Bernabe de Varona, a brilliant writer and devoted patriot, was born at Camaguey in 1845, a member of a distinguished family. He entered the Ten Years War with much zeal and displayed exceptional military skill. He went on various patriotic missions to New York, to France and to Mexico, and was instrumental in securing much aid for the patriot cause. His last expedition was on the ill-fated _Virginius_, on which he was captured and shot to death at Santiago de Cuba on November 4, 1873.
On August 7, the powers of the various officers of the Government, including the Secretaries of State, were described and fixed.
From the foregoing it will be seen that the officers of the new Republic had high aspirations for an orderly government, and for the just administration of wise laws for the benefit of the people.
Unfortunately, in a large measure, the Republic of Cuba established at that time was a government only in name, and was not destined to take the reins in administering the affairs of the Island, except in a more or less theoretical way.
CHAPTER XI
A revolution usually involves fighting as well as the organization of a government. In the case of Cuba, this was especially inevitable. It was realized by the patriots in advance that the redemption of Cuba from the tyranny of Spain could only be accomplished by force of arms, and consequently plans to that effect had been carefully perfected in advance. It was highly creditable to the Cubans that they so promptly organized a dignified and worthy government, and adopted a const.i.tution favorably comparable with that of any other republic in the world. It was no less creditable to their judgment and their earnestness that they had already prepared for extensive military operations, and that they at once entered upon these in a vigorous and systematic manner. Plans for the uprising had indeed been matured before the breaking out of the revolution in Spain, but the latter event undoubtedly hastened the execution of their designs.
At the outset, before complete organization was effected, the insurgents at Bayamo were under the leadership of Francisco V. Aguilera, Manuel A.
Aguilera and Francisco M. Osorio; at Manzanillo the leader was Carlos Manuel Cespedes; at Holguin, Belisario Alvarez was in command; at Las Tunas, Vincente Garcia; at Jiguani, Donato Marmol; and at Santiago, Manuel Fernandez.
When Cespedes issued his proclamation on October 10, the insurgents had only 147 men in their ranks, armed with forty-five fowling pieces, four rifles, and a few pistols and machetes--not enough arms to provide one weapon apiece. But volunteers began to flock to their standards and in two days the army had increased to over twenty-six times its original strength, and numbered upwards of four thousand men, while at the end of the month it had more than doubled, and had grown to nine thousand seven hundred. By November 8, the revolutionary army contained twelve thousand men, and at the end of 1868, it had grown to twenty-six thousand.
But even this growth did not give them anything like the strength of the Spanish Army in Cuba. In October, 1868, Spain had in Cuba twelve regiments of infantry, one corps of engineers, one regiment of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, one section of civil guards, one regiment of armed firemen, one regiment of prison guards, and five regiments of infantry and cavalry militia, amounting to the following:
Regular troops of all kinds, including officers 14,300 Civil guards 640 Prison guards 120 Armed firemen 1,000 Infantry and cavalry militia 3,400 Soldiers who had served their time but had been kept in service 300 ------ 19,760
These troops were distributed to the proportion of three-fifths of them in the Western Department, and the remainder divided between the Central and Eastern Departments. They were amply armed and munitioned, although it must be admitted that not all of their armament was of the newest pattern. It was, however, in excellent condition and they had six thousand of the latest model Remington rifles.
At the end of the year, the Spanish troops had been augmented by large reinforcements from the mother country, so that Spain had in the field a thoroughly organized and abundantly equipped army of about 110,000 men, which, of course, was capable of being greatly increased. She also had in Cuban waters the following men of war, at the beginning of October, 1868:
2 Steam frigates 91 guns 2 2d cla.s.s steamers 12 guns 5 3d cla.s.s steamers 10 guns 5 screw steamers, schooner rigged 15 guns -------- 128 guns
Of course, she at once added to this navy, and it soon grew to formidable proportions, while the revolutionists had no navy at all, with which to repel Spanish attacks from the sea.
Despite the great preponderance of forces in its favor, the Spanish government did not at first depend upon military prowess for the suppression of the insurrection and the retention of Cuba as its colony.
This was perhaps, in a measure, because of the revolution in Spain, which was keeping the Government well occupied with its internal affairs, and also because of the desire of some of the liberal leaders in Spain to avoid endless strife and bloodshed. Therefore at first, pacific measures were contemplated. It had been thought that General Dulce, as Captain-General of the Island for his third term, would be able to effect a compromise with the Cubans, because of his kindly disposition, and the good feeling which prevailed between him and the Cubans. His good offices were greatly hampered and off-set by the arrogance of the Volunteers, who did not hold him in high regard, since they thought him much too gentle with the Cubans, and who were not in sympathy with his mediations. Perhaps the flame of revolution had now grown too hot to be quenched by soothing measures. At any rate, the hope of the Spanish Government proved delusive. On the one hand, the patriot leaders were outspoken in their unwillingness to accept Dulce"s proposals of an amicable settlement, based on compromise; and on the other, the Volunteers frankly opposed making any concessions to the Islanders, and directed all their influence against every measure which Dulce offered as a solution. In this they had the ulterior motive of driving Dulce from office, so that there might be placed in his position a more arbitrary and ruthless man, one of their own kidney.
In reviewing the state of affairs in Cuba at this early stage of the Ten Years" War, and comparing the strength and composition of the contending forces, it should be borne in mind that the Cuban army in the field was a mere fragment of the potential strength of the Cuban people. There were probably 150,000 Cubans, able bodied and of military age, who were both willing and eager to enter the war, but who were restrained from so doing for fear of what would befall their families if they identified themselves openly with the patriot cause. If they left their homes to take the field, their wives and children would be at the mercy of Spanish troops or of the still more to be dreaded and pitiless Volunteers. If we add to this the not unnatural doubt of the possibility of succeeding in the revolt against the formidable power of Peninsular Spain--a doubt fostered and confirmed by the failure of the former attempts--we cannot blame the Cubans for not more generally partic.i.p.ating in active operations. Their absentation from so doing is to be charged not, certainly, to cowardice or to lack of patriotism, but to an excess of prudence.
In these circ.u.mstances, the numerical odds were at the beginning, and remained all through the war, tremendously against the Cubans. Besides this their army in a large measure, particularly at the beginning, consisted of men who had had no experience in warlike manoeuvres, and who lacked military drilling, for while preparations for uprisings had been as constant as had been the uprisings themselves, naturally the revolutionists, when their revolt was in an incipient stage, did not wish to call attention to what they were planning by putting their sympathizers through military tactics. The Cuban Army also lacked a tremendous stabilizer of morale, in not being properly uniformed, but rather presenting a motley appearance on the field. In fact there were many times when they were so hard put that they were not only inadequately clothed, but suffered for lack of food. The fact that they were able so frequently to defeat the highly trained and well equipped Spanish forces, and to hold their ground as successfully, as they did year after year, is the highest possible tribute to their valor, their intelligence in military matters, and their patriotic devotion.
The earliest engagements between the opposing forces occurred on October 13, 1868, at three places, not widely separated; Yara, Bairi and Jiguani; in all of which the Cuban patriots were successful. The last of the three named was considered by the patriots to be an extremely important victory, and was accomplished by troops under the command of General Donato Marmol. Heartened by this good fortune, the patriots on October 15 laid siege to Bayamo, and three days later effected its capture; whereupon that place was made the temporary seat of the Cuban Government. These victories were all the more creditable and encouraging because, we must remember, while the Spanish Army numbered many thousands--scattered it is true in various parts of the Island--the Cuban Army was only one-fourth as large and poorly armed and equipped.
At all times during the first engagements, the patriots were outnumbered, but they made up in courage what they lacked in numbers, and their enthusiasm and zeal for the cause for which they were fighting carried them safely against tremendous odds.
Late in October--on the 26th to be exact--the patriots attacked the Spanish troops at Las Tunas, and also at Villa del Cobre at the foot of Monte Alta Garcia, between Puerto Principe and Nuevitas, and at Moran.
In all these engagements the Cubans were greatly hampered by the serious lack of arms and munitions, but if they were not entirely successful they were far from routed, they lost little ground, and maintained very complete control over those portions of the Central and Eastern Departments which were in sympathy with them.
By the early part of November, 1868, the Cubans had thoroughly beaten the troops under the command of the Spanish Colonel Demetrio Quiros, and forced him to retreat, and were thus enabled to advance into the very suburbs of Santiago de Cuba, the ancient capital of the Island, and at this time the capital of the Eastern Department. They promptly cut the aqueduct which supplied that city with water, and thereby caused not only great discomfort but something resembling panic among the inhabitants. The patriots were naturally reluctant to resort to such measures, because of the suffering which it caused to their own friends and sympathizers; yet if the Spanish garrison in Santiago was to be brought to terms, any strategic advantage which the Cubans could acquire must be used to the utmost.
The third week in November found them in possession of the towns of El Caney and El Cobre; the latter famous as the site of the first copper mines opened in Cuba, and the former as the scene of one of the sharpest engagements of the United States war with Spain in 1898. The patriots kept control of these two places for several weeks, and then deeming it inexpedient to undertake any further operations against Santiago, which was not only garrisoned by the Spanish Army but also protected by the Spanish fleet, they withdrew their forces to the defense of Bayamo, which was now being seriously threatened by the troops of Count Valmaseda, reenforced by those under Colonel Lono, who had come thither from Manati, under Colonel Campillo from Manzanillo, Colonel Mana from Puerto Principe, and Colonel Quiro, who had hastened to Bayamo from Santiago. With all these Spanish troops, well armed and abundantly supplied with ammunition concentering upon the place, President Cespedes realized that it would be impolitic to attempt to resist a siege. After consultation with his a.s.sociates, the result of which was a unanimous decision, he set fire to the city and withdrew his troops. In consequence, when Valmaseda arrived a little later, he found nothing left of Bayamo but ruins.
This loss of their temporary capital did not perceptibly weaken the Cuban position; indeed the patriot cause steadily grew in strength and numbers. The entire jurisdiction of Holguin revolted against Spanish authority, on October 28, and the inhabitants, in large numbers, rushed to take up arms with the patriots. A week later Camaguey followed the example of Holguin. The Spanish government both at home and in Cuba was in the position of a man sitting on a couch under which had been stored a quant.i.ty of bombs, all timed to go off at irregular intervals, and from which position there was no escape. They did not know which way to jump. The high officials in both countries lived in an uncertainty as to events in Cuba which must have been nerve racking. Indeed--to mix our metaphors--they never knew where the fever of revolutions was scheduled to break out next. If they succeeded in getting it under control in one place, and began to feel a bit secure against an epidemic, the next morning they found what to them seemed a new eruption, and one which they had not been able to antic.i.p.ate. They conquered, or apparently subdued, the patriots in one portion of the Island, and immediately those in another burst forth into active opposition to what the Spanish government would have termed law and order, but which the insurgents called by the less pleasant terms of cruelty and unjust oppressions. And occasionally, as we have seen, there glimmered in some Spanish intelligence a faint doubt as to the efficacy of their usual methods, and then for a very short time the authorities would try temporizing.
But the patriots had not suffered for generations from Spanish misrule without having learned to mistrust the wiles of their oppressors, and they viewed with more or less cynicism any surface indications of a less tyrannous rule.
With the revolts of Camaguey and Holguin, the Spanish authorities came to the conclusion that it was about time to try temporizing, and to endeavor in some way to pacify the patriots. It may be that they would have actually made concessions--we have it from one authority that they were willing at this time to grant almost anything but the one thing which was the single desire of the patriots. At any rate, on January 19, 1869, they made a formal proposal for a meeting between representatives of the belligerents for the discussion of the issues between them, and for a serious attempt to effect a compromise. President Cespedes felt that the time for compromise had pa.s.sed, long years before. The die had been cast. The revolution had one aim, complete freedom, and that was above all things the one concession which the Spaniards would not make.
But he was too clever not to realize that after all something might be gained by compliance, if no more than a chance to feel out the mettle and present designs of the Spaniards. It was possible that if he sent a clever enough envoy he might learn much that would be to his advantage in future negotiations. He was under no obligation to consent to or even to consider seriously any terms which the Spaniards might offer, so that he had nothing to lose by such a proceeding, and it was barely possible that he might gain valuable information.
So he a.s.sented to the proposal, and sent his representative, Augustin Arango, to Puerto Principe, under safe conduct issued by the Spanish Government at Manzanillo. It is probable that the safe conduct would have been respected by the Spanish authorities and Spanish troops. But unfortunately, not only for the innocent envoy, and for the patriots, but also for any hope that the Spaniards may have entertained--if indeed their offer had been made in good faith, and there is always a measure of doubt, in the face of their usual trickery--of an amicable understanding, Arango fell into the hands of the Volunteers, who, in quite characteristic manner, contemptuously disregarded the credentials of their own government, and cruelly and brutally murdered General Cespedes"s messenger, immediately upon his entrance into Puerto Principe.
It is not difficult to picture the rage and disgust of the patriots at this new example of Spanish perfidy, which so clearly demonstrated the futility of attempting any negotiations of any kind whatever with an enemy capable of such lack of honor. The death of Arango, therefore, put an end to the farce of Spanish pretended repentance. And this circ.u.mstance did not pa.s.s without the news being spread all over the island. Patriots who had been timidly balancing themselves in outward neutrality, were so aroused with indignation that they began boldly to plunge into the maelstrom of civil war. On February 9, 1869, the entire district of Las Tunas revolted and cast its lot with the insurgents.
Each new act of injustice emanating from the Spaniards was like removing the supports of a dam behind which had been restrained the waters of patriotism. The Spaniards had killed one Cuban patriot in cold blood; the cause of revolutions had gained thousands, each fired with enthusiasm.
Thus far General Quesada had been waging an almost exclusively irregular or guerrilla warfare. This was because of the smallness of his army, the lack of arms and equipment, and the unfamiliarity of his men with military tactics. Indeed, such methods of warfare were in a large measure continued throughout the entire Ten Years" War. But by the time of which we now write he was able on some occasions and at some places to array his troops in orderly fashion and to conduct his campaign in much the same manner as the Spaniards themselves. Thus, he was able to carry on regular siege operations against Colonel Mena, and his garrison of three thousand Spaniards, at Puerto Principe. Colonel Prieto with several thousand Cubans busied himself with cutting the railroad lines which the Spanish authorities had constructed for strategic purposes, and destroying communications between Villa Clara and Cienfuegos. A strong Spanish force was sent against him, and a serious engagement occurred at San Cristobal, where the patriots were entirely successful.
The Spanish troops retreated to Guanajay, a short distance from Havana, closely pursued by the patriots, and when forced to give battle, the Spaniards were once more put to rout, with heavy losses.
Havana was now practically in a state of siege, with a patriot army in possession of Guanajay, and small bands constantly hara.s.sing the Spanish troops at different points in the vicinity of the city. The Spanish Captain-General, Dulce, was still nursing the idea that some sort of an agreement might be reached, and at least a truce declared, and he therefore refused to officially declare the besieged condition of the city, and endeavored to placate the patriots by leniency toward the sympathizers in the city, and a conciliatory att.i.tude toward the revolutionists. However, his efforts had little effect on the Cubans.
Their forces pressed forward against Santiago de Cuba, and disaster for the Spanish garrison at that city was only averted by the timely arrival of Count Valmaseda with reinforcements. Las Tunas was still in the hands of the revolutionists, who were divided into small parties and were conducting a guerrilla warfare throughout practically the entire Island, attacking whenever it seemed to be to their advantage, and dispersing when the forces sent against them were sufficiently large to give the odds to the Government. Trinidad was practically segregated from the outside world so far as communications by land were concerned. The patriots had stopped the mail service, and had cut the telegraph wires.
The city was in a turmoil of fear and apprehension, sending requests for aid whenever they could get word through, which was not frequently, since the patriots took a cynical delight in having so far turned the tables on their oppressors, and in detaining and making prisoners the couriers who tried to reach the Spanish lines with news of Trinidad"s predicament.
The patriots did not confine their efforts to any part of the Island, although the major part of them were east of Havana, and only that small stretch of territory embracing the province of Pinar del Rio was comparatively free from trouble. The insurgents were insufficiently provisioned, and so they resorted to pillage. This was particularly true of the bands in the vicinity of Nuevitas, where attacks were constantly being made on the plantations, and the farmers lived in a state of alarm, never knowing when a patriot band might descend upon them demanding food for the present and for the future, and proceeding to take it by force, if necessary. Frequently those who were not in favor of the cause of liberty extended a frightened hospitality, rather than to excite the wrath of their hungry visitors, and resorted to treachery to carry the news of the marauders to some nearby Spanish camp, only to have the rescuing forces chagrined to find, when they arrived, that the birds were not "in the hand," but had been fed, and had fled with their booty. Nuevitas was well garrisoned, and therefore the patriots confined their operations to a region sufficiently remote from the outskirts of the town, so that reprisals would be slow and difficult.
The Cubans were strongly entrenched at San Miguel, where, on February 7, they were attacked by the Spaniards. When other means failed, the Spanish forces tried to "smoke out" the insurgents by burning the city, but while this dislodged them from the city itself, it failed to drive them from the vicinity, where they took up an advantageous position and held it against a.s.sault.
Puerto Principe was surrounded; the aqueduct was cut, and food was scarce and growing scarcer. The inhabitants clamored for succor, when starvation seemed imminent. Their cries for aid became too insistent to be disregarded, and therefore a body of troops was dispatched from Santiago de Cuba toward Jiguani, whither the main body of the Spanish troops under Count Valmaseda, had retired. The patriots were apprised of this manoeuvre, and the Spanish troops were constantly hara.s.sed by bands of Cubans, and it was only after several severe engagements, and considerable losses, that they succeeded in joining Valmaseda at Jiguani.
In the sort of warfare which they were now waging, the advantages were all with the revolutionists. They were thoroughly acquainted with the country, and knew well how to take advantage of its natural defenses, while the Spanish forces, especially those imported from Spain for the purpose of putting down the rebellion, lacked such knowledge, and in strategy were always at a disadvantage. The Cuban leaders were not only exceedingly clever in their manoeuvres, but they seemed to have a sense of humor, and to take a grim delight in fooling the Spanish commanders, and luring them on a fool"s errand. The patriots, whenever the tide of battle went against them, retreated to fastnesses in the interior, well known to them, and uncharted by the enemy, from whence they would sally forth, when opportunity presented, hara.s.s the Spaniards, and again retire to their lair, whither the enemy feared to follow them, lest they might fall into a trap.
The Cubans had a particularly annoying practice of spreading reports that a large revolutionary force had a.s.sembled in a certain place, and enticing the Spaniards to that location, when the latter would only discover, to their chagrin, that the report had been "grossly exaggerated," and that in reality there was only a handful of men instead of the large number which they expected; and to this would be added the further annoyance of having the little body of Cubans melt as if by magic in retreat to some position unknown to the Spanish or practically impenetrable by them, with their lack of information as to its potentialities, and their fear that it might prove their undoing. If this were not sufficiently annoying, the Cubans had a habit of sending out anonymous and misleading information, to the effect that an attack on the Cubans at a particular point would have felicitous results for the Spaniards, since it was believed that that position was inadequately defended, and upon acting on this information, the Spaniards would be baffled by discovering that the supposed forces, if indeed there had been any previously present, had long since departed, leaving the place deserted. Again and again the Spaniards were thus decoyed and beguiled, and yet they continued to act on the misleading advices, because failure to do so might lose them a real victory, should one message out of the many really prove reliable.
Thus were the patriots learning to match Spanish cunning with a new, peculiar and ironic brand of their own, and were turning the tables on the tormentors who had for so many years mistreated them and laughed at their protests. It will be recalled that Bayamo had been burned by the revolutionists, when it seemed apparent that their capital city was about to fall in to the hands of the Spaniards, or at least, when it seemed the part of prudence to surrender it. In spite of the fact that this meant that the inhabitants would be rendered homeless, so strong was the patriotic feeling in that city, that the destruction was done with the consent of the populace. A thousand of these people now fell into the hands of the Spaniards, and on February 14 were taken to Manzanillo. The next day long expected reinforcements arrived from Spain. They were small in number, it is true, only a thousand strong, but conditions in Spain made it difficult for her to spare large numbers of troops, and this was most fortunate for the cause of freedom, for thus Spain was unable to send to Cuba a sufficient number of drilled soldiers to offset the advantage which the little Cuban army had in its acquaintance with the geography of the Island, and the physical possibilities which it afforded for scattered and sporadic attacks in unexpected quarters.
Captain-General Dulce, alarmed at the conditions which existed, and at the failure of the Spanish army to subdue the revolution, and undoubtedly spurred on by the Volunteers, who had no patience with his conciliatory methods, changed his policy, and issued a proclamation, thoroughly muzzling the press, to avoid the spreading of the news of the extent of the revolution and the success of the revolutionists, and thus endeavored to stem the influx of recruits into the Cuban Army. He also established a military court martial, which planned to deal summarily with the leaders of the revolution should any fall into their hands.
Next he proclaimed the expiration of the amnesty previously granted, while he--true to type--softened this decree, probably as a bit of insidious strategy, by offering to pardon all insurgents who would surrender themselves, excluding the leaders, and those who had been convicted--unrepresented at the trials, of course--of the crimes of murder, arson and robbery. The underlying thought of this proclamation probably was that the rank and file of the insurgents might surrender and deliver their leaders into his hands for punishment. This was accompanied by a demand upon the citizens of Havana for the sum of $25,000,000 to support the government, and to aid it in carrying on its campaign against the revolutionists.
He only too well knew that the sympathy of the people of the United States, if not the secret sympathy of the government at Washington, was with the Cubans, and not only Dulce himself but indeed all the leaders of the Spanish cause lived in constant fear of private aid to the insurgents from the United States, if not of possible governmental intervention in their behalf. They well knew also that the Americans who had made their homes on the Island, and who were deeply interested in its commercial salvation, were all sympathizers in the cause of the revolution, and felt that only through freedom from Spanish rule and a resumption of peace could they hope to retrieve the fortunes which they had invested, and now apparently sunk, in Cuban business ventures. That these Americans, despite the censorship, were in communication with their friends in their own country Dulce did not doubt, and that they would urge the sending of relief to Cuba he felt certain. He therefore applied to the United States Consul at Havana for the names of all American residents of Cuba, that he might keep them under surveillance, check up their movements, and act, if necessary, to prevent them from either personally, or through their influence in the United States, lending any material aid to the revolutionists.
In spite of the Captain-General"s precautions, his fears were realized.
Aid did reach the revolutionists from the United States, in the shape of guns and ammunition, accompanied by American sympathizers, who in some fashion ran the gauntlet of the Spanish navy in Cuban waters. The Cuban Army advanced against La Guanaja, wrested it from the Spaniards, and proceeded to fortify it with American guns, manned by American gunners.
The town was believed by both of the belligerents to be impervious to attack from the land, and the Spanish commanders therefore dispatched a naval force to conquer it from the sea. The bombardment which ensued dashed the hopes of the revolutionists, so far as the effectiveness of their fortifications were concerned, as against a naval attack. The Spanish sh.e.l.ls wrought great damage, and when they had reduced the defenses, a landing was made and the town was retaken by a.s.sault. The Cubans were therefore forced to beat a hurried retreat to the surrounding country, and the Spaniards were left in complete control of the city. Now they had a decided advantage, for from this vantage-point they were able to send aid to Puerto Principe, and, on February 23, two battalions were hurried thither. Meanwhile, General Lesca, who had been stationed at La Guanaja, set out to attack the Cuban Army at Colonia de Santo Domingo and in this expedition he was reinforced by the troops under General Puello. The Spanish army in this encounter greatly outnumbered the patriots but the latter fought with the courage of desperation; a wholesale slaughter ensued in which both sides suffered enormous losses; and when, worn out, the Cubans withdrew, the result might well be termed a draw, for neither side could justly claim victory.
During the month of February, the revolutionists hara.s.sed the Spaniards in the vicinity of Santa Cruz, but not with their usual success, the odds being largely in favor of the latter. On February 25, a band of revolutionists surprised the town of La Lujas, situated only a short distance from Cienfuegos. Before opposition could be mustered, they took possession of the town, and with it the uniforms of the city guards, and all the arms, ammunition and horses which they could find, and they also burned the police archives, thus destroying any records at that place which might later be used against individual revolutionists, in the event of an ultimate Spanish victory.
But, with it all, neither army was making any particular progress toward a decisive victory. The balance of advantage swung first one way and then the other. The Spanish found their well drilled troops unable to match themselves with any degree of effectiveness against the resourcefulness of the revolutionists, and their methods of warfare. The attempts at mediation had failed; indeed had been thwarted by the treacherous action within their own body--by the murder which was staged by the Volunteers" faction. On the other hand, as yet Cuba had been able to secure but little aid from the one country on the sympathy of the citizens of which she might count. The United States had far from come up to expectations in the a.s.sistance she had thus far unofficially rendered. Perhaps this was because the authorities in that country had no desire to embroil themselves with Spain, and kept a close watch on the movements of suspected Cuban partisans. The Cubans were able to make life exceedingly uncomfortable for the Spanish forces, and for Spaniard sympathizers throughout the country, but with their present numbers and equipment they had little hope of gaining a decision of the hostilities in their favor. The best they could do was to keep the country in a state of uproar, gaining what little advantage they could, and meanwhile the inhabitants were facing starvation, the destruction of their holdings, the burning of their buildings, and the devastation of a fruitful country. The constant operations of marauders, who took advantage of the Cuban method of warfare, to pillage and steal and lay in ruin various portions of the country, as well as the fear of attack from the guerrillas, were driving the farmers and their families to the protection of the cities, and thus farms were standing idle and uncultivated, and there was bound to be an even greater food shortage.
The Government was being aided by the church, and the neutrals, despairing of any change in conditions for the better, were, whenever the opportunity presented itself, emigrating from the Island to regions less tumultuous, where living conditions were not so uncertain and dangerous.
The Government was finding conditions intolerable, and decided to make a strenuous effort to dislodge the revolutionists from their inland strongholds and thus to compel them to abandon their badgering methods, and to come forth into the open and give battle, well knowing that, if this could be accomplished, the odds would all be in favor of the Spaniards. Therefore, a special company of Volunteers was a.s.sembled, with fresh reinforcements direct from Spain, and they were sent into the fastnesses of the interior, in a strong endeavor to drive out the Cubans. Simultaneously General Letona conducted a vigorous campaign in relief of Cienfuegos, and General Puello organized small parties which were sent out on marauding expeditions. But the princ.i.p.al result of these efforts was to throw the Island into a still greater state of excitement, and to encourage robbers and bandits, who, taking advantage of the consequent uproar, seized the favorable opportunity for pillage.
Thus their devastation was added to the troubles of the already much tried farmers in Cuba. The country around Holguin and Gibara was in a state beyond description, and the life of every citizen, no matter what his sympathies, was in constant danger.
Then a very serious battle took place between the forces under General Lesca, and an army of four thousand Cubans. The Spaniards were advancing from La Guanaja to the succor of Puerto Principe, when the two forces met. The Cubans were well entrenched on the Sierra de Cubitas. They were princ.i.p.ally infantry, and they had the Spanish at a disadvantage. The engagement might have ended in an utter defeat for that portion of the Government Army, had it not been that they were well supplied with artillery, which did effective work against the Cubans, and therefore the Spaniards were able to escape, though with heavy losses.
Early in the next month, March, 1869, the Cubans obtained--from what source is not disclosed, but it may be that their American sympathizers were responsible--large accessions of artillery, with a goodly supply of ammunition, which a small body of not over a hundred men, under Cisneros, were able to convey to Mayari, where General Quesada was stationed with seven thousand Cubans. When we consider that heretofore the revolutionists had been much more blessed with enthusiasm and belief in the ultimate triumph of their just cause than they had with the material means for accomplishing that end, it is not difficult to picture with what new hope and confidence this much needed a.s.sistance was received. Now more than ever they began to feel the certainty of final success, and to be imbued with a steadfast purpose to fight to the last ditch for the cause of freedom.