Doctor Francisco de Sande.
Before me: Alonso Beltran, His Majesty"s notary.
REASONS FOR HOSTILITIES
The above shows clearly that Governor Sande intended, first, to reduce Sulu to a va.s.sal state; second, to exact tribute in pearls; third, to secure the trade of Sulu for the Spaniards; fourth, to punish the Sultan of Sulu for the help he rendered the Sultan of Bruney against the Spanish forces; fifth, to rescue the Christian slaves in Sulu; sixth, to deprive the Sulus of their artillery and ammunition and of all vessels except fishing vessels, in order to stop their piracy; seventh, to compel the Sulus to become peaceful agriculturists; eighth, to uproot the "accursed doctrine" of Mohammed and to convert the Sulus to the Christian religion.
The leader of the expedition was directed to carry out these instructions as carefully and as gently as possible; and there is no reason to think that he failed to comply with his orders to the letter. But no matter how careful and faithful Captain Rodriguez could have been, it was not difficult for the Sulus to understand the purpose of the expedition and the motives of the Spanish Government, and it does not stand to reason that such people would yield to va.s.salage and receive a direct insult to their religion without resentment and without a struggle. Governor Sande knew the reputation of the Sulus, but he must have underestimated their strength and failed to provide garrisons for the occupation of the conquered territory and the protection of peaceful natives.
In January, 1579, Governor Sande sent an expedition to Mindanao, commanded by Capt. Gabriel de Ribera, under instructions similar to those given to Captain Rodriguez. Ribera had additional orders to visit Jolo and collect the tribute for that year, and special stress was laid on procuring from the Sultan of Sulu "two or three tame elephants." Ribera accomplished nothing in Mindanao; the natives abandoned their villages and fled to the interior. On his return to Kawite or Caldera, he met a deputation from Jolo, which brought insignificant tribute and informed him of the existence of famine in Sulu and the extreme distress of the people. He returned their tribute, receiving in its place a cannon, which the Sulus had obtained from a wrecked Portuguese galley. Ribera then returned to Cebu, without producing any significant effect on conditions in Sulu.
In April, 1580, Governor Sande was relieved by Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo, who did not take the same interest in Borneo and Sulu. In the same year the kingdom of Portugal and its rich eastern colonies were annexed to the Spanish domain. No danger could then be expected from the direction of Borneo and Sulu, and the ambitious new Governor-General turned his attention to more desirable fields of conquest.
Piracy was not the primary cause of this invasion of Sulu. Public sentiment was not so strong against slavery in those days as it is now; for the Spaniards and other leading civilized nations were then diligently pursuing a profitable trade in it between the west coast of Africa and the West Indies and America. Piracy is always a crime among nations, but it can not be urged as the princ.i.p.al and leading cause of this war or as sufficient reason in itself for the early precipitation of such a deadly conflict between Sulu and Spain. Religion, on the other hand, was declared by Governor Sande to be the "princ.i.p.al reason for going to their lands." He ordered the Sulus not to admit any more preachers of Islam, but to allow the Spanish priests to preach Christianity to them. The Mohammedan preachers he directed to be arrested and brought to him, and the mosques to be burned or destroyed and not to be rebuilt.
Part of the instructions the Adelantado [154] Miguel Lopez de Legaspi received before embarking on his expedition to the Philippines read as follows:
And you shall have especial care that, in all your negotiations with the natives of those regions some of the religious accompanying you be present, both in order to avail yourself of their good counsel and advice, and so that the natives may see and understand your high estimation of them; for seeing this, and the great reverence of the soldiers toward them, they themselves will hold the religious in great respect. This will be of great moment, so that, when the religious shall understand their language, or have interpreters through whom they may make them understand our holy Catholic faith, the Indians shall put entire faith in them; since you are aware that the chief thing sought after by his Majesty is the increase of our holy Catholic faith, and the salvation of the souls of those infidels. [155]
In 1566, a pet.i.tion was sent from Cebu to the King of Spain, bearing the signatures of Martin de Goiti, Guido de Labezari, and the other leading officers under Legaspi, setting forth, among other requests, the following:
That the Moros, "because they try to prevent our trade with the natives and preach to them the religion of Mohammed," may be enslaved and lose their property. That slave traffic be allowed, "that the Spaniards may make use of them, as do the chiefs and natives of those regions, both in mines and other works that offer themselves." [156]
In a letter addressed to Legaspi King Philip II said:
We have also been pet.i.tioned in your behalf concerning the Moro Islands in that land, and how those men come to trade and carry on commerce, hindering the preaching of the holy gospel and disturbing you. We give you permission to make such Moros slaves and to seize their property. You are warned that you can make them slaves only if the said Moros are such by birth and choice, and if they come to preach their Mohammedan doctrine or to make war against you or against the Indians, who are our subjects and in our royal service.
In a letter addressed to King Philip II Bishop Salazar writes, June 27, 1588, as follows:
The second point is that, in the Island of Mindanao, which is subject to your Majesty, and for many years has paid you tribute, the law of Mohammed has been publicly proclaimed, for somewhat more than three years, by preachers from Bruney and Ternate who have come there--some of them even, it is believed, having come from Mecca. They have erected and are now building mosques, and the boys are being circ.u.mcised, and there is a school where they are taught the Quran. I was promptly informed of this, and urged the president to supply a remedy therefor at once, in order that that pestilential fire should not spread in these islands. I could not persuade them to go, and thus the hatred of Christianity is there; and we are striving no more to remedy this than if the matter did not concern us. Such are the calamities and miseries to which we have come, and the punishments which G.o.d inflicts upon us. [157]
In drawing a contract with Capt. Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, in 1591, for the pacification and conquest of Mindanao, the Governor and Captain-General Gomez Perez Dasmarinas makes the following declarations:
His Majesty orders and charges me, by his royal instructions and decrees, as the most worthy and important thing in these islands, to strive for the propagation of our holy faith among the natives herein, their conversion to the knowledge of the true G.o.d, and their reduction to the obedience of His holy church and of the king, our sovereign. * * *
Moreover, the Island of Mindanao is so fertile and well inhabited, and teeming with Indian settlements, wherein to plant the faith, *
* * and is rich in gold mines and placers, and in wax, cinnamon, and other valuable drugs. And although the said island has been seen, discussed, and explored, * * * no effort has been made to enter and reduce it, nor has it been pacified or furnished with instruction or justice--quite to the contrary being, at the present time, hostile and refusing obedience to his Majesty; and no tribute, or very little, is being collected. * * *
Besides the above facts, by delaying the pacification of the said island greater wrongs, to the offense and displeasure of G.o.d and of his Majesty, are resulting daily; for I am informed that the king of that island has made all who were paying tribute to his Majesty tributary to himself by force of arms, and after putting many of them to death while doing it; so that now each Indian pays him one tae [158] of gold. I am also told that he destroyed and broke into pieces, with many insults, a cross that he found, when told that it was adored by the Christians; and that in Magindanao, the capital and residence of the said king, are Bornean Indians who teach and preach publicly the false doctrine of Mohammed, and have mosques; besides these, there are also people from Ternate--gunners, armorers, and powder-makers, all engaged in their trades--who at divers times have killed many Spaniards when the latter were going to collect the tribute, * * * without our being able to mete out punishment, because of lack of troops. By reason of the facts above recited, and because all of the said wrongs and troubles will cease with the said pacification; and, when it is made, we are sure that the surrounding kingdoms of Bruney, Sulu, Java, and other provinces, will become obedient to his Majesty: therefore, in order that the said island may be pacified, subdued, and settled, and the gospel preached to the natives; and that justice may be established among them, and they be taught to live in a civilized manner, and to recognize G.o.d and His holy law, I have tried to entrust the said pacification to a person of such character that he may be entrusted with it. [159]
It is plain, therefore, that the sentiment of the times justified war on the Moros for the cause of religion alone, and that, though the primary object was conquest, no doubt the religious motives of the Spaniards were stronger than their desire to check piracy. But, of all the Christian nations, the Spaniards should have been most aware of the tenacity, determination, and courage with which the Mohammedans defend their faith, and the Sulus were no exception to the rule, for they had been born and reared in that religion for more than four generations.
A wiser policy on the part of Governor Sande would have either let the Moros of Sulu and Mindanao alone, or effected a complete reduction of the state of Sulu and immediate occupation of the coasts of Mindanao with strong forces; for it appears from all accounts that neither the Sulus nor the Magindanaos were as strongly organized then as they were a generation later, and either alliance or war should have been easier then than afterwards.
The Spaniards at that time were excellent warriors. Their conquests of the Bisayan Islands and Luzon were rapid and brilliant, but it appears that the system of government which they inaugurated there met with distinct failure the minute it was extended to the more organized communities and the greater forces they encountered in the south. The Sulus, on the other hand, fought in the defense of their national independence and religion, and never found life too dear to sacrifice in that cause. They resented the treatment of Spain, and in their rage and desire for revenge built stronger forts and fleets and became fiercer pirates.
RULE OF BATARA SHAH TANGAH
Pangiran must have died about 1579 and was followed by Sultan Batara Shah Tangah, who is in all probability the Paquian or Paguian Tindig of the Spanish writers. Tangah"s claim to the sultanate was strongly contested by his cousin, Abdasaolan [160] who ruled over Basilan. The latter attacked Jolo with a strong force, but failed to reduce its forts. Tangah, however, felt insecure and went to Manila to request Governor Sande"s aid and returned to Sulu with two Spanish armed boats (caracoas). [161] Abdasaolan, whose power had in the meantime increased, prepared for defense and watched for the advance of the Sultan"s boat. Finding that the caracoas were at a considerable distance from the Sultan"s boat he manned two light salisipans [162] with a strong force and dispatched them, with speed to intercept Tangah. The Sultan"s party was completely surprised, and in the fight that resulted Tangah was killed. On reaching Jolo the Spanish forces attacked the town. The Sulus fought valiantly, but their fort was reduced. The officers in command of the caracoas a.s.sembled the people and had Raja Bungsu, who was wounded in the fight, elected sultan to succeed Tangah. The full t.i.tle of Bungsu was "The Sultan Muwallil Wasit Bungsu." [163]
FIGUEROA"S EXPEDITION AGAINST MINDANAO
In 1596 Capt. Esteban Rodriguez led an expedition into Mindanao, for its conquest and pacification.
It is maintained that he proceeded up the Mindanao River as far as Bwayan, the capital of the upper Mindanao Valley.
Don Esteban Rodriguez prepared men and ships, and what else was necessary for the enterprise, and with some galleys, galleots, frigates, vireys, [164] barangays, [164] and lapis, [165] set out with two hundred and fourteen Spaniards for the Island of Mindanao, in February of the same year, of 1596. He took Capt. Juan de la Xara as his master-of-camp, and some religious of the Society of Jesus to give instruction, as well as many natives for the service of the camp and fleet.
He reached Mindanao River after a good voyage, where the first settlements, named Tampakan and Lumakan, both hostile to the people of Bwayan, received him peacefully and in a friendly manner, and joined his fleet. They were altogether about six thousand men. Without delay they advanced about 8 leagues farther up the river against Bwayan, the princ.i.p.al settlement of the island, where its greatest chief had fortified himself on many sides. Arrived at the settlement, the fleet cast anchor and immediately landed a large proportion of the troops with their arms. But before reaching the houses and fort, and while going through some thickets [cacatal] [166] near the sh.o.r.e, they encountered some of the men of Bwayan, who were coming to meet them with their kampilan, [167] carazas [168] and other weapons, and who attacked them on various sides. The latter [i.e., the Spaniards and their allies], on account of the swampiness of the place and the denseness of the thickets [cacatal], could not act unitedly as the occasion demanded, although the master-of-camp and the captains that led them exerted themselves to keep the troops together and to encourage them to face the natives. Meanwhile Governor Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa was watching events from his flagship, but not being able to endure the confusion of his men, seized his weapons and hastened ash.o.r.e with three or four companions and a servant who carried his helmet in order that he might be less impeded in his movements. But as he was crossing a part of the thickets [cacatal] where the fight was waging, a hostile Indian stepped out unseen from one side and dealt the governor a blow on the head with his kampilan that stretched him on the ground badly wounded. [169] The governor"s followers cut the Mindanao to pieces and carried the governor back to the camp. Shortly after the master-of-camp, Juan de la Xara, withdrew his troops to the fleet, leaving behind several Spaniards who had fallen in the encounter. The governor did not regain consciousness, for the wound was very severe, and died next day. The fleet after that loss and failure left that place, and descended the river to Tampakan, where it anch.o.r.ed among the friendly inhabitants and their settlements.
The master-of-camp, Juan de la Xara, had himself chosen by the fleet as successor in the government and enterprise. He built a fort with arigues [170] and palms near Tampakan, and founded a Spanish settlement to which he gave the name of Murcia. He began to make what arrangements he deemed best, in order to establish himself and run things independently of, and without acknowledging the governor of Manila, without whose intervention and a.s.sistance this enterprise could not be continued. [171]
Bwayan was 30 miles up the river and 25 miles above Magindanao or Kotabato where Bwisan, the Sultan of Magindanao, was strongly fortified. It is difficult to believe that Rodriguez could advance so far even with a small scouting party. A careful review of the Spanish reports referring to these early campaigns in Mindanao indicates that Bwayan has been erroneously used in place of Magindanao, the ancient capital of the sultanate of Magindanao.
Bent on the conquest of Mindanao, Governor Tello prepared another expedition under Gen. Juan Ronquillo [172] and dispatched it by the way of Cebu. At Caldera, it was joined by the fleet of Mindanao and the whole force proceeded east in the direction of the Mindanao River, on the 6th of February, 1597. Captain Chaves arrived with his frigates at the river on the 8th of January. In a battle fought at Simway to capture Moro vessels going to seek aid from Ternate he had a leg cut off and received a shot in the helmet above the ear. Ronquillo arrived at the mouth of the river on February 21, and on the 17th of April he engaged a Moro fleet with 40 arquebusiers and defeated them, killing a number of their brave men and some Ternatans without losing any of his men except 5 Bisayans. Leaving a guard of 34 men under Chaves at the fort of Tampakan he advanced up the river with a force of 230 sailors and gunners. The enemy retired behind some parapets as soon as the artillery opened upon them, and brought some artillery to bear on the flagship (one of the galleys), but could not r.e.t.a.r.d the Spanish advance.
"I answered their fire with so great readiness," said Ronquillo in his report, "that I forced them to withdraw their artillery. But, as if they were goblins, they remained here behind a bush or a tree, firing at us without being seen." Reinforced by the chief of the hill tribes, Lumakan, with 500 natives, Ronquillo resumed the fighting after the delay of a few days. "Finally," continued Ronquillo, "I planted my battery of eight pieces somewhat over 100 paces from the fort. Although I battered the fort hotly, I could not effect a breach through which to make an a.s.sault. All the damage that I did them by day, they repaired by night. * * *
"I was very short of ammunition, for I had only 3,000 arquebus bullets left, and very few cannon b.a.l.l.s; and both would be spent in one day"s fighting, during which, should we not gain the fort, we would be lost--and with no power to defend ourselves while withdrawing our artillery and camp. * * *
"I reconnoitered the fort and its situation, for it is located at the entrance of a lagoon, thus having only water at the back, and swampy and marshy ground at the sides. It has a frontage of more than 1,000 paces, is furnished with very good transversals, and is well supplied with artillery and arquebuses. Moreover it has a ditch of water more than 4 brazas [173] wide and 2 deep, and thus there was a s.p.a.ce of dry ground of only 15 paces where it was possible to attack; and this s.p.a.ce was bravely defended, and with the greatest force of the enemy. The inner parts were water, where they sailed in vessels, while we had no footing at all."
"Again, I reflected that those who had awaited us so long, had waited with the determination to die in defense of the fort; and if they should see the contest ending unfavorably for them, no one would prevent their flight. Further, if they awaited the a.s.sault it would cost me the greater part of my remaining ammunition, and my best men; while, if the enemy fled, nothing would be accomplished, but on the contrary a long, tedious, and costly war would be entered upon. Hence, with the opinion and advice of the captains, I negotiated for peace, and told them that I would admit them to friendship under the following conditions:
"First, that first and foremost they must offer homage to his Majesty, and pay something as recognition" (a gold chain). Second, "that all the natives who had been taken from the Pintados Islands [Bisayan Islands] last year, must be restored." Third, "that they must break the peace and confederation made with the people of Ternate, and must not admit the latter into their country." Fourth, "that they must be friends with Danganlibor and Lumakan, * * *
and must not make war on their va.s.sals." Fifth, "that all the chiefs must go to live in their old villages." [174]
Ronquillo later reported the place indefensible and was authorized to retire to Caldera.