It gave others food for thought; the Spanish Loyalists of both Const.i.tutionalist and Reformist predilections, and the dwindling but still resolute body of Cuban Autonomists. The last-named were at this desperate conjuncture of affairs Campos"s best friends. The Const.i.tutionalists were hostile to him. They had from the first disapproved his moderate and humane methods, wishing to return to the savagery of Valmaseda in the Ten Years" War. The Reformists were hesitant; they had little faith in Campos, yet they doubted the expedience of openly repudiating him. The Autonomists, having faith in his sincerity, respecting his humanity, and deploring the devastation and ruin which was befalling Cuba, urged that he should be supported loyally in at least one last effort to pacify the island and abate the horrors of civil war.
The intellectual and moral power of the Autonomists carried the day. The Reformists first and then the Const.i.tutionalists agreed to join them in making a demonstration of loyalty and confidence to the Captain-General, to cheer and sustain him in the depression--almost despair--which he was certainly suffering. So the representatives of all three factions appeared publicly before Campos. For the Const.i.tutionalists, Santos Guzman spoke; an intense reactionary, who could not altogether conceal his feelings of disapproval of Campos"s liberal course, or his realization of the desperate plight in which the country was at that time. But he made an impa.s.sioned pledge of the loyalty of his party to the Captain-General. For the Autonomists, Dr. Rafael Montoro was the spokesman, one of the foremost orators and scholars of the Spanish-speaking world. He had been a Cuban Senator in the Spanish Cortes, and perhaps more than any other man in Cuba commanded the respect and confidence of all parties, Spanish and Cuban alike. He also pledged to Campos the unwavering support of the Autonomists in what he believed sincerely to be the best policy for both Cuba and Spain. A representative of the Reformists spoke to the same effect. Then Campos responded with a frank confession that he had meditated resignation, fearing that he had lost the united confidence of the various parties; but that after this demonstration of loyalty, he would continue his military and civil administration with restored hope of success in pacifying the island.
We have called the Autonomists at this time the best friends of Campos.
It might be possible, however, to argue successfully that they were his worst friends, or at least badly mistaken friends. It might have been better, that is to say, for him to have persisted in retirement at that time, instead of merely postponing the day of wrath. For his renewed efforts either to crush or to pacify the revolutionists were vain. At the very moment when he was gratefully listening to those pledges of loyal support, Gomez and Maceo were pushing unrelentingly forward, not merely through Matanzas but far into Havana province itself. And like Israel of old, they were guided or accompanied by a pillar of fire by night and a pillar of cloud by day. The plantations near the capital were sources of supply for the Spanish, and they must be destroyed. It seemed savage to doom canefields and factories to the torch. But it was more humane to do that and thus make the island uninhabitable for the Spaniards, than to lose myriads of lives in battle. Moreover, the destruction of the sugar crop, then ripe for harvest, would do more than anything else to cripple the financial resources of Spain in the island. All Spain wanted of Cuba, said Gomez, grimly but truly, was what she could get out of it. Therefore if she was prevented from getting anything out of it she would no longer desire it but would let it go.
So night after night "the midnight sky was red" with the glow of blazing canefields and factories, and day after day the tropic sun was half obscured by rolling clouds of smoke from the same conflagrations; while behind them the advancing armies left a broad swath of blackened desolation, above which gaunt, tall chimneys towered solitary, above twisted and ruined machinery, grim monuments of the pa.s.sing of the destroyer. Day after day the inexorable terror rolled toward the capital. On the last day of the year the vanguard of the patriot army was at Marianao, only ten miles from Havana, and every railroad leading out of the city was either cut or had suspended operations. Two days later Campos proclaimed martial law and a state of siege in the Provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. Thus the new year opened with the entire island involved in the War of Independence. Nor was it merely a nominal state of war. Already Pinar del Rio was overrun by bands of Cuban irregulars, who destroyed the cane fields of Spanish Loyalists and ravaged the tobacco plantations of the famous Vuelta Abajo. But this was not enough. On January 5, 1896, Gomez, leaving Maceo and Quintin Bandera to hold Campos in check at Havana, drove straight at the centre of the Spanish line which strove to bar his progress westward, broke through it, and marched his whole army into Pinar del Rio.
That was the beginning of the end for Campos. In desperation he flung all available troops in a line across the western part of Havana Province vainly hoping, since he had not been able thus to keep him out of Pinar del Rio, that thus he could keep Gomez shut up in that province, deprived of supplies or succor. Meantime he sent three of his ablest generals, Luque, Navarro and Valdez, into the western province, in hope of capturing Gomez. But the wily Cuban chieftain played with them, marching and countermarching at will and wearing them out, until he had completed his work there. Then as if to show his scorn at Campos"s military barriers, he burst out of Pinar del Rio and reentered Havana, sweeping like a besom of wrath through the southern part of that province, and defeating the army of Suarez Valdez near Batabano. Then, while all the Spanish columns were in full cry after Gomez, Maceo crossed the border into Pinar del Rio at the north, and marched along the coast as far as Cabanas, destroying several towns on his way.
From Batabano the Cubans under Gomez and Angel Guerra turned northward again, and by January 12 were at Managuas, in the outskirts of Havana, from which the sound of firing could be heard in the capital itself. The railroads had been stopped before, and now all telegraph communication with Havana was cut, save that by submarine cable. The city was not merely in a technical state of siege but was actually besieged, and if Jose Maceo and Jesus Rabi, who were on the eastern border of the province, had been able promptly to join Gomez and Bandera, Havana would probably have been captured. In this state of affairs the Spanish inhabitants of the city were frantic with fear, and with faultfinding against Campos for his inability to protect them from the revolutionists. The Volunteers mutinied outright refusing to serve longer under his orders unless he would alter his policy to one of extreme severity. The Spanish political leaders openly inveighed against him.
In these circ.u.mstances Campos invited the leaders of the various parties, the very men who shortly before had pledged their support to him, to meet him again for a conference. They came, but in a different spirit from before. Santos Guzman was first to speak. He declared that the Const.i.tutionalists had lost confidence in the Captain-General and did not approve his policy, and that they could no longer support him.
The spokesman of the Reformists was less violent of phrase but no less hostile in intent and purport. From neither of the factions of the Spanish party could Campos hope for further support. There remained the Cuban Autonomists, and with a constancy which would have been sublime if only it had been exercised in a better cause, they reaffirmed their loyalty to Campos and to his policy and renewed their pledges of support. But this was in vain. Campos realized that a Spanish Captain-General who had not the support and confidence of the Spanish party would be an impossible anomaly. He would not resign, but he reported to Madrid the state of affairs, and placed himself, like a good soldier, at the commands of the government; excepting that he would not change his policy for one of ruthless severity. If he was to remain in Cuba, his policy of conciliation, in cooperation with the Autonomists, must be maintained.
The answer was not delayed. On January 17 a message came from Madrid, directing Campos to turn over his authority to General Sabas Marin, who would exercise it until a permanent successor could be appointed and could arrive; and to return forthwith to Spain. Of course there was nothing for him to do but to obey. In relinquishing his office to his temporary successor he spoke strongly in defence of the policy which he had pursued. Later, out of office, he talked with much bitterness of the political conspiracies which had been formed against him by the Spaniards of Cuba, of their moral treason to the cause of Spain, and of the sordid tyranny which they exercised. He declared that Spain herself was at fault for the Cuban revolution, which never would have occurred if the island had been treated as an integral province of Spain and not as a subject and enslaved country; and he prophesied that the verdict of history would be, as it had been in the case of Central and South America, that Spain had lost her American empire through the perverse faults of the Spaniards themselves. "My successor," he added, "will fail." Three days later he sailed for Spain.
CHAPTER V
The administration of General Marin lasted only a few weeks, but it was marked with strenuous doings. His first effort was to do what Campos had failed to do, namely, to maintain an impa.s.sable barrier between Pinar del Rio and Havana. He ma.s.sed troops on the line between Havana and Batabano, and took command himself at the centre, hoping to draw Maceo into a general engagement. But Maceo sent Perico Diaz with 1,400 men from Artemisia to create a diversion just north of the centre, which was done very effectively, Diaz and General Jil drawing a large Spanish force into a trap and inflicting terrible slaughter with a cavalry machete charge. Taking advantage of this, Maceo with a small detachment easily crossed the trocha at the south. At once the Spanish forces all rushed in that direction, to head off Maceo and to prevent him from joining Gomez, whereupon the remainder of Maceo"s troops crossed the trocha at the centre and north. After raiding Havana Province at will, and capturing fresh supplies, Maceo returned to Pinar del Rio, fought and won a pitched battle at Paso Real, won another at Candelaria, where the Spanish General Cornell was killed, and captured the city of Jaruco and its forts with 80 guns.
By this time the new Captain-General had arrived. This was General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau; the man most of all desired--and indeed earnestly asked for--by the Volunteers and other extremists among the Spanish party in Cuba, the man most undesired by the Autonomists, and the man most hated by the Cuban revolutionists. He had made himself unspeakably odious in the Ten Years" War as the chief aid of Valmaseda in his savage outrages, and he was confidently expected to renew in Cuba the horrors of that campaign; as he did. Upon the announcement of his appointment the Autonomists largely abandoned hope of any amicable arrangement, and those of them who were mayors or other officers promptly resigned their places, being unwilling to serve under him. Many of them left Cuba altogether, dreading the horrors which they knew were impending. As for the ma.s.ses of the Cuban people, they flocked to the standard of the revolution in greater numbers than before. Within a month after Weyler"s arrival at Havana, more than 15,000 fresh recruits were following the banners of Gomez and Maceo.
[Ill.u.s.tration: GENERAL WEYLER]
It was on February 10 that Weyler landed in Cuba. He promptly issued a number of decrees addressed to both the Spanish Loyalists and the Cuban Revolutionists. He chided the former for their indifference and fears, warned them that they must expect to make sacrifices and endure sufferings, and demanded of them that they should themselves undertake the guardianship of their cities and towns so as to release all his troops for service in the field. The latter he threatened with all possible pains and penalties if they persisted in their contumacy. Death or life imprisonment was to be the fate of all who circulated news unfavorable to the government, who interfered with the operation of railroads, telegraphs or telephones, who by word of mouth disparaged Spain or Spanish soldiers or praised the enemy, who aided the enemy in any way, or who failed to help the government and to injure the revolutionists at every opportunity. All inhabitants of Oriente, Camaguey and the district of Sancti Spiritus in Santa Clara were required to register at military headquarters and receive permits to go about their business. Later he ordered all persons living in rural districts to move into fortified towns, and confiscated the property of all who were absent from their homes without leave. It should be added that at the beginning of his administration he sought to curb and even reproved and punished the cruelties of his subordinates.
In spite of the repudiation of Campos and his policy of pacification, and the accession of Weyler and his policy of severity, the Spanish Prime Minister, Canovas del Castillo, determined to make another attempt at amicable settlement. Elections for a new Cortes were to be held, and he directed that they should be held in Cuba as well as in the Peninsula. To that end it was desirable to raise the state of siege in at least the three western provinces, and on March 8 Weyler issued an order which he hoped would conduce to that end. The civil guard, or rural military police, was to be restored to duty, amnesty was offered to all insurgents who surrendered within fifteen days and who had not been guilty of burning or confiscating property, and all others were to be treated as bandits, to be put summarily to death. All loyal inhabitants were required actively to a.s.sist in repairing railroads, telegraph lines, etc. A similar proclamation was issued for the other provinces.
The elections were set for April 12, and were then held. The Reformist faction of Spaniards refused to take part in them, not approving the policy of Weyler. The Cuban Autonomists also refused to vote, or to nominate candidates, excepting for Deputies from the University of Havana and the Economical Society of Havana. They did this at great risk to themselves, because Weyler after trying persuasions resorted to the most ominous threats against them if they would not take part in the elections, and there really was much danger that at least their leaders would be arrested and imprisoned for treason. The outcome was that only Const.i.tutionalists voted, and only their candidates were elected; representing an insignificant fraction of the Cuban people.
Meantime the war raged unceasingly. Having failed to keep the Cubans from invading Pinar del Rio, and then from emerging from that province, Weyler again formed a trocha from Havana to Batabano to prevent them from moving further east. But both Gomez and Maceo broke through, the former marching into the heart of Matanzas and playing havoc with the sugar plantations, and the latter going southward to the Cienaga de Zapata and thence into Santa Clara, where he received strong reenforcements from Oriente and Camaguey. Then, when Weyler was ma.s.sing his troops in Santa Clara, Maceo with 10,000 men swept back to the very gates of Havana. With the adoption of Weyler"s policy as announced in his proclamations, the war became a campaign of destruction on both sides, each burning towns in order that they might not be occupied by the other. In this fashion in a few weeks there were burned or laid in ruins in Pinar del Rio the towns of Cabanaz, Cayajabos, Vinales, Palacios, San Juan Martinez, Montezuelo, Los Arroyos, Cuano, San Diego, Nunez, Bahia Honda, Hacha and Quiobra; in Havana there perished La Catalina, San Nicolas, Nueva Paz, Bejucal, Jaruco, Wajay, Melena and Bainoa; in Matanzas, Los Ramos, Macagua, Roque, San Jose and Torriente; and in Santa Clara, Amaro, Flora, Mata, Maltiempo, Ranchuelo, Salamanca and San Juan. Many other towns were partially destroyed. On March 13 Maceo attacked Batabano, one of the most strongly defended Spanish coast towns, took 50 guns and much ammunition, and destroyed the town. Nine days later Gomez sent troops into the city of Santa Clara, and captured 240,000 rounds of ammunition. He established his headquarters so near Las Cruces that General Pando fled from that place to Cienfuegos; for which cowardice he was recalled to Spain, as were several other generals. Maceo, after his exploit at Batabano, returned to Pinar del Rio, routed General Linares at Candelaria and another Spanish army at Cayajibaos, and destroyed part of the town of Pinar del Rio.
Filibustering was now rife. In spite of the vigilance of the United States government and of the Spanish navy, numerous expeditions carried men and arms to the Cuban patriots. Those which were successful were little heard of by the public, while those which failed often attracted much attention. General Calixto Garcia, one of the most resolute and daring veterans of the Ten Years" War, sent one on the steamer _Hawkins_, which was lost at sea. He organized another on the British steamer _Bermuda_, which was detained by the United States authorities on February 24, and he was arrested and tried for "organizing a military expedition," but was acquitted. A little later he reorganized the expedition and reached Cuba with it in safety. Enrique Collazo and others sent an expedition from Cedar Keys on the _Stephen R. Mallory_, which was detained, for a time, but finally got off and landed most of the cargo in Matanzas. The Danish steamer _Horsa_ was seized by the United States authorities for carrying a military expedition. The _Commodore_ carried a cargo of arms safely from Charleston, S. C. The _Bermuda_ took another expedition from Jacksonville under Col. Vidal and Col. Torres, but was attacked by a Spanish gunboat before all the cargo was landed, and took to flight, throwing the rest of the cargo overboard. Other successful expeditions in the early part of 1896 were five on the steamer _Three Friends_, one of which was led by Julian Zarraga and one by Dr. Joaquin Castillo Duany; three on the _Laurada_, of which one was led by Juan Fernandez Ruiz and one by Rafael Portuondo; several led by Rafael Cabrera, one by General Carlos Roloff, and one by Juan Ruiz Rivera. One came from France, under Fernando Freyre y Andrade, bringing 5,000 rifles and 1,000,000 cartridges. President Cleveland issued a warning, that all violators of the United States neutrality laws would be prosecuted and severely punished, and General Weyler offered large rewards for information leading to the capture of such expeditions, but the chief effect was to stimulate Cuban patriots to greater efforts, if also to increased precautions.
Much attention was meanwhile paid to Cuban affairs by the United States government, not only in trying to check filibustering but also in looking after the rights--and wrongs--of American citizens, and also in seeking an ending of a war which was commercially ruinous and humanely most distressing. Several joint resolutions were introduced in the Congress at Washington, for recognizing the Cubans as belligerents, for inquiry into the state and conditions of the war, for intervention, and for recognizing the independence of the Cuban Republic. There were finally adopted on April 6 resolutions favoring recognition of Cuban belligerency and the tender of good offices for the settlement of the war on the basis of Cuban independence. It was of course necessarily left to the discretion of the President to execute these designs. He did not deem it expedient to recognize Cuban belligerence, but he did promptly, on April 9, direct the American Minister at Madrid to make the tender of good offices for ending the war on the basis of reforms which would be satisfactory to the Cuban people. True, it had been made clear that the great ma.s.s of the Cuban people would accept nothing short of independence; but the American Secretary of State, Mr. Olney, believed that if a genuine measure of Home Rule were granted and put into effect, the Cubans and their friends in the United States would withdraw their support from the revolution and thus constrain the revolutionists to yield and accept the compromise. To this overture of the United States government Spain made no reply; nor did it to a similar suggestion offered by the Pope. But Tomas Estrada Palma, speaking for the Cuban Junta in New York and for Cubans and Cuban sympathizers throughout the United States, declared that they were not at all interested in any such scheme, and that they would consider nothing short of absolute independence.
The Spanish government did, indeed, consider a scheme of so-called autonomy, somewhat resembling that of Senor Abarzuza at the beginning of the war; but in the speech from the throne at the opening of the Cortes on May 11 it was frankly recognized that the revolutionists would accept nothing short of independence, and that therefore it would be expedient to attempt any such reforms until the insurrection had been subdued by force of arms; which was, of course, General Weyler"s policy.
There were numerous diplomatic controversies between Spain and the United States over Cuban affairs. The American Consul-General at Havana, Ramon O. Williams, intervened in behalf of numerous American citizens who had been arrested for complicity in the revolution, insisting upon their trial by civil and not by military courts. In the case of five American sailors taken on a filibustering expedition, death by shooting was ordered by Weyler, but the Spanish government quashed the sentence and ordered a civil trial on Mr. Williams"s threat to close the Consulate and thus suspend relations. Antagonism between the consul and the Captain-General became so intense that Mr. Williams offered to resign his office, but the President requested him to remain. However he finally retired, at his own volition, and was succeeded on June 3 by Fitzhugh Lee; who proved equally resolute in his protection of American interests.
Meantime, what of the revolutionary civil government of the Republic of Cuba? At the beginning it was a fugitive in the mountain fastnesses of the Sierra Maestra, in the southern part of Oriente, between Santiago and Manzanillo. Thence it removed to Las Tunas, in the same province.
But after the great eastward drive by Gomez and Maceo it established itself permanently in the Sierra de Cubitas, in the Province of Camaguey, midway between the city of Camaguey and the north coast of Cuba. There it remained, in a practically impregnable stronghold, and there it surrounded itself with such military industries as it was capable of conducting--largely the manufacture of dynamite, machetes, and of clothing. From that capital it directed an efficient administration of the major part of the island. It levied and collected taxes, and gave to about two-thirds of the island a mail service at least as efficient as that of the Spanish government had ever been. A complete judicial and police system was maintained, and was more respected by the people than that of Spain. In brief it was substantially true, as President Cisneros declared, that the island was peaceful, law-abiding and well-governed, excepting in those places where the Spanish invaders were making trouble!
But the Spanish did make trouble. Weyler once more strove to place an impa.s.sable barrier between Pinar del Rio and Havana, to keep Maceo shut up in the former province. He constructed it so strongly, with ditches, block houses, barbed wire fences, artillery and what not as to make it almost impossible of pa.s.sage. Then he put 10,000 of his best troops west of it, to fight Maceo, and distributed 28,000 more along the trocha to keep Maceo from breaking out. The result was most unfortunate for the Spanish troops west of the trocha. They were there to hunt down Maceo.
Instead, Maceo hunted them. If they ventured to attack him, he repulsed them. More often he attacked them, and almost invariably routed them. At Lechuza he cut to pieces Colonel Debos"s column and drove its survivors to the shelter of a gunboat at the sh.o.r.e. At Bahia Honda and Punta Brava the Spanish were badly beaten. In the Rubi Hills a Spanish force was all but annihilated, and the commanders began to clamor for reenforcements; though Maceo had only 11,000 men, and the Spanish had 50,000 along the trocha to keep him from crossing it. During the summer the campaign slackened a little, though Maceo won several spirited engagements and maintained his control of practically all the province excepting parts of the coast. In the early fall, with his army increased to 20,000 he resumed the aggressive; using for the first time a dynamite gun which thoroughly demoralized the Spaniards. Near Pinar del Rio city, at Las Tumbas Torino, at San Francisco, at Guayabitos and at Vinales, he defeated the enemy and inflicted heavy losses. The same record was made early in October at San Felipe, at Tunibar del Torillo, at Manaja, at Ceja del Negro, and Guamo. A solitary Spanish victory was won at Guayabitos.
Like the general government at Cubitas, Maceo had headquarters in the mountains, and there guarded effectively a large and fertile region, where supplies ample for feeding his army could be produced. He also conducted workshops for the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Against this position, in his rage and desperation, Weyler himself in November led an army of 36,000 picked troops, with six Generals. For several days attack after attack was made, every one being repulsed by Maceo with heavy loss to the Spaniards, until at last, with a third of his army destroyed, Weyler abandoned the attempt and retreated. Unfortunately, on December 4 Maceo with his staff and a small force decided to undertake a secret expedition to seek a conference with leaders in Havana Province.
They accordingly crossed the Bay of Mariel in a small boat and thus reached the eastern side of the trocha. Messages were sent to revolutionary chiefs in Havana and Matanzas, asking them to come to a council of war at a designated point near Punta Brava, familiar to them all as secure rendezvous. A few came promptly, but in some way the secret of the meeting became known to the Spanish. In consequence, on December 7, while he was expecting the arrival of more of his friends, Maceo heard the sound of firing at the outposts of his camp. Riding to the scene, he found Spanish troops attacking him. He rallied his troops and under his directions they were soon mastering the enemy, when a shot struck Maceo and he fell mortally wounded; his last words, referring to the progress of the skirmish, being, "It goes well."
[Ill.u.s.tration: JOSe ANTONIO MACEO
Born at Santiago de Cuba in 1849, of a family of patriots and brave fighters, and dying in battle at Punta Brava, near Havana, on December 7, 1896, Jose Antonio Maceo was one of the most gallant soldiers in the Ten Years" War and one of the very foremost chieftains of the War of Independence. Gifted with military genius and with leadership of men, he was the greatest strategist and the most popular commander in the Liberating Army, and the greatest terror to the foe. Partly of Negro blood, he was an equal honor to both races, and finely typified in himself their union in the cause of Cuban independence. A monument to his imperishable memory crowns Cacagual Hill, where his remains were buried.]
At his fall his troops were panic stricken and gave way, so that the Spaniards occupied the field and plundered and stripped the dead. It was said that they did not know that it was Maceo whom they had killed until a native guide who was with them recognized his body. While they were still plundering the dead Cuban reenforcements under Pedro Diaz came up, furious at the loss of their peerless chief, and a desperate fight ensued, which ended in the rout of the Spaniards and the recovery of Maceo"s body by the Cubans. When the defeated Spaniards got back to headquarters and reported that they had slain Maceo, they were not believed. It was not considered possible that he had crossed the trocha.
But a little later convincing confirmation came to them from a Cuban source. This was furnished when Dr. Maximo Zertucha, who had been Maceo"s surgeon-general and who was the only member of his staff who had survived the disastrous fight at Punta Brava, came to Spanish headquarters and surrendered himself. He explained that he did so because he had seen Maceo killed, and he regarded the loss of that leader as certainly fatal to the cause of the Cuban revolution. The Spanish authorities accepted his surrender and granted him full amnesty, a circ.u.mstance which caused many Cubans to suspect that he had betrayed his chief, by sending word of his whereabouts to the Spanish commander.
Of this there appears, however, to have been no proof. Thus perished Antonio Maceo, who would have been the generalissimo of the Cuban forces but for the prudent fear that maligners might then have spread successfully the damaging libel that the revolution was nothing but a negro insurrection; a fear which he himself felt, and on account of which he insisted that Maximo Gomez should be the Commander in Chief of the Cuban Revolutionary armies. Thus perished Antonio Maceo, a soldier and a man without a superior in either of the contending armies, and a commander, indeed, who, in personal valor, in strategic skill, in resource, in resolution, in knowledge of the art of war, and in all the elements of military greatness, was worthy to be ranked among the great captains of all lands and of all time. The loss of him was irreparable.
But it was not fatal to the Cuban cause. Thereafter the effort of every Cuban soldier and patriot was to increase his own efficiency to some degree, so that the aggregate would atone for the loss that had been sustained.
While Maceo was thus baffling the Spanish in the far west of the island, Gomez and his lieutenants were more than holding their own in the other five provinces. Jose Maceo in April marched from Oriente all the way to the western side of Havana, where he was joined by Serafin Sanchez, Rodriguez, Lacret, Maso, Aguirre and others, until nearly 20,000 Cubans were gathered there. Gomez remained in Santa Clara, where the Spaniards had a precarious foothold at Cienfuegos, protected by their fleet.
Colonel Gonzalez, commanding in the district of Remedios, routed the forces of General Oliver. Then, the Spanish power in the three great eastern provinces having been rendered negligible, a general movement westward was undertaken, following in the trail of the two Maceos. Gomez himself took supreme command, and Collazo, Calixto Garcia and others marched their forces to join him. Calixto Garcia, after only Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo, was the foremost chieftain of the patriots, and not unworthy to rank with them in a trinity of military prowess. He was now advanced in years, having been born in 1839, at Holguin, Oriente.
From childhood a fervent patriot, at the outbreak of the Ten Years" War he took the field under Donato Marmol. His native bent for military achievement a.s.sured him advancement, and at Santa Rita and Baire he was a Brigadier General under Gomez. In 1871 he besieged Guisa and Holguin, and then, when Gomez marched westward into Camaguey, thence to force pa.s.sage of the trocha between Jucaro and Moron, Garcia was left in supreme command in Oriente. In that capacity he was active, triumphing at Santa Maria, Holguin, Chaparra, the siege and capture of Manzanillo, and at Ojo de Agua de los Melones. Then came the incident which for the time ended his military career and which gave him that scar in the centre of his forehead which was ever after so conspicuous a feature. At San Antonio de Baja he and only twenty of his men were surprised and surrounded by a large force of Spaniards. Seeing that escape was impossible, and having vowed never to fall alive into the hands of Spain, he put the muzzle of a pistol beneath his chin and fired. The bullet pa.s.sed through the tongue, the roof of his mouth, behind his nose, and out at the centre of his forehead. But not thus was he to die.
The Spaniards took him to a hospital at Santiago, where he recovered, and then sent him to prison in Spain; whence he returned to Cuba after the Treaty of Zanjon. He was a leader in the "Little War"; then, enjoying the respect and friendship of Martinez Campos, he went back to Spain and for a time was a bank clerk at Madrid. Thus he was engaged when the War of Independence began. Suspected and watched, he was not able to escape until a year later. But on March 24, 1896, he landed at Baracoa with an important expedition, and thereafter he was a raging and consuming flame of war.
The westward march was marked with victory. On May 14 Colonel Segura"s whole battalion was captured. On June 9 and 10 near Najasa General Jiminez Castellanos was soundly beaten and forced to retreat to Camaguey. Then, hoping to bar the Cubans from Santa Clara, the Spanish reconstructed the eastern trocha, from Jucaro to Moron, and sent forces inland from Santiago and other coast towns to create a back fire in Oriente. Calixto Garcia turned upon these latter, and routed them on the Cauto River, at Venta de Casanova, and near Bayamo, and captured great stores of supplies. At Santa Ana several stubbornly contested battles occurred between Garcia and General Linares, in which the latter was finally worsted. At Loma del Gato on July 5 the Cubans under Jose Maceo and Perequito Perez defeated the forces of General Albert and Colonel Vara del Rey, but at the heavy cost of Maceo"s death. Meanwhile Juan B.
Zayas, Lacret and others penetrated Havana Province at will, in guerrilla warfare; but Zayas was finally killed in an engagement near Gabriel.
During the rainy season there was comparatively little activity, but in the fall the advance westward began in earnest. Garcia captured Guaimaro, and Gomez pushed on to Camaguey, but left the place to be dealt with by Garcia and hastened on, with Rodriguez, Rabi, Bandera and Carrillo. He crossed the trocha with ease, penetrated Santa Clara, and was soon in Matanzas, where Aguirre joined them with 3,200 men. He put an end to sugar making throughout most of the province, and then encamped in the Cienaga de Zapata, leaving a number of active guerrilla bands to hara.s.s and menace Havana. In the latter province at the beginning of December Raoul Arango and Nicolas Valencia attacked the town of Guanabacoa, only five miles from Havana, and seized great stores of supplies. Beyond the western trocha Ruiz Rivera succeeded Antonio Maceo in command, and carried on his work with much success.
Thus the second year of the war drew to a close with the patriots despite some heavy losses decidedly in the ascendant, and the Spanish campaign of ruthless severity no more successful than that of moderation and conciliation had been.
One other incident of the year 1896 was highly significant. At the beginning of December the President of the United States, Mr. Cleveland, in his annual message to Congress, discussed the Cuban problem very fully and frankly. He practically rea.s.serted the historic policy toward that island first enunciated by John Quincy Adams, as quoted in a preceding volume of this history. He rea.s.serted the Monroe Doctrine. He made it clear that the United States had special interests in Cuba, which not only all other nations but also Spain herself must recognize and acknowledge. Concerning the war he said, most justly:
"The spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one of the most fertile and charming on the globe, would engage the serious attention of the government and people of the United States in any circ.u.mstances. In point of fact, they have a concern with it which is by no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character. It lies so near us as to be hardly separated from our territory. Our actual pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and government of Spain. It is reasonably estimated that at least from $30,000,000 to $50,000,000 of American capital are invested in plantations and in railroad, mining and other business enterprises on the island. The volume of trade between the United States and Cuba, which in 1889 amounted to about $64,000,000, rose in 1893 to about $103,000,000, and in 1894, the year before the present insurrection broke out, amounted to nearly $96,000,000. Beside this large pecuniary stake in the fortunes of Cuba, the United States, finds itself inextricably involved in the present contest in other ways both vexatious and costly."
Then he added, in words the purport of which was unmistakable:
"When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."
To those who knew Mr. Cleveland, and who appreciated the care with which he selected every word in all important addresses, this could have but one meaning. It meant that American intervention was inevitable. Note that he did not say "_If_ the inability of Spain _should_ ... a situation _would_ ..." as though the thing were still problematic. No; but he said plumply "When the inability of Spain _has_ become manifest ... a situation _will_ be presented...." In his mind the thing was certain to come. It had already come, and only awaited disclosure and recognition. Remember, too, that of all men of his time Mr. Cleveland was one of the most opposed to "jingoism," and meddling with the affairs of other lands; while to any suggestion of conquest and annexation of Cuba to the United States he would have offered the most resolute opposition of which he was capable. In view of those facts, that utterance in his message was of epochal import. It foreshadowed precisely what did occur less than a year and a half later. It was in effect a declaration of intervention and of war with Spain in behalf of Cuban independence, made more than a year before the steamer _Maine_ entered Havana harbor.
CHAPTER VI
We have said that the death of Antonio Maceo moved Cuban patriots to redouble their efforts to atone for the grievous loss which their cause had thus suffered. Unfortunately not all of them were capable of so doing, while those who did so were unable to make devotion and zeal take the place of consummate military genius. In consequence, despite the utmost efforts of Gomez and his colleagues matters went badly for the revolution through most of the following year. Gomez himself indeed felt that he had lost his right arm. He was at La Reforma, near Sancti Spiritus, at the beginning of 1897, and he summoned the other revolutionary leaders to meet him there, to concentrate their forces, and to plan a new campaign. They came promptly and eagerly, some of them unfortunately thus leaving without protection important strategic points and centers of revolutionist industry, which were pounced upon and captured by the Spanish. When the patriot forces were thus gathered it was expected that there would be immediately undertaken a general advance westward, into Matanzas and Havana; for which it was believed the Cuban army was strong enough, and which the Spanish were not believed to be able to resist.
Instead, Gomez decided first to effect the reduction of Arroyo Blanco.
This was a small and unimportant town in the Province of Camaguey, near the Santa Clara border; containing a Spanish garrison under Captain Escobar. Gomez first summoned Escobar to surrender, in order to avoid the destruction which would be caused by the bombardment of the place with a dynamite gun, which he threatened to begin forthwith. Escobar defied him, and the bombardment was undertaken, but proved ineffective, and before Gomez could capture the place strong Spanish reenforcements arrived and the attempt had to be abandoned. Thereafter Gomez contented himself with sending several strong bands westward, to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Spaniards wherever they could, while he himself remained near Sancti Spiritus, also engaging in irregular operations.
There he was presently menaced by Weyler himself. That formidable foe had practically achieved the conquest of Pinar del Rio. After Maceo"s death the Cuban forces in that province had largely dispersed, some abandoning the struggle altogether as hopeless, and others going to the east, to join themselves with Gomez, Garcia or other surviving leaders.
Only a few roving bands remained. Accordingly Weyler announced that the western province was pacified. That was sufficiently true; but it was conspicuously true in the sense expressed by Tacitus, and Byron. They had made a solitude, and called it peace. Seldom had any comparable region been so thoroughly devastated and desolated. Then Weyler felt himself free to lead his army elsewhere.