The truth was that, despite his efforts to gain a foothold at William"s court while he was still residing in Hanau, Mayer Amschel was still to all intents and purposes a n.o.body when the new Landgrave moved north to Ka.s.sel on his father"s death in 1785. We know from the fact that he requested a special Sunday pa.s.s to leave the Judenga.s.se in 1783 and from later correspondence that Mayer Amschel had already begun to involve himself in the English bills business. But it was not until 1789 that he was able to squeeze himself into the main market for these bills at Ka.s.sel by offering to pay more than the established local firms. Even then he was granted only the most meagre credit facility-800, compared with the figure of 25,000 given to the leading Ka.s.sel broker Feidel David-and when he requested a higher credit limit the following year he got just 2,000, compared with the 10,000 he had asked for.1 At this point, however, Mayer Amschel struck up one of those peculiarly instrumental friendships based on mutual advantage which were to become a hallmark of his sons" (and grandsons") At this point, however, Mayer Amschel struck up one of those peculiarly instrumental friendships based on mutual advantage which were to become a hallmark of his sons" (and grandsons") modus operandi modus operandi. Karl Friedrich Buderus had begun his career in William"s service as the tutor of his b.a.s.t.a.r.ds by Dorothea Ritter. In 1783 he had moved into the financial administration at Hanau and in 1792, at the age of thirty-three, he moved to Ka.s.sel to work for the all-important War Chest, rising swiftly through the civil service ranks.
The first sign of tacit co-operation between Buderus and Rothschild came in 1794 when the former explicitly recommended that Mayer Amschel be allowed to join five established firms in bidding for a sale of 150,000 of English bills. Evidently, his recommendation was ignored, but Buderus tried again in 1796 and this time succeeded. The two Gentile banking partnerships of Ruppell & Harnier and Preye & Jordis had offered 1 million gulden of Frankfurt city bonds to the War Chest, of which the Chest had bought 900,000. Buderus then tipped off Mayer Amschel that he should offer to sell the remaining 100,000 gulden to the Chest at a more generous price (97.5 per cent of face value) than the other banks were offering (98 per cent). This was hardly profitable as the bonds were quoted at par (that is, 100) on the Frankfurt bourse, but the slightly larger discount he was offering secured Mayer Amschel the foothold he had so long sought. In 1798 most of the 37,000 of English bills sold were bought either by him, by Ruppell or by Jordis for cash. In the following years, Mayer Amschel steadily increased his share of William"s investment business as well. Altogether, between 1801 and 1806, he was involved in at least eleven major loans, of which the most important were to Denmark, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden and the Order of St John. He also became involved in purchases of real estate on William"s behalf, while continuing to supply him with his beloved medals.
The negotiations leading up to the various Danish loans are of particular interest because they give us an insight into the way Mayer Amschel squeezed out his business rivals. At first, in 1800 and 1801, he was content merely to take a share of loans which were organised by the likes of Ruppell & Harnier and Bethmanns. Before long, he was being treated by them as an equal partner. Finally, from around 1804, he was able to establish what amounted to a monopoly of Danish business, partly thanks to the "douceurs" and discounts he gave the obsessively penny-pinching William, partly thanks to the good relationship he established with the Hamburg banker J. D. Lawatz, who played a mediating role between Ka.s.sel and Copenhagen. Altogether, Mayer Amschel sold William Danish bonds worth a total of at least 4.5 million gulden (roughly 450,000) in this period; placed three loans to the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt totalling 1.3 million gulden, of which around half was taken by William; and one loan to Baden of 1.4 million gulden. These are impressive figures and, understandably, Mayer Amschel"s success aroused considerable envy and resentment among his compet.i.tors. In 1806 Ruppell & Harnier complained bitterly (but vainly) about aspersions being cast on their honour by "Jewish commercial rivals" who seemed to believe that "the name Rothschild" enjoyed more credit in Hesse-Ka.s.sel than that of the Danish government itself.
Nor was such ill-feeling confined to Gentile firms. In 1802 the Ka.s.sel Jewish community lodged a complaint against Mayer Amschel, on the ground that he was to all intents and purposes residing in the town (where most of the business described above was done) without having the status-and tax liabilities-of a "protected Jew." Having been obliged to pay 180 gulden to buy exemption from the relevant dues, Mayer Amschel then decided to secure protected status for his eldest son Amschel. With wonderful insincerity, he argued in his application that the presence of a Rothschild in Ka.s.sel would "not impair the activities of the local merchants in any way and those who conduct business in bills will rather profit from this, as such transactions always benefit from a large compet.i.tion." Opposition from the local Jewish community and hesitation on the part of Mayer Amschel as to whether the residence permit should be in his or his son"s name meant that it was not actually issued until June 1806.2 Yet, despite the t.i.tle of senior court agent (Oberhof.a.gent) bestowed on him in 1803, it is important to stress that at this juncture it was not Mayer Amschel so much as William who was the real banker; Rothschild was in many ways more of a stockbroker, catering to his client"s growing preference for bearer bonds as opposed to personal loans.3 Typically, Mayer Amschel"s commission when he bought bonds for William was no more than around 1.75 or 2 per cent, so that his total profits from this business probably did not exceed 300,000 gulden. Moreover, on at least two occasions, it was Mayer Amschel himself who borrowed from William. At the same time, it is important to remember that, although William was Mayer Amschel"s most important client in this period, he was by no means his only client. The objective, in this era of multiple states, was to establish links with as many princely courts as possible-something which the loans business he did for Hesse-Ka.s.sel made easy. By 1803 he had been appointed court agent to the Order of St John (on the strength of a decidedly ill-starred loan), the Prince of Thurn und Taxis (hereditary postmaster of the Holy Roman Empire), the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt and Karl Friedrich Ludwig Moritz zu Isenburg, Count of Budingen. The most prestigious of these appointments came in 1800, when Mayer Amschel secured the t.i.tle of imperial court agent from the Austrian Emperor, in return not only for his earlier services as a supplier of war Typically, Mayer Amschel"s commission when he bought bonds for William was no more than around 1.75 or 2 per cent, so that his total profits from this business probably did not exceed 300,000 gulden. Moreover, on at least two occasions, it was Mayer Amschel himself who borrowed from William. At the same time, it is important to remember that, although William was Mayer Amschel"s most important client in this period, he was by no means his only client. The objective, in this era of multiple states, was to establish links with as many princely courts as possible-something which the loans business he did for Hesse-Ka.s.sel made easy. By 1803 he had been appointed court agent to the Order of St John (on the strength of a decidedly ill-starred loan), the Prince of Thurn und Taxis (hereditary postmaster of the Holy Roman Empire), the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt and Karl Friedrich Ludwig Moritz zu Isenburg, Count of Budingen. The most prestigious of these appointments came in 1800, when Mayer Amschel secured the t.i.tle of imperial court agent from the Austrian Emperor, in return not only for his earlier services as a supplier of war materiel materiel, but also for his work in collecting the interest on the Emperor"s considerable borrowings from Hesse-Ka.s.sel. His only failure came in 1802, when the court of Bavaria ignored his application for the t.i.tle of agent.
The importance of such t.i.tles should not be exaggerated, of course. In 1803, for example, Hesse-Darmstadt customs officials simply refused to recognise Mayer Amschel"s privileged status as a court agent. In any case, the whole system of petty princ.i.p.alities and overlapping jurisdictions which had made such t.i.tles matter in the eighteenth century was on the brink of an unprecedented and revolutionary upheaval-an upheaval which was to transform the Rothschilds" relationship with their princely patrons. Up until 1806 they had depended on the Elector and his ilk for their business and the privileges they could confer. Thereafter, William found that, little by little, it was he who began to depend on Mayer Amschel and his sons.
The Origins of a Myth As we have seen, there had already been one major collision between Hesse-Ka.s.sel and the forces of Revolutionary France in the 1790s, culminating in the bombardment of Frankfurt which destroyed the Judenga.s.se in 1796. That had led to a strengthening of the traditional links between Ka.s.sel and London: not for the first time, William put troops in the field against France in return for English money. True, he had subsequently accepted the terms of the Peace of Luneville (1801), which transferred the left bank of the Rhine to France. But when war broke out again between England and France in 1803 a showdown became almost inevitable. William was too committed to England to follow the lead of those sixteen German states which seceded from the defunct Holy Roman Empire to form the Francophile Confederation of the Rhine in the summer of 1806. He was also too intent on driving a hard bargain with the various powers bidding for his support to realise the vulnerability of his own position. Napoleon offered Hanoverian territory. On the other hand, the Elector (as William now was) had lent money to Austria and to Prussia, who had joined the coalition against France in 1805. When the Prussian army was defeated at Jena and Auerstadt in the autumn of 1806, he was hopelessly exposed. Neither the hasty demobilisation of his troops, nor his belated request to join the Rhine Confederation, nor even the plaintive signs he hastily ordered to be put up at his borders-"Electorat de Hesse: Pays Neutre"-could deflect the wrath of Bonaparte, in whose eyes he was now merely "a field marshal in the service of Prussia." "My object," Napoleon declared bluntly, "is to remove the House of Hesse-Ka.s.sel from rulership and to strike it out of the list of powers." William had little option but to flee, heading initially for his brother"s estate at Gottorp in Holstein (then Danish territory).4 On November 2 General Lagrange occupied his residence at Ka.s.sel as Governor-General; two days later he issued a proclamation formally confiscating all his a.s.sets and threatening anyone who sought to conceal these with trial by a military tribunal. On November 2 General Lagrange occupied his residence at Ka.s.sel as Governor-General; two days later he issued a proclamation formally confiscating all his a.s.sets and threatening anyone who sought to conceal these with trial by a military tribunal.
According to legend, it was at this critical moment that William turned to his faithful court agent Rothschild, hastily leaving in his care the entirety of his movable wealth: The French army was actually entering Frankfurt at the moment when Rothschild succeeded in burying the prince"s treasures in a corner of his little garden. His own property, which in goods and money was worth about 40,000 thalers, he did not hide, well knowing that, if he did so, a strict search would be made and that not only his own but the prince"s h.o.a.rd would be discovered and plundered. The Republicans who, like the Philistines of old, fell upon Rothschild, left him not one thaler"s value of his own money or property. In truth, he was, like all the other Jews and citizens, reduced to utter poverty but the prince"s treasure was safe . . .
According to this not untypical version of the story from an English newspaper in 1836, when Mayer Amschel finally returned the money to William, he replied: "I will neither receive the interest which your honesty offers nor yet take money out of your hands. The interest is not sufficient to replace what you lost to save mine; and further my money shall be at your service for 20 years to come and at no more than two per cent interest."
As discussed in the introduction, this story first gained currency in 1827, when it appeared in F. A. Brockhaus"s General German Encyclopaedia for the Educated Cla.s.ses General German Encyclopaedia for the Educated Cla.s.ses. Though there is good reason to think that it was initially inspired by the Rothschilds themselves, it was subsequently so widely disseminated as to take on a life-and a variety of significances-of its own. Initially, it was intended to ill.u.s.trate the family"s exceptional probity as deposit-holders: willing to risk everything rather than fail to protect and pay interest on a client"s money. That was certainly the message of Moritz Daniel Oppenheim"s two paintings on the subject commissioned by the family in 1861. By the later nineteenth century, however, it was beginning to acquire an alternative reading: the Elector"s treasure was "blood money" because it had been earned by the sale of mercenaries, while Mayer Amschel made the most of it rather than merely preserving it. The positive and negative versions of the myth are vividly juxtaposed in the American and German films The House of Rothschild The House of Rothschild (1934) and (1934) and Die Rothschilds Die Rothschilds (1940). (1940).
As has long been realised, the story is fiction-though, like so much of the Rothschild myth, it contains a very tiny grain of truth. In fact, William"s movable property was widely dispersed in the period after the French occupation and only a few relatively unimportant items came into Mayer Amschel"s possession. Some of the most important valuables-mainly bonds (without their coupons, which were stored separately)-were successfully smuggled out of Ka.s.sel by Buderus, who made the hazardous trip through the French lines to Itzehoe in early November. The bulk, however, was stored in caches at William"s country houses. According to a meticulous list drawn up by the Elector himself, twenty four chests-containing not only securities and coupons but also accounts, silverware and clothes-were hidden under the stairs of the north wing of the Wilhelmshohe, while another twenty-four, including important War Chest papers, were concealed in another part of the palace. In the cellar of the nearby Lowenburg were hidden a further twenty-four chests, including securities belonging to the Elector"s mistress, official papers, porcelain and clothes. Finally, at his hunting lodge at Sababurg, there were forty-seven chests, most of them filled with silverware. Most of this would in fact have been lost to the French-who quickly managed to obtain an inventory of the Elector"s silver-had it not proved possible to strike a deal with Lagrange. In return for a bribe of 260,000 francs (modest under the circ.u.mstances) he agreed to allow forty-two of the chests to be spirited away; the rest were confiscated. Accordingly, on the night of November 8, one of the Elector"s officers led a convoy of carts with the freed chests to Hof Stolzingen, where they were divided up. War Councillor Lennep took some of the most important doc.u.ments (including papers relating to the Elector"s London investments) back to Ka.s.sel; ten chests were deposited with the Munden firm of Thorbecke, of which two were sent on to Schleswig and the rest to Eisenach; and nineteen were smuggled into Frankfurt and left in the hands of the bankers Preye & Jordis.
By this time, however, Lagrange had realised that he had undercharged the Elector"s men. Having managed to recapture some of the chests he had previously released, he now demanded more money. Eventually, an agreement was reached: in return for a second, rather larger payment, Lagrange promised to understate the total value of the Elector"s a.s.sets. A list was drawn up totalling 19.8 million gulden (composed mainly of the larger loans to other German princes), and this became the "official" French inventory. All doc.u.ments relating to the Elector"s other a.s.sets-an estimated 27 million gulden-were then handed over to Buderus. Some of these were sent to the Elector at Schleswig. Some were kept by Buderus himself. The rest, mostly routine papers from the War Chest and Privy Purse, were packed into four chests. It was these four chests which were given to Mayer Amschel. A few others containing medals and a few bonds were also temporarily left in his care in Hamburg when the Elector left Itzehoe for Austrian territory in the summer of the following year.5 But that was all. But that was all.
Yet this prosaic account understates Rothschild"s importance to the exiled Elector. For one thing, William still had need of a skilled stockbroker and investment adviser. Having managed to hang on to a.s.sets worth 27 million gulden, his investment income remained substantial, even after the extra costs imposed by exile. (According to Berghoeffer"s figures, the surplus was something like 740,000 gulden a year.) Part of Mayer Amschel"s role in this period was to collect this income from the various borrowers concerned. In addition, he had to reinvest it in new loans. For example, he arranged a loan of 100,000 gulden to the Hanau Treasury and a large loan to Graf Karl von Hahn zu Remplin (the profligate "Theatergraf," who was shortly afterwards made a ward of court by his family). He looked after a current account for money the Elector had entrusted to Buderus. On one occasion, at Buderus"s suggestion, he also borrowed money from the Elector himself. He repurchased a substantial part of the Elector"s coin collection, which had been sold off and dispersed, as well as fourteen cases of wine which had been stolen from the Hanau cellars. He handled various transfers of money which the Elector had to make for military and diplomatic purposes: payments to Hessian prisoners-of-war held by the French, to the Machiavellian Prince Wittgenstein, who had offered his diplomatic services, as well as to Russia and Prussia in 1813. He lent around 160,000 gulden to the Elector"s son in Berlin. He looked after the finances of the Elector"s mistress, Grafin von Schlotheim. He even sold the Elector a diamond ring.
Much of this was trivial, admittedly, and a good deal of it was unprofitable. A lot of time was wasted in 1809 and 1810 on an abortive scheme to a.s.sist the depleted Austrian Treasury by transferring some of William"s a.s.sets-with a nominal value of over 10 million gulden-to the Emperor. But there was one service performed by the Rothschilds for William which made all the rest worthwhile: the management of his English investments. Nathan later claimed that "The Prince of Hesse-Ca.s.sel . . . gave my father his money; there was no time to be lost; he sent it to me. I had 600,000 arrive unexpectedly by the post; and I put it to such good use, that the prince made me a present of all his wine and his linen." This has a superficial plausibility: one of the most important financial consequences of the French wars was a large migration of capital from the continent to London. As with the story of the treasure, however, the reality was rather more complex.
At the start of his time in exile, William already had a very substantial English portfolio, primarily annuities with a nominal value of 635,400 paying interest of 20,426 a year. In addition, he was owed a considerable sum-around 200,000-by the Prince of Wales and his brothers (though they were characteristically in arrears with their interest payments). As an ally of the crown, he also received subsidies totalling 100,150 between 1807 and 1810.6 The critical question was what should be done with the interest payments and subsidies as they were paid to William"s current account with Van Notten. As early as 1807-in other words, some time before his move from Manchester to London-Nathan approached William"s envoy in London, Lorentz, with suggestions as to how the money might be invested, but he was rebuffed at the Elector"s express instruction. The critical question was what should be done with the interest payments and subsidies as they were paid to William"s current account with Van Notten. As early as 1807-in other words, some time before his move from Manchester to London-Nathan approached William"s envoy in London, Lorentz, with suggestions as to how the money might be invested, but he was rebuffed at the Elector"s express instruction.7 It was not until two years later, once again at the prompting of Buderus, that Mayer Amschel was instructed to purchase 3 per cent consols (redeemable state annuities, or what would now be called gilt-edged securities) with a face value of 150,000 at 73.5 (that is, at 73.5 per cent of their face value or price at redemption). It was to be the first of no fewer than nine such purchases up until the end of 1813, totalling 664,850. This was the money to which Nathan later alluded in his conversation with Buxton. His brother Carl was also alluding to it when he observed in 1814 that "the Old Man"-mean ing William-had "made our fortune. If Nathan had not had the Elector"s 300,000 [ It was not until two years later, once again at the prompting of Buderus, that Mayer Amschel was instructed to purchase 3 per cent consols (redeemable state annuities, or what would now be called gilt-edged securities) with a face value of 150,000 at 73.5 (that is, at 73.5 per cent of their face value or price at redemption). It was to be the first of no fewer than nine such purchases up until the end of 1813, totalling 664,850. This was the money to which Nathan later alluded in his conversation with Buxton. His brother Carl was also alluding to it when he observed in 1814 that "the Old Man"-mean ing William-had "made our fortune. If Nathan had not had the Elector"s 300,000 [sic] in hand he would have got nowhere."
How could such purchases of consols on someone else"s behalf have been so vital to the Rothschilds? The answer lies in the way these investments were carried out. At first sight, there was not a great deal to be made from this business, as Mayer Amschel charged only one-eighth of a per cent brokerage on each purchase. On closer inspection, however, much more stood to be made. William did not actually put up all the cash at once for each purchase; it was the Rothschilds who effectively bought the consols, albeit on his behalf, and with money they had largely borrowed. If they had wished, they could have paid only a fraction of the market price, postponing full payment until a future settlement date. But this would have involved a double speculation: on the price of the consols and on the gulden-sterling exchange rate. Mayer Amschel preferred not to do this. He was content to derive advantage from the difference between the price and the exchange rate agreed with William, and the actual price and exchange rate paid by his son in London. For the first three purchases, the difference in price was of the order of 2 per cent, reflecting the fact that, at this low ebb in Britain"s campaign against Napoleon, consols were falling. It is probable (though impossible to prove) that Mayer Amschel was also deriving some benefit from differences in the exchange rate.
The Elector probably suspected what was going on: when consols reached a low of 62.5 in the summer of 1811, he called a halt to new purchases and ceased remitting money to cover previous purchases until May of the following year. But this probably suited the Rothschilds well. For the consols remained registered in Nathan"s name until they were fully paid for by William. That meant, for example, that even as late as March 1813 consols with a face value of 121,000 were notionally Nathan"s. Of course, they had largely been bought with borrowed money, and, from the moment the Elector"s remittances arrived until the stocks were formally transferred to him or his agents, the Rothschilds also had to pay interest. On the other hand, a certain lat.i.tude was possible, given the difficulty of getting certificates of ownership from London to the Elector in Prague.8 Whatever profits Nathan was able to make on the market price and the exchange rate, purchases of more than 600,000 worth of consols and the actual possession of over 100,000 signalled the advent of a new financial force in the City of London. In this sense, as Carl later noted, it gave Nathan a kind of "security"-the impression of capital resource in excess of what the family actually had. Amschel spelt out the significance of this in a letter to his brothers in 1818: "The good Nathan would have been unable to draw during the war bills to the amount of 132,000 and to handle all the businesses if . . . we had not obtained for him in Prague the big deal of the Elector"s stocks, which he handled . . . [U]p to then Nathan did not even know what stocks looked like." In effect, the war had allowed the Rothschilds to make a part of William"s financial strength their own. Whatever profits Nathan was able to make on the market price and the exchange rate, purchases of more than 600,000 worth of consols and the actual possession of over 100,000 signalled the advent of a new financial force in the City of London. In this sense, as Carl later noted, it gave Nathan a kind of "security"-the impression of capital resource in excess of what the family actually had. Amschel spelt out the significance of this in a letter to his brothers in 1818: "The good Nathan would have been unable to draw during the war bills to the amount of 132,000 and to handle all the businesses if . . . we had not obtained for him in Prague the big deal of the Elector"s stocks, which he handled . . . [U]p to then Nathan did not even know what stocks looked like." In effect, the war had allowed the Rothschilds to make a part of William"s financial strength their own.
On the other hand, the price of that security was a high level of insecurity on the continent. For the risks the Rothschilds ran in serving William were real. The French authorities were in earnest about tracking down the Elector"s wealth and they were prepared to use all the means at their disposal to do so. Under the Berlin Convention of 1808, for example, Napoleon extended a tempting offer to the Elector"s numerous debtors, inviting them to settle with the French authorities instead of the Elector in return for reductions in their debts. More alarmingly, the departure of General Lagrange put paid to the deal which had been struck with him. Mayer Amschel"s offices were searched by the French police, as were those of Preye & Jordis. It was probably at this time that the contents of the four chests in Mayer Amschel"s possession were concealed in the secret cellar described above. In August 1808 Salomon was interrogated by a French police official, as was a representative of another bank suspected of acting for William, and the following month Buderus and Lennep were briefly arrested. The same happened in the summer of the following year, in the wake of a minor anti-French revolt. The Special Commissioner of Police in Westphalia-a man named Savagner-had Buderus and Lennep arrested again and then, acting on information supplied by one of the Rothschilds" business rivals, proceeded with a senior Frankfurt police officer to Mayer Amschel"s office. There followed a bizarre interrogation in which the French attempted to get Mayer Amschel to admit to having supplied money on William"s behalf to the instigators of the recent revolt.
Savagner was undeniably well informed. He knew about Mayer Amschel"s visits to Hamburg and Itzehoe in 1807-where he had "spent hours with [the Elector] in his office, walking in his garden and conversing with him." He also knew about his dealings with Buderus. But Mayer Amschel was apologetic: "Because of a painful illness from which he had suffered for years, he had developed a short memory." Yes, he had been in Hamburg, but only on account of some goods which had erroneously been impounded as contraband. Yes, he knew Buderus and Lennep, but he had "never trusted them, as neither of them had ever sincerely been his friends, merely appearing to be in the world"s eyes." Yes, he had been the Elector"s court agent and had in the past made loans on his behalf to Denmark-or was it Emden? Far from relaying money to Buderus, he had received 20,000 gulden from him, from which he had made various payments, though to whom he could not recollect. The next day, Savagner tried again with Salomon, the fifteen-year-old Jacob, Salomon"s wife, Amschel"s wife and even Mayer Amschel"s wife Gutle. Each stonewalled in turn. Gutle in particular was the embodiment of feminine innocence: "She knew about nothing at all, she was at home throughout the year and had nothing whatever to do with business. She had never seen [Buderus], she only concerned herself with her housework." In the end, Savagner seems to have admitted defeat and, like most Napoleonic officials the Rothschilds encountered, settled for a small "loan." Matters only eased in 1810 when Frankfurt was transformed into a grand duchy under the direct jurisdiction of Baron Karl Theodor Anton von Dalberg, erstwhile Archbishop of Mainz and, since 1806, Prince-Primate of the Rhenish Confederation.
Mayer Amschel had already begun to ingratiate himself with Dalberg some three years before by offering the inevitable loan. He now proceeded to facilitate a payment of 440,000 gulden to secure the emanc.i.p.ation of the Frankfurt Jews by discounting bonds worth a total of 290,000 gulden and to advance Dalberg 80,000 gulden to finance his journey to Paris for the baptism of Napoleon"s son. Indeed, Mayer Amschel was soon formally acting as Dalberg"s "court banker," a.s.sisting him in the speculative purchases of land he undertook with the money paid by the Frankfurt Jews. It was a sign of the esteem in which Dalberg came to hold Mayer Amschel that he appointed him to the electoral college of the new departement of Hanau, along with such eminent Gentiles as Simon Moritz von Bethmann. Whether he was aware how far Mayer Amschel continued simultaneously to serve the man whose most fervent wish was to oust him and his French patrons from Hesse-Ka.s.sel is not known. There is a startling symmetry in the fact that, only a few years previously, Mayer Amschel had been arranging payments of some 620,000 gulden from the Elector to Austria, to pay for troops and horses in the 1809 campaign against France. Shortly after Mayer Amschel"s death, his son Amschel was advancing 255,000 gulden to Dalberg, partly in order to purchase horses for the French army!
It is possible, of course, that Mayer Amschel-like Buderus, who also accepted an official appointment by Dalberg-no longer expected William to be restored to his estates. But if so, he never wrote him off completely. He simply backed both sides. Such a strategy has obvious attractions, and it was to become a frequent Rothschild gambit in the decades ahead. However, the double agent always runs the risk of forfeiting the trust of both sides and ending up the loser, whichever wins. For this reason, it is not surprising that during the years of the Elector"s exile Mayer Amschel developed a penchant for secrecy-another of his most enduring bequests to later generations. At first, he had been blase. He and his son Carl made numerous trips to the vicinity of Itzehoe in the first months of the Elector"s exile-indeed, they established a permanent office for the purpose in Hamburg-and corresponded regularly and openly with one of William"s most senior officials, Knatz. As we have seen, this did not go unnoticed by the French police, and Mayer Amschel quickly came to appreciate that "these days one has to set to work carefully." By the middle of 1808 correspondence between the Rothschilds and the Elector"s officials, much of which was relayed via Buderus and Lawatz, was being written in a crude code. Buderus was referred to as "Baron von Waldschmidt," Knatz as "Johann Weber," Mayer Amschel as "Peter Arnoldi" or "Arnold" and William himself, variously, as "Herr von Goldstein," "Johannes Adler" or "the Princ.i.p.al." The Elector"s English investments were known as "stock fish" (a pun on the German for cod, Stockfisch Stockfisch). For additional security-"for the more care that you take, the better it is"-letters were sent not to Mayer Amschel but to Juda Sichel, whose son Bernhard had married Isabella Rothschild in 1802. When Carl and Amschel travelled to see the Elector in Prague, following his flight south from Denmark, correspondence was hidden in specially fitted secret compartments. Sometimes the Rothschilds even took the precaution of transliterating incriminating letters into Hebrew characters. And it seems highly probable that two sets of books were kept in this period, one complete, the other specially doctored for the consumption of the authorities. Such precautions were justified; in addition to the searches and interrogations described above, the French police succeeded in intercepting at least one letter in 1811.
In Austrian territory too, Rothschild moves were monitored by the police. There was less reason to fear the Austrian authorities, of course, but there was no guarantee that relations between William and the Emperor would remain friendly. Indeed, after the French victory over Austria at Wagram, there was a strong likelihood that the Elector would be forced once again to move on. Nor can the failure of their financial discussions have endeared him to the authorities in Vienna. For this reason, the Rothschilds continued to operate behind a veil of secrecy even in Prague, leading the police to draw somewhat exaggerated inferences about their political role: [T]his Jew [Amschel] is at the head of an important propaganda scheme in favour of the Elector, whose branches extend throughout the former Hessian territories . . . These suppositions are based on facts: whenever I enter the Elector"s quarters, I always find Rotschild [sic] there, and generally in the company of Army Councillor Schminke and War Secretary Knatz, and they go into their own rooms and Rotschild generally has papers with him. We may a.s.sume that their aims are in no sense hostile to Austria, since the Elector is exceedingly anxious to recover the possession of his Electorate, so that it is scarcely open to question that the organisations and a.s.sociations, whose guiding spirit Rotschild probably is, are entirely concerned with the popular reactions and the other measures to be adopted if Austria should have the good fortune to make any progress against France and Germany. Owing to his extensive commercial connections it is probable that he can ascertain this more easily than anybody else, and can also conceal his machinations under the cloak of business.
Yet for all the risks they took on his behalf, the Rothschilds were never wholly trusted by William. No part of the myth of the hidden treasure is more at variance with the truth than the idea that he was grateful to Mayer Amschel for his efforts on his behalf. On the contrary, Mayer Amschel had to endure repeated bouts of paranoia on the Elector"s part. William"s first concern was that Mayer Amschel might betray him to the French. Later, he began to worry that his agent had his hand in the till, suspicions which were only encouraged by envious rivals. He accused Mayer Amschel of swindling him of the interest on his English stocks. He accused him of deliberately hanging on to the valuables which had been left in his care at Hamburg. Throughout this time, Mayer Amschel had to rely on Buderus to rea.s.sure the Elector. Buderus was unstinting in his praise. His reasons for entrusting so much business to Mayer Amschel were, he told William, the most punctual payment which one can expect of him, the certainty that he always reckons by the official exchange rate on the day of a transaction, the conviction that he never discloses Your Majesty"s transactions to anyone, as he has handled the realisation [of your a.s.sets] with such care that French officials who were sent to interrogate him to find out whether he had received English money on Your Majesty"s behalf, could find no trace of the money in the books which were laid before them.
The irony, however, is that Buderus"s a.s.surances were themselves far from disinterested. For, unbeknown to the Elector, he had entered into an agreement with Mayer Amschel which effectively made him a sleeping partner in the Rothschild firm. In return for investing 20,000 gulden-the sum which Mayer Amschel admitted to having received when questioned by Savagner-Buderus promised "to advise that firm in all business matters to the best of his ability and to advance its interests as far as he may find practicable." In the light of this-to say nothing of the deals struck by Mayer Amschel with the French authorities and with Dalberg-the Elector"s mistrust begins to look rather less like paranoia. As William came to realise, the Rothschilds" skill at forging new business relationships was liberating them from their early dependence on him. When, in May 1812, he requested that one of Mayer Amschel"s sons move to Prague to act as a kind of court agent in exile, he was politely but firmly rebuffed.
It is therefore something of an exaggeration to say, as Carl did, that "the old man" had made their fortune. In 1797 Mayer Amschel"s capital had been 108,504 gulden (around 10,000). Ten years later the balance sheet showed a total capital of 514,500 gulden (around 50,000).9 It seems unlikely that the business he did with William in this period accounted for as big a share of this increase as the import-export business between Frankfurt and Manchester. By 1810, to be sure, the firm"s capital had risen to 800,000 gulden (around 80,000) and a substantial part of this increase probably was due to the income generated by managing William"s portfolio. But the real significance of the Elector"s treasure, as both Carl and Amschel implicitly acknowledged, was that it helped Nathan to make the transition from Manchester merchant to London banker. Once this was achieved, the Rothschilds needed "the Old Man" less. It seems unlikely that the business he did with William in this period accounted for as big a share of this increase as the import-export business between Frankfurt and Manchester. By 1810, to be sure, the firm"s capital had risen to 800,000 gulden (around 80,000) and a substantial part of this increase probably was due to the income generated by managing William"s portfolio. But the real significance of the Elector"s treasure, as both Carl and Amschel implicitly acknowledged, was that it helped Nathan to make the transition from Manchester merchant to London banker. Once this was achieved, the Rothschilds needed "the Old Man" less.
Mayer Amschel"s Legacy.
A letter Buderus wrote to William at around this time provides a neat summary of the firm"s radius of activity in the last months of its founder"s life: Their father is old and ailing. His eldest son Amschel Mayer, and his second son Salomon, who is delicate, are indispensable to him in his extensive operations. The third [sic] son, Carl, is almost continually engaged in travelling in the service of your Electoral Highness, while the fourth [sic] son, Nathan, is very usefully established in London and the youngest, James, spends his time between London and Paris.
By this stage, power in the firm had effectively pa.s.sed from Mayer Amschel to his five sons. Only a few years before, however, the old man had still been playing the role of Herr im Haus Herr im Haus. As we have seen, even the mercurial Nathan, far away in England, was still having to do as he was told as late as 1805. His brothers were treated even more like employees: Amschel writes that Kalman [Carl] would like to come to you, but what is the point of that? . . . I still need to have Kalman with me in Frankfurt for the moment and he would be much less use with you . . . He is keen to go to London. But I don"t think it sensible from the point of view of our house, as Salomon has hard work to do cashing in and paying out bills. He has the obligations to deal with too . . . [If Kalman goes] then all my commodity business will have to be done through Seligmann and Abraham Schnapper, and Mayer Schnapper his son, because although Jakob [James] is already in the office he has only just had his bar mitz vah. So it really is necessary for Kalman to stay with us. He really wants to go to London [and] if you really need him then I will write him off. But it is stupid not to leave Kalman here for a few more years until Jakob has grown up. Don"t write to Kalman that I said this to you . . . Furthermore, my dear son Nathan, when you are writing to my son Kalman, I advise you to praise him a lot. With G.o.d"s help he is a very clever man for his age, though he is rather too bold . . . He really wants to come to you but I really don"t want this dear boy, may he live to be a hundred years old, crossing the sea for just a three-week trip and we cannot do without him for long[er] because as I told you Amschel has business in Ka.s.sel. Much as I would like my son Kalman to travel to London for three weeks it would end up being six months, and it is simply not possible to teach conceited outsiders how to run my indigo business.
Mayer Amschel prevailed and Carl stayed; it may have been a sop to Nathan that James was sent to join him for a spell three years later.
As this letter also shows, Mayer Amschel"s in-laws, the Schnappers, were now involved in the business; so too were the Sichels, into which family Isabella had married, and the Beyfus brothers, Seligmann and Mayer, who married Babette and Julie respectively in 1808 and 1811. He was also well aware of Nathan"s work in partnership with Rindskopf and his own father-in-law Levi Barent Cohen. But from the outset, Mayer Amschel kept his in-laws at one remove from the management of the firm: the reference to the Schnappers as "outsiders" is revealing. In the same letter to Nathan, he asked a characteristic question: "Dear Nathan, do our letters come directly into your hands alone, so that one can write what one wants, or do you read our letters to your whole family [meaning Nathan"s in-laws, the Cohens]? Let me know." Even at this early stage, Mayer Amschel had formulated a rule which was to be followed strictly for more than a century: his male descendants were, as far as the running of the firm was concerned, the inner circle. In practice, this meant a distinction between family or private correspondence-almost always written in Hebrew characters-and business correspondence, usually written in German, French or English by clerks. Mayer Amschel more than once had to reprimand Nathan for forgetting this distinction: "I repeat for the last time that your Hebrew written letters may be good enough for family purposes, but for account and business matters you have to write in German, French, or English; I cannot give to my clerks in the office your muddled Jewish letters mixed with family news, if they are to keep good books-accordingly, a good deal of confusion arises." For the historian, of course, it is precisely these letters-repet.i.tive and unstructured though they often were-which have by far the greater value.
The transition of the family business into "Mayer Amschel Rothschild & Sons" happened in September 1810, when he and three of his sons-Amschel, Salomon and Carl-issued a printed circular announcing that they would henceforth act as partners (wirkliche Theilhaber) in a new firm (Gesellschaft). When members of the family had been interrogated by Savagner the year before, Mayer Amschel was still calling himself the sole proprietor (Inhaber) of the firm, while his sons were merely his "a.s.sistants" (Gehulfen). However, he may have been lying in order to protect them in case Savagner decided to prosecute the firm. Earlier in the year it had been Amschel, Salomon and Carl who had negotiated the purchase of a vacant lot in the Judenga.s.se (as reconstruction work at last began) in order to build a proper office for the firm. And when a formal legal partnership contract was drawn up in September 1810, its preamble explicitly stated that "a trading company already existed" in which Mayer Amschel, Amschel and Salomon were the "a.s.sociates." The princ.i.p.al function of the 1810 agreement was to make Carl a partner, giving him a 30,000 gulden share of the total capital of 800,000 compared with Mayer Amschel"s 370,000, Amschel"s 185,000 and Salomon"s 185,000; and to guarantee that James would become a partner (also with a share worth 30,000 gulden) when he attained his majority.
It was not only in terms of capital that Mayer Amschel remained primus inter pares primus inter pares: he alone had the right to withdraw his capital from the firm during the period of the agreement; he alone had the right to hire and fire employees of the firm; and his unmarried sons could marry only with his permission. The agreement made the grounds for this explicit. It was Mayer Amschel who had, "through the industry which he had evinced from his youth onwards, his commercial abilities and the indefatigable activity which he had maintained into his old age, laid the basis for the prosperity of the firm, and thereby established the worldly fortune of his children."
In other respects, however, the agreement would act as a model for future agreements between the brothers and their descendants for most of the nineteenth century. Profits were divided in proportion to capital shares, no partner was to engage in business independently of the others and the agreement was to run for a fixed period of years (in this case, ten). The most remarkable clause in the agreement stated what would happen were one of the partners to die. Each solemnly renounced the rights of his wife, children or their guardians to contest in any way the amount of money agreed by the surviving partners to be the deceased"s share of the capital. Specifically, his widow and heirs were to be denied any access to the firm"s books and correspondence. This was the first formal statement of that distinctive and enduring rule which effectively excluded Rothschild women-born Rothschilds as well as those who married into the family-from the core of the business: the hallowed ledgers and letters.
The death of a partner was, of course, no longer a remote possibility. Not only was Mayer Amschel now an old man-he was sixty-six or sixty-seven when the 1810 agreement was signed-he was also a sick man. He had been seriously ill two years before, possibly with a rectal abscess arising from chronic haemorrhoids, and, although an operation was successfully performed, his health never fully recovered. It was a common complaint in the Judenga.s.se, whether because of the sedentary lives its inhabitants perforce led, or because of a genetic defect which intermarriage-also imposed by the Stattigkeit-had spread through the street"s 500 families. On September 16, 1812, he was taken ill; he died just three days later. But even as he lay on his deathbed, Mayer Amschel hastily revised his will, as if wishing to reinforce the message conveyed to his sons in the 1810 agreement. The new will pre-empted the agreement"s provisions by withdrawing just 190,000 gulden from the firm as his notional share of the capital-obviously a substantial understatement. And it repeated emphatically the rule excluding the female line from the business: I hereby decree and therefore wish that my daughters and sons-in-law and their heirs have no share in the capital of the firm "Mayer Amschel Rothschild & Sons" and even less that they are able or are permitted to make a claim against it for whatever reason. Rather, the said firm shall exclusively belong to and be owned by my sons. None of my daughters and their heirs therefore has any right or claim on the said firm and I would never be able to forgive a child of mine who, against this my paternal will, allowed themselves to disturb my sons in the peaceful possession of their business.
If his daughters did do so, they would forfeit all but their minimal statutory claims as heirs under the Napoleonic code. The distinction between sons and daughters could scarcely have been more strongly expressed.10 That Mayer Amschel"s testament was so strictly adhered to, not just by his immediate heirs but by his descendants for generations to come, confirms the impression given by those letters to his sons which have survived. Within his immediate family circle, he was a commanding and perhaps also intimidating figure. Interestingly, this is not how he was remembered by the rest of the world. To Gentiles who had dealings with him, he had tended to conform to the intelligent but deferential stereotype of the court Jew. It should be stressed that modern portrayals of Mayer Amschel-especially the screen performances by George Arliss and Erich Ponto-probably exaggerated the "Jewishness" of his appearance and manner, the former sporting a long beard and fez-like hat, the latter ringlets and a skullcap. On the other hand, the most commonly reproduced nineteenth-century lithograph-of a rather square-jawed clean-shaven man in a neat wig-was the product of an artist"s imagination. One contemporary who met him in her youth remembered "a rather big man, who wore a round unpowdered wig and a small goatee beard." Another remembered him wearing the kind of hat and clothes which would have been worn by a Gentile merchant of the same generation, albeit slightly threadbare.
This tallies with Mayer Amschel"s somewhat ambiguous reputation within the Judenga.s.se as relatively orthodox in matters of religion, but progressively more and more liberal in matters of education and politics. Mayer Amschel was not one of those maskilim maskilim who were inspired by the Jewish Enlightenment, nor did his att.i.tudes antic.i.p.ate the later Reform movement to modernise Judaism as a religion; but nor was he a staunch conservative. Cohen"s unauthorised memoir (published shortly after his death) portrayed him as the personification of a kind of middle way between the new and the old-"proof that the dogmas of the Jewish religion, even according to the teachings of the Talmud, contain nothing which conflicts with the laws of morality." Rothschild had been "a zealous believer in the Talmud and chose it alone as the guiding principle of all his actions"; indeed, according to Cohen, his att.i.tude towards religious conservatism had been "a little exaggerated." He and his brother Moses (who administered the community"s poor-relief fund for some years) were active members of the Jewish community. But Mayer Amschel was also a "good citizen"-a significant phrase, as we shall see. who were inspired by the Jewish Enlightenment, nor did his att.i.tudes antic.i.p.ate the later Reform movement to modernise Judaism as a religion; but nor was he a staunch conservative. Cohen"s unauthorised memoir (published shortly after his death) portrayed him as the personification of a kind of middle way between the new and the old-"proof that the dogmas of the Jewish religion, even according to the teachings of the Talmud, contain nothing which conflicts with the laws of morality." Rothschild had been "a zealous believer in the Talmud and chose it alone as the guiding principle of all his actions"; indeed, according to Cohen, his att.i.tude towards religious conservatism had been "a little exaggerated." He and his brother Moses (who administered the community"s poor-relief fund for some years) were active members of the Jewish community. But Mayer Amschel was also a "good citizen"-a significant phrase, as we shall see.
This is evident in Mayer Amschel"s att.i.tude towards charity. As noted above, he and his brothers were conscientious in paying their tenth to the poor of the community. Ludwig Borne remembered the crowd of beggars who used to lie in wait for Mayer Amschel as he walked through the street, and the patience with which he distributed alms. Yet he was less conventional in not confining his charity to the Jewish community. Cohen recalled an occasion when a street-urchin had shouted "Jew!" at him. Mayer Amschel calmly reached into his purse and gave the needy youth some money with the request that he might often repeat what he had said. No one could have been happier to oblige. He took what he was offered and cried at the top of his voice: "Jew! Jew!" Several other youths came up and mockingly joined in. Rothschild listened with evident pleasure, p.r.o.nouncing the Hebrew blessing: "Praise be to Him, who gave the laws to His people of Israel!"
In his will too he bequeathed 100 gulden to "three praiseworthy, charitable Christian foundations." Even his charitable work within the Jewish community became increasingly secular in its orientation. In 1804 he played a leading role in establishing a new school for poorer Jewish children-the Philanthropin-the curriculum of which had a thoroughly secular flavour. This seems to have reflected the influence of his book-keeper Geisenheimer and of the tutor he employed for his own children, Michael Hess, a follower of Moses Mendelssohn who later became the school"s headmaster. It may also have been inspired by his younger sons, at least one of whom (Salomon) was a member of the same masonic lodge as Geisenheimer.11 The important point is that Mayer Amschel continued to favour a communal basis for education at a time when an increasing number of Jewish families were sending their children to Gentile schools outside the ghetto. Ludwig Borne was one of those who rebelled against the relatively conservative atmosphere of the Frankfurt ghetto, ultimately converting to Christianity rather than endure discrimination. But, as Heine later recalled, he could not help admiring the unaffected piety of the Rothschild household. Pa.s.sing the old family home in the Judenga.s.se in 1827, he noticed nostalgically that Mayer Amschel"s widow Gutle had decorated its windows with white curtains and candles in celebration of the great feast of joy (Chanukkah): The important point is that Mayer Amschel continued to favour a communal basis for education at a time when an increasing number of Jewish families were sending their children to Gentile schools outside the ghetto. Ludwig Borne was one of those who rebelled against the relatively conservative atmosphere of the Frankfurt ghetto, ultimately converting to Christianity rather than endure discrimination. But, as Heine later recalled, he could not help admiring the unaffected piety of the Rothschild household. Pa.s.sing the old family home in the Judenga.s.se in 1827, he noticed nostalgically that Mayer Amschel"s widow Gutle had decorated its windows with white curtains and candles in celebration of the great feast of joy (Chanukkah): How gaily the candles sparkle-those candles which she has lit with her own hands in order to celebrate the day of victory on which Judas Mac cabeus and his brothers liberated their fatherland as heroically as did in our own day King Frederick William, the Emperor Alexander and the Emperor Francis II! When the good lady looks at these little lights, her eyes fill with tears, and she remembers with melancholy joy her younger days when Mayer Amschel Rothschild, of blessed memory, still celebrated the Feast of Lights with her, and when her sons were still little boys who placed candles on the floor and leapt over them with childlike pleasure, as is the custom in Israel.
It was Mayer Amschel"s work to win full civil and political rights for the Frankfurt Jews, however, which best expressed his loyalty towards Judaism.We know that his political activism predated the French Revolution because he had been one of the seven signatories of the protest to the Senate of 1787 (quoted in chapter 1) about increased restrictions on travel outside the ghetto on Sundays and holy days. However, it was only with the advent of a French-backed regime that the possibility arose of more substantial improvements in the lot of the Jews. Things would have moved faster if Frankfurt had been under the direct jurisdiction of Napoleon"s brother Jerome who, as King of Westphalia, favoured a policy of complete emanc.i.p.ation. By contrast, Dalberg was cautious, partly because he could not risk alienating the local Gentile establishment, partly because he himself feared that a liberated Jewish community might "balance Christian injustice, as soon as they breathed some air, with Jewish impudence." The new Stattigkeit which he issued in 1808 seemed, if anything, a step backwards, as it rea.s.serted the ban on Jews living outside the (still dilapidated) Judenga.s.se, reimposed the poll tax and confirmed the traditional restrictions on numbers of families and marriages.
It was at this point that Mayer Amschel was able to use his financial leverage over Dalberg to force the pace of change-the first time a Rothschild acted in such a way for what he explicitly called "our nation," and not the last. Dalberg, as we have seen, was biddable: if a sufficiently large capital sum could be paid to compensate his duchy for the loss of tax revenue which Jewish emanc.i.p.ation would entail, he was prepared to give his consent. After preliminary discussions conducted via Dalberg"s Jewish police commissioner Itzstein, the sum of 440,000 gulden was agreed on-twenty times the sum paid each year by the Jews for their "protection"-of which Mayer Amschel raised 290,000 on behalf of the community by discounting bonds. In December 1811, after further negotiations with the Frankfurt Senate, Mayer Amschel was able to inform his son, with understated satisfaction: "You are now a citizen." Two weeks later the decree on the "civil-legal equality of the Jewish community" came into force.
To be a citizen of his native state, but to remain unequivocally a member of "our nation," meaning the traditional Jewish religious community: this was Mayer Amschel"s aim. For the critical distinction between the Rothschilds and many other successful Jewish families of this period was that, while they fervently desired social, civil and political equality with their Gentile counterparts, they refused to abandon Judaism as their religion in order to achieve it. Their own ambition was therefore from the outset inseparable from the political campaign for Jewish emanc.i.p.ation not only in Frankfurt, but throughout Europe.
In this, as in so much else, Mayer Amschel"s influence on his descendants was profound and enduring. Four days after their father"s death, his sons sent out a circular to their most valued clients to rea.s.sure them that there would be no change in the conduct of the family business: "His memory will never fade among us, his surviving partners . . . Our blessed father remains unforgettable to us." Such pious sentiments are not always translated into practice once the first pain of bereavement has pa.s.sed; but the sons of Mayer Amschel meant what they said. Time and again in the years after his death, they harked back to their father"s words-to his business aphorisms, to his views on Jewish emanc.i.p.ation and, above all, to his paternal commandments to them, his male descendants. In many ways, these numerous allusions to Mayer Amschel-unremarked by previous historians-reveal more about his character than any other source.
A typical example is Amschel"s request for better stock market information from Nathan in October 1814: "Father used to say: "A banker has to calculate, there is no merit in making transactions in the dark." " He made a similar point in 1817: their father had told them "that Jewish fortunes as a rule don"t keep longer than two generations for two reasons. One because the housekeeping and other expenses are not being considered, second because of Jewish stupidity." While these echoed Mayer Amschel"s criticism of Nathan"s somewhat casual approach to accounting, other maxims related more to the firm"s relations with governments. One point was obvious enough, given the benefits Mayer Amschel had derived from his relationship with William of Hesse-Ka.s.sel: "I [learned?] from our blessed father," Salomon told Nathan in 1818, "who always said, "The evil eye of the court brings fewer advantages [than the t.i.tle of consul or court banker]." " But, as Amschel remembered, it was not enough just to acquire minor t.i.tles like "court agent": "Nowadays everybody calls himself "Excellency." I remember, however, what our father used to say, "With money you become an Excellency." " The key was to establish some kind of financial leverage. As Amschel put it, "It is better to deal with a government in difficulties than with one that has luck on its side. We heard this from our father."
Nor was it only the elder brothers who reminisced in this fashion. In March 1817 James remembered a tip which he would often put into practice in his relations with rival firms: "Father used to say, "If you can"t make yourself loved, make yourself feared." " As late as 1840 Carl could still be heard recalling how "his Father had often taught him, when he had occasion to apply to an inferior or a man who had little power to a.s.sist him in carrying an object he had in view, he spoke with the person as if the whole depended entirely on him, though perhaps he knew he had but the smallest possible influence in the business." Of all these pieces of business advice, the one most frequently cited was probably Salomon"s favourite, on the importance of cultivating politicians. He cited this in a letter to Nathan in October 1815: "You know, dear Nathan, what father used to say about sticking to a man in government." It came up again a few days later: "But you remember father"s principle that you have to be ready to try everything to get in with such a great government figure." And Mayer Amschel had left them in no doubt as to how such politicians could best be wooed: "Our late father taught us that if a high-placed person enters into a [financial] partnership with a Jew, he belongs to the Jew" ("gehort er dem Juden").
The brothers" consciousness of their Jewishness and of their responsibilities to the rest of the Jewish community also owed much to their father"s influence. Intriguingly, both Salomon and Carl seem to have regarded carrying on their father"s work for Jewish emanc.i.p.ation in an almost instrumental way. As Carl put it in May 1817, "It is the best thing on earth to be of service to the Jews. Our father did so and we see how well we are paid back." Salomon made the same connection between good works and good fortune a few months later when he wrote to Nathan reminding him to put pressure on the British government on behalf of European Jewry: "If we want our children to be one day really happy, we have to do all that is in our power to bring to a good end all the work which . . . father of blessed memory . . . began in the interest of our people." And he repeated the point early the next year: If everything depends, as it does, on G.o.d, if we want, as we do, to be fortunate, then, dear Nathan, [the interests of the entire Jewish people] must be as important to you as the most important business deal once was. How can we show more respect for our blessed father, than by supporting that work which he laboured at for years[?]
But of all their father"s advice, his last commandment-to maintain fraternal unity-had the greatest and most enduring impact. Salomon once attributed "all our luck to the benediction which our father gave us an hour before he pa.s.sed away." Amschel remembered that benediction too: "I remember what our father, peace be with him, told me on his deathbed: "Amschel, keep your brothers together and you will become the richest people in Germany." This has almost come true." That advice was often invoked when the brothers quarrelled-as they frequently did in the turbulent years immediately after Mayer Amschel"s death. "Our blessed father ordered us to live in peace," Salomon reminded Nathan, following an especially bitter attack by the latter on Carl. He had to say it again just a week later: "My good brother, dear Nathan, our blessed father ordered us to live in peace, otherwise we shall lose our courage. Let us have peace." More than twenty years later the same principle was elaborately enshrined in a new partnership agreement, drawn up following the death of Nathan himself: We wish to offer a proof of our reverence for the holiest memory of our father, whose virtuous conduct in all of life"s relations is a n.o.ble example to us all. Thr