But amongst these various tribes, Christian or heathen, there is said to be one subject, and one only, upon which they all agree. They have combined to resist by force the American invasion. If it is attempted to conquer them by force of arms, it will be a difficult, a tedious, and a costly operation--a campaign far more sickly than that now proceeding in the arable lands around Manila, where the ground is hard, the country very level, and where field-guns can be taken anywhere during the dry season. It is my belief that, if skilfully handled, half the island--the eastern half--could be pacified without war, although, no doubt, gangs of bandits would have to be destroyed; but this could be done by the Visayas and the converts, organised as a militia, and paid whilst on active service.
But this pacification requires the a.s.sistance of the missionaries. They are not likely to give that a.s.sistance unless terms are made with them, and one of those terms will surely be that they shall be allowed to continue their beneficent work unhindered and unvexed.
So the United States Government is confronted with a dilemma. Either they must shoot down the new Christians, to introduce and enforce freedom of worship which the converts do not want, and cannot understand, or they must negotiate with the Jesuits for them to use their influence to pacify the island, and thus subject themselves to the abuse and the outcry such a proceeding will bring upon them from the divines and missionaries of Protestant sects, and from their political opponents.
As for the western half of the island, a part may be pacified with the help of the missionaries, but military operations on a considerable scale will be required there sooner or later against the Moros of Lake Lanao.
This would be a holy war, a war of humanity, and I would say to the Americans: Look back on the deeds of your forefathers, on the days when your infant navy covered itself with imperishable glory, when it curbed the insolence of the Bashaw of Tripoli, the Bey of Tunis, and the Dey of Algiers, teaching all Europe how to deal with Mediterranean pirates. Inspire yourselves with the Spirit of Decatur and his hero-comrades whose gallant deeds at Tripoli earned Nelson"s praise as being "the most bold and daring act of the age," and do not hesitate to break up this last community of ex-pirates and murderous slave-hunters.
The Moros of Lake Lanao could be simultaneously attacked from north and south. In 1894, the Spaniards attacked by the north, and transported all their artillery and stores and their small steamers built in sections, by paths on the eastern side of the River Agus. Some of the Moros remained neutral in that campaign. Such were the Dattos of Lumbayangin and Guimba. Their cottas were spared. The distance in a straight line from the mouth of the Agus near Iligan to the lake is fifteen miles.
The path winds a good deal, and the country is hilly, wooded on the heights, and intersected by streams. There is a path on the west bank of the Agus, the country there is more open, and a large part of it is under cultivation. A good outfit of mountain-guns would be required on this northern expedition.
The other attack could be made from the south, the forces landing at Fort Baras, or at Lalabuan. From either of these places there is what in the Philippines is called a road to Ganasi at the southern end of the lake. The distance in a straight line is about twenty miles. The two roads join at about half way, just before coming to the cotta of Kurandangan in the Sultanate of Pualas.
This road is reported to have no steep gradients, no boggy parts, and no unfordable streams. The country is fairly open, as there is no thick forest, but only scrub and cogon, or elephant gra.s.s. From a description given by a Tagal who traversed this road, it appears to be practicable for field artillery. The combined attack, north and south, could be supported by an advance from the eastward of irregular forces of the Monteses from the reducciones of the Tagoloan, Sawaga and Malupati Rivers, if they were supplied with arms and ammunition for this purpose.
It seems to me that we have here the usual three courses; the fourth, to do nothing, and allow Moro and Christian to fight it out, would be unworthy of the United States, or of any civilized government.
1. Put a stop to slave-hunting and murdering by a military expedition against the Moro Dattos.
2. Maintain garrisons to keep the peace and protect the missionaries and their converts and trust to their efforts to gradually convert the Moros.
3. Arm all the Christian towns round about the Moros and organise the men as local militia, so that they can protect themselves against Moro aggression.
All these courses are expensive, the second less expensive than the first, the third less expensive than the second.
However, if either the second or third course is adopted, it is very probable that before long the first course would become imperative, for the Moros are faithless and treacherous in the extreme, and no treaty unsupported by bayonets has the least chance of being respected.
To adopt the second or third course, then, only amounts to putting off the evil day.
The missionaries can be of the greatest service in pacifiying the Moros whenever the power of the dattos is broken and when slavery can be put an end to. The object of the expedition I have spoken of should not be to exterminate the Moros, but merely to break the power of the dattos and pandits, and to free their followers and slaves from their yoke.
It is generally taken for granted that a Moro cannot be converted, but this is not the case in Mindanao. Father Jaoquin Sancho, S.J., informs me that when the political power of the dattos has been destroyed, their followers have been found ready to listen to the teachings of the missionaries and beginning by sending their children to school, then perhaps sanctioning the marriage of their daughters with Christians, they have finally cast in their lot with the Roman Catholic Church, not in scores, nor hundreds, but by thousands. He says that his colleagues baptized in one year after 1892, in the district of Davao alone, more than three thousand Mahometan Moros. He adds that their religious receptivity is much greater than that of the heathen tribes, that once baptized they remain fervent Christians, whilst the Mandayas, Man.o.bos, Monteses and other heathen are only too apt, with or without reason, to slip away to the forests and mountains and resume their nomadic life, their heathen orgies, and human sacrifices.
I have already spoken of the success of the missionaries on the Rio Grande and of their industrial and agricultural orphanage at Tamontacca, where they were bringing up hundreds of children of both s.e.xes, mostly liberated slaves of the Moros, to be useful members of society. This n.o.ble inst.i.tution occupied the very spot where the former Moro Sultan of Tamontacca held his court.
Two or three more inst.i.tutions like this, established at points a few miles distant from Lake Lanao, and protected from aggression on the part of the Moro, would gradually undermine the power of the Dattos by affording an asylum to all fugitive slaves attempting to escape from cruelties of their masters.
For years past the Spaniards have protected all slaves who have fled to them from their masters. The Datto Utto applied to General Weyler to restore to him forty-eight slaves who had taken refuge at a Spanish fort on the Rio Grande, but Weyler refused, reminding the datto that he had signed an engagement to keep no slaves, but only free labourers, who had the right to fix their residence where they pleased.
I a.s.sume that no slaves who seek the shelter of the Stars and Stripes will ever be sent back again into bondage.
As a guide to the strength of the expedition which will sooner or later have to be sent against the Moros of Lake Lanao, I may say that the total war strength of the Moros of Mindanao was estimated in 1894 at 19,000 fighting-men, 35 guns, 1896 Lantacas and 2167 muskets or rifles. (See list, p. 387).
They have probably since then obtained a large supply of rifles and ammunition. This traffic in arms should be at once stopped.
Swords and spears they have in abundance.
But of these 19,000 men many have submitted to the Spanish rule, or have become allies of the Spaniards, like the Datto Ayunan, the Datto Abdul, the Sultan of Bolinson and many others.
Probably 10,000 men would be the very utmost that the Moros of Lake Lanao could bring on the field, and only a part of these would have fire-arms, which they could have little skill in handling.
They would on no account give battle in the open, but would fight in the bush, and desperately defend their cottas. They would not concentrate their forces, for want of transport for their food supply; besides, the nature of the country would prevent this.
They could not stop a flotilla from being launched on the lake and from capturing the islands as a base of operations.
The flotilla would be operating on inside lines of communication. It could threaten one side of the lake, and in less than two hours be landing troops on the opposite side.
In fact, with a moderate force, their subjugation would not be so difficult as has often been supposed.
It should be made clear to the Sacopes and to the slaves that the war is waged against the Sultans and Dattos, that the people would have their lives and property and the free exercise of their religion guaranteed to them, and that the adults should be exempt from taxation and conscription for the rest of their lives or for a term of years. Then the resistance would soon slacken, and the sultans and dattos might be captured. Those who would not conform to the new condition of things might be allowed to emigrate to Borneo or elsewhere, but their subjects and slaves should by no means be allowed to go with them, for they will soon become useful agriculturists and good Christians, and Mindanao cannot spare them.
The question of slavery, more especially of slave-concubines, will require delicate handling, but by adopting a conciliatory but firm policy, this curse may gradually be got rid of without causing disturbance or bloodshed. Cranks and faddists should not be allowed to handle this question, but it should be placed in the hands of some one well versed in human nature, and a true friend of freedom.
The wise policy of the British authorities in Zanzibar and Pemba is well worthy of imitation.
As happens in Africa, the greatest impediment to the conversion of the heathen polygamist is the obligation to renounce all his wives but one. This is a sore trial, more especially when they have paid a good price for them, or if they are good cooks.
Father Urios having persuaded a Man.o.bo, who wished to be baptized, to do this, the man said to him: "Of my two wives I have decided to keep the elder, but I make a great sacrifice in separating from the other, for I had so much trouble to obtain her. Her father would only give her to me in exchange for fifteen slaves. As I did not possess them, I was obliged to take the field against the timid tribes in an unknown country, and to capture these fifteen slaves. I was obliged to fight often, and to kill more than thirty men."
The ill.u.s.tration represents a scene from the labours of Father Gisbert amongst the Bagobos. He is exhorting a blood-stained old datto and his wives and followers to abandon their human sacrifices, exhibiting to them the image of the crucified Redeemer, whose followers he urges them to become.
As regards the maintenance of the missions, I do not for one moment doubt that the liberality of the Roman Catholics of the United States is quite equal to the needs of the pioneers of civilisation, who have laboured with such remarkable success.
Altogether the Jesuits administered the spiritual, and some of the temporal affairs of 200,000 Christians in Mindanao.
They educated the young, taught them handicrafts, attended to the sick, consoled the afflicted, reconciled those at variance, explored the country, encouraged agriculture, built churches, laid out roads, and a.s.sisted the Administration. Finally, when bands of slave-hunting, murdering Moros swept down like wolves on their flocks, they placed themselves at the head of their ill-armed parishioners and led them into battle against a ferocious enemy who gives no quarter, with the calmness of men who, long before, had devoted their lives to the Master"s cause, to whom nothing in this world is of any consequence except the advancement of the Faith and the performance of duty.
They received very meagre monetary a.s.sistance from the Spanish Government, and had to depend greatly upon the pious offerings of the devout in Barcelona and in Madrid. It is to be feared that these subscriptions will now fall off as Spain has lost the islands; if so, it is all the more inc.u.mbent upon the Roman Catholics of America to find the means of continuing the good work.
I feel sure that this will be so--Christian charity will not fail, and the missions will be maintained.
For their devotion and zeal, I beg to offer the Jesuit missionaries my profound respect and my earnest wishes for their welfare under the Stars and Stripes.
To my mind, they realise very closely the ideal of what a Christian missionary should be. Although a Protestant born and bred, I see in that no reason to close my eyes to their obvious merit, nor to seek to be-little the great good they have done in Mindanao. Far from doing so, I wish to state my conviction that the easiest, the best, and the most humane way of pacifying Mindanao is by utilising the powerful influence of the Jesuit missionaries with their flocks, and this before it is too late, before the populations have had time to completely forget the Christian teaching, and to entirely relapse into barbarism.
List of Posts in Mindanao Garrisoned by Detachments of the Native Army with Spanish Officers in 1894.
Field Officers.
Officers.
Men.
1st District.
San Ramon .. 1 12 Infantry.
Santa Maria .. 1 34 Infantry.
Margos-sa-tubig .. 2 60 Infantry.