On the same date Admiral Sampson"s squadron arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, whither it had gone in the expectation of meeting with Admiral Cervera"s fleet, which had sailed westward from the Cape Verde Islands on April 29th, after Portugal"s declaration of neutrality. The Spanish fleet, however, did not materialize, and Admiral Sampson, while on the ground, concluded it would be well to draw the fire of the forts that he might at least judge of their strength and efficiency, if indeed he should not render them incapable of a.s.sisting the Spanish fleet in the event of its resorting to this port at a later period. Accordingly, Sampson bombarded the batteries defending San Juan, inflicting much damage and sustaining a loss of two men killed and six wounded. The loss of the enemy is not known. The American war-ships sustained only trivial injuries, but after the engagement it could be plainly seen that one end of Morro Castle was in ruins. The Cabras Island fort was silenced and the San Carlos battery was damaged. No shots were aimed at the city by the American fleet.
Deeming it unnecessary to wait for the Spanish war-ships in the vicinity of San Juan, Sampson withdrew his squadron and sailed westward in the hope of finding Cervera"s fleet, which was dodging about the Caribbean Sea. First it was heard of at the French island, Martinique, whence after a short stay it sailed westward. Two days later it halted at the Dutch island, Curacoa, for coal and supplies. After leaving this point it was again lost sight of. Then began the chase of Commodore Schley and Admiral Sampson to catch the fugitive. Schley, with his flying squadron, sailed from Key West around the western end of Cuba, and Sampson kept guard over the Windward and other pa.s.sages to the east of the island. It was expected that one or the other of these fleets would encounter the Spaniard on the open sea, but in this they were mistaken. Cervera was not making his way to the Mexican sh.o.r.e on the west, as some said, nor was he seeking to slip through one of the pa.s.sages into the Atlantic and sail home to Spain, nor attack Commodore Watson"s blockading vessels before Havana, according to other expert opinions expressed and widely published. For many days the hunt of the war-ships went on like a fox-chase. On May 21st Commodore Schley blockaded Cienfuegos, supposing that Cervera was inside the harbor, but on the 24th he discovered his mistake and sailed to Santiago, where he lay before the entrance to the harbor for three days, not knowing whether or not the Spaniard was inside. On May 30th it was positively discovered that he had Cervera bottled up in the narrow harbor of Santiago. He had been there since the 19th, and had landed 800 men, 20,000 Mauser rifles, a great supply of ammunition, and four great guns for the defense of the city.
OPERATIONS AGAINST SANTIAGO.
On May 31st Commodore Schley opened fire on the fortifications at the mouth of the harbor, which lasted for about half an hour. This was for the purpose of discovering the location and strength of the batteries, some of which were concealed, and in this he was completely successful.
Two of the batteries were silenced, and the flagship of the Spaniards, which took part in the engagement, was damaged. The Americans received no injury to vessels and no loss of men. On June 1st Admiral Sampson arrived before Santiago, and relieved Commodore Schley of the chief command of the forces, then consisting of sixteen war-ships.
[Ill.u.s.tration: RICHMOND PEARSON HOBSON.]
Admiral Sampson, naturally a cautious commander, suffered great apprehension lest Cervera might slip out of the harbor and escape during the darkness of the night or the progress of a storm, which would compel the blockading fleet to stand far off sh.o.r.e. There was a point in the channel wide enough for only one warship to pa.s.s at a time, and if this could be rendered impa.s.sable Cervera"s doom would be sealed. How to reach and close this pa.s.sage was the difficult problem to be solved. On either sh.o.r.e of the narrow channel stood frowning forts with cannon, and there were other fortifications to be pa.s.sed before it could be reached.
Young Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson, a naval engineer, had attached himself to Admiral Sampson"s flagship, _New York_, just before it sailed from Key West, and it was this young man of less than thirty years who solved the problem by a plan originated by Admiral Sampson, which he executed with a heroic daring that finds perhaps no parallel in all naval history. At three o"clock A.M., June 3d, in company with seven volunteers from the _New York_ and other ships, he took the United States collier _Merrimac_, a large vessel with 600 tons of coal on board, and started with the purpose of sinking it in the channel. The chances were ten to one that the batteries from the forts would sink the vessel before it could reach the narrow neck, and the chances were hardly one in one hundred that any of the men on board the collier would come out of this daring attempt alive. The ship had hardly started when the forts opened fire, and amid the thunder of artillery and a rain of steel and bursting sh.e.l.ls the boat with its eight brave heroes held on its way, as steadily as if they knew not their danger. The channel was reached, and the boat turned across the channel. The sea-doors were opened and torpedoes exploded by the intrepid crew, sinking the vessel almost instantly, but not in the position desired. As the ship went down the men, with side-arms buckled on, took to a small boat, and, escape being impossible, they surrendered to the enemy. It seems scarcely less than a miracle that any of the eight men escaped, yet the fact remained that not one of them was seriously injured. The Spaniards were so impressed with this act of bravery and heroism that they treated the prisoners with the utmost courtesy, confined them in Morro Castle, and Admiral Cervera promptly sent a special officer, under a flag of truce, to inform Admiral Sampson of their safety. The prisoners were kept confined in Morro Castle for some days, when they were removed to a place of greater safety, where they were held until exchanged on July 7th.
THE SECOND BOMBARDMENT OF SANTIAGO AND THE COMING OF THE ARMY.
On the 6th of June the American fleet under Admiral Sampson bombarded the forts of Santiago for about three hours. The gunners were all instructed, however, to spare Morro Castle lest they should inflict injury upon Hobson and his heroic companions, who were then confined within its walls. Nearly all of the fortifications at the entrance of the harbor were silenced. An examination after the fleet had withdrawn revealed the fact that no lives were lost on the American side, and none of the vessels were seriously injured. The Spanish ship _Reina Mercedes_ was sunk in the harbor, she being the only ship from the enemy"s fleet which ventured within the range of the American"s guns.
The danger of entering the narrow harbor in the face of Cervera"s fleet rendered it necessary to take the city by land, and the government began preparations to send General Shafter with a large force from Tampa to aid the fleet in reducing the city. Some 15,000 men, including the now famous Rough Riders of New York, were hurried upon transports, and under the greatest convoy of gunboats, cruisers, and battleships which ever escorted an army started for the western end of the island of Cuba.
But the honor of making the first landing on Cuban soil belongs to the marines. It was on June the 10th, a few days before the army of General Shafter sailed from Tampa, that a landing was effected by Colonel Huntington"s six hundred marines at Caimanera, Guantanamo Bay, some distance east of Santiago. The object of this landing was twofold: first, to secure a place where our war-ships could safely take on coal from colliers, and, second, to unite if possible with the insurgents in hara.s.sing the Spaniards until General Shafter"s army could arrive.
Furthermore, Guantanamo Bay furnished the American ships a safe harbor in case of storm.
In the whole history of the war few more thrilling pa.s.sages are to be found than the record of this brave band"s achievements. The place of landing was a low, round, bush-covered hill on the eastern side of the bay. On the crest of the hill was a small clearing occupied by an advance post of the Spanish army. When the marines landed and began to climb the hill, the enemy, with little resistance, retreated to the woods, and the marines were soon occupying the cleared s.p.a.ce abandoned by them. They had scarcely begun to compliment themselves on their easy victory when they discovered that the retreat had only been a snare to lure them into the open s.p.a.ce, while unfortunately all around the clearing the woods grew thick, and their unprotected position was also overlooked by a range of higher hills covered with a dense undergrowth.
Thus the Spanish were able under cover of the bushes to creep close up to our forces, and they soon began to fire upon them from the higher ground of the wooded range. The marines replied vigorously to the fire of their hidden foe, and thus continued their hit-and-miss engagement for a period of four days and nights, with only occasional intermissions. Perhaps the poor marksmanship of the Spaniards is to be thanked for the fact that they were not utterly annihilated. On the fourth day the Spanish gave up the contest and abandoned the field.
[Ill.u.s.tration: MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE.]
Major Henry C. Cochrane, second in command, states that he slept only an hour and a half in the four days, and that many of his men became so exhausted that they fell asleep standing on their feet with their rifles in their hands. It is remarkable that during the four days the Americans lost only six killed and about twenty wounded. The Spaniards suffered a loss several times as great, fifteen of them having been found by the Americans dead on the field. It is not known how many they carried away or how many were wounded.
THE LANDING OF SHAFTER"S ARMY.
On June 13th troops began to leave Tampa and Key West for operations against Santiago, and on June 20th the transports bearing them arrived off that city. Two days later General Shafter landed his army of 16,000 soldiers at Daiquiri, a short distance east of the entrance to the harbor, with the loss of only two men, and they by accident. Before the coming of the troops the Spanish had evacuated the village of Daiquiri, which is a little inland from the anchorage bearing the same name, and set fire to the town, blowing up two magazines and destroying the railroad roundhouse containing several locomotives. As the transports neared the landing-place Sampson"s ships opened fire upon Juragua, engaging all the forts for about six miles to the west. This was done to distract the attention of the Spanish from the landing soldiers, and was entirely successful. After the forts were silenced the _New Orleans_ and several gunboats sh.e.l.led the woods in advance of the landing troops. The soldiers went ash.o.r.e in full fighting trim, each man carrying thirty-six rations, two hundred rounds of ammunition for his rifle, and a shelter-tent.
While the troops were landing at Daiquiri, the battleship _Texas_, hitherto considered as an unfortunate ship by the attaches of the navy, completely changed her reputation and distinguished herself by a.s.sailing and silencing, unaided, the Spanish battery La Socapa at Santiago, which had hitherto withstood the attacks against it, though all the ships of Commodore Schley"s command had twice fiercely bombarded it without result. Captain Philip and his men were complimented in warm terms of praise by Admiral Sampson. The _Texas_ was struck but once, and that by the last shot from the Spanish fort, killing one man and wounding eight others, seriously damaging the ship.
[Ill.u.s.tration: REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM T. SAMPSON.]
THE VICTORY OF THE ROUGH RIDERS.
[Ill.u.s.tration: AMERICANS STORMING SAN JUAN HILL
The most dramatic scene and the most destructive battle of the Spanish War.]
On June 24th the force under General Shafter reached Juragua, and the battle by land was now really to begin. It was about ten miles out from Santiago, at a point known as La Guasima. The country was covered with high gra.s.s and chaparral, and in this and on the wooded hills a strong force of Spaniards was hidden. Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt"s Rough Riders, technically known as the First Volunteer Cavalry, under command of Colonel Wood, were in the fight, and it is to their bravery and dash that the glory of the day chiefly belongs. Troops under command of General Young had been sent out in advance, with the Rough Riders on his flank. There were about 1,200 of the cavalry in all, including the Rough Riders and the First and Tenth Regulars. They encountered a body of two thousand Spaniards in a thicket, whom they fought dismounted. The volunteers were especially eager for the fight, and, perhaps due somewhat to their own imprudence, were led into an ambuscade, as perfect as was ever planned by an Indian. The main body of the Spaniards was posted on a hill approached by two heavily wooded slopes and fortified by two blockhouses, flanked by intrenchments of stones and fallen trees.
At the bottom of these hills run two roads, along one of which the Rough Riders marched, and along the other eight troops of the Eighth and Tenth Cavalry, under General Young. These roads are little more than gullies, very narrow, and at places almost impa.s.sable. Nearly half a mile separated Roosevelt"s men from the Regulars, and it was in these trails that the battle began.
[Ill.u.s.tration: THEODORE ROOSEVELT.]
For an hour they held their position in the midst of an unseen force, which poured a perfect hail of bullets upon them from in front and on both sides. At length, seeing that their only way of escape was by dashing boldly at the hidden foe, Colonel Wood took command on the right of his column of Rough Riders, placing Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt at the left, and thus, with a rousing yell, they led their soldiers in a rushing charge before which the Spaniards fled from the hills and the victorious a.s.sailants took the blockhouses. The Americans had sixteen killed and fifty-two wounded, forty-two of the casualties occurring to the Rough Riders and twenty-six among the Regulars. It is estimated that the Spanish killed were nearly or quite one hundred. Thirty-seven were found by the Americans dead on the ground. They had carried off their wounded, and doubtless thought they had taken most of the killed away also.
PREPARING FOR THE a.s.sAULT UPON SANTIAGO.
The victory of the Rough Riders and the Regulars at La Guasima, though so dearly bought, stimulated the soldiers of the whole army with the spirit of war and the desire for an opportunity to join in the conquest.
They had not long to wait. The advance upon Santiago was vigorously prosecuted on the land side, while the ships stood guard over the entrapped Spanish Admiral Cervera in the harbor, and, anon, sh.e.l.led every fort that manifested signs of activity. On June 25th, Sevilla, within sight of Santiago, was taken by General Chaffee, and an advance upon the city was planned to be made in three columns by way of Altares, Firmeza, and Juragua. General Garcia with 5,000 Cuban insurgents had placed himself some time before at the command of the American leader.
On the 28th of June another large expedition of troops was landed, so that the entire force under General Shafter, including the Cuban allies, numbered over 22,000 fighting men.
The enemy fell back at all points until the right of the American column was within three miles of Santiago, and by the end of June the two armies had well-defined positions. The Spanish intrenchments extended around the city, being kept at a distance of about three and one-half miles from the corporation limits. The trenches were occupied by about 12,000 Spanish soldiers, and there were some good fortifications along the line.
It was the policy of General Shafter to distribute his forces so as to face this entire line as nearly as possible. A week was consumed, after the landing was completed, in making these arrangements and in sending forward the artillery, during which time the battle of La Guasima, referred to, with some minor affairs, had occurred. Meantime the ships of Admiral Sampson had dragged up the cables and connected them by tap-wires with Shafter"s headquarters, thus establishing communication directly with Washington from the scene of battle.
THE BATTLES OF SAN JUAN AND EL CANEY.
The attack began July 1st, involving the whole line, but the main struggle occurred opposite the left centre of the column on the heights of San Juan, and the next greatest engagement was on the right of the American line at the little town of El Caney. These two points are several miles apart, the city of Santiago occupying very nearly the apex of a triangle of which a line connecting these two positions would form the base. John R. Church thus described the battles of July 1st and 2d:
"El Caney was taken by General Lawton"s men after a sharp contest and severe loss on both sides. Here as everywhere there were blockhouses and trenches to be carried in the face of a hot fire from Mauser rifles, and the rifles were well served. The jungle must disturb the aim seriously, for our men did not suffer severely while under its cover, but in crossing clearings the rapid fire of the repeating rifles told with deadly effect. The object of the attack on El Caney was to crush the Spanish lines at a point near the city and allow us to gain a high hill from which the place could be bombarded if necessary. In all of this we were entirely successful. The engagement began at 6.40 A.M., and by 4 o"clock the Spaniards were forced to abandon the place and retreat toward their lines nearer the city. The fight was opened by Cap.r.o.n"s battery, at a range of 2,400 yards, and the troops engaged were Chaffee"s brigade, the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Infantry, who moved on Caney from the east; Colonel Miles" brigade of the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry, operating from the south; while Ludlow"s brigade, containing the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and Second Ma.s.sachusetts, made a detour to attack from the southwest. The Spanish force is thought to have been 1,500 to 2,000 strong. It certainly fought our men for nine hours, but of course had the advantage of a fort and strong intrenchments.
"The operations of our centre were calculated to cut the communications of Santiago with El Morro and permit our forces to advance to the bay, and the princ.i.p.al effort of General Linares, the Spanish commander in the field, seems to have been to defeat this movement. He had fortified San Juan strongly, throwing up on it intrenchments that in the hands of a more determined force would have been impregnable.
"The battle of San Juan was opened by Grimes" battery, to which the enemy replied with shrapnell. The cavalry, dismounted, supported by Hawkins" brigade, advanced up the valley from the hill of El Pozo, forded several streams, where they lost heavily, and deployed at the foot of the series of hills known as San Juan under a sharp fire from all sides, which was exceedingly annoying because the enemy could not be discerned, owing to the long range and smokeless powder. They were under fire for two hours before the charge could be made and a position reached under the brow of the hill. It was not until nearly 4 o"clock that the neighboring hills were occupied by our troops and the final successful effort to crown the ridge could be made. The obstacles interposed by the Spaniards made these charges anything but the "rushes" which war histories mention so often. They were slow and painful advances through difficult obstacles and a withering fire.
The last "charge" continued an hour, but at 4.45 the firing ceased, with San Juan in our possession.
"The Spaniards made liberal use of barbed-wire fencing, which proved to be so effective as a stop to our advance that it is likely to take its place among approved defensive materials in future wars. It was used in two ways: Wires were stretched near the ground to trip up our men when on the run. Beyond them were fences in parallel lines, some being too high to be vaulted over.
"The object of our attack was a blockhouse on the top of the hill of San Juan, guarded by trenches and the defenses spoken of, a mile and a half long. Our troops advanced steadily against a hot fire maintained by the enemy, who used their rifles with accuracy, but did not cling to their works stubbornly when we reached them. San Juan was carried in the afternoon. The attack on Aguadores was also successful, though it was not intended to be more than a feint to draw off men who might otherwise have increased our difficulties at San Juan. By nightfall General Shafter was able to telegraph that he had carried all the outworks and was within three-quarters of a mile of the city.
"Though the enemy"s lines were broken in the princ.i.p.al places, they yielded no more than was forced from them, and the battle was resumed on the 2d. The last day saw our left flank resting on the bay and our lines drawn around the city within easy gun-fire. Fears were entertained that the enemy would evacuate the place, and the right flank was pushed around to the north and eventually to the northwest of the city."
In the fight at San Juan General Linares, commanding the Spanish forces in Santiago, was severely wounded, and transferred the command to General Jose Toral, second in authority.
THE DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA"S FLEET.
During the previous two days" fight by land the fleet of Admiral Cervera in Santiago harbor had taken an active part in sh.e.l.ling our positions, with no inconsiderable effect; and General Shafter, largely on this account, had about despaired of taking the city, with the force at his command. In fact, he went so far on the morning of July 3d as to telegraph Washington that his losses had been greatly underestimated, that he met with stronger resistance than he had antic.i.p.ated, and was seriously considering falling back to a position five miles to the rear to await reinforcements. He was also anxious for an interview with Admiral Sampson. The fleet had been sh.e.l.ling the enemy during the two days" fight, but it was necessary that the navy and army should have an understanding; and at 8.30 o"clock on Sunday morning Admiral Sampson with his flagship _New York_ steamed eastward for the purpose of conferring with the general.
[Ill.u.s.tration: THE OREGON.
One of the most renowned ships of the American Navy is the mighty Battleship Oregon. Her famous run from San Francisco around Cape Horn to take part in the Battle of Santiago has never been equalled by any battleship in the world"s history. After she won fame in the destruction of Cervera"s fleet she was ordered to Manila by Admiral Dewey "for political reasons" and remained there throughout the Philippine War hurling her 13-inch sh.e.l.ls into the Insurgent ranks when occasion required.]
General Miles telegraphed General Shafter, in response to his request to hold his position, that he would be with him in a week with strong reinforcements; and he promptly started two expeditions, aggregating over 6,000 men, which reached Santiago on the 8th and 10th respectively, in time to witness the closing engagements and surrender of the city. But fortune again favored our cause and completely changed the situation, unexpectedly to the American commanders of the land and naval forces.
It was on Sunday morning, July 3d, just before Sampson landed to meet Shafter, that Admiral Cervera, in obedience to commands from his home government, endeavored to run his fleet past the blockading squadron of the Americans, with the result that all of his ships were destroyed, nearly 500 of his men killed and wounded, and himself and about 1,300 others were made prisoners. This naval engagement was one of the most dramatic and terrible in all the history of conflict upon the seas, and, as it was really the beginning of the end of what promised to be a long and terrible struggle, it was undoubtedly the most important battle of the war.