4. The speedy punishment of all Moro misconduct and aggression should be secured through the datu or chief.
5. The fleet should make frequent visits to various islands to familiarize the people with the flag, to map the country, and to study conditions in general.
6. Religion should be fully tolerated in the same manner as in India and Java. Proselytism should be prohibited.
7. The sultan should be invited to live in Jolo; an edifice should be constructed for his residence which would increase his dignity in the eyes of his people; and he should be given a high office in connection with the government (as secretary) which would engender and promote his interest in the government and its welfare and secure needed and desirable cooperation between officers and chiefs.
In conclusion, Giraudier pointed to the wisdom of English and Dutch policy in affording education to the sons of native princes and chiefs at public expense, to the necessity of large sacrifices at the beginning which would be amply compensated for by a general pacification of the Archipelago in the end.
VIEWS OF ESPINA
Colonel Espina a.s.sumed that retrogression was out of the question and that the flag which was waving over Sulu must be defended and supported. Sulu could not be abandoned to her fate and Spanish sovereignty had inevitably to be exercised. Extermination of Moros he held to be absurd and impossible, and measures so directed he regarded as injurious and unwise. He entertained strong hopes, amounting to actual conviction, that Moros could become Spanish in political organization, sympathy, and civilization, and that their religion did not form an obstacle to their reformation and a.s.similation unless conversion into the Christian religion was insisted upon and rigorously kept up. He thought that the cause of religion alone was sufficient to prolong the war indefinitely and lead the Government to a policy of extermination and failure. Instead of that he advised a prudent and tolerant policy declaring absolute noninterference with religion and hearty cooperation with the Sulus in matters of general concern and public welfare. He considered it of great importance to occupy all the princ.i.p.al islands of the Archipelago with garrisons and to establish colonies and agricultural stations at the most desirable localities and harbors. He wrote at considerable length on the organization of a rural police force to maintain order and carry out the various measures of his policy. He pointed out the advisability of strengthening the authority of the sultan over Sulus, of rendering his appointment subject to the approval or choice of the Spanish Government, and of selecting a council of state loyal to the Spanish Government and serving under salary. The chief features of the policy he outlined are as follows:
1. The organization of the sultanate should be made or continued in accordance with the laws and customs of the country, but in a manner agreeable to the interests of the Spanish Government. Rank, order, and religion should not be interfered with.
2. The sultan and members of the council of state should be appointed by the Governor-General and should have salaries.
3. A new treaty should be made in order to rectify those clauses of the treaty of 1878 pertaining to the maintenance of peace and the guarantee of safety of life and property.
4. Slavery should be abolished, radically and thoroughly.
5. Compulsory tribunals of justice or courts should be established to relieve datus and chiefs of the exercise of such functions.
6. Commerce should be encouraged and rendered free for all boats for a period of twenty-five years.
7. Roads should be constructed to facilitate communication and transportation from the central region of the island to its princ.i.p.al harbors.
8. Agriculture should be developed and colonies encouraged.
9. Necessities should be created for the Moros, providing them at the same time with means for satisfying them. Children of the sultan and datus should be educated in Manila, and schools for the Moro dialect should be established and made accessible to the public.
PURPOSE OF SPAIN
A few closing remarks on the purpose and interests of Spain in Sulu and the resources she had available for carrying out this purpose may not be out of place in order to give the reader a clear idea of the final policy which Spain had for Sulu and to enable him to grasp the scope, complexity, and difficulties of this problem. However, in discussing these subjects and the changes they were intended to bring about it must be remembered that every project on the part of the sovereign nation or Spain calls for consideration from two points of view--the first is whether the agency employed was sufficient and adequate to impose the change and carry it through; the second is the amount of resistance such a project encountered on the part of the subject nation or Sulu, and in case the resistance could be overcome, whether or not a nation like that of the Sulus was developed sufficiently for the requirements of the change and for subsequent adaptation to the system it was proposed to inaugurate.
Inasmuch as the treaty of 1878 was not abrogated and no distinct effort was actually made to disregard it, it should be regarded as the official and most authentic expression of Spain"s relation, rights, and purpose in Sulu. The terms of this treaty gave Spain indisputable sovereignty over Sulu, the right to occupy all necessary points and to establish military garrisons wherever needed, the right to establish custom-houses at occupied points, the right to limit or control the importation of firearms, the right to suppress piracy and to demand the Sultan"s cooperation in its suppression.
The degree or amount of sovereignty Spain was to exercise over Sulu was very indefinitely stated. The term "indisputable" does not signify "complete," as some hasty reports on Moro affairs have expressed it. The aim of the treaty was to exclude Great Britain, Germany, and other foreign nations from the Spanish sphere of influence over Sulu, and the word "indisputable" should be interpreted in this sense, which is clearly expressed in the Sulu text of the treaty. At that time there was no intention on the part of Spain to a.s.sume the control of Sulu internal affairs and the Sulus endeavored to guard their complete freedom and right to continue their political organization, laws, and religion by specifying those powers which Spain had a right to exercise over them and by declaring emphatically that all their customs, usages, and religion should not be changed. The Sulu word for "customs" signifies laws, organization, and administrative methods. It is the political not the social sense of the word about which they were so very particular. The treaty did not ent.i.tle Spain to interference, or to inst.i.tute any measure that tended toward political change or reform in Sulu. The sultan was left supreme in the exercise of his authority over Moros. The treaty simply secured undisputed Spanish control over Sulu"s foreign relations and commerce and incorporated Sulu into the Philippine Archipelago in this sense only. It further established peace within the Archipelago by checking any possible revival of Sulu piracy. It appears that both distinguished governors, Martinez and Parrado, interpreted the treaty in this sense, and the Sulus certainly so understood it.
Two important steps were taken by Spain later than 1878 in order to modify the relations established by the treaty. The first of these steps was a resolution to appoint the Sultan of Sulu or control the succession to this office. This occurred in 1886 when Sultan Harun was declared by the Spanish Government, in answer to the requests of Governor-General Terrero and Governor Arolas, as the legitimate sultan. By this act the Madrid Government a.s.serted its right to a degree of actual sovereignty over Sulu internal affairs and backed its a.s.sertion with the necessary force and partially carried it through at the hands of Governor Arolas. Jamalul Kiram II finally recognized, to a certain extent, Spain"s authority in this matter and accepted her right of approval or confirmation of the election.
The second step was an attempt to exact tribute from the Sulus. This was done by a decree issued in 1894 by Governor-General Blanco directing that a census be taken of Sulu and a poll tax of 1 "real"
per capita be collected. Advantage was taken at that time of the strong desire of Raja Muda Amirul Kiram to become sultan. Sultan Harun was persuaded to resign, and the measure adopted for the collection of the tribute resulted in the payment of a sum of money or its equivalent by Amirul Kiram and the latter"s appointment as sultan. The scheme was a compromise by which Spain attempted to a.s.sume more control over Sulu, and Amirul Kiram secured his appointment as sultan without having to go to Manila for this purpose. However, the attempt to impose a tribute on the Sulus appears to have failed completely. No census was taken and no tribute was asked in later years.
The purpose of Spain, in accordance with her official declarations, may therefore be summed up as follows: 1. Complete control of Sulu foreign relations; 2. Complete control of Sulu commerce; 3. The right to appoint the sultan; 4. The right to impose tribute on the Sulus.
The first two propositions were legitimate and proper. Both could be accomplished and retained by virtue of Spain"s naval power, merchant marine, and friendly foreign relations with the European nations. The Sulus had no navy and no steam vessels. Their native boats could not offer any significant resistance and were powerless to oppose the Spanish navy. Ever since 1844 the latter was in the ascendant and by 1870 it had completely overpowered the Sulu naval forces. Both these propositions were conceded to Spain in the treaty of 1878 and were justly held ever since. They strengthened the unity of the Philippine Archipelago and secured strength and permanent internal peace.
The third proposition, the right to appoint the sultan, was in effect defeated. It was poor policy. At the end of the b.l.o.o.d.y struggle that arose because if it, Spain retained only the right to confirm the choice of the nation. Had Governor Arolas confined himself to this point he would have won without a contest and without engendering hostility and ill feeling toward his Government. Had a test of arms been the sole arbiter of the question Governor Arolas might be said to have won his point completely, for his forces defeated those of the Sulus in every encounter; but the tenacity of purpose, persistence, and patriotism of the Sulus outlived his determination, and what was won by force and cruelty was given up in the end as inadvisable and impolitic.
The fourth proposition fell through. The best argument that can be advanced in its favor is that a tribute was actually paid by the Sultan Jamalul Kiram II in 1894 and that the tax was not imposed in later years because of the extensive campaign conducted in Mindanao and the frequent changes of Governor-General, and also because of the Tagalog insurrection of 1896. Such argument is more in the nature of an apology than a defense. There is some significance in exacting tribute from the Sultan of Sulu, but the princ.i.p.al of the tribute was utterly defeated. The sultan evidently evaded the question entirely as soon as he felt secure in his office. Such a measure would certainly have been opposed by the Sulus. They would have risen to a man and sacrificed more life and treasure in this cause than in the previous one of the appointment of their candidate for the sultanate. The nation was somewhat divided in the former case, but in the matter of resisting the payment of a tribute there was not a dissenting vote. They would have fought most vigorously and unitedly. Governor Arolas did not exhaust their fighting powers; they could have fought just as well in 1888 as in 1886-87. One party alone advanced against Jolo in 1895, and a band attacked landing soldiers in 1897. To pay tribute to a foreign power meant va.s.salage in their opinion, and this they could not tolerate. They would fight, not on the strength of a careful and intelligent estimate of their power as compared to that of Spain, but because they would not tolerate the idea and their national honor would prompt them to exhaust their strength before they would yield to such a humiliating proposition. Their fighting power was only one unit of their national resources; their national independence, national character, unity and stability of organization were other units which added considerable strength to their resistance. What they could not defeat they would have left alone; what they could not tolerate they would have evaded; what they could not evade they would have run away from.
An exaggerated degree of honor and self-pride, uncontrolled by a certain degree of intelligence, culture, and moral courage, is dangerous. Courage unenc.u.mbered by prosperity or wealth and spurred by abnormal religious sentiment, becomes desperate, reckless, and fanatical. Moreover the treatment by a highly civilized nation of another limited in culture and development is under moral restrictions similar to those pertaining to the treatment by a man of mature age of a minor. A minor can not be blamed for lack of mature reason, and no more can be expected of him than he is able to do. He must further be treated with equity and justice, though he is weak and helpless. It was impossible for the Sulus to change their character at once. It was absurd to expect of them any action contrary to their natural disposition and national character. It was the duty of the sovereign nation to recognize the national character of her inferior and treat her wisely and justly. Tact might have been mightier than an army and wise measures might have worked wonders. Nations can be educated and can develop like individuals and force is a poor agent where the carrying out of a certain measure is intended to bring about reform.
Spain imposed tribute upon the Sulus without being prepared to enforce its collection and before the Sulus were ready for such a measure and the relation it involved. Granting that the funds derived from the tax were to be used for the benefit of the Sulus the principle underlying the inst.i.tution of the tax is repugnant to the people and no means were used to remedy this feeling or train the people for its tolerance. No savage or semicivilized nation can be reformed and governed without initial expense, nor can reform be effected in a day, although forces and funds are available in plenty.
RESOURCES OF SPAIN
In their bearing on the subject under consideration the resources of Spain may be divided into three divisions--her fighting power, her government machinery or system of government, and her racial influence.
Her fighting power includes all the forces of the army and navy which she could bring to bear on Sulu and her ability to support them. The largest Spanish force that ever a.s.sembled on the soil of Sulu was that commanded by Governor-General Malcampo in the expedition of 1876; this was estimated at from 9,000 to 11,000 troops. In January, 1888, the military forces of the Philippine Islands numbered 12,800 men, of whom 1,400 were Spaniards and the rest natives. Governor Arolas never commanded more than 2,000 troops in his various expeditions and never needed more than that number. A garrison force of 700 men proved sufficient to repulse a general attack on Jolo in 1881. We may therefore safely conclude that a force of 2,000 native troops stationed in Sulu was sufficient for all purposes and considerations. Such a force should have been kept in Sulu all the time. The moral effect of maintaining it would be to suppress any attempt at opposition and to check the tendency to mischief or rebellion. The fact that there is a ready force behind an order or request prompts obedience and conformity, before deceit or plots can have time to grow. Wise measures are more effective and peace is a.s.sured. Besides, the honor of the sovereign power is constantly maintained and no chances for disregard or dishonor are allowed. Force back of a wise administrator is a potent factor for good. It need not be used except rarely and when absolutely necessary. Force is evil only when it is allowed to rule the head of the administrator and, like every other agency, it is good only when it is wisely directed. It was therefore necessary and, in as far as it was needed to back a competent administration, it should have been provided. Spain could have easily kept such a force in Sulu all of the time. She had the troops and the means to support them. She, however, did not do this, and only part of the time did the Sulu garrison have the required strength. However, the facility of transporting troops from Zamboanga to Jolo and the preponderance of her naval forces reduced this deficiency to a minimum and the fighting power of Spain may, as far as our purpose is concerned, be deemed to have been adequate to rule Sulu.
The chief weakness in the Spanish regime lay in her system of government. Her government machinery proved ineffective and inadequate. No competent men were educated into the needs of the situation and given permanent charge of Sulu affairs. Temporary military commanders were put in command without the necessary preparation for the requirements of the office. No special ability was needed to conduct an office already organized, to execute laws already established, or to carry out a system of government already laid out; but it required higher abilities to establish sovereignty over a new state like Sulu, lay down a definite, settled, and wise policy, and carry out the regeneration and reform of a nation. Besides too frequent changes in the office of Governor-General, the governors of Sulu were also allowed too short terms. More than thirteen governors ruled Sulu in the course of twenty-three years, from 1876 to 1899. Not one of these felt that it was his duty to inst.i.tute a permanent policy for Sulu, or believed that he was going to stay long enough to carry it through, and that he was going to be held responsible for its conduct, whether it failed or succeeded.
The government of a state is ent.i.tled to as much consideration as any business undertaking and there is no reason why it should not be conducted on sound and businesslike principles. Such methods as characterized the government of Sulu would have ruined any business establishment and could not have done justice to any nation or body of men it represented. The men in responsible positions trusted the transmission of all official actions and communications to interpreters of limited capacity and strength of character. No governor could speak Sulu and verify the translation of his letters and orders. His knowledge of Sulu affairs and his ideas and opinions were necessarily colored by the opinions or designs of his interpreters. The strength of Spain"s a.s.sertion and declaration of her rights to rule Sulu, exclude foreign interests, appoint the Sultan of Sulu, and impose tribute on the Sulus was based on the meaning of the word "sovereignty"
which does not appear at all in the Sulu text of the treaty of 1878. The Sulu copy of the treaty uses in this connection the word "agad" which means "follow." In the translation of this doc.u.ment from Sulu into English a point was stretched and "agad" was interpreted as "obey." While the Sultans of Sulu felt that they were independent and free in their administration of Sulu internal affairs, and that they were only obliged to give Spain preference, and ally themselves on her side when foreign nations interfered, governors like Arolas read the word "sovereignty" in the Spanish text and tried to inforce its full and actual sense. The Sulus felt that the Spanish governors were thus transgressing the limits of their authority, and the Spanish governors thought at the same time that the Sulus were unreliable and deceitful, a most undesirable and unfortunate condition of affairs.
The missionaries in the northern islands acted differently. They talked the language of the natives and performed their duties creditably and with unquestionable success. They understood the people, knew their real conditions, sympathized with them, and worked out their religious regeneration admirably. The governors of Sulu did not take any such view of their duties; they had some zeal, but they lacked that understanding of human nature and the forces of regeneration that the missionaries mastered. They had no idea of how a Sulu law or custom could be modified and reformed, for they never acquainted themselves sufficiently with the laws and customs of the people and never paid much attention to the feelings and public opinion of the Sulus. They trusted every measure to force and could not think of reform without compulsion. A missionary who observed the intense fear of demons on the part of some pagan Filipinos converted several of them by means of a picture of h.e.l.l and satan, and gradually taught them the principles of Christianity. But the governors of Sulu could never detect any relation between Sulu and Spanish laws and could never find a method of approach from one side to the other. Their form of government failed to adapt itself to the conditions of the country and could neither merge into the Sulu organization nor adapt the Sulu organization to its system. No sympathies bound the two races or the two organizations, and no foundation for unification and subsequent a.s.similation could be laid. Spanish jurisdiction remained within the garrison, and its machinery could find no application outside the walls of Jolo.
The amount of force needed to reduce and reform Sulu varies in accordance with the policy pursued. Considerable light can be thrown on this subject by a study of the circ.u.mstances and causes which gave rise to Datus Ayunan, Mandi, Piang, Ara, and Pedro Cuevas or Kalun.
Datu Ayunan lived at Taviran and was much lower in rank and influence than either the Sultan of Bagumbayan or Datu Utu. Having grievances against Datu Utu he shrewdly allied himself with the Spanish forces and rendered them valuable a.s.sistance. In a short time he rose to power, dignity, and fame and died greater in the estimation of the country than his overlord, the Sultan of Bagumbayan.
Datu Piang married the daughter of Datu Ayunan and learned his methods. As soon as Datu Utu"s att.i.tude toward him became unbearable and hostile he offered his services to the Spanish authorities and won their protection and support. By shrewd tactics he dispossessed his former master Utu of his best lands, attracted most of his following and caused his downfall. At the time of the Spanish evacuation he had become the richest Moro in Mindanao and the most influential chief in the island.
Datu Ara had Chinese blood in him. He married his daughter to the Gugu [224] of Magindanao, won the favor of the governor of Kotabato, and ruled over all Moros on the southern branch of the Mindanao River below Tamontaka. He was strong and well respected.
Datu Mandi married the daughter of a Samal chief of Zamboanga and through his tact and ability to speak Spanish established for himself a respectable position over the Samals of Mindanao. He served the interests of Spain faithfully and bore arms in her behalf against Bisayans and Lanao Moros. The recognition and support he obtained from the Spanish Government raised him to the rank of a datu and gave him supremacy over all the chiefs of the peninsula of Zamboanga. A close observation of Datu Mandi"s ability and att.i.tude toward the government renders it clear that the influence this man could bring to bear on his people was immense. It is no exaggeration to state that had his influence been tactfully utilized, he could have easily, with the aid of one company of Spanish troops, reduced to submission all Moros and Subanuns living between Point Flechas and Sindangan on the outskirts of Dapitan. There never existed a Moro chief more tactful, pliable, forceful, and favorable to the reorganization of the Moro community and its system of government along modern and civilized lines.
With little aid from the governor of Zamboanga, Pedro Cuevas made himself the real lord of northern Basilan. His power was further well respected throughout all the Basilan Group of islands. With no more than two companies of troops at his disposal he could have acted as the Spanish representative and subordinate ruler or governor of all the Basilan and Balangingi Groups of islands and could have effected any reform desired.
By tact and ability these men obtained Spanish influence and support and rose from the lowest ranks of the people to positions of great power and dignity. Had the Spanish Government employed such men to further its influence by enlarging their following and extending their territories and spheres of activity, there is no doubt that a very significant step would have been taken which would have made clear to the Spanish authorities successful methods of procedure and new lines of policy that lead to success.
Similar lines of action could have been adopted in Sulu by taking advantage of existing parties and factions. Once the sympathy of one Sulu party was obtained and its forces bore arms on behalf of or on the same side with Spain, the door would have been opened for effective influence and wise measures directed along the line of cleavage would have been bound to produce results. A minimum of force would then be needed, and strained relations and discord would give way to friendship and concord. The history of Sulu is not wanting in proof that wise attractive methods have been more effective than force and arbitrary rule, and, once we reflect upon Abu Bakr"s rule and the wonderful reformation he worked out, then we realize what was and what was not a wise policy for Sulu.
Little attention has, as a rule, been given to race characteristics as a potent factor in a nation"s policy. The racial character of the sovereign nation bears on the ruled nation in several ways--in the conduct and demeanor of officials in their official and social relations with the chiefs and common people, in the demeanor of soldiers and civilians in their social intercourse with the ma.s.s of the people, and in the industrial or business relations of the two nations.
The Sulu datus and chiefs are very courteous and polite and are unusually keen to notice personal discourtesy. Impulsive and unconciliatory methods are bitterly resented, and an abrupt manner may in itself be sufficient to defeat any measure. The people in general have no patience with an impetuous officer and hate to be discourteously treated even by their datus. Treated with disrespect by the authorities or disregarded by the ruling race, they become exclusive, evasive, indifferent, unsympathetic, and discontented. The ruling race can be polite, courteous, and civil in all its social relations with those under it and yet retain its racial supremacy and social position, and win the respect and submission of the ruled race. If ordinary civil duties require good breeding and good manners, the duties of the Spanish officer toward the native chiefs certainly demanded the highest qualities of a gentleman and the most sympathetic, upright, and firm disposition possible. Many Spanish officers possessed these qualities and conducted their offices with full dignity and credit, but it can not be said that all officers were so fully qualified. Such facts in themselves are sufficient to determine the quality of the person to whom state affairs in Sulu should be trusted.
Further, the reform of a nation can never be fully accomplished without the aid of her chiefs and leaders. The cooperation of the natives is a very potent factor for good, and a system of government which aims at the elevation of a conquered nation must find a place in its machinery for the activities of natives of ability and influence. Hence the necessity of successful cooperation with natives and the importance of securing higher qualifications in men holding the highest offices of government. The fewer such officers are and the abler they are, the better and safer the result will be. Such men can overcome racial prejudices and national sentiments and grievances and by the manner in which they discharge their duties, they can command the approval and respect of the ruled nation, gain its sympathies to the side of the government, and maintain peace, prosperity, and good relations between the governing and the governed nations. However, these results were not obtained by Spain in Sulu. The religion and racial prejudices of the two nations were never overcome and the Sulus maintained a feeling of revulsion and distrust toward Spaniards and Christian Filipinos.