge, and the furious struggle had exhausted the defenders. Day was closing and the great battle of Gettysburg was ended.
THE FEARFUL LOSSES.
The Union losses were: killed, 3,070; wounded, 14,497; missing, 5,434; total, 23,001. The Confederate losses were: killed, 2,592; wounded, 12,706; captured and missing, 5,150; total, 20,448. To quote from Fox"s "Regimental Losses in the American Civil War:" "Gettysburg was the greatest battle of the war; Antietam the bloodiest; the largest army was a.s.sembled by the Confederates in the Seven Days" Fight; by the Unionists at the Wilderness."
THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR.
Gettysburg has been styled the Waterloo of the Southern Confederacy.
"Highest tide" was reached by its fortunes during those three first days in July, 1863. Lee put forth his supreme effort, and the result was defeat. He and his leading generals clearly saw that their cause had received its death-blow, and, as one of them expressed it, the fighting thenceforward was for terms. They were not yet conquered, and severe work remained to be done, but never again did the Lost Cause come so near success. Its sun, having reached meridian, must now go down until it should set forever in gloom, disaster, and ruin.
General Lee could not fail to perceive that all that remained to him was to leave the country before overtaken by irretrievable disaster. He withdrew Ewell"s Corps that night from Gettysburg and posted it on Seminary Ridge, where intrenchments were thrown up. The town was occupied by Meade, and the dismal morrow was spent by the Confederates in burying their dead and removing their wounded. At night the retreat was begun by the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads, which enter the c.u.mberland Valley through the South Mountain range. Great battles always produce violent storms, and one of these added to the unspeakable wretchedness of the homeward march. Finding Lee was retreating, Meade sent Sedgwick in pursuit. The rear guard was overtaken on the night of the 6th, but its position was too strong to be attacked and the Union army took a route parallel to that of the Confederate. There was considerable skirmishing, but nothing decisive occurred, and the retiring army reached Hagerstown, where it found the fords of the Potomac so swollen as to be impa.s.sable. Lee, therefore, intrenched, and stayed where he was until the 13th, by which time the river had fallen sufficiently to be forded, and he once more re-entered Virginia. Meade, fearful that the great prize was about to escape him, made strenuous efforts to intercept him, but failed, and returned to the Rappahannock, while Lee established himself in the neighborhood of Culpeper.
[Ill.u.s.tration: ENTRANCE TO GETTYSBURG CEMETERY.]
A period of inactivity now followed. Both Meade and Lee sent strong detachments from their armies to the southwest, where, as we have seen, they had the most active kind of service at Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, Knoxville, and other places. When Lee had considerably depleted his forces, Meade thought the prospect of success warranted his making a move against him. Accordingly, he sent his cavalry across the Rappahannock, whereupon Lee withdrew to a position behind the Rapidan, which was so strong that Meade dared not attack, and he, therefore, attempted a flank movement. Before, however, it could be carried out, he was called upon to send two more of his corps to the southwest, because of the defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga. These corps were the Eleventh and Twelfth under the command of Hooker.
This withdrawal compelled Meade to give up his purpose, and he remained on the defensive. By-and-by, when the troops were returned to him, he prepared once more to advance, but Lee antic.i.p.ated him by an effort to pa.s.s around his right flank and interpose between him and Washington.
Crossing the Rapidan on the 9th of October, he moved swiftly to Madison Court-House, without detection by Meade, who did not learn of it until the next day, when his outpost was attacked and driven back on the main army at Culpeper. This was proof that the Union right flank had been turned, and Meade immediately started his trains toward the Rappahannock, following a few hours later with his army. On the further side of Bull Run, he fortified himself so strongly that Lee saw it was useless to advance further, and, on the 18th of October, he returned to the line of the Rappahannock.
Meade started for Richmond on the 7th of November. The Confederates were found occupying earthworks on the north of the Rappahannock. An impetuous a.s.sault drove them out and across the river. Meade pushed on to Culpeper, and Lee hurriedly retreated across the Rapidan.
Meade"s judgment was that no further advance should be made, but the clamor of the North forced him to try another of the many attempts to capture Richmond. He crossed the river on the 26th and 27th of November, his aim being to divide the Confederate army by a rapid march on Orange Court-House. But it seemed as if the flood-gates of heaven were then opened. The rain fell in torrents day and night, and the country became a sea of mud and water. Bridges had to be laid to connect different portions of the army, and all offensive movements were for a while out of the question. The delay gave Lee time to form his troops into a compact ma.s.s, so that when the Unionists were ready to attack, it was so evident that another Fredericksburg ma.s.sacre would follow that the plan was abandoned.
In truth, Lee felt so strong that he was disposed to advance himself, but was dissuaded by the belief that some blunder of the Union commander would give him a better opportunity, but Meade was too wise to do so. On the 1st of December he returned to his old quarters on the Rapidan. The weather had become extremely cold, and both armies went into winter quarters.
The princ.i.p.al military movements of this year have now been described, but it remains to tell of the operations on the seacoast and of the leading military raids.
PRIVATEERING.
The Confederates displayed great activity and ingenuity in the construction of ironclads and in running the blockade. Their vessels continually dodged in and out of a few of the leading ports, the princ.i.p.al one being Wilmington, North Carolina. The profits in a single cargo of a blockade-runner were so enormous that the owners were enriched by several successful voyages, while a single one would reimburse them for the loss of their ship. Under such circ.u.mstances it was no wonder that they took desperate chances, and firms were organized who paid liberal salaries to the officers of vessels, who advertised among their friends the regular dates of their departure, and, the worst of it was, they were very regular in keeping them.
The _Alabama_ and other privateers were busy on the ocean, and the Confederates strained every nerve to send others to sea. The _Nashville_ was a fine steamer that was in the Ogeechee River, Georgia, waiting for a chance to slip out and join the commerce destroyers. She had a valuable cargo of cotton, and the Federal cruisers were alert to prevent her escape. They would have gone up the river after her, but there were too many torpedoes waiting for them, and the guns of Fort McAllister were too powerful.
Captain Worden, of the old _Monitor_, was now in command of the _Montauk_, and he was delighted on the night of February 27th to observe the _Nashville_ lying stuck fast in shallow water above Fort McAllister.
The opportunity was too tempting to be neglected, and the next morning, despite a hot attack from the fort, he fired into the _Nashville_ until she broke into flames and soon after blew up.
FAILURE OF THE ATTACKS ON CHARLESTON.
Naturally the desire was strong in the North to humble Charleston, where the baleful secession sentiment was born and brought all the woe upon the country. General Beauregard was in command of that department, and he made every preparation for the attack, which he knew would soon come.
In a proclamation he urged the removal of all non-combatants, and called upon the citizens to rally to the defense of the city.
A fleet of ironclads was always lying outside of Charleston, watching for an opportunity to give its attention to the forts or city. One tempestuous night in January a couple of rams dashed out of the harbor, and, in a ferociously vicious attack, scattered the ironclads, and compelled a gunboat to surrender. Thereupon the Confederates claimed that the blockade had been raised, but no one paid any attention to the claim.
An expedition was carefully organized for the capture of Charleston, and placed in command of Admiral Samuel F. Dupont. The fleet, numbering a hundred vessels, left the mouth of the North Edisto River on the 6th of April, and on the same day crossed the bar and entered the main channel on the coast of Morris Island.
A dense haze delayed operations until the following day, when a line of battle was formed by the ironclads, the wooden vessels remaining outside the bar. A raft was fastened to the front of the _Weehawken_, with which it was intended to explode the torpedoes. The c.u.mbrous contrivance greatly delayed the progress of the fleet, which advanced slowly until the _Weehawken_ had pa.s.sed the outer batteries and was close to the entrance to the inner harbor. Then Fort Moultrie fired a gun, instantly followed by that of Fort Sumter, and the batteries on Sullivan and on Morris Island. Then a hawser, which the Confederates had stretched across the channel with the purpose of clogging the screws of the propellers, was encountered, the _Weehawken_ was compelled to grope around for a better pa.s.sage, and everything went wrong. The _New Ironsides_ made an attempt to turn but became unmanageable, two other ironclads ran afoul of her, and matters were in a bad way when Admiral Dupont signaled for each one to do the best it could.
After a time, eight ironclads secured position in front of Fort Sumter, at distances varying from a third to half a mile. This placed them in direct range of 300 heavy guns which concentrated their appalling fire upon them, the shots following one another as rapidly as the ticking of a watch. The _Keokuk_, which ran close to Fort Sumter, was struck ninety times, in the course of half an hour, in the hull and turrets, and nineteen shots pierced her sides close to and below the water-line. Her commander with great difficulty extricated her from her perilous position, and she sank the next day.
The fight was another proof of the fact that, in all such engagements, the preponderating advantage is with the land batteries. The ships of the squadron were severely injured, but they inflicted no perceptible damage upon the forts. Admiral Dupont had gone into the battle against his judgment, and he now signaled for the ships to withdraw. All with the exception of the _New Ironsides_ returned to Port Royal on the 12th of April.
This failure caused great disappointment in the North and to the government. Admiral Dupont was ordered to hold his position inside of Charleston bar, and to prevent the enemy from erecting any new defenses on Morris Island. The admiral replied that he was ready to obey all orders, but, in his judgment, he was directed to take an unwise and dangerous step. Thereupon he was superseded by Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, and preparations were begun for a combined land and naval attack upon Charleston.
[Ill.u.s.tration: ATTACK ON CHARLESTON, AUGUST 23D TO SEPTEMBER 29, 1863
"After a time eight ironclads secured position in front of Fort Sumpter, at a distance varying from a third to half a mile. This placed them in direct range of 300 heavy guns, which concentrated their appalling fire upon them, the shots following one another as rapidly as the ticking of a watch."]
One of the best engineer officers in the service was General Quincy A.
Gillmore, who had captured Fort Pulaski at Savannah the previous year.
He was summoned to Washington, and helped the government to arrange the plan of attack upon Charleston. The most feasible course seemed to be for a military force to seize Morris Island and bombard Fort Sumter from that point, the fleet under Dahlgren giving help. There was hope that the monitors and ironclads would be able to force their way past the batteries and approach nigh enough to strike Charleston.
Accordingly, a sufficient detachment was gathered on Folly Island, which lies south of Morris Island, and batteries were erected among the woods.
On the 10th of July, General Strong with 2,000 men attacked a force of South Carolina infantry at the southern part of Morris Island, and drove them to Fort Wagner at the opposite end. The Confederates were reinforced, and, in the attack on Fort Wagner, the Federals were repulsed and obliged to retreat, with heavy loss.
On the night of the 18th, in the midst of a violent thunderstorm, a determined a.s.sault was made upon Fort Wagner, one of the newly formed negro regiments being in the lead. The fighting was of the most furious character, but the Federals suffered a decisive defeat, in which their losses were five times as great as those of the defenders.
General Gillmore carried parallels against the fort, and the ironclads a.s.sisted in the bombardments; but, though it continued for weeks, the city of Charleston seemed to be as far from surrender as ever. A part of the time the weather was so intolerably hot that operations were suspended.
Gillmore, however, was so near Charleston that he was able to reach it with his heaviest guns, and he prepared to do so. His princ.i.p.al piece was a Parrott, which threw a 100-pound ball, and was christened the "Swamp Angel."
The first shot was fired at midnight, August 22d. As the screeching sh.e.l.l curved over and dropped into the sleeping city, with its frightful explosion, it caused consternation. The people sprang from their beds and rushed into the streets, many fleeing to the country. Beauregard sent an indignant remonstrance, telling Gillmore that all civilized nations, before bombarding a city, gave warning that the non-combatants might be removed. Gillmore explained his reason for his course, and agreed to wait until the following night before renewing the bombardment.
At that hour it was resumed, with the promise of grave results, but at the thirty-sixth discharge the Swamp Angel exploded, and thus terminated its own career. General Gillmore continued to push his parallels against Fort Wagner. Although the ironclads could not pa.s.s the obstructions to the inner harbor so as to help, Gillmore persevered, and finally rendered Forts Wagner and Gregg untenable. The evacuation occurred on the night of September 6th. As soon as the Federals took possession, they had to make all haste to repair the ramparts to protect themselves against the fire from Fort Moultrie and James Island, whose guns were immediately turned upon them.
By this time, Fort Sumter was in ruins, its artillery could not be served, and its garrison comprised only a detachment of infantry. Upon being summoned to surrender by Dahlgren, the commander invited the admiral to come and take the fort. The effort to do so was made by a military force and the ironclads on the 9th of September, but failed. No more important attempts followed. The result had shown that the defenses of Charleston were practically impregnable, and, though sh.e.l.ls were occasionally sent into the forts and city, the latter was not captured until near the end of the war, and then it was brought about, as may be said, by the collapse of the Confederacy itself.
When the war began the Southerners were the superiors of the Northerners as regarded their cavalry. Horseback riding is more common in the South than in the North, but it did not take the Union volunteers long to acquire the art, and, as the war progressed, the cavalry arm was greatly increased and strengthened. One of the natural results of this was numerous raids by both sides, some of which a.s.sumed an importance that produced a marked effect on the military campaigns in progress, while in other cases, the daring excursions were simply an outlet to the adventurous spirit which is natural to Americans and which manifests itself upon every opportunity and occasion.
ONE OF GENERAL STUART"S RAIDS.
Mention has been made of the embarra.s.sment caused General Lee during his Gettysburg campaign by the absence of Stuart with his calvary on one of his raids. In the autumn, Stuart started out on a reconnaissance to Catlett"s Station, where he observed French"s column in the act of withdrawing from the river, whereupon he turned back toward Warrenton.
Taking the road leading from that town to Mana.s.sas, he found himself unexpectedly confronting the corps of General Warren. Thus he was caught directly between two fires and in imminent danger of defeat and capture, for his force was but a handful compared with either column of the Federals. Fortunately for the raider, he and his men were in a strip of woods, and had not been seen, but discovery seemed certain, for their enemies were on every hand, and the slightest inadvertence, even such as the neighing of a horse, was likely to betray them.
Stuart called his officers around him to discuss what they could do to extricate themselves from their dangerous situation. No one proposed to surrender, and it looked as if they would be obliged to abandon their nine pieces of horse artillery and wait until night, when they might cut their way out.
[Ill.u.s.tration: THE SWAMP ANGEL BATTERY BOMBARDING CHARLESTON.]
Stuart did not like the idea of losing his guns. At any rate, he would not consent, until another plan which had occurred to him was tried.
Several of his men were dismounted, and each was furnished with a musket and infantry knapsack. The uniform was not likely to attract notice in the darkness, in case they met any Federals. These messengers were ordered to pick their way through the Union lines to Warrenton, where they would find General Lee, who was to be told of the danger in which Stuart was placed. The Confederate commander could be counted upon to send prompt help. Fortunately for Stuart, two of his men succeeded in getting through the Union lines and reaching Lee.