The History of Rome

Chapter 30

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38. Lest, however, the suddenness of the affair, and the fear of night, should frustrate a measure which was in itself ill adapted to his condition, he thought it right that his soldiers should be addressed and exhorted; and having called an a.s.sembly, he discoursed as follows: "Soldiers, either my veneration for our late commanders, both living and dead, or our present situation, may impress on every one the belief that this command, as it is highly honourable to me, conferred by your suffrages, so is it in its nature a heavy and anxious charge. For at a time when I should be scarcely so far master of myself as to be able to find any solace for my afflicted mind, did not fear deaden the sense of sorrow, I am compelled to take upon myself alone the task of consulting for the good of you all; a task of the greatest difficulty when under the influence of grief. And not even at that critical moment, when I ought to be considering in what manner I may be enabled to keep together for my country these remains of two armies, can I divert my mind from the affliction which incessantly preys upon me. For bitter recollection is ever present, and the Scipios ever disturb me with anxious cares by day and dreams by night, frequently rousing me from my sleep, and imploring me not to suffer themselves nor their soldiers, your companions in war, who had been victorious in this country for eight years, nor the commonwealth to remain unrevenged; enjoining me also to follow their discipline and their plans; and desiring that as there was no one more obedient to their commands while they were alive than I, so after their death I would consider that conduct as best, which I might have the strongest reason for believing they would have adopted in each case. I could wish also that you, my soldiers, should not show your respect for them by lamentations and tears, as if they were dead; (for they still live and flourish in the fame of their achievements;) but that whenever the memory of those men shall occur to you, you would go into battle as though you saw them encouraging you and giving you the signal. Nor certainly could anything else than their image presenting itself yesterday to your eyes and minds, have enabled you to fight that memorable battle, in which you proved to the enemy that the Roman name had not become extinct with the Scipios; and that the energy and valour of that people, which had not been overwhelmed by the disaster at Cannae, would, doubtlessly, emerge from the severest storms of fortune. Now since you have dared so much of your own accord, I have a mind to try how much you will dare when authorized by your general: for yesterday, when I gave the signal for retreat while you were pursuing the routed enemy with precipitation, I did not wish to break your spirit, but to reserve it for greater glory and more advantageous opportunities; that you might afterwards, when prepared and armed, seize an occasion of attacking your enemy while off their guard, unarmed, and even buried in sleep. Nor do I entertain the hope of gaining an opportunity of this kind rashly, but from the actual state of things. Doubtless, if any one should ask even himself, by what means, though few in number and disheartened by defeat, you defended your camp against troops superior in number and victorious, you would give no other answer than that, as this was the very thing you were afraid of, you had kept every place secured by works and yourselves ready and equipped. And so it generally happens: men are least secure against that which fortune causes not to be feared; because you leave unguarded and exposed what you think is not necessary to be cared about. There is nothing whatever which the enemy fear less at the present time, than lest we, who were a little while ago besieged and a.s.saulted, should aggressively a.s.sault their camp ourselves. Let us dare, then, to do that which it is incredible we should have the courage to attempt; it will be most easy from the very fact of its appearing most difficult. At the third watch of the night I will lead you thither in silence. I have ascertained by means of scouts that they have no regular succession of watches, no proper outposts. Our shout at their gates, when heard, and the first a.s.sault, will carry their camp. Then let that carnage be made among men, torpid with sleep, terrified at the unexpected tumult, and overpowered while lying defenceless in their beds, from which you were so grieved to be recalled yesterday. I know that the measure appears to you a daring one; but in difficult and almost desperate circ.u.mstances the boldest counsels are always the safest. For if when the critical moment has arrived, the opportunity of seizing which is of a fleeting nature, you delay ever so little, in vain do you seek for it afterwards when it has been neglected. One army is near us; two more are not far off. We have some hopes if we make an attack now; and you have already made trial of your own and their strength. If we postpone the time and cease to be despised in consequence of the fame of yesterday"s irruption, there is danger lest all the generals and all the forces should unite. Shall we be able then to withstand three generals and three armies, whom Cneius Scipio with his army unimpaired could not withstand? As our generals have perished by dividing their forces, so the enemy may be overpowered while separated and divided. There is no other mode of maintaining the war; let us, therefore, wait for nothing but the opportunity of the ensuing night. Now depart, with the favour of the G.o.ds, and refresh yourselves, that, unfatigued and vigorous, you may burst into the enemy"s camp with the same spirit with which you have defended your own." This new enterprise, proposed by their new general, they received with joy; and the more daring it was the more it pleased them. The remainder of the day was spent in getting their arms in readiness and recruiting their strength, the greater part of the night was given to rest, and at the fourth watch they were in motion.

39. At a distance of six miles beyond their nearest camp lay other forces of the Carthaginians. A deep valley, thickly planted with trees, intervened. Near about the middle of this wood a Roman cohort and some cavalry were placed in concealment with Punic craft. The communication between the two armies being thus cut off, the rest of the forces were marched in silence to the nearest body of the enemy; and as there were no outposts before the gates, and no guards on the rampart, they entered quite into the camp, as though it had been their own, no one any where opposing them. The signals were then sounded and a shout raised. Some put the enemy to the sword when half asleep; others threw fire upon the huts, which were covered in with dry straw; others blocked up the gates to intercept their escape. The enemy, who were a.s.sailed at once with fire, shouting, and the sword, were in a manner bereaved of their senses, and could neither hear each other, nor take any measures for their security. Unarmed, they fell into the midst of troops of armed men: some hastened to the gates; others, as the pa.s.ses were flocked up, leaped over the rampart, and as each escaped they fled directly towards the other camp, where they were cut off by the cohort and cavalry rushing forward from their concealment, and were all slain to a man. And even had any escaped from that carnage, the Romans, after taking the nearer camp, ran over to the other with such rapidity, that no one could have arrived before them with news of the disaster. In this camp, as they were far distant from the enemy, and as some had gone off just before daylight for forage, wood, and plunder, they found every thing in a still more neglected and careless state. Their arms only were placed at the outposts, the men being unarmed, and either sitting and reclining upon the ground, or else walking up and down before the rampart and the gates. On these men, thus at their ease and unguarded, the Romans, still hot from the recent battle, and flushed with victory, commenced an attack; no effectual opposition therefore could be made to them in the gates.

Within the gates, the troops having rushed together from every part of the camp at the first shout and alarm, a furious conflict arose; which would have continued for a long time, had not the b.l.o.o.d.y appearance of the Roman shields discovered to the Carthaginians the defeat of the other forces, and consequently struck them with dismay. This alarm produced a general flight; and all except those who were overtaken with the sword, rushing out precipitately wherever they could find a pa.s.sage, abandoned their camp. Thus, in a night and a day, two camps of the enemy were carried, under the conduct of Lucius Marcius.

Claudius, who translated the annals of Acilius out of Greek into Latin, states that as many as thirty-seven thousand men were slain, one thousand eight hundred and thirty made prisoners, and a great booty obtained; among which was a silver shield of a hundred and thirty-eight pounds" weight, with an image upon it of the Barcine Hasdrubal. Valerius Antias states, that the camp Of Mago only was captured, and seven thousand of the enemy slain; and that in the other battle, when the Romans sallied out and fought with Hasdrubal, ten thousand were slain, and four thousand three hundred captured. Piso writes, that five thousand were slain in an ambuscade when Mago incautiously pursued our troops who retired. With all, the name of the general, Marcius, is mentioned with great honour, and to his real glory they add even miracles. They say, that while he was haranguing his men a stream of fire poured from his head without his perceiving it, to the great terror of the surrounding soldiers; and that a shield, called the Marcian, with an image of Hasdrubal upon it, remained in the temple up to the time of the burning of the Capitol, a monument of his victory over the Carthaginians. After this, affairs continued for a considerable time in a tranquil state in Spain, as both parties, after giving and receiving such important defeats, hesitated to run the hazard of a general battle.

40. During these transactions in Spain, Marcellus, after the capture of Syracuse, having settled the other affairs in Sicily with so much honour and integrity as not only to add to his own renown, but also to the majesty of the Roman people, conveyed to Rome the ornaments of the city, together with the statues and pictures with which Syracuse abounded. These were certainly spoils taken from enemies, and acquired according to the laws of war; but hence was the origin of the admiration of the products of Grecian art, and to that freedom with which at present all places, both sacred and profane, are despoiled; which at last recoiled upon the Roman G.o.ds, and first upon that very temple which was so choicely adorned by Marcellus. For foreigners were in the habit of visiting the temples dedicated by Marcellus near the Capuan gate, on account of their splendid ornaments of this description, of which a very small portion can be found. Emba.s.sies from almost all the states of Sicily came to him. As their cases were different, so were also the terms granted to them. Those who had either not revolted or had returned to the alliance before the capture of Syracuse, were received and honoured as faithful allies. Those who had been induced to submit through fear after the capture of Syracuse, as vanquished, received laws from the conqueror. The Romans, however, had still remaining a war of no small magnitude at Agrigentum, headed by Epicydes and Hanno, generals in the late war, and a third new one sent by Hannibal in the room of Hippocrates, a Libyphoenician by nation, and a native of Hippo, called by his countrymen Mutines; an energetic man, and thoroughly instructed in all the arts of war under the tuition of Hannibal. To this man the Numidian auxiliaries were a.s.signed by Epicydes and Hanno. With these he so thoroughly overran the lands of his enemies, and visited his allies with such activity, in order to retain them in their allegiance, and for the purpose of bringing them seasonable aid as each required it, that in a short time he filled all Sicily with his fame, nor was greater confidence placed in any one else by those who favoured the Carthaginian interest.

Accordingly the Carthaginian and Syracusan generals, who had been hitherto compelled to keep within the walls of Agrigentum, not more at the advice of Mutines than from the confidence they reposed in him, had the courage to go out from the walls, and pitched a camp near the river Himera. When this was announced to Marcellus, he immediately advanced and sat down at a distance of about four miles from the enemy, with the intention of waiting to see what steps they took, and what they meditated. But Mutines allowed no room or time for delay or deliberation, but crossed the river, and, charging the outposts of his enemy, created the greatest terror and confusion. The next day, in an engagement which might almost be called regular, he compelled his enemy to retire within their works. Being called away by a mutiny of the Numidians, which had broken out in the camp, and in which about three hundred of them had retired to Heraclea Minoa, he set out to appease them and bring them back; and is said to have earnestly warned the generals not to engage with the enemy during his absence. Both the generals were indignant at this conduct, but particularly Hanno, who was before disturbed at his reputation. "Is it to be borne," said he, "that a mongrel African should impose restraints upon me, a Carthaginian general, commissioned by the senate and people?"

Epicydes, who wished to wait, was prevailed upon by him to agree to their crossing the river and offering battle; for, said he, if they should wait for Mutines, and the battle should terminate successfully, Mutines would certainly have the credit of it.

41. But Marcellus, highly indignant that he who had repulsed Hannibal from Nola, when rendered confident by his victory at Cannae, should succ.u.mb to enemies whom he had vanquished by sea and land, ordered his soldiers immediately to take arms and raise the standards. While marshalling his army, ten Numidians rode up rapidly from the enemy"s line with information that their countrymen, first induced by the same causes which brought on the mutiny, in which three hundred of their number retired to Heraclea, and secondly, because they saw their commander, just on the approach of a battle, sent out of the way by generals who wished to detract from his glory, would not take any part in the battle. This deceitful nation made good their promise in this instance. Accordingly the spirits of the Romans were increased by the intelligence, which was speedily conveyed through the lines, that the enemy were abandoned by the cavalry, which the Romans princ.i.p.ally feared; while at the same time the enemy were dispirited, not only because they were deprived of the princ.i.p.al part of their strength, but further, because they were afraid lest they should themselves be attacked by their own cavalry. Accordingly, there was no great resistance made: the first shout and onset determined the business.

The Numidians who stood quiet in the wings during the action, when they saw their party turning their backs, accompanied them in their flight only for a short time; but when they perceived that they were all making for Agrigentum with the most violent haste, they turned off to the neighbouring towns round about, through fear of a siege. Many thousand men were slain and captured, together with eight elephants.

This was the last battle which Marcellus fought in Sicily, after which he returned victorious to Syracuse. The year was now about closing; the senate therefore decreed that Publius Cornelius, the praetor, should send a letter to Capua to the consuls, with directions that while Hannibal was at a distance, and nothing of any great importance was going on at Capua, one of them, if they thought fit, should come to Rome to elect new magistrates. On the receipt of the letter, the consuls arranged it between themselves, that Claudius should hold the election, and Fulvius remain at Capua. The consuls created by Claudius were Cneius Fulvius Centumalus, and Publius Sulpicius Galba, the son of Servius, who had never exercised any curule magistracy. After this Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Caius Sulpicius, and Caius Calpurnius Piso, were created praetors. Piso had the city jurisdiction; Sulpicius, Sicily; Cethegus, Apulia; Lentulus, Sardinia.

The consuls were continued in command for a year longer.

BOOK XXVI.

_Hannibal encamps on the banks of the Amo, within three miles of Rome. Attended by two thousand hors.e.m.e.n, he advances close to the Colline gate to take a view of the walls and situation of the city. On two successive days the hostile armies are hindered from engaging by the severity of the weather. Capua taken by Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the chief n.o.bles die, voluntarily, by poison. Quintus Fulvius having condemned the princ.i.p.al senators to death, at the moment they are actually tied to the stakes, receives despatches from Rome, commanding him to spare their lives, which he postpones reading until the sentence is executed. Publius Scipio, offering himself for the service, is sent to command in Spain, takes New Carthage in one day. Successes in Sicily. Treaty of friendship with the Aetolians. War with Philip, king of Macedonia, and the Acarnanians._

1. The consuls, Cneius Fulvius Centumalus and Publius Sulpicius Galba, having entered on their office on the ides of March, a.s.sembled the senate in the Capitol, and took the opinion of the fathers on the state of the republic, the manner of conducting the war, and on what related to the provinces and the armies. Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the consuls of the former year, were continued in command; and the armies which they before had were a.s.signed to them, it being added that they should not withdraw from Capua, which they were besieging, till they had taken it. The Romans were now solicitously intent upon this object, not from resentment so much, which was never juster against any city, as from the consideration that as this city, so celebrated and powerful, had by its defection drawn away several states, so when reduced it would bring back their minds to respect for the former supreme government. Two praetors also of the former year, Marcus Junius and Publius Semp.r.o.nius, were each continued in command of the two legions which they had under them, the former in Etruria, the latter in Gaul. Marcus Marcellus also was continued in command, that he might, as proconsul, finish the war in Sicily with the army he had there. If he wanted recruits he was to take them from the legions which Publius Cornelius, the propraetor, commanded in Sicily, provided he did not choose any soldier who was of the number of those whom the senate had refused to allow to be discharged, or to return home till the war was put an end to. To Caius Sulpicius, to whose lot Sicily had fallen, the two legions which Publius Cornelius had commanded were a.s.signed, to be recruited from the army of Cneius Fulvius, which had been shamefully beaten, and had experienced a dreadful loss the year before in Apulia. To soldiers of this description the senate had a.s.signed the same period of service as to those who fought at Cannae; and as an additional mark of ignominy upon both, they were not allowed to winter in towns, or to build huts for wintering within the distance of ten miles from any town. To Lucius Cornelius, in Sardinia, the two legions which Quintus Mucius had commanded were a.s.signed; if recruits were wanted, the consuls were ordered to enlist them. To t.i.tus Otacilius and Marcus Valerius was allotted the protection of the coasts of Sicily and Greece, with the legions and fleets which they had commanded. The Greek coast had fifty ships with one legion; the Sicilian, a hundred ships with two legions. Twenty-three legions were employed by the Romans in carrying on the war this year by land and sea.

2. In the beginning of the year, on a letter from Lucius Marcius being laid before the senate, they considered his achievements as most glorious; but the t.i.tle of honour which he a.s.sumed (for though he was neither invested with the command by the order of the people, nor by the direction of the fathers, his letter ran in this form, "The propraetor to the senate") gave offence to a great many. It was considered as an injurious precedent for generals to be chosen by the armies, and for the solemn ceremony of elections, held under auspices, to be transferred to camps and provinces, and (far from the control of the laws and magistrates) to military thoughtlessness. And though some gave it as their opinion, that the sense of the senate should be taken on the matter, yet it was thought more advisable that the discussion should be postponed till after the departure of the hors.e.m.e.n who brought the letter from Marcius. It was resolved, that an answer should be returned respecting the corn and clothing of the army, stating, that the senate would direct its attention to both those matters; but that the letter should not be addressed to Lucius Marcius, propraetor, lest he should consider that as already determined which was the very point they reserved for discussion.

After the hors.e.m.e.n were dismissed, it was the first thing the consuls brought before the senate; and the opinions of all to a man coincided, that the plebeian tribunes should be instructed to consult the commons with all possible speed, as to whom they might resolve to send into Spain to take the command of that army which had been under the conduct of Cneius Scipio. The plebeian tribunes were instructed accordingly, and the question was published. But another contest had pre-engaged the minds of the people: Caius Semp.r.o.nius Blaesus, having brought Cneius Fulvius to trial for the loss of the army in Apulia, hara.s.sed him with invectives in the public a.s.semblies: "Many generals," he reiterated, "had by indiscretion and ignorance brought their armies into most perilous situations, but none, save Cneius Fulvius, had corrupted his legions by every species of excess before he betrayed them to the enemy; it might therefore with truth be said, that they were lost before they saw the enemy, and that they were defeated, not by Hannibal, but by their own general. No man, when he gave his vote, took sufficient pains in ascertaining who it was to whom he was intrusting an army. What a difference was there between this man and Tiberius Semp.r.o.nius! The latter having been intrusted with an army of slaves, had in a short time brought it to pa.s.s, by discipline and authority, that not one of them in the field of battle remembered his condition and birth, but they became a protection to our allies and a terror to our enemies. They had s.n.a.t.c.hed, as it were, from the very jaws of Hannibal, and restored to the Roman people, c.u.mae, Beneventum, and other towns. But Cneius Fulvius had infected with the vices peculiar to slaves, an army of Roman citizens, of honourable parentage and liberal education; and had thus made them insolent and turbulent among their allies, inefficient and dastardly among their enemies, unable to sustain, not only the charge, but the shout of the Carthaginians. But, by Hercules, it was no wonder that the troops did not stand their ground in the battle, when their general was the first to fly; with him, the greater wonder was that any had fallen at their posts, and that they were not all the companions of Cneius Fulvius in his consternation and his flight.

Caius Flaminius, Lucius Paullus, Lucius Posthumius, Cneius and Publius Scipio, had preferred falling in the battle to abandoning their armies when in the power of the enemy. But Cneius Fulvius was almost the only man who returned to Rome to report the annihilation of his army. It was a shameful crime that the army of Cannae should be transported into Sicily, because they fled from the field of battle, and not be allowed to return till the enemy has quitted Italy; that the same decree should have been lately pa.s.sed with respect to the legions of Cneius Fulvius; while Cneius Fulvius himself has no punishment inflicted upon him for running away, in a battle brought about by his own indiscretion; that he himself should be permitted to pa.s.s his old age in stews and brothels, where he pa.s.sed his youth, while his troops, whose only crime was that they resembled their general, should be sent away in a manner into banishment, and suffer an ignominious service. So unequally," he said, "was liberty shared at Rome by the rich and the poor, by the enn.o.bled and the common people."

3. The accused shifted the blame from himself to his soldiers; he said, "that in consequence of their having in the most turbulent manner demanded battle, they were led into the field, not on the day they desired, for it was then evening, but on the following; that they were drawn up at a suitable time and on favourable ground; but either the reputation or the strength of the enemy was such, that they were unable to stand their ground. When they all fled precipitately, he himself also was carried away with the crowd, as had happened to Varro at the battle of Cannae, and to many other generals. How could he, by his sole resistance, benefit the republic, unless his death would remedy the public disasters? that he was not defeated in consequence of a failure in his provisions; that he had not, from want of caution, been drawn into a disadvantageous position; that he had not been cut off by an ambuscade in consequence of not having explored his route, but had been vanquished by open force, and by arms, in a regular engagement. He had not in his power the minds of his own troops, or those of the enemy. Courage and cowardice were the result of each man"s natural const.i.tution." He was twice accused, and the penalty was laid at a fine. On the third accusation, at which witnesses were produced, he was not only overwhelmed with an infinity of disgraceful charges, but a great many a.s.serted on oath, that the flight and panic commenced with the praetor, that the troops being deserted by him, and concluding that the fears of their general were not unfounded, turned their backs; when so strong a feeling of indignation was excited, that the a.s.sembly clamorously rejoined that he ought to be tried capitally.

This gave rise to a new controversy; for when the tribune, who had twice prosecuted him as for a finable offence, now, on the third occasion, declared that he prosecuted him capitally; the tribunes of the commons being appealed to, said, "they would not prevent their colleague from proceeding, as he was permitted according to the custom of their ancestors, in the manner he himself preferred, whether according to the laws or to custom, until he had obtained judgment against a private individual, convicting him either of a capital or finable offence." Upon this, Semp.r.o.nius said, that he charged Cneius Fulvius with the crime of treason; and requested Caius Calpurnius, the city praetor, to appoint a day for the comitia. Another ground of hope was then tried by the accused, viz. if his brother, Quintus Fulvius, could be present at his trial, who was at that time flourishing in the fame of his past achievements and in the near expectation of taking Capua. Fulvius wrote to the senate, requesting the favour in terms calculated to excite compa.s.sion, in order to save the life of his brother; but the fathers replied, that the interest of the state would not admit of his leaving Capua. Cneius Fulvius, therefore, before the day appointed for the comitia arrived, went into exile to Tarquinii, and the commons resolved that it was a legal exile.

4. Meanwhile all the strength of the war was directed against Capua.

It was, however, more strictly blockaded than besieged. The slaves and populace could neither endure the famine, nor send messengers to Hannibal through guards so closely stationed. A Numidian was at length found, who, on undertaking to make his way with it, was charged with a letter; and going out by night, through the midst of the Roman camp, in order to fulfil his promise, he inspired the Campanians with confidence to try the effect of a sally from every quarter, while they had any strength remaining. In the many encounters which followed, their cavalry were generally successful, but their infantry were beaten: however, it was by no means so joyful to conquer, as it was miserable to be worsted in any respect by a besieged and almost subdued enemy. A plan was at length adopted, by which their deficiency in strength might be compensated by stratagem. Young men were selected from all the legions, who, from the vigour and activity of their bodies, excelled in swiftness; these were supplied with bucklers shorter than those worn by hors.e.m.e.n, and seven javelins each, four feet in length, and pointed with steel in the same manner as the spears used by light-armed troops. The cavalry taking one of these each upon their horses, accustomed them to ride behind them, and to leap down nimbly when the signal was given. When, by daily practice, they appeared to be able to do this in an orderly manner, they advanced into the plain between the camp and the walls, against the cavalry of the Campanians, who stood there prepared for action. As soon as they came within a dart"s cast, on a signal given, the light troops leaped down, when a line of infantry formed out of the body of horse suddenly rushed upon the cavalry of the enemy, and discharged their javelins one after another with great rapidity; which being thrown in great numbers upon men and horses indiscriminately, wounded a great many. The sudden and unsuspected nature of the attack, however, occasioned still greater terror; and the cavalry charging them, thus panic-struck, chased them with great slaughter as far as their gates. From that time the Roman cavalry had the superiority; and it was established that there should be velites in the legions. It is said that Quintus Navius was the person who advised the mixing of infantry with cavalry, and that he received honour from the general on that account.

5. While affairs were in this state at Capua, Hannibal was perplexed between two objects, the gaining possession of the citadel of Tarentum, and the retaining of Capua. His concern for Capua, however, prevailed, on which he saw that the attention of every body, allies and enemies, was fixed; and whose fate would be regarded as a proof of the consequences resulting from defection from the Romans. Leaving therefore, a great part of his baggage among the Bruttians, and all his heavier armed troops, he took with him a body of infantry and cavalry, the best he could select for marching expeditiously, and bent his course into Campania. Rapidly as he marched he was followed by thirty-three elephants. He took up his position in a retired valley behind Mount Tifata, which overhung Capua. Having at his coming taken possession of fort Galatia, the garrison of which he dislodged by force, he then directed his efforts against those who were besieging Capua. Having sent forward messengers to Capua stating the time at which he would attack the Roman camp, in order that they also, having gotten themselves in readiness for a sally, might at the same time pour forth from all their gates, he occasioned the greatest possible terror; for on one side he himself attacked them suddenly, and on the other side all the Campanians sallied forth, both foot and horse, joined by the Carthaginian garrison under the command of Bostar and Hanno. The Romans, lest in so perilous an affair they should leave any part unprotected, by running together to any one place, thus divided their forces: Appius Claudius was opposed to the Campanians; Fulvius to Hannibal; Caius Nero, the propraetor, with the cavalry of the sixth legion, placed himself in the road leading to Suessula; and Caius Fulvius Flaccus, the lieutenant-general, with the allied cavalry, on the side opposite the river Vulturnus. The battle commenced not only with the usual clamour and tumult, but in addition to the din of men, horses, and arms, a mult.i.tude of Campanians, unable to bear arms, being distributed along the walls, raised such a shout together with the clangour of brazen vessels, similar to that which is usually made in the dead of night when the moon is eclipsed, that it diverted the attention even of the combatants. Appius easily repulsed the Campanians from the rampart. On the other side Hannibal and the Carthaginians, forming a larger force, pressed hard on Fulvius. There the sixth legion gave way; being repulsed, a cohort of Spaniards with three elephants made their way up to the rampart. They had broken through the centre of the Roman line, and were in a state of anxious and perilous suspense, whether to force their way into the camp, or be cut off from their own army. When Fulvius saw the disorder of the legion, and the danger the camp was in, he exhorted Quintus Navius, and the other princ.i.p.al centurions, to charge the cohort of the enemy which was fighting under the rampart; he said, "that the state of things was most critical; that either they must retire before them, in which case they would burst into the camp with less difficulty than they had experienced in breaking through a dense line of troops, or they must cut them to pieces under the rampart: nor would it require a great effort; for they were few, and cut off from their own troops, and if the line which appeared broken, now while the Romans were dispirited, should turn upon the enemy on both sides, they would become enclosed in the midst, and exposed to a twofold attack."

Navius, on hearing these words of the general, s.n.a.t.c.hed the standard of the second company of spearmen from the standard-bearer, and advanced with it against the enemy, threatening that he would throw it into the midst of them unless the soldiers promptly followed him and took part in the fight. He was of gigantic stature, and his arms set him off; the standard also, raised aloft, attracted the gaze both of his countrymen and the enemy. When, however, he had reached the standards of the Spaniards, javelins were poured upon him from all sides, and almost the whole line was turned against him; but neither the number of his enemies nor the force of the weapons could repel the onset of this hero.

6. Marcus Atilius, the lieutenant-general, also caused the standard of the first company of principes of the same legion to be borne against a cohort of the Spaniards. Lucius Portius Licinus and t.i.tus Popilius, the lieutenant-generals, who had the command of the camp, fought valiantly in defence of the rampart, and slew the elephants while in the very act of crossing it. The carca.s.ses of these filling up the ditch, afforded a pa.s.sage for the enemy as effectually as if earth had been thrown in, or a bridge erected over it; and a horrid carnage took place amid the carca.s.ses of the elephants which lay prostrate. On the other side of the camp, the Campanians, with the Carthaginian garrison, had by this time been repulsed, and the battle was carried on immediately under the gate of Capua leading to Vulturnus. Nor did the armed men contribute so much in resisting the Romans, who endeavoured to force their way in, as the gate itself, which, being furnished with ballistas and scorpions, kept the enemy at bay by the missiles discharged from it. The ardour of the Romans was also clamped by the general, Appius Claudius, receiving a wound; he was struck by a javelin in the upper part of his breast, beneath the left shoulder, while encouraging his men before the front line. A great number, however, of the enemy were slain before the gate, and the rest were driven in disorder into the city. When Hannibal saw the destruction of the cohort of Spaniards, and that the camp of the enemy was defended with the utmost vigour, giving up the a.s.sault, he began to withdraw his standards, making his infantry face about, but throwing out his cavalry in the rear lest the enemy should pursue them closely. The ardour of the legions to pursue the enemy was excessive, but Flaccus ordered a retreat to be sounded, considering that enough had been achieved to convince the Campanians, and Hannibal himself, how unable he was to afford them protection. Some who have undertaken to give accounts of this battle, record that eight thousand of the army of Hannibal, and three thousand Campanians, were slain; that fifteen military standards were taken from the Carthaginians, and eighteen from the Campanians. In other authors I find the battle to have been by no means so important, and that there was more of panic than fighting; that a party of Numidians and Spaniards suddenly bursting into the Roman camp with some elephants, the elephants, as they made their way through the midst of the camp, threw down their tents with a great noise, and caused the beasts of burden to break their halters and run away. That in addition to the confusion occasioned, a stratagem was employed; Hannibal having sent in some persons acquainted with the Latin language, for he had some such with him, who might command the soldiers, in the name of the consuls, to escape every one as fast as he could to the neighbouring mountains, since the camp was lost; but that the imposture was soon discovered, and frustrated with a great slaughter of the enemy; that the elephants were driven out of the camp by fire. However commenced, and however terminated, this was the last battle which was fought before the surrender of Capua. Seppius Lesius was Medixtuticus, or chief magistrate of Capua, that year, a man of obscure origin and slender fortune. It is reported that his mother, when formerly expiating a prodigy which had occurred in the family in behalf of this boy, who was an orphan, received an answer from the aruspex, stating, that "the highest office would come to him;" and that not recognising, at Capua, any ground for such a hope, exclaimed, "the state of the Campanians must be desperate indeed, when the highest office shall come to my son." But even this expression, in which the response was turned into ridicule, turned to be true, for those persons whose birth allowed them to aspire to high offices, refusing to accept them when the city was oppressed by sword and famine, and when all hope was lost, Lesius, who complained that Capua was deserted and betrayed by its n.o.bles, accepted the office of chief magistrate, being the last Campanian who held it.

7. But Hannibal, when he saw that the enemy could not be drawn into another engagement, nor a pa.s.sage be forced through their camp into Capua, resolved to remove his camp from that place and leave the attempt unaccomplished, fearful lest the new consuls might cut off his supplies of provision. While anxiously deliberating on the point to which he should next direct his course, an impulse suddenly entered his mind to make an attack on Rome, the very source of the war. That the opportunity of accomplishing this ever coveted object, which occurred after the battle of Cannae, had been neglected, and was generally censured by others, he himself did not deny. He thought that there was some hope that he might be able to get possession of some part of the city, in consequence of the panic and confusion which his unexpected approach would occasion, and that if Rome were in danger, either both the Roman generals, or at least one of them, would immediately leave Capua; and if they divided their forces, both generals being thus rendered weaker, would afford a favourable opportunity either to himself or the Campanians of gaining some advantage. One consideration only disquieted him, and that was, lest on his departure the Campanians should immediately surrender. By means of presents he induced a Numidian, who was ready to attempt any thing, however daring, to take charge of a letter; and, entering the Roman camp under the disguise of a deserter, to pa.s.s out privately on the other side and go to Capua. As to the letter, it was full of encouragement. It stated, that "his departure, which would be beneficial to them, would have the effect of drawing off the Roman generals and armies from the siege of Capua to the defence of Rome.

That they must not allow their spirits to sink; that by a few days"

patience they would rid themselves entirely of the siege." He then ordered the ships on the Vulturnus to be seized, and rowed up to the fort which he had before erected for his protection. And when he was informed that there were as many as were necessary to convey his army across in one night, after providing a stock of provisions for ten days, he led his legions down to the river by night, and pa.s.sed them over before daylight.

8. Fulvius Flaccus, who had discovered from deserters that this would happen, before it took place, having written to Rome to the senate to apprize them of it, men"s minds were variously affected by it according to the disposition of each. As might be expected in so alarming an emergency, the senate was immediately a.s.sembled, when Publius Cornelius, surnamed Asina, was for recalling all the generals and armies from every part of Italy to protect the city, disregarding Capua and every other concern. Fabius Maximus thought that it would be highly disgraceful to retire from Capua, and allow themselves to be terrified and driven about at the nod and menaces of Hannibal. "Was it probable that he, who, though victorious at Cannae, nevertheless dared not approach the city, now, after having been repulsed from Capua, had conceived hopes of making himself master of Rome? It was not to besiege Rome, but to raise the siege of Capua that he was coming.

Jupiter, the witness of treaties violated by Hannibal, and the other deities, would defend the city of Rome with that army which is now at the city." To these opposite opinions, that of Publius Valerius Flaccus, which recommended a middle course, was preferred. Regardful of both objects, he thought that a letter should be written to the generals at Capua, informing them of the force they had at the city for its protection, and stating, that as to the number of forces which Hannibal was bringing with him, or how large an army was necessary to carry on the siege of Capua, they themselves knew. If one of the generals and a part of the army could be sent to Rome, and at the same time Capua could be efficiently besieged by the remaining general and army, that then Claudius and Fulvius should settle between themselves which should continue the siege of Capua, and which should come to Rome to protect their capital from being besieged. This decree of the senate having been conveyed to Capua, Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, who was to go to Rome, as his colleague was ill from his wound, crossed the Vulturnus with a body of troops, to the number of fifteen thousand infantry and a thousand horse, selected from the three armies. Then having ascertained that Hannibal intended to proceed along the Latin road, he sent persons before him to the towns on and near the Appian way, Setia, Cora, and Lanuvium, with directions that they should not only have provisions ready in their towns, but should bring them down to the road from the fields which lay out of the way, and that they should draw together into their towns troops for their defence, in order that each state might be under its own protection.

9. On the day he crossed the Vulturnus, Hannibal pitched his camp at a small distance from the river. The next day, pa.s.sing by Cales, he reached the Sidicinian territory, and having spent a day there in devastating the country, he led his troops along the Latin way through the territory of Suessa, Allifae, and Casinum. Under the walls of Casinum he remained encamped for two days, ravaging the country all around; thence pa.s.sing by Interamna and Aquinum, he came into the Fregellan territory, to the river Liris, where he found the bridge broken down by the Fregellans in order to impede his progress. Fulvius also was detained at the Vulturnus, in consequence of Hannibal"s having burnt the ships, and the difficulty he had in procuring rafts to convey his troops across that river from the great scarcity of materials. The army having been conveyed across by rafts, the remainder of the march of Fulvius was uninterrupted, a liberal supply of provisions having been prepared for him, not only in all the towns, but also on the sides of the road; while his men, who were all activity, exhorted each other to quicken their pace, remembering that they were going to defend their country. A messenger from Fregella, who had travelled a day and a night without intermission, arriving at Rome, caused the greatest consternation; and the whole city was thrown into a state of alarm by the running up and down of persons who made vague additions to what they heard, and thus increased the confusion which the original intelligence created. The lamentations of women were not only heard from private houses, but the matrons from every quarter, rushing into the public streets, ran up and down around the shrines of the G.o.ds, sweeping the altars with their dishevelled hair, throwing themselves upon their knees and stretching their uplifted hands to heaven and the G.o.ds, imploring them to rescue the city of Rome out of the hands of their enemies, and preserve the Roman mothers and their children from harm. The senate sat in the forum near the magistrates, in case they should wish to consult them. Some were receiving orders and departing to their own department of duty; others were offering themselves wherever there might be occasion for their aid. Troops were posted in the citadel, in the Capitol, upon the walls around the city, and also on the Alban mount, and the fort of Aesula.

During this confusion, intelligence was brought that Quintus Fulvius, the proconsul, had set out from Capua with an army; when the senate decreed that Quintus Fulvius should have equal authority with the consuls, lest on entering the city his power should cease. Hannibal, having most destructively ravaged the Fregellan territory, on account of the bridge having been broken down, came into the territory of the Lavici, pa.s.sing through those of Frusino, Ferentinum, and Anagnia; thence pa.s.sing through Algidum he directed his course to Tusculum; but not being received within the walls, he went down to the right below Tusculum to Gabii; and marching his army down thence into the territory of the Pupinian tribe, he pitched his camp eight miles from the city. The nearer the enemy came, the greater was the number of fugitives slain by the Numidians who preceded him, and the greater the number of prisoners made of every rank and age.

10. During this confusion, Fulvius Flaccus entered the city with his troops through the Capuan gate, pa.s.sed through the midst of the city, and through Carinae, to Esquiliae; and going out thence, pitched his camp between the Esquiline and Colline gates. The plebeian aediles brought a supply of provisions there. The consuls and the senate came to the camp, and a consultation was held on the state of the republic.

It was resolved that the consuls should encamp in the neighbourhood of the Colline and Esquiline gates; that Caius Calpurnius, the city praetor, should have the command of the Capitol and the citadel; and that a full senate should be continually a.s.sembled in the forum, in case it should be necessary to consult them amidst such sudden emergencies. Meanwhile, Hannibal advanced his camp to the Anio, three miles from the city, and fixing his position there, he advanced with two thousand horse from the Colline gate as far as the temple of Hercules, and riding up, took as near a view as he could of the walls and site of the city. Flaccus, indignant that he should do this so freely, and so much at his ease, sent out a party of cavalry, with orders to displace and drive back to their camp the cavalry of the enemy. After the fight had begun, the consuls ordered the Numidian deserters who were on the Aventine, to the number of twelve hundred, to march through the midst of the city to the Esquiliae, judging that no troops were better calculated to fight among the hollows, the garden walls, and tombs, or in the enclosed roads which were on all sides. But some persons, seeing them from the citadel and Capitol as they filed off on horseback down the Publician hill, cried out that the Aventine was taken. This circ.u.mstance occasioned such confusion and terror, that if the Carthaginian camp had not been without the city, the whole mult.i.tude, such was their alarm, would have rushed out. They then fled for refuge into their houses and upon the roofs, where they threw stones and weapons on their own soldiers as they pa.s.sed along the streets, taking them for enemies. Nor could the tumult be repressed, or the mistake explained, as the streets were thronged with crowds of rustics and cattle, which the sudden alarm had driven into the city. The battle between the cavalry was successful, and the enemy were driven away; and as it was necessary to repress the tumults which were arising in several quarters without any cause, it was resolved that all who had been dictators, consuls, or censors, should be invested with authority till such time as the enemy had retired from the walls. During the remainder of the day and the following night, several tumults arose without any foundation, and were repressed.

11. The next day Hannibal, crossing the Anio, drew out all his forces in order of battle; nor did Flaccus and the consuls decline to fight.

When the troops on both sides were drawn up to try the issue of a battle, in which Rome was to be the prize of the victors, a violent shower of rain mingled with hail created such disorder in both the lines, that the troops, scarcely able to hold their arms, retired to their camps, less through fear of the enemy than of any thing else. On the following day, likewise, a similar tempest separated the armies marshalled on the same ground; but after they had retired to their camps the weather became wonderfully serene and tranquil. The Carthaginians considered this circ.u.mstance as a Divine interposition, and it is reported that Hannibal was heard to say, "That sometimes he wanted the will to make himself master of Rome, at other times the opportunity." Two other circ.u.mstances also, one inconsiderable, the other important, diminished his hopes. The important one was, that while he lay with his armed troops near the walls of the city, he was informed that troops had marched out of it with colours flying, as a reinforcement for Spain; that of less importance was, that he was informed by one of his prisoners, that the very ground on which his camp stood was sold at this very time, without any diminution in its price. Indeed, so great an insult and indignity did it appear to him that a purchaser should be found at Rome for the very soil which he held and possessed by right of conquest, that he immediately called a crier, and ordered that the silversmiths" shops, which at that time stood around the Roman forum, should be put up for sale. Induced by these circ.u.mstances he retired to the river Tutia, six miles from the city, whence he proceeded to the grove of Feronia, where was a temple at that time celebrated for its riches. The Capenatians and other states in the neighbourhood, by bringing here their first-fruits and other offerings according to their abilities, kept it decorated with abundance of gold and silver. Of all these offerings the temple was now despoiled. After the departure of Hannibal, vast heaps of bra.s.s were found there, as the soldiers, from a religious feeling, had thrown in pieces of uncoined bra.s.s. The spoliation of this temple is undoubted by historians; but Caelius a.s.serts, that Hannibal, in his progress to Rome, turned out of his way to it from Eretum. According to him his route commenced with Amiternum, Caetilii, and Reate. He came from Campania into Samnium, and thence into Pelignia; then pa.s.sing the town Sulmio, he entered the territory of the Marrucini; thence through the Alban territory he came to that of the Marsi, from which he came to Amiternum and the village of Foruli. Nor is this diversity of opinion a proof that the traces of so great an army could be confounded in the lapse of so brief a period. That he went that way is evident. The only question is, whether he took this route to the city, or returned by it from the city into Campania?

12. With regard to Capua, Hannibal did not evince such obstinate perseverance in raising the siege of it as the Romans did in pressing it; for quitting Lucania, he came into the Bruttian territory, and marched to the strait and Rhegium with such rapidity, that he was very near taking the place by surprise, in consequence of the suddenness of his arrival. Though the siege had been urged with undiminished vigour during his absence, yet Capua felt the return of Flaccus; and astonishment was excited that Hannibal had not returned with him.

Afterwards they learnt, by conversations, that they were abandoned and deserted, and that the Carthaginians had given up all hopes of retaining Capua. In addition to this a proclamation was made by the proconsul, agreeably to a decree of the senate, and published among the enemy, that any Campanian citizen who came over before a stated day should be indemnified. No one, however, came over, as they were held together by fear more than fidelity; for the crimes they had committed during their revolt were too great to admit of pardon. As none of them pa.s.sed over to the enemy, consulting their own individual interest, so no measure of safety was taken with regard to the general body. The n.o.bility had deserted the state, nor could they be induced to meet in the senate, while the office of chief magistrate was filled by a man who had not derived honour to himself from his office, but stripped the office of its influence and authority by his own unworthiness. Now none of the n.o.bles made their appearance even in the forum, or any public place, but shut themselves up in their houses, in daily expectation of the downfall of their city, and their own destruction together. The chief responsibility in every thing devolved upon Bostar and Hanno, the praefects of the Punic garrison, who were anxious on account of their own danger, and not that of their allies.

They addressed a letter to Hannibal, in terms, not only of freedom, but severity, charging him with "delivering, not only Capua into the hands of the enemy, but with treacherously abandoning themselves also, and their troops, to every species of torture;" they told him "he had gone off to the Bruttians, in order to get out of the way, as it were, lest Capua should be taken before his eyes; while, by Hercules, the Romans, on the contrary, could not be drawn off from the siege of Capua, even by an attack upon their city. So much more constant were the Romans in their enmity than the Carthaginians in their friendship.

If he would return to Capua and direct the whole operations of the war to that point, that both themselves and the Campanians would be prepared for a sally. That they had crossed the Alps not to carry on a war with the people of Rhegium nor Tarentum. That where the Roman legions were, there the armies of the Carthaginians ought to be. Thus it was that victories had been gained at Cannae and Trasimenus; by uniting, by pitching their camp close to that of the enemy, by trying their fortune." A letter to this effect was given to some Numidians who had already engaged to render their services for a stated reward.

These men came into the camp to Flaccus under pretence of being deserters, with the intention of quitting it by seizing an opportunity, and the famine, which had so long existed at Capua, afforded a pretext for desertion which no one could suspect. But a Campanian woman, the paramour of one of the deserters, unexpectedly entered the camp, and informed the Roman general that the Numidians had come over according to a preconcerted plan of treachery, and were the bearers of letters to Hannibal; that she was prepared to convict one of the party of that fact, as he had discovered it to her. On being brought forward, he at first pretended, with considerable pertinacity, that he did not know the woman; but afterwards, gradually succ.u.mbing to the force of truth, when he saw the instruments of torture called for and preparing, he confessed that it was so. The letters were produced, and a discovery was made of an additional fact, before concealed, that other Numidians were strolling about in the Roman camp, under pretence of being deserters. Above seventy of these were arrested, and, with the late deserters, scourged with rods; and after their hands had been cut off, were driven back to Capua. The sight of so severe a punishment broke the spirit of the Campanians.

13. The people, rushing in crowds to the senate-house, compelled Lesius to a.s.semble a senate, and openly threatened the n.o.bles, who had now for a long time absented themselves from the public deliberations, that unless they attended the meeting of the senate, they would go round to their houses and drag them all before the public by force.

The fear of this procured the magistrate a full senate. Here, while the rest contended for sending amba.s.sadors to the Roman generals, Vibius Virrius, who had been the instigator of the revolt from the Romans, on being asked his opinion, observed, that "those persons who spoke of sending amba.s.sadors, and of peace, and a surrender, did not bear in mind either what they would do if they had the Romans in their power, or what they themselves must expect to suffer. What! do you think," says he, "that your surrender will be like that in which formerly we placed ourselves and every thing belonging to us at the disposal of the Romans, in order that we might obtain a.s.sistance from them against the Samnites? Have you already forgotten at what a juncture we revolted from the Romans, and what were their circ.u.mstances? Have you forgotten how at the time of the revolt we put to death, with torture and indignity, their garrison, which might have been sent out? How often, and with determined hostility, we have sallied out against them when besieging us, and a.s.saulted their camp?

How we invited Hannibal to come and cut them off? And how most recently we sent him hence to lay siege to Rome? But come, retrace on the other hand what they have done in hostility towards us, that you may learn therefrom what you have to hope for. When a foreign enemy was in Italy, and that enemy Hannibal; when the flame of war was kindled in every quarter; disregarding every other object, disregarding even Hannibal himself, they sent two consuls with two consular armies to lay siege to Capua. This is the second year, that, surrounded with lines and shut up within our walls, they consume us by famine, having suffered in like manner with ourselves the extremest dangers and the severest hardships, having frequently had their troops slain near their rampart and trenches, and at last having been almost deprived of their camp. But I pa.s.s over these matters. It has been usual, even from of old, to suffer dangers and hardships in besieging an enemy"s city. The following is a proof of their animosity and bitter hatred. Hannibal a.s.saulted their camp with an immense force of horse and foot, and took a part of it. By so great a danger they were not in the least diverted from the siege. Crossing the Vulturnus, he laid waste the territory of Cales with fire. Such calamities inflicted upon their allies had no effect in calling them off. He ordered his troops to march in hostile array to the very city of Rome. They despised the tempest which threatened them in this case also. Crossing the Anio, he pitched his camp three miles from the city, and lastly, came up to the very walls and gates. He gave them to understand that he would take their city from them, unless they gave up Capua. But they did not give it up. Wild beasts, impelled by headlong fury and rage, you may divert from their object to bring a.s.sistance to those belonging to them, if you attempt to approach their dens and their young. The Romans could not be diverted from Capua by the blockade of Rome, by their wives and children, whose lamentations could almost be heard from this place, by their altars, their hearths, the temples of their G.o.ds, and the sepulchres of their ancestors profaned and violated. So great was their avidity to bring us to punishment, so insatiable their thirst for drinking our blood. Nor, perhaps, without reason. We too would have done the same had the opportunity been afforded us. Since, however, the G.o.ds have thought proper to determine it otherwise, though I ought not to shrink from death, while I am free, while I am master of myself, I have it in my power, by a death not only honourable but mild, to escape the tortures and indignities which the enemy hope to inflict upon me. I will not see Appius Claudius and Quintus Fulvius in the pride and insolence of victory, nor will I be dragged in chains through Rome as a spectacle in a triumph, that afterwards in a dungeon, or tied to a stake, after my back has been lacerated with stripes, I may place my neck under a Roman axe. I will neither see my native city demolished and burnt, nor the matrons, virgins, and free-born youths of Campania dragged to constupration. Alba, from which they themselves derived their origin, they demolished from her foundations, that there might remain no trace of their rise and extraction, much less can I believe they will spare Capua, towards which they bear a more rancorous hatred than towards Carthage. For such of you, therefore, as have a mind to yield to fate, before they behold such horrors, a banquet is furnished and prepared at my house. When satiated with wine and food, the same cup which shall have been given to me shall be handed round to them. That potion will rescue our bodies from torture, our minds from insult, our eyes and ears from seeing and hearing all those cruelties and indignities which await the vanquished. There will be persons in readiness who will throw our lifeless bodies upon a large pile kindled in the court-yard of the house. This is the only free and honourable way to death. Our very enemies will admire our courage, and Hannibal will learn that those whom he deserted and betrayed were brave allies."

14. More of those who heard this speech of Virrius approved of the proposal contained in it, than had strength of mind to execute what they approved. The greater part of the senate being not without hopes that the Romans, whose clemency they had frequently had proof of in many wars, would be exorable by them also, decreed and sent amba.s.sadors to surrender Capua to the Romans. About twenty-seven senators, following Vibius Virrius to his home, partook of the banquet with him; and after having, as far as they could, withdrawn their minds, by means of wine, from the perception of the impending evil, all took the poison. They then rose from the banquet, after giving each other their right hands, and taking a last embrace, mingling their tears for their own and their country"s fate; some of them remained, that they might be burned upon the same pile, and the rest retired to their homes. Their veins being filled in consequence of what they had eaten, and the wine they drank, rendered the poison less efficacious in expediting death; and accordingly, though the greater part of them languished the whole of that night and part of the following day, all of them, however, breathed their last before the gates were opened to the enemy. The following day the gate of Jupiter, which faced the Roman camp, was opened by order of the proconsul, when one legion and two squadrons of allies marched in at it, under the command of Caius Fulvius, lieutenant-general. When he had taken care that all the arms and weapons to be found in Capua should be brought to him; having placed guards at all the gates to prevent any one"s going or being sent out, he seized the Carthaginian garrison, and ordered the Campanian senators to go into the camp to the Roman generals. On their arrival they were all immediately thrown into chains, and ordered to lay before the quaestor an account of all the gold and silver they had. There were seventy pounds of gold, and three thousand two hundred of silver. Twenty-five of the senators were sent to Cales, to be kept in custody, and twenty-eight to Teanum; these being the persons by whose advice princ.i.p.ally it appeared that the revolt from the Romans had taken place.

15. Fulvius and Claudius were far from being agreed as t

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